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The glue that holds emotional stability in war is complex, and many factors—exposure, fatigue, isolation, and combat intensity among them— can undercut a soldier’s courage and will to resist. Unit cohesion is a critical bulwark against the stresses of the battlefield.
Battle casualties occur not only from physical injury, but from injuries of the mind as well, especially during periods of intense fighting. During World War I, for example, one-seventh of all British casualties Were diagnosed with “shell shock”; and these cases accounted for 20% of all disability discharges. The United States, a latecomer in the ^ar> experienced 116,000 killed in action, 200,000 w°unded, and 106,000 Psychiatric casualties. Of the latter, 25,000 ultimately required separation from service.
When World War II r°ke out, the United tates attempted to screen °ut those likely to break Under the stress of comat. Despite the rejection of more than 800,000 Potential servicemen for emotional and mental” teasons, U.S. military medical services still (ieated almost one million combat fatigue” cases.
U|timately, the U.S. mil- 'tary was obligated to discharge nearly 500,000 of hese individuals; almost 0 divisions worth. Even Ur>ng the early stages °f the Korean conflict,
Psychiatric casualties occurred in extraordinarily '§h numbers (at rates Caching 240 per 1000 tnoops) during the worst 'ghting around Pusan.
The Combat Environment
“The main characteristic of the soldier with a combat- induced neurosis is that he has become a frightened, lonely, helpless person whose interpersonal relationships have been disrupted. . . He had lost the feeling that he was part
ASSOCIATED PRESS PHOTO FROM LIFE MAGAZINE
of a powerful group, and became instead a lonely and frightened person whose efforts to protect himself were doomed to failure.” These are the words of a World War II military psychiatrist describing the casualties he treated—formerly competent soldiers whose emotional reactions to the stress of battle rendered them ineffective to the point where they could not be relied upon to defend themselves or those around them.
The resistance of military personnel can be weakened substantially by exposure, bad weather, sleep deprivation, dehydration and malnutrition, physical fatigue, and minor illnesses and injuries. Noise, vibration, fumes, and oxygen deprivation create additional stressful demands. Indeed, during 44 days of sustained operations in Italy during World War II, the pro-
portion of psychiatric casualties within the U.S. Army’s 2d Armored Division reached a peak of 54%.
The battles of attrition warfare, involving assaults upon well defended positions, tended to produce many battle fatigue cases among both attackers and defenders. Artillery or air attack generally provided an additional source of stress, no doubt engendered by the victims’ inability to strike back. Other sources of potent stress in combat include friendly fire; isolation—real or imagined; and attack by chemical agents and other unique weapons. In terms of modern tactics, stress may also be manifested among those located in the rear area, where deep penetration attacks by an adversary attempt to disrupt vulnerable infrastructure.
Previous studies of battle morale have emphasized the effects of new and strange weapons. Gas in World War I and both air attack and tanks in World War II had a much greater initial psychological impact than physical effect. Fear of nuclear and/or chemical attack, combined
The Mysterious Fraternity
Combat effectiveness is not entirely a product of the organizational structure of a military force. Effective be- , havior on the battlefield is ultimately a human condition, reflecting an ongoing personal conflict between a sense of duty and a wish to survive. This human dimension, including the relationship of soldiers to one another, is critical to the ability of any military unit to perform under fire.
The Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of October 1973 was the first conflict fought between main-force armies using the nonnuclear weapons and tactics that characterized the latter 20th century. Under conditions of overwhelming stress and hostility, outnumbered Israeli maneuver units contained the massive thrusts of their opponents, while maintaining unit integrity and performance, to turn the tide of the war. They performed in the face of con- ( tinuous echeloned operations and despite the use of
The combat environment itself can chip away at a soldier’s emotional willpower. Forces fighting in the Solomon Islands during World War II squared off not only against the enemy, but also against the diseases, dangers, and debilitating effects of the jungle.
with a general lack of experience with the effects of conventional weapons used in intensity, will create that same psychological effect in modern high-intensity warfare.
The modern combat environment will bear great potential for high intensity and high lethality. It may well include sustained operations in the face of multiecheloned attack, decentralization of forces, and extreme dispersal over the battlefield of small units with little substantive physical contact with one another. Furthermore, modern weapons and high-intensity warfare raise the shock, intensity, and stress of combat to previously unseen levels. Such conditions will maximize psychological, behavioral, and performance breakdown among soldiers.
weaponry designed to disrupt the individual soldier’s behavior and performance to the maximum extent.
