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We welcome brief comments on material published in Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military' interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of Proceedings is to provide a forum where ideas of importance to the sea services can be exchanged. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in Proceedings. Please include your return address, your social security number, and a daytime phone number.
“Is Fixed-Wing CAS Worth It?”
(See W. G. Welch, pp. 51-55, September 1994 Proceedings)
“The Future is Attack Helicopters”
(See B. M. Ford, pp. 54-55, September 1994
Proceedings)
Captain Harry Ward, U.S. Marine Corps—As a fixed-wing naval flight officer who was on the ground as a forward air controller (FAC) during the Persian Gulf War, 1 think that drawing conclusions about the future of fixed- wing close air support (CAS) from the Gulf War experience is ludicrous. The fast-moving nature of mechanized warfare necessitates the use of armed helicopters rather than fixed-wing aircraft for CAS because of the difficulty in coordinating marks from sources that are moving rapidly and having difficulty determining their own positions and those of the intended targets. Most of the time that I controlled AH-1W Cobras during the Gulf War, I actually pointed out the targets with my hand while talking the pilots’ eyes onto them. Insofar as safety is concerned, close air support by armed helicopters always is preferable to that provided by high-flying, fixed-wing aircraft. However, in a higher threat scenario, it is more likely that the movement of the infantry would be slower and, therefore, the coordination of fixed-wing aircraft would be easier. The bottom line is that the future of close air support in the Marine Corps is fixed-wing attack jets and attack helicopters controlled by tactically proficient FACs.
Lieutenant Colonel Ford put his finger on the issue that definitely needs attention when he wrote: “FACs will remain key players in close air support, no matter what type of platforms provide it.” If there is a weakness in fixed-wing close air support, it is the selection, training, and employment of ground FACs. The most demanding mission a ground FAC can run is one performed by a fixed-wing aircraft flying at high altitudes and a FAC with fixed-wing experience probably would do a better job. However, my ground FAC class had 5 fixed-wing and 16 rotary-wing aviators. This disparity stems from the two communities’ general
attitudes toward FAC tours. Within the rotary-wing community, they are considered a welcome respite from the high operational tempo of rotary-wing squadrons. The fixed-wing aviators see them either as drains on already undermanned 1 squadrons or in terms of 12 to 18 months of lost cockpit time.
The solution is a “Rent-a-FAC” program. Presently, every battalion has an air officer and two FACs. This is appropriate for exercises and deployments, but not for garrison. A FAC would be better employed flying with his squadron than spending time in garrison with an infantry battalion. As soon as a fixed-wing aviator had approximately 600 to 700 hours in the cockpit, he would attend the three- week FAC course on either coast and then report back to his squadron. Thus, a pool of FAC-trained aviators would be created from which FACs would be drawn by the divisions for training, exercises, and operational deployments. The exceptions to this program would be Western Pacific (WestPac) battalions—• which would be covered by FACs from WestPac—and the battalions deployed to the Mediterranean—which certainly require permanently assigned forward air controllers.
In November 1990, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One held fleet contingency training for ground FACs. The squadron aggressively advertised this training—which included more than 200 controls of live close air support—to the ground FACs of units that had not yet deployed to Southwest Asia. Only one battalion sent a FAC. Therefore, these units went to Kuwait with FACs who were not as proficient as they could have been. The three-week FAC course is a good introduction to ground forward air control, but we’re fooling ourselves if we think that a ground FAC is totally proficient after a dozen controls. The best line 1 heard at FAC school was “Aircrew and FACs cannot visit the bombing range enough times.” □
“Gone with the LSTs”
(See ]. E. O’Neil, pp. 93-94, May 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Tracy M. Conroy, U.S. Navy—Captain O’Neil was on
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the mark about the detrimental effect of the loss of amphibious command billets caused by the retirement the Newport (LST-1179)-class tank landing ships.
