The U.S. Navy in Review

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It was “a year of ‘operationalizing’

. . From the Sea.’” So Vice Admiral Leighton Smith, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/5), noted of the previous year in early February 1994: “From Somalia, to the Adriatic, to the northwest Pacific, to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, we put our money where our mouth was,

erating under the auspices of the United Nations. When the situation worsened in the Persian Gulf less than a month later, air combat elements of this multifaceted naval force were dispatched to Saudi Arabian bases, ultimately taking part in a combined strike of more than 100 U.S., British, and French aircraft against Iraqi ground radar installations. Meanwhile,

ent from any other year since the end of World War II. In the new world order, world peace was still a commodity in critically short supply.

At home, other factors underscored the new realities of the post-Cold War era for the Navy and Marine Corps. A new President took office intent on scaling back the defense infrastructure, looking for dual-use civilian conversions for military systems, and shifting his and the nation’s focus to nondefense concerns. A new foreign policy of “enlargement” had become apparent, if still ill-defined in early 1994, within a framework of four dangers to U.S. security interests:

>■ Threats to democracy and reform throughout the world, but most critically in the Baltic republics, Eastern and Central Europe, and Central and South America

► Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resulting from an anticipated hemorrhage of weapon sales from the former Soviet republics and Russia, China,

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U.S. NAVY (J. LEEKEY)

The F-14 over Somalia from VF-102 and the maritime prepositioning ship Pvt. Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK-3004) tied up at Mogadishu were part of Operation Restore Hope—an undertaking that demonstrated Navy and Marine Corps capabilities .. From the Sea.”

maintaining a credible presence of highly capable naval forces in regions of importance to the United States and projecting decisive military power where and when needed.”

Indeed, as 1992 ended, the landing of Navy Special Warfare forces and Marines on the coast south of Mogadishu seemed to go according to the “. . . From the Sea” script that had been released in late September. Highly mobile and sustainable U.S. naval forces answered the call to a faraway trouble spot to safeguard national interests; they were tailored to the specific operational needs at hand; they operated from the sea, in the littorals; they laid the groundwork for the introduction of Army and Air Force units; and they complemented multinational forces op-

.S. NAVY (T. MITCHELL)

other elements of the Navy maintained constant vigil overseas, honing combat skills in possible combat environments, working with old allies and new friends, with the Navy’s ships averaging about 30% of the time under way and almost 20% forward-deployed.

Such compellence operations continued throughout 1993, which from the deckplates, at least, seemed little differ-

and North Korea to unstable regimes in Iran, Libya, and practically anyone else having the cash

► Regional dangers posing the potential for conflicts of varying dimensions, including North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, the former Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and India; the arc of crisis and conflict throughout the newly independent states on the southern tier of the former Soviet Union;

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Somalia, the Middle East, and Southern Africa

^ Economic dangers posed by a continued and growing dependence on foreign oil, threats to critical sea lines of communication, need for secure access to markets worldwide, and political and economic instability in key world regions Just how all of these dangers would af- | feet the need for naval forces was Hot clear, but in 1993 the Navy began fashioning an operational concept of engagement, partnership, and prevention that took "'hatever guidance was available from the White House to breathe /life into the words in . . From the Sea.”

Operations and Exercises

During 1993, the Navy supported nine major crisis-response operations and participated in more than 165 exercises in almost ' ^every comer of the globe. The Somalia evolution—Operations Restore and Sustain Hope—provided ■he first trial of the new strategic concept and in retrospect epito- ■mized what the white paper en- I Wsages for the future. The September 1992 war game at the Naval War College in Newport,

Rhode Island, confirmed in an academic setting that the theory embodied in “.. . From the Sea” was achievable in the real world.

Among several critical littoral Warfare requirements identified at Newport, however, the war game ^recognized a crucial need for enhanced command-control-communication (C³) upgrades for all large-deck amphibious ships. The No- ^vember deployment of the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) to Somalia provided the testbed for a C³ van. This enabled her to ■ serve as a joint and combined command- and-control node for a humanitarian mission that all too soon degenerated to crisis and conflict, as ambiguous U.S. Political and military objectives were frustrated by the continuing intransigence of various Somali warlords.

