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For the U.S. Navy, the wholesale decommissioning and striking of ships, many of them with years of effective service life remaining, has been a sobering experience. Nothing like it has happened since the end of the Vietnam War, when so many World War II-vintage destroyers, missile cruisers, carriers, and amphibious ships were discarded; the fleet’s ship strength was cut almost in half in just a few years. This time, though, we [ also are discarding combat aircraft, most prominently A-6Es.
In each case the logic is much the
same. Within a falling budget, the Navy can choose either to maintain a large but aging fleet (whose maintenance needs increase), or it can accept drastic cuts in hopes of freeing funds for the future, both for new construction and to pay for the development of the next generation of weapons and other systems. There is yet another factor: The likely conflicts of the next decade or so differ from those imagined during the Cold War.
Had the Cold War gone hot, the Navy would have had to protect sea communications against a massive Soviet subma
rine fleet. There was much debate over just how that could be done, with particular reference to reconciling the requirements of its day-to-day role of presence in the Third World. The former required convoy escorts, maritime patrol aircraft, and attack submarines; presence demanded carriers and surface strike forces. Indeed, the purpose of the 1980s’ Maritime Strategy was to show how the two roles fit together, and how what had been characterized as a power-projection force could help win a big war against the Soviets—among other things, it could neutralize the antishipping threat presented by land-based Soviet bombers.
Now the Russian submarine threat is shrinking, and it seems unlikely that any Russians recovery could pose a threat in less than a decade or two. The first and most obvious wave of fleet down-sizing has been to decrease the Cold War frigate and P-3C forces. Attack submarines, although often unfairly perceived as primarily Cold War antisubmarine warfare assets, are more flexible—hence the decision to preserve more of them.
The old Knox (FF-1052)-class steam frigates, which lack modern combat direction systems, are being discarded wholesale. The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class ships, which are more versatile, are likely to be retained in reserve (some will remain in commission). Some P-3C squadrons will be retained, their aircraft modified for improved surface surveillance.
The second wave involved older but still very capable missile frigates, fossil- fueled carriers, and nuclear-powered attack submarines. All had real roles in the new sort of littoral warfare the Navy now considers central (actually much of the Navy’s role since 1945 has been littoral); all, however, are aging. The carriers and cruisers have steam plants that are increasingly difficult to man and to maintain; far better to standardize surface combatants on gas turbines and carriers
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Proceedings / May 1994
The USS Cape St. George (CG-71), which joined the Atlantic Fleet last June, was built to confront multiple attackers; her powerful, quick- reaction Aegis system can make the ship a major player in any antitactical ballistic missile defense.
on nuclear power. As for the submarines and the nuclear cruisers, they are being discarded instead of being refueled since most of the cost of operating a nuclear ship is incurred at refueling time.
The second wave also includes the A-6E. Like the cruisers, it is still obviously very capable, but—it is aging. Maintenance costs are increasing. The planes were being fitted with new wings merely to keep flying. Earlier, the choice was between a drastic modernization— an updated version, the A-6F—or retiring the aircraft and using the money to build and buy an entirely new aircraft. The Navy decided to do what was necessary to keep the A-6Es flying safely but not to build any A-6Fs—and use the money saved to buy what turned out to be the ill-fated AX (later designated the A-12), which was canceled. Some may reasonably argue that naval aviation’s current choice, the F/A-18E/F, cannot match A-6E capabilities, but few will argue that some newer aircraft will not be cheaper to run within a drastically shrinking budget.
This is not quite the situation the Navy faced after 1945. At that time, most of the fleet was almost brand new. Clearly, however, it could not be manned on a peacetime budget and so the bulk of the new ships were laid up and carefully preserved, on the theory that they might be needed again before they became obsolete. That proved prescient: many of them were pressed back into service for the Korean War. On the other hand, it was also true that new technology such as missiles made existing ships obsolete. With so many hulls in existence, the Navy was unlikely to convince either the Truman administration or Congress to pay for a large new-construction program. On the other hand, with the war over, the administration was unlikely to allocate money for new ships even without a large existing fleet. The war-b,uilt hulls were very successfully rebuilt and it was these modernized ships which were discarded after Vietnam.
Aircraft were a different proposition. Like ships, many of them
This U.S. Customs Service P-3 airborne early warning aircraft is being modified as part of the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability Program. It will help determine whether such platforms can provide targeting and link all components of a joint force—air, sea, and land.