As an aviator who has served in the Gator Navy, 1 know that the amphibious t'-'orld requires skills and seamanship usually not practiced in the “regular Navy” and that cannot be taught in classes. The ability to coordinate numerous operations simultaneously with other combatants— in specific sea lanes and at precise time marks—is only learned by repetition. Many captains would shirk from simultaneous well-deck, boat-deck, and flight operations all the time remaining in a sea lane, but that’s the way it’s done in the amphibious world.
To expect an officer to go from an executive officer slot on a LST, an amphibious transport dock (LPD), or a dock landing ship (LSD), screen for a dwindling number of command positions, and then fill major command billets—e.g., the captain of a LPD or executive officer of an amphibious assault ship—is asking a lot. Where will these officers gain the necessary experience?
1 agree with Captain O’Neil’s idea that command tours on the Anchorage (LSD-36)-class and Whidbey Island (LSD-4 l)-class ships should be shortened to 18 months. Although many type commanders think that 18 months isn’t enough time to ensure the accountability of their captains—as well as competitive fitness reports—with a declining number of billets, experience is more important than accountability.
On the issue of giving plum Gator Navy billets to aviators, as long as aviators command aircraft carriers, it is a good idea to put those who have a reasonable prospect of carrier command in a strictly surface billet. Aviators assigned to shipboard aviation billets often never see the bridge during their tours. On the other hand, with shrinking number of positions, surface-warfare officers need as much experience as possible in their spe
cific jobs. My recommendation, therefore, is to let the aviators take a back seat until it is clear what the Navy will look like after “rightsizing.” Retaining surface officers and honing their professional skills presently is more important than letting a few aviators punch some good tickets. □
“What Do We Stand For?”
{See C. Matthews, p. 72, August 1994;
R. Seamon, p. 13, September 1994 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Matthews certainly reflects the majority opinion within the naval service on the subject of the Admiral Stanley Arthur case. He sets the stage for the Navy’s leadership being in for more sexual-harassment cases alleged by juniors who have been disciplined by their seniors. In Admiral Arthur’s case, the legal entities were unanimous in that they could find no evidence of reprisals against Lieutenant Hansen for an earlier case of sexual harassment that apparently was processed well—i.e., the offending party was punished and is out of the Navy. The Navy appears to have accepted an unproven charge against an outstanding leader and did not wish to fight it. Admiral Arthur became a victim and political correctness won the day. I believe that this decision will have a long and bad impact on the morale of the people in the Navy.
Although Lieutenant Matthews used the Dreyfus case as an example to support his case, the Navy has a better example and it should have followed it and fought for Admiral Arthur. It is the case of Arleigh Burke’s promotion to flag. President Harry Truman did not want to promote Captain Burke to rear admiral and wanted the selection board to remove him from the list. The Navy said no; and if he was to be removed, the President himself would have to overrule the selection board. Admiral Burke’s sin had
been to fight for the Navy and naval aviation in its struggle with the Air Force. This was no censured Senator objecting to his selection, but the President. It would have been so easy for the Navy to have agreed with the President. However, if it had gone along, the Navy would have lost the best Chief of Naval Operations it has had to date. □
Intelligence Specialist Third Class Chris Wood, U.S. Naval Reserve—In the two years I have been in the Naval Reserve, much of what has occurred in the Navy has been quite depressing. Between scandals, cutbacks, drawdowns, decommissionings, downsizing, and rightsizing, there has not been a lot about which to be cheerful. I joined the Naval Institute before I enlisted and read each issue of Proceedings faithfully. Occasionally, it is difficult to sleep after doing so. Although the world is not becoming a safer place, each issue contains article after article on the problems faced by the Navy and Marine Corps—e.g., the absence of a replacement for the A-6; the short legs of the F/A-18; the lack of modern medium-lift aircraft for the Marines; and the impossibility of a 12-carrier Navy to remain continuously on station at three hotspots in the world. I have to wonder if there is anyone left who has the moral judgment, strength of character, and general common sense to make the honorable, intelligent, and tough decisions.