The three-ship Tripoli amphibious ready group (ARG) arrived off the Somali coast supported by a maritime Prepositioning ship (MPS) from Diego Garcia, the first time such a civilian- manned asset had been integrated with an amphibious task group. The Tripoli ARG was augmented by the USS Ranger fCV-61), which had been operating with hvo such groups during this, her last deployment to the Persian Gulf. This early Arriving task force on 9-10 December established a secure environment—with the

force reconnaissance Marines coming ashore amid the glare of news media waiting for them on the beach—that gave the various U.N. and nongovernmental relief organizations time to stave off famine, while other elements worked to resolve political issues separating the numerous Somali clans. Indeed, one of the first indications that Somali factions had

of the U.S. force offshore were low and hot overflights by the Ranger's fighter/ attack aircraft above Mogadishu. The Tripoli's enhanced C³ capabilities allowed her to act in an air-marshalling role, complemented by E-2C Hawkeye aircraft from the Ranger and later assumed by Aegis cruisers with their much more capable radar and command-and- control systems, that guided U.S. Air Force and other countries’ relief flights into Mogadishu airport.

The Navy’s forces at times included aircraft carriers, two ARGs, and a naval construction regiment that provided support to Army and Air Force units conducting humanitarian relief operations throughout the country. Active and reserve Military Sealift Command units delivered heavy equipment and supplies aboard fast sealift ships and other MPS assets, operated the port of Mogadishu, and piloted ships bringing in humanitarian aid. With the situation in Somalia sta

bilizing. the Ranger headed home for decommissioning, relieved by the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-64) in early January 1993.

As Operation Provide Hope stood up, Iraqi air-defense radars continued a cat- and-mouse game, illuminating U.S. and allied aircraft conducting Operation Southern Watch patrols in the no-fly zones above southern Iraq. Despite U.S. and U.N. warnings to stop such truculent activities, the Iraqis continued to challenge allied aircraft. As the taunting grew more belligerent in December and early January, two squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet fighter/attack aircraft flew from the Kitty Hawk joining U.S. Air Force aircraft operating from Saudi Arabian air bases, as the carrier turned north and steamed toward the Persian Gulf. On 13 January the Kitty Hawk launched 35 aircraft that joined other coalition forces in a strike against the offending surface- to-air missile sites.

Four days later, three Navy destroyers—the USS Caron (DD-970), Hewitt (DD-966), and Stump (DD-978)—in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf launched 45 Tomahawk land-attack missiles against a suspected Iraqi nuclear fabrication site. Of those, one failed to go into cruise phase, and three hit civilian areas (including a Baghdad hotel), but 41 struck their targets successfully. With tensions mounting in both the northern and southern no-fly zones above Iraq, the Navy moved several surface warships and submarines into position in the Eastern Mediterranean complementing those already on station in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to support U.S. Central Command operations. These ship movements highlighted the operational flexibility inherent in naval forces, with the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) battle group especially demonstrating the ease with which assets can be shifted between theater commanders to meet emerging needs.

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Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers (above) and Aegis cruisers launched Tomahawk missiles against Iraq on several occasions during 1993.

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Then, on 26 June 1993, in response to revelations that Iraq had attempted to assassinate then-President George Bush during a 1992 visit to Kuwait, U.S. surface warships operating in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea launched Tomahawks against Iraq’s intelligence headquarters in Baghdad. The destroyer Peterson (DD-969) and the Aegis cruiser Chancellorsville (CG-62) successfully launched 23 missiles, destroying or heavily damaging many of the buildings in

the compound. Three of the missiles missed their targets and struck surrounding residential areas, and four landed within the compound but missed their intended targets. A 24th missile was not fired, because it failed to align properly in its launcher. (The three wayward Tomahawks and four near-misses—and the January strike on the A1 Rashid Hotel in Baghdad—were the proximate cause for Nora Slatkin, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research. Development and Acquisition, to call for a pause in Navy planning for the Block IV TLAM and the

Deployed Navy and Marine Corps units tried out a new idea in 1993: adaptive force packaging. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) left some of her air w ing ashore to make room for 600 Marines and their aircraft, such as this HMH-362 CH-53D landing during Operation Deny Flight in the Adriatic last May.

Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program, ostensibly to ensure that the potential for collateral damage will be minimized in future weapons ... a “peacetime” concern that caused some Navy planners to deride her decision.) The next month, EA-6B Prowler aircraft from the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) fired two high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMS) at Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites that had illuminated coalition aircraft on no-fly patrols.

U.S. Navy forces—including the Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) of Marine Corps fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft and 600 Marines embarked on board the

Theodore Roosevelt during her 1993 Mediterranean deployment—maintained important sea and air surveillance off the shores of and in the skies over the former Yugoslavia. With the continuation of Operation Provide Promise—which began in July 1992 to airlift humanitarian supplies from Germany to Sarajevo— Operation Deny Flight began in April 1993 to enforce the U.N. resolution declaring a no-fly zone in the airspace above Bosnia. Similarly, Operation Sharp Guard was a multinational effort begun in 1993 in the Adriatic Sea and con-

ducted by the NATO Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean and other Western European navies to enforce economic sanctions against Croatia, Serbia, and the Republic of Yugoslavia. Aircraft carriers and air wings. Aegis cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines, and Marine Corps aircraft complemented the land-based forces of U.S. allies and friends. Navy surface warships with embarked Coast Guard law-enforcement detachments conducted maritime interceptions of vessels suspected of carrying contraband, while Aegis cruisers provided command-and- control support to U.S. Air Force humanitarian flights and E-3C airborne warning and control aircraft managing the complex airspace in the region.