(See “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Developments,” this issue, pages 152-164.)
were mothballed, but it was generally agreed that wartime types were obsolete and could reasonably be discarded. Aeronautics was changing rapidly and time passed them by. In any case, individual airplanes were inexpensive in those days, and were not expected to last long. Few probably noticed the end of this situation: airplanes are now extremely expensive, and their individual lives are about as long as those of ships. Aeronautics is changing slowly enough for very low procurement rates to maintain a substantial naval air arm. We tend to modernize airplanes partly to avoid the shock of having to replace them en masse.
Proponents of a new generation of stealthy airplanes argue that their innovation is as significant as the introduction of jet power after World War II— that their introduction makes the current aircraft fleet obsolete. One of the great questions we have faced since the mid- 1980s is whether that is true: do we really have to invest most of the Navy budget in a new generation of aircraft? Or should we forgo it and rely on new weapons—carried by existing aircraft?
The post-Vietnam collapse of naval strength was inevitable, given the sheer size of the fleet built during World War II. Ships generally last 20 to 30 years, so those completed in 1945 were due for replacement about 1965-75. There was no prospect whatever of a massive new-construction program at the time. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations who presided over much of the post-Vietnam contraction, believed that by accelerating it, he could release some funds for the necessary replacements. He has written that the col
lapse of the Nixon administration in the Watergate affair made it impossible for him to collect on promises made early in his tenure.
The post-Cold War era is turning out to be rather like that after World War II in that no postwar budget will support the kind of fleet we had at the end of the Cold War. The situation is different from 1945, however, in that we do not have large numbers of new temporarily surplus ships. Instead, we have many older ships giving way to newer Aegis cruisers and destroyers. We also have an industrial base that, having become accustomed to the Navy’s Cold War needs, may find much of its capability surplus.
We know that something like a Cold War may return. Even without it, the world is very turbulent, and only the United States has the ability to project force into places such as the Persian Gulf, whose stability matters deeply to us. It might be argued that the existing fleet suffices for that job, but that fleet is a wasting asset, which cannot be renewed without the industrial base. To lay up ships nearing the end of their natural lives is to preclude replacement; it is too easy for a budget-cutter to put off new construction for a few more years—or decades.
The very real problems of maintaining steam-powered ships should not be minimized. In the 1950s, the Navy introduced a new generation of 1,200-pound steam plants. They were far more compact and more economical than their lower-pressure predecessors, but they proved difficult to maintain and sometimes even dangerous to operate. Earlier plants were relatively simple; they did not need par-
J.S AIR FORCE
ticularly sophisticated operators. The newer steam plants were very different and required special training to operate. Even so, a steam plant is far more temperamental than a diesel or a gas turbine. A gas turbine, for example, is usually replaced altogether when it gives trouble, an option that becomes particularly attractive as the Navy sheds manpower.
Also, many of the older ships may not be as well suited to the post-Cold War military situation as they seem. We are discarding many cruisers armed with extended-range Standard Missile (SM)-2 (ERs), ships very recently modernized under the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) program, which allowed such ships to engage multiple targets almost simultaneously, much as an Aegis ship can (albeit at a slower rate). Why discard them and build new Aegis ships instead? One reason is that NTU/SM-2(ER) ships in fact fire much more slowly than Aegis ships and cannot easily engage targets at very short range.
The New Threat Upgrade was conceived to help deal with massive raids by
bombers carrying stand-off missiles. In such cases, targets could be engaged at a considerable distance. Rate of fire mattered much less than the ship’s ability to engage multiple targets more or less simultaneously. In a Third World littoral situation, a ship may well be faced with missiles fired at very short range, e.g., by concealed coast-defense batteries or by missile boats or, in future, by submarines. Very quick reaction becomes much more important. The enemy may not have many missiles to fire, but they will appear suddenly.
In many cases, as in that of the USS Stark (FFG-31), the political situation may preclude any sort of preemption on our part, yet require our ships to operate within range of possible attack in order to achieve our goals, i.e., to make presence credible. Although Aegis was conceived to deal with the case of multiple attackers approaching from long range, the system is also the best available one for very quick short-range reaction. The Aegis system also is adapting to the antimissile role, which may be very im-
The Air Force’s new composite w ing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, is a package deal—bombers, refuelers, fighters, and electronic w arfare aircraft.
portant, not least politically.