From time to time, the gloom lifts when someone does step forward to speak out for what is right. Such was the case with Lieutenant Matthews’s column. His defense of the guiltless Admiral Stanley R. Arthur could not have been better stated. His questions of senior naval leadership deserve a response. I was disheartened when I first read about this story in Navy Times. Yet, in reading Lieutenant Matthews’s column, I was encouraged by the fact that someone felt the same way I did—sickened by the current
direction of our society and our Navy— and that person was willing to voice an opinion and call on others to make a stand. It made me remember why I put on the uniform—and it gave me hope.
The letter also reminded me that many of us in uniform are to blame. Every time we sit back and say nothing we give a free hand to those who out of ignorance or by design seek to destroy the tradition and values that made our nation and our navy great. We are in desperate need of people to stand in the gap. □
“The Value of Being There”
(See H. H. Mauz, pp. 26-29, August 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Kirtland, U.S. Air Force—With all due respect to Admiral Mauz, he seems to be performing a bait-and-switch operation. First, he claims to be all for jointness; then he says that only the Navy can do the job of forward presence.
Admiral Mauz says that only regular interaction and evidence of commitment can build the sustained coalitions necessary for the future—and that only naval forces can provide them. Not true. Insofar as sustained presence and continuous interaction are concerned, U.S. Air Force aircraft—especially the airlift force, but also tactical aircraft—constantly de
ploy and interact with the forces of other nations. In fact, in 1993, U.S. Air Force aircraft were deployed to virtually every member state of the United Nations—not just those adjacent to an ocean.
The primary problem is not who does what or how much each service does. Rather, the confusion stems from considering presence as an end in itself. Presence is not an objective, but a means to an end. It is the ability to influence a nation through presence that makes for international power. By itself, sailing the oceans is not enough. A nation’s government must perceive that the U.S. military forces present off its shores, in its ports, or on its airfields are providing relief, protecting them, or deterring or punishing our mutual enemies.
As to Admiral Mauz’s contention that naval forces will be the first to respond to crises, that is true only when there is sufficient time—at least a week or two— for a carrier task force to steam to the area of operations. If there is less time than that available, then land-based air- power is required. It was U.S. Air Force P-15s—not carrier-based fighters—that were flying combat air patrols over northern Saudi Arabia just days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. If the area of crisis is far from the coast—e.g., Rwanda—forget it, naval forces cannot be players. Sustained operations by Air Force tactical and airlift aircraft to Somalia, Bosnia, and
Rwanda show clearly that the admiral is wrong about air power not being able to provide sustained lift and resupply.
Finally, Admiral Mauz compares the strategic bomber force, designed for nuclear alert and response, with the entire Navy and finds that, since the 1970s, the Navy has seen more action. Instead of this apple-and-oranges comparison, the admiral should have examined like forces. How many times have the Navy’s ballistic-missile submarines been used in combat in since the 1970s? What about attack submarines? The Air Force has been used regularly and continuously during the past 25 years in crisis response, coalition building, providing military-to- military influence, and humanitarian relief. Admiral Mauz states that "nearly 80 times since the early 1970s” aircraft carriers have been used. Compare that to the 330 times that Air Force aircraft have taken part in forward presence, deterrence, crisis-response, and combat operations from 1970 to 1992.
Admiral Mauz was on strong ground when he said that the future of U.S. military power is joint. Each of the services brings a unique strength to both peacetime operations and combat. It is extremely unlikely that any major operations in the future will be mounted by a single service. Cooperation with mutual support is the name of the game for the future. □
ARLEIGH BURKE
ESSAY CONTEST
The U.S. Naval Institute invites entries for its prestigious Arleigh Burke Essay Contest (previously known as the General Prize Essay Contest), an annual competition now entering its 115th year.
Three essays will be selected for prizes.
Anyone is eligible to enter and win. First prize earns $3,000, a Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute First Honorable Mention wins $2,000 and a Silver Medal. Second Honorable Mention wins $1,000 and a Bronze Medal.
The topic of the essay must relate to the objective of the U.S. Naval Institute: “The advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the naval and maritime services, and the advancement of the knowledge of sea power.”
Essays will be judged by the Editorial Board of the U.S. Naval Institute.