Israeli sources reported that 40%-50% of all casualties during the three weeks of active engagement were com' bat-stress related. Egyptian combat-stress rates likewise approached 50% of casualties. Among the Israeli Defense Forces, highly cohesive units possessing strong leadership- strong bonding, and strong unit self confidence experi- . enced fewer combat-stress casualties, with the best pos- j sibilities for reconstitution after battle. Highly cohesive units were able to sustain effective combat even with phys' ical casualty levels exceeding 50%. Unit sustainability in combat was demonstrated not as related to the propor' tion of casualties in the unit, but rather to be a consequence of other less tangible unit characteristics.
Group dynamics are critical to upholding resistance to the stress of combat. As the historian S. L. A. Marshall once noted, “I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war, that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to
keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade.” The maintenance of close emotional links between comrades is the compelling stimulus that encourages one to fight on. even against apparently hopeless odds, ignoring personal safety first and Personal fears. This tendency is reinforced by a soldier's belief in the superiority of his unit over others, by his pride ln that superiority, and by his pride in being a worthy uiember of it.
Psychosocial bonds among people who are familiar with and trust one another are vital to the maintenance of militarily effective performance. They also tninirnize the probability of individuals or groups succumbing to the terrors of battle. The Phrase “military unit cohesion” defines the web of ties and bonds that hold a group of soldiers together. Past research has demonstrated the effectiveness °f unit cohesion in preventing Psychological and performance disintegration in battle. Such studies were carried out by the penman Army in World War II. by the U.S. Army both in World ^ar II and the Korean War, and by the Israeli Army following the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
Military unit cohesion historically has relied upon the support and coherence derived from Members feeling themselves as Purt of a disciplined mass. The group provided structure and leaning to an otherwise alien existence; a haven from an impersonal process apparently intent upon grinding the life from pi involved. As valued mem- ers of a strong group, soldiers ought—not for God and coun- bb'T-but for their comrades, for heir leaders, and for their own rePutation with both. A classic study of the German Army confirmed that units held together under severe combat stress largely because of oyalty. German soldiers, their noncommissioned officers, and their officers comprised a supporting web of strongly Personal relationships generated by the experiences of c°mbat. Soldiers came to feel a responsibility to their peers and superiors that was born of mutual risk, hardship, and trust.
Historically, well-trained soldiers have always drawn sup- P°rt, strength, security, and a sense of invulnerability r°m the physical presence of “the line,” i.e„ from the shoul- er-to-shoulder contact with their fellows. The psychological integrity of the soldier was in its greatest measure ePendent upon the maintenance of the physical integrity of the line of battle. If the line broke, the soldier was prone to break and cease being capable of effective performance.
The submergence of individuals and small groups underpinned the psychological integrity of the soldier and the line.
In support of this kind of physical and psychological cohesion, there evolved an emphasis upon the “corporate” behaviors of the drill field, the parade ground, and the garrison. The most essential reason for ceremonial drill was “to teach soldiers to keep their ranks and never abandon their colors,” even in the most difficult evolutions. Traditionally, a confidence and a sense of competence was enhanced and reinforced by drills and convolutions. Each unit member would feel part of a whole, with enhanced power. The well trained and well disciplined soldier would be submerged within the “unity” of his company on the line of battle, by marching, moving, turning, parrying, thrusting, and discharging musketry as one mighty whole. Each individual literally flowed into and became a part of the other. Thus trained, soldiers, it was believed, would never be at a loss amid the greatest confusions of combat.
This general model of infantry unit structure and tactics governed constituted armies from classical times to World War I. In the Roman Legions, the physical bonding and ordering of drill was reinforced by the social ordering, group identification, and bonding of the legionnaires. Similarly, in the U.S. military, commencing during the Civil War, the squad was populated by the same group of mess and tent mates. Social, training, and tactical realities merged to reinforce each other and optimize the combat performance of the line during battle. It was envisioned that each small group would be highly bonded and easily “submerged” in the longer line of the company, battalion, or regimental front.
A detailed study of three famous English battles—Ag- incourt, Waterloo, and the Somme—was conducted to detail why men remained together in battle despite terrible stress. It found a distinct absence of ideological motives. Rather, cohesion sprang from the mutual hardship, risk, and suffering of all those involved—officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The small unit became the focus of intensely personal, almost “priest-like” attachments, for which the most conspicuous acts of bravery were performed. Men appeared to be willing to die for their fellow soldiers—not for grandiose ideals or military systems.