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Proceedings / May 1994
For the near term, the Navy must be able to offer the country a range of capabilities, from presence up through the sort of littoral attacks executed against Libya and Iraq. Credible presence requires that ships be able to survive in the face of the kind of missile threat Third World governments try to buy. If they cannot, then some of those governments may find our ships less than convincing visitors. Many will not be so reflective, but it takes only a few incidents to educate all of them. Often, presence serves not so much to threaten enemies as to reassure our friends. To the extent that they may often feel threatened by their neighbors' ballistic missiles, a U.S. Navy capacity to deal with, say. Scuds is a valuable element of presence.
These considerations explain what looks like an emphasis on the high end of the naval spectrum. It certainly is true that a credible antimissile system can be built into a ship far smaller than an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer. As antiship missiles become more sophisticated, however—particularly faster—the minimum cost of a missile- defense system rises dramatically. One might imagine that somehow a bigger
This Marine Corps Ml tank coming off an LCAC at Camp Pendleton, California, illustrates the service’s commitment to maneuver warfare.
ship with bigger missiles costs far more than a frigate-size ship with short-range missiles, but most of the cost of a system is in her radar and command system. A frigate with a really effective self-defense missile might not be much cheaper than an Arleigh Burke, and she would not benefit from the passive survivability inherent in a larger hull.
Another dramatic development is the loss of the last Newport (LST-1179)- class amphibious ships. Four already are being transferred to Australia and Spain, and all the others are on offer. Is this really consistent with the new emphasis on littoral warfare? The answer would seem to lie in the peculiarities of these ships. From about 1948 on, the goal of U.S. amphibious development was a 20-knot force. That was not too difficult to achieve for every class except the LST. Alone of ocean-going amphibious ships, the LST had to beach in order to unload heavy tracked vehicles. It was virtually impossible to combine high speed with
the sort of bluff bow needed to accommodate doors and a ramp. One early solution was to put the doors in the stem, put tractor propellers under the bow, and turn 180° to get onto the beach. The New- port-class LSTs use a rather elaborate bow and extending ramp instead. They cannot safely beach; their design was never altogether satisfactory for their intended mission. The Russians, as it turned out, in their Ivan Rogov landing ships.
managed to combine conventional bow doors with high speed. For them the key was a technology the U.S. Navy had not embraced when the Newports were designed: high-powered gas turbines, which provided enormous brute force—albeit at high fuel consumption—in a compact package.
Over time, the amphibious force shifted to dock-type ships—LSDs, LPDs, LHAs, and LHDs—which could unload smaller craft to bring tanks and other vehicles onto a beach. The big ships could be shaped properly for high-speed transits; the smaller ones did not have to be fast. When the Marines adopted their current doctrine of over-the-horizon assault, it was relatively easy to substitute fast air-cushion landing craft (LCACs) for the slow tank carriers of the past. LSTs survived to carry amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), which they launched at sea. That was clearly a secondary role, however, since the same vehicles could swim out of well decks. The LSTs just do not
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fit current ideas of how to execute an amphibious assault. Retaining them would not be homage to littoral concerns, but rather a way of consuming valuable people and money. They are going.
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The changing shape of the Navy clearly has real consequences. For example, for a long time the amphibious force has been changing from numerous relatively small ships to a much smaller number of relatively large ones. One consequence is that there are many fewer command billets in the amphibious force. Fewer officers will gain amphibious command experience during their careers, and that presumably will affect the balance of views within the fleet as a whole. The change in numbers is driven by major external forces, not by any internal desire to change the balance within the fleet. [See ‘“Gone with the LSTs,” pages 93-94, this issue.]
In the case of the amphibious force, the move towards fewer larger ships was economically attractive: it took fewer sailors to move the same number of Marines. The Marines sometimes pointed out that the bigger amphibious ships were not too much harder to sink than the smaller ones, so that the better peacetime economy might prove rather costly in wartime. The shift to over-the-horizon assault was justified partly by hopes that ships could remain safely out of reach of coastal antiship missiles—there was of course no hope of providing them with much in the way of defensive armament. Flence the end of the LSTs.
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One irony remains. The LCACs can indeed bring vehicles onto the beach at high speed. Unlike their slow predecessors, however, they cannot carry large numbers of troops. Their tank decks become far too hot (vehicle crews are carried in compartments in the LCAC). Hence the need exists for the assault amphibians, which carry troops. Existing ones are quite slow, however, and therefore cannot be launched from well beyond the horizon. The projected solution is a very fast amphibian, the advanced amphibious assault vehicle—but it may prove too expensive to be viable. For a time, there was real interest in a fast assault amphibious vehicle carrier, which could bring amphibians from the big well-deck ships sitting safely offshore to a launch area near a beach. They may yet return.
Proceedings / May 1994