ENTRY RULES
1. Essays must be original, must not exceed 3,500 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Publisher, U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 1 December 1994.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author s name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank, branch of service, biographical sketch, social
security number, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and motto. The identity of the essayist will not be known by the judging members of the Editorial Board until they have made their selections.
5. The awards will be presented to the winning essayists at the 121st Annual Meeting of the membership of the Naval Institute. Letters notifying the award winners will be mailed on or about 1 February 1995, and the unsuccessful essays will be returned to their authors during February.
6. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8-1/2” x 11". Submit two complete copies. If typed on a computer, please also submit the entry on an IBM-compatible disk, indicating word-processing software used.
7. The winning and honorable mention essays will be published in the Proceedings. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in the Proceedings. The writers of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
8. An essay entered in this contest should be analytical and/or interpretative, not merely and exposition, a personal narrative, or a report.
Deadline: 1 December 1994
“Friendly Fire: Facts, Myths, and Misperceptions”
(See C. F. Hawkins, pp. 54-59, June 1994;
R. Parks, pp. 18-19, August 1994 Proceedings)
“IFF Update: Stalled Again”
(See G. Cornelius, pp. 58-59, June 1994;
R. Parks, pp. 18-19, August 1994 Proceedings)
“We’re Not Doing Enough About Friendly Fire”
(See R. J. Kalil, p. 60, June 1994; R. Parks,
Pp. 18-19, August 1994 Proceedings)
lieutenant Colonel William G. Welch, L'-S. Army (Retired)—On the first day of •he air campaign of the Persian Gulf War, I Was in the operations section of the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). About 1100, we received a call from VII Corps saying that one of its helicopters had spotted an Iraqi mechanized regiment attack- 'ng into Saudi Arabia from the elbow of Kuwait and requesting immediate air support to destroy the Iraqi unit. The TACC onmediately diverted or scrambled 16 A-10s to the area. As the senior Army officer in the room, all looked to me for Permission to attack. As the aggressive •ype, I was about to give that permission when one of the new Saudi liaison officers interrupted and stated that since •he target’s coordinates were inside of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) and within the Saudi Corps’ sector he Would have to get clearance to fire. He had received his first briefing on the PSCL about three days before. Cursing the facts that good training was about to cause a lengthy delay and that ten Air Force generals were waiting eagerly and impatiently for the magic word, I ordered phone calls made to the Saudi Corps. As we waited, calls and then more calls came from VII Corps and Army Forces, U.S. Central Command, all of them asking why the target hadn’t been destroyed. The rank of the callers kept increasing until, at one point, half of the Army lieutenant generals in country were on the phone. The A-10 desk was lighting up as pilots in the air began to reach their fuel limits. There was a target and people wanted it killed. Still we waited for word from the Saudi sector. Finally, the Special Forces teams on the border reported in through the Saudi Corps: “What Iraqi regiment?”
At that moment, one of the Marine liaison officers burst into the room, “Don’t shoot! It’s us!” A Marine light armored infantry battalion was in that general area conducting a deception operation— driving around, raising dust, and making noise. As no one in the TACC had been informed of this operation, we ended
up being deceived as well. What could have been a really nasty friendly fire incident was avoided narrowly.
In the heat of battle, the basic urge is to kill the target. We didn’t go there not to shoot. No one is paying us to bring home ammunition. We see what we want to see or imagine we want to see; we tend to take what is said to us at face value; we don’t question our superiors. Whiz- bang devices break or are used by our enemies to identify us. All these corollaries to Murphy’s Law are what get us into friendly-fire trouble.
What prevents fratricide? Simple: good, solid procedures; disciplined and trained personnel who aren’t afraid to speak up; and leaders who listen. From the published facts of the Persian Gulf War friendly fire incidents, it seems that in most of the cases one of the three was missing. I remember reading the comment, “We did every thing by the book and still it went wrong.” Wrong book, then. The first rule in the right book is that we don’t kill our own. Our procedures have to emphasize that fact. The reality of where and when these procedures are used and who uses them must be thoroughly thought-out, tested, and rehearsed. Things that worked in the jungles of Vietnam or the wooded plains of Germany might not work in the desert of Iraq—and vice versa.