Military cohesion, then, is a complex product of mul-
COURTESY OF DAVID DOUGLAS DUNCAN
During the Korean War, duty in the combat zone was limited to a one-year tour, to reduce psychiatric casualty rates. Unfortunately, such rotation works against unit cohesion and integration and is probably helpful only in lower-intensity, slower paced warfare.
Identity with the group provides critical psychological armor—the added strength, competence, and survivability that comes from being part of a group and the support that maintains one in the face of grief or loss when friends are killed and wounded.
Within the tactical format of modern high-intensity maneuver warfare, new stresses and demands are placed upon the soldier and the combat group. To minimize the destructive effects of new weapons upon force concentrations, personnel are more commonly distributed in small combat teams. Consequently, armies have become more decentralized and cellular, replacing the kinds of shoul- der-to-shoulder and face-to-face groups that traditionally mediated the stresses and reinforced effective combat behavior and performance among combat personnel. This has brought with it the need for more intense psychosocial solidarity among unit members. Such a solidarity implies a level of automatic trust and respect among soldiers and between soldiers and their leaders. It demands even greater unit self-knowledge and greater interpersonal sup-
BLACK STAR (D. TURNLEY/DETROIT FREE
port. To function well in the new warfare environment requires new levels of sharing and understanding of a common military and unit “culture.”
Studies evaluating combat effectiveness among small units have shown that there is a defined set of behaviors, expectations, and decision-making patterns in the combat situation that allow the dispersed unit with poor or no communications to do its job in a commonly shared way. Soldiers and leaders are predictable each to the other- Such units actually contribute to moderating the external stresses that affect the soldier’s capacity to perform—particularly in the realm of family issues. Units also demonstrate concern and care for their members. Of equal importance, members of such units have been cross-trained so that the death or loss of certain key personnel does not disrupt the overall ability of the unit to function.
Some critics have argued that, except for special and elite combat units, cohesion building has not been a major preoccupation of the U.S. military. This institu tionalized neglect was attributed to a number of interrelated factors:
>• For the most significant part of this century, the U.S- Army was built on a draftee base that, except for World War II, mandated a two-year obligation of military service for first-term soldiers. This obligation defined a maximum unit tenure of no more than 18-20 months in the unit of assignment following basic training. (
► Another factor of profound importance was the Army s individual replacement system wherein soldiers were defined as interchangeable parts in systems that primarily required them only to be able to perform “by the numbers. The performance of the combat unit was assumed to be 3 simple summation of the individual soldiers’ skills and be
tiple components. It entails the bonding of equals and of organizational unequals.
It also requires the demonstration of special capabilities, training, or equipment of the group, as well as the ability of individuals to identify with the unit’s overall special capabilities.
It includes, as well, each person’s perceptions of the particular skills and abilities of self and others.
Identity with “the group” provides critical social support. It neutralizes the effects of stress by providing a psychological “armor” of strength and competence through the individual’s incorporation into the “power” of the group. In an overwhelmingly hostile environment, it provides a perception of safety and survivability. It also maintains one in the face of grief and loss, when friends and acquaintances are killed and wounded. Hence, combat personnel frequently use words such as love, kinship, and fraternal bonding in describing their relationships with their units and one another.
Unit cohesion, then, allows well-trained combat-arms units, bonded between equals and structural unequals, supportive of their members, and prepared to be skilled and resilient in battle, to fight for each other as would members of a family.
The Impact of Modern Combat Tactics
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haviors; in essence, the group or unit was purely an instrumentality that is never greater than the sum of its parts.
These concepts were further advanced by the economies derived from impersonal mass training of personnel and (he perceived economies obtained from an individual replacement system. Such views have been further reinforced hy a vision of military operations as essentially driven and shaped by technology rather than by the structure and nature of the human groups that carry them out.