Those who believe that U.S. forces thrive on chaos are doomed to send young Americans home with pieces of U.S.-made bombs, bullets, and shells in them. Failure to follow procedures—or casting them aside when they seem inconvenient—has killed a lot of our own. Our soldiers must realize that discipline is soldiers doing the right thing not when they are under direct supervision, but when they are alone and afraid on the battlefield.
Finally, and most importantly, leaders need to listen. Your subordinates are unlikely to say “Sir, I think we are making a mistake here,” unless they really believe it. And when they do, it is not the time to hit the command override switch, as so many have done. It is the time to listen and think, reevaluate your own situational awareness, and make the right decision.
I was lucky, very lucky; many others were not. I am not naive enough to believe that we can prevent all friendly-fire incidents. People of all ranks will shoot first and worry about it later; therefore, we cannot rely on gadgets to solve the problem. The solution is solid, relevant procedures, reinforced by training and discipline at all levels. Probably the saddest thing about the Persian Gulf War is that more Americans have to say they killed Americans then Iraqis can say they
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killed Americans. We cannot allow that to happen again. □
Lieutenant (junior grade) David L Teska, U.S. Coast Guard—Major Hawkins’s article on friendly fire was well-written and thought provoking; however, it prompted more questions than it answered. The author characterizes the U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command’s current definition of fratricide as “arguably restrictive.” He presents the Army’s definition, but fails to give us his own; thus depriving readers of the opportunity to compare and contrast the two. If fratricide or friendly fire isn’t the unintentional maiming or killing of friendly troops with munitions intended for the enemy, then what is it?
I think that the services and the public accept the fact that when armed conflict erupts, some friendly-fire casualties will occur. The issue should revolve around reducing the chance of friendly- fire incidents by developing better iden- tification-friend-or-foe capabilities and setting strict criteria for classifying com
bat-area deaths as fratricide. I suspect the wide disparity in percentages of combat deaths due to fratricide cited by Major Hawkins could be attributed to a lack of a concise set of conditions for fratricide for deaths outside the realm of friendly fire—e.g., traffic deaths. With strict criteria for determining fratricide, commanders could decide whether a death resulted from friendly fire—and develop ways to avoid such casualties. □
“A True Force in Readiness”
(See N. C. Cam and S. S. Coerr, pp. 35-38,
August 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Terry McKeamey, U.S. Navy (Retired)—As much as I sympathize with the desire of Captain Carn and Captain Coerr for more capable amphibious forces, 1 cannot agree that Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) should be routinely deployed as a component of U.S. forward naval presence. There never will be enough amphibious lift or Marines to keep something as large as a MEB continuously “on station.” At present, the strategy validated and commonly accepted by the services is to keep three . Marine Expeditionary Unit/Amphibious Ready Group teams continuously deployed: one to the Mediterranean and two to the Western Pacific (one of which is in Okinawa). These requirements have driven current force planning to 12 three- ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs)—each capable of lifting a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)—or a total of 36 amphibious ships somewhere in the “out years” when the tank landing ships and the amphibious cargo ships the authors rely on are decommissioned. By the way, this total also coincides with a requirement to lift 2.5 MEBs—actually two MEBs and a MEU—in support of the strategy of fighting two major regional conflicts simultaneously. Note that this is a surge response capability, not a steady- state deployment capability, as Captains Carn and Coerr propose. By just look
ing at the numbers, it is obvious that the two-year cycle they propose for MEB deployment could never be maintained with the future force structure.
Cost is not the only reason I’d challenge the wisdom of upgrading our standard amphibious presence from a MEE to a MEB. Although its easy to folio* the authors’ logic in suggesting that the MEB is a superior force, more is not necessarily better. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) missions outlined in the article lend themselves to execution by a small force that is able to train intensively for them. It is not apparent that a MEB would be any better at supporting this specialized training. When it comes to command-and-control in crisis response, the relatively more cumbersome MEB might not be as effective.
Finally, I take issue with Captains Cam and Coerr on the question of staying on Okinawa. Keeping ARG Bravo deployed forward cuts three to four weeks off the time needed to send a force to the Western Pacific—an obvious plus in any crisis. More importantly, a permanent U.S. presence on Asian soil demonstrates the commitment of the United States to the security of the region. Certainly, Japanese politicians criticize our bases for the domestic audience, but the contention that our presence has lost relevance in the post-Cold War Pacific is false; we should stay on Okinawa. □
“Gratuitous Religious Comment”
(See D. S. Jonas, p. 82, August 1994
Proceedings)
Major Keith Oliver, U.S. Marine Corps— Major Jonas’s essay serves as a useful reminder for every leader to be careful not to use speech that might antagonize members of their commands—vulgarity, for instance. Unfortunately, it also discounts an American—and American military— heritage rooted deeply in the Judeo-Chris- tian tradition. I’ll leave it to nimbler minds to cite the practical, historical, cultural, and legal precedents which serve to encourage, not discourage, religious expression among warriors.
Speaking, however, as a grateful Ma- fine who has had more than his fair share of good postings and recognition in 20 years of service, perhaps the “litigious society” that Major Jonas portends will bestow upon me a far higher honor: That of being found worthy of persecution for j the gospel of Jesus Christ. □
Staff Sergeant J. P. Tonkay, U.S. Air Force—I’m having a hard time digesting Major Jonas’s criticism of a general of-
ficer who, at a change-of-command Ceremony, “reveals that he is ‘bom again’ and makes numerous references to Christ.”
Major Jonas leads the readers to be- tave that the Marines and sailors in attendance were forced to listen to this general drone on for hours about Christian theology. I wonder if those who were antagonized by the general’s comments "'Quid feel equally offended had the general made a “public declaration of enthusiasm for or loyalty to” the Wash- lngton Redskins and made numerous references to his Redskins season tickets.
More than likely, the general introduced his wife and children at the ceremony. Was that an instance of a “commanding officer exerting a tremendous amount of influence” on those in attendance to get married and have children? hdore to the point, had the general loosely Used the name of Jesus Christ in vain or made such comments as “for Christ’s sake,” or “honest to God,” would Major ■Was have attacked him for his “insen- Sdivity, lack of propriety and common
sense”?
Finally, Major Jonas stated that “many members of the audience reacted with shock and disbelief’ at the general’s comments. However, I cannot help wonder- mg how many were delighted to learn diat their new commander had Godly val
ues and was unafraid to admit that fact in public. □
“Buy KC-Xs ... Not C-17s”
(See D. Eckstein, pp. 72-73, July 1994
Proceedings)
John J. Jenista—Captain Eckstein correctly pointed out that the KA-6 tanker aircraft will soon be gone from the fleet and that, currently, there are no plans to replace it. Experience teaches that carrier-based tankers are vital for safety and operational survivability; thus, the lack of a replacement for the KA-6 represents the greatest unfulfilled need in naval aviation today.
However, the brutal facts is that there is no money for a new tanker aircraft and, even if there were, new aircraft take forever to reach the fleet. Look at the T-45; it took 14 years for this simple little jet trainer to become operational. Therefore, the air wings are forced to improvise, and most are coping with the aerial refueling gap by using their S-3Bs as tankers. This is a horrid waste of the S-3’s antisubmarine and antisurface capabilities in a mission that demands little beyond a carrier-suitable airframe and the capability to handle lots of fuel.
There is one place the Navy could get an inexpensive, carrier-suitable aircraft:
the aircraft boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. As the former Naval Air Systems Command assistant program manager for propulsion on the A-7, I know the A-7 can carry a lot of fuel with a tanker package and had a small deck spot factor. Refurbished KA-7s could serve as interim tankers— and lessen the urgency of a long-term replacement program—for quite a few years. In the past, many A-7s have been furnished to foreign governments, but
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The U.5. Naval Institute Announces the 33rd Annual Naval & Maritime
PHOTO CONTEST
The U.S. Naval Institute is proud to announce the 33rd Annual Naval & Maritime Photo Contest.