Matching Cohesion With Battle Intensity
Other reasons existed for alleged inattention to military unit cohesion in the combat situation. Paradoxically, one Was the perceived success of policies implemented dur- ,ng wartime to minimize psychological breakdowns in battle. During World War II, it was noted that the length of combat exposure, in relationship to combat intensity, was the most significant risk factor conducive to psychological breakdown. At the typical levels of combat sustained ln Italy and the Mediterranean theater of operations, significant numbers of psychological casualties were gener- uted following 150 or more days of combat exposure. Inheed, in the Italian campaign, victims often were not green soldiers but hardened veterans of North Africa and Sicily. Stress was manifest not so much in terror as in sadness, Wlth soldiers not claiming to be sick but simply worn °ut and “no good any more.” In higher-intensity fight- lng, such as the Normandy invasion, equivalent stress- elated casualty levels were obtained after 20-30 days.
Following World War II, during the limited wars of K°rea and Vietnam, a decision was made to minimize the rates of potential psychiatric casualties by limiting sol- h'ers’ combat exposure. This depended upon the massive esource base of the United States, as well as the nature °l these conflicts. Whereas the World War II duty term Was “the duration and six months,” Korea and Vietnam saw the imposition of one-year tours of duty in the comat zone, followed by the out-transfer of each eligible ser- VlCe member at his rotation date. This rotational policy ^as deemed to have significantly lowered classic comat psychological casualty rates.
Both the Korean and Vietnam wars, however, may be c!assified as primarily low- to mid-intensity wars on the c°ntinuum of modern warfare. The pace of warfare was comparatively slow enough for classically defined comat bonding and integration of units to take place under 're- With the exception of the first disastrous months of he Korean conflict, most units were introduced to comat at levels of intensity just high enough to enable the rjpid testing and development of knowledge, trust, and "itirnacy among unit members. The levels of initial com- hWinent to combat also were low enough to pose no ul- hrnate threat to the existence of the not-yet-fully bonded a°d integrated group. Furthermore, the episodic nature °f the fighting in Vietnam, combining short patrols with r®latively secure base camps, along with U.S. control of *ae air and the relative freedom from enemy artillery at- [ack, made the occurrence of combat-related stress less hkely.
The “gains” of Korea and Vietnam can only be viewed as successful, therefore, in the context of lower-intensity
warfare. They were not solutions to the problem of the human response to the stresses of modern high-intensity combat. Because of increased lethality, violence, and tempo, future conflicts may well be defined by the first weeks of the engagement. The model for this kind of war—high-intensity, high-density conventional conflict carried out by an enemy operating in a continuously echeloned combat mode (initiating upwards of five to nine pulses of combat per day)—erupted in 1973 in the Sinai Desert.
The way we plan to conduct future warfare, such as the Army’s “Air Land Battle” doctrine, also uses heavy forces, rapid attack, engulfment, and deep penetration. Furthermore, the worst-case war of the future may well be fought without the six-month lead time that was experienced in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
The Bottom Line
The glue that holds emotional stability in war is admittedly complex, and many factors may ultimately imprint upon a soldier’s courageous instincts. Together, however, they may well determine the victory or defeat of a nation at war.
Recently, executive branch and Defense policy declarations have invoked steps to eliminate putative discrimination in the military by virtue of gender and sexual proclivity. Although seemingly proper from a constitutional and ethical perspective, implementation of any such mandates should stimulate a detailed examination of their ultimate impact upon unit cohesiveness and military effectiveness. Apart from the seemingly benign compatibility of such policies with military activity during peacetime, the potential influence of any “social engineering” mandates upon the war-fighting capabilities of military structural units, especially in light of expected patterns of future conflict, should engender further study.
Lord Moran, a British physician, psychiatrist, and veteran of both world wars, declared in his memoirs, “A man’s courage may be equated with his moral capital, and he is always spending.” The call on the bank might be the daily drain of receiving intensive shelling or bombing, incessant watch rotations on a destroyer in northern seas during wintertime, repeated high-stress bombing missions, or a bloody battle. Depletion of a man’s willpower may evolve more slowly through monotony, environmental exposure, physical exhaustion, or the loss of support from comrades on whom one has come to depend.
Alternatively, there may be a sudden traumatic major expenditure that threatens to “close one’s account.” When one’s moral and emotional capital is depleted, he or she is finished!1
'L. Moran, Anatomy of Courage: The Classic Study of the Soldier's Struggle against Fear (Garden City Park, N.Y.: Avery, 1987).
Captain Smith is an actively drilling Navy reservist at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland, where he holds appointments as Clinical Professor of Surgery and Clinical Professor of Military and Emergency Medicine. He is on the full-time faculty at the Medical College of Georgia in Augusta. Georgia, where he serves as Professor of Surgery (Urology). Captain Smith was the Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the year in 1988.