The contest is open to both amateur and professional photographers. The winning photographs will be published in a 1995 issue of Proceedings, the monthly magazine of the Naval Institute. Cash prizes will be awarded as follows:
1st Prize $500
2nd Prize $350
3rd Prize $250
Honorable Mention (15) $100 each
Entry Rules:
1. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest.)
2. Limit: 5 entries per person.
3. Entries must be either black-and-white prints, color prints, or color transparencies.
4. Minimum print size is 5" x 7".
5. Minimum transparency size is 35mm. (No glass-mounted transparencies, please.)
6. Full captions and the photographer's name, address, and social security number must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print or printed on the transparency mount. (Do not write directly on the back of a print. No staples, please.)
7. Entries may not have been previously published, and winners may not be published prior to publication in Proceedings. Prior publication could result in the relinquishment of the prize awarded.
8. Entries must be postmarked by 31 December 1994. Only photographs accompanied by self-
addressed, stamped envelopes will be returned. Photographs not awarded prizes may possibly be purchased by the Naval Institute.
Deadline: 31 December 1994
Write for details or mail entries to:
Naval & Maritime Photo Contest-U.S. Naval Institute-118 Maryland Ave.-Annapolis, MD 21402-5035—(410) 268-6110
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The Naval Institute Guide to
COMBAT FLEETS EWORLD,1994/95
Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament
THE NAVAL INSTITUTE GUIDE TO
COMBAT FLEETS
OF THE WORLD 1994/1995
Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament
Edited by Bernard Prezelin
English Language Edition Prepared by A.D.Baker III
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Edited by Bernard Prezelin / English- language edition prepared by A.D. Baker III
This book offers the most complete and balanced guide to the composition and capabilities of the world’s naval and paranaval forces. The author treats ships as systems within an overall military context and provides the detail necessary for present-day naval planning. This timely information provides the most accurate reflection of major new developments, such as general downsizing of the major fleets of the world and the impending dispersal of former U.S. Navy ships to foreign fleets.
there should be enough TA-7Cs left to do the job. The two-seater would be the best aircraft for the job anyway; they are newer and have not been used quite as hard, and the second cockpit can be very useful at times. Some of the TF-41 engines from TA-7Cs were pulled to upgrade Portuguese A-7Bs. This is no problem because we wouldn’t want to use the old engines for the simple reason that they are unsupportable. Converting TA-7Cs to KA-7Cs would be done with as many components currently in the fleet inventory as possible. For example, the engine should be the same high-bypass fan engine that is to be used in the F/A- 18E/F—but without the afterburner. The airflow is compatible with the A-7’s inlet, the thrust is about right, and the engine is lighter with better fuel specifics. Vought’s designers used a lot of their A-7 experience when developing the S3; perhaps, then, some S-3 spares could be adapted to the KA-7. To reduce weight and maintenance requirements, all systems not needed for the tanker mission would be removed. A Global Positioning Satellite system would replace the inertial platform, and a commercial weather radar could replace the complex MilSpec radar. Airframe-specific spares—e.g., control surfaces—could be gleaned front the surplus Air Force A-7Ds that also are in Arizona.
To avoid problems within the air wings as to who will fly these aircraft, they should be assigned to the carriers directly, to be flown by ship’s company aviators. This is not an unprecedented move; aircraft carriers used to have their own C-lAs assigned to them in this manner. Replacement air group training could be accomplished by the S-3 groups.Q
Colonel Michael R. Gallagher, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—Captain Eckstein misses an important point when he advocates the use of commercial wide-body, dual-role tanker-transports to support the Navy. If it is assumed that both airlift and tanker support will be limited in any major contingency, then analysis consistently will support using wide-body aircraft, like the KC-10, for airlift and the KC-135 for aerial refueling of naval tactical aircraft. Even with supplemental refueling pods on both aircraft, the best use of the KC-10 remains airlift.
Interservice bickering and funding cuts for additional refueling pods have clouded the entire airlift issue. The fact remains that all the tanker enhancements in the world will not reduce the pressing need for a new airlifter to meet the strategic mobility requirements of the United States. Therefore, the C-17 remains a critically important national priority. □
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