Maritime Interception Force operations continued in the Red Sea, North Arabian Gulf, and Persian Gulf in support of U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Important elements of these operations are the Coast Guard detachments that serve on U.S. Navy surface warships and conduct boardings and inspections of suspicious vessels. (Because of some congressional intransigence, the Coast Guard has been ef-

fectively—if only implicitly—barred from using any of its cutters or patrol boats in these operations. This is ironic, for the Middle Eastern interception operations— like the Caribbean Haitian and coun- temarcotics operations—seem tailor-made for the Coast Guard’s national security roles and missions, especially as Navy force levels are declining.) This is arduous duty, placing great strains on people and platforms. On 19 September 1993, the USS Spruance (DD-963) conducted the 18,000th interdiction. Through the end of the year, some estimates noted that the interdictions had resulted in about 8,500 boardings and the diversion of nearly

1.0   cargo ships carrying nonhumanitarian materials bound for Iraq.

Operation Support Democracy, enforcing U.N. sanctions against the Haitian military regime in the wake of its renunciation of the 1993 Governor’s Island Agreement, began in October. In addition to U.S. Navy ships and aircraft devoted to the operation. Coast Guard aircraft and cutters, and ships from Argentina, Canada, and France helped the Navy’s Task Force 120 implement the international quarantine, with Coast Guard boarding parties searching 62 vessels inbound to Haiti through early February 1994.

The Navy also deployed aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and surface warships to underscore U.S. and international diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis over North Korea’s announcement in March 1993 that it was leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and rejecting calls for inspections of facilities suspected of producing nuclear weapons. The Navy maintained a combat-ready posture in the Western Pacific, with the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, Japan, also primed for a rapid response, had the diplomatic posturing bom no fruit.

Finally, drug intercept operations continued throughout 1993 under three Joint Task Forces (JTF-4, -5, and -6) comprising Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Air Force people linked to the U.S. Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Guard. Active and Naval Reserve surface ships, submarines, and aircraft supported the multiagency campaign to interdict the flow of drugs into the United States. The Department of the Navy Posture Statement released in February 1994 noted that “last year, these operations, involving over

Proceedings / May 1994

31.0 flight hours and more than 4,500 ship days, contributed to the seizure of over 40 tons of cocaine.” While the Clinton administration has proposed refocusing U.S. counterdrug efforts away from interdiction, this clearly is an element of

the future spectrum of what is now being referred to as “OOTW”—Operations Other Than War—in a search for non-tra- ditional missions for the U.S. military services in the new era of international “peace.” The Navy, for example, has proposed several such initiatives, including the use of oceanographic support ships that are no longer required for Cold War antisubmarine operations to support the President’s National Drug Control Policy, thereby releasing surface warships for other, more demanding forward-presence missions.

In complement with and sometimes simultaneously, the Navy continued its program of major exercises with other U.S. armed services and the militaries of allies and friends throughout the world. Such annual exercises as Ocean Venture ‘93 and ad-hoc exercises planned almost at the spur of the moment, such as passing exercises, offer opportunities to practice the full range of military missions and tasks, to test the compatibility of joint and combined forces’ equipment, and to evaluate new tactics and procedures. A

few of the many exercises conducted during 1993 illustrate the new direction of the Navy, focusing on projection of power in the littorals.

Given the significant potential for our adversaries’ mines to attack the Navy’s strategy directly, with chilling and deadly results as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, the Navy’s emphasis on improving its mine countermeasures (MCM) capa-

bilities and the programs put in place since the Mine Warfare Plan was first published in early 1992 had to be tested. From January through June 1993, four mine countermeasures exercises— GulfMCMEx, Unified Spirit, Euro, and Blue Harrier—showed how far the Navy had come . . . and how far it has yet to go to become the world’s best. The last three provided the opportunity for U.S. surface and airborne mine countermeasures units to conduct integrated operations with MCM forces from seven other NATO countries, some of which still enjoy the reputation of being the best such forces in the world. A critically important development for the future, the USS Inchon (LPH-12), slated for conversion as the Navy’s MCM command- control-support ship (MCS), served in a flagship role for MCM Group Two, supported MH-53E airborne mine countermeasures helicopters and four explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachments, and was a mothership for four Avenger

During operation Support Democracy- in the Caribbean, crews from the USS Ainsworth (FFT-1090) boarded the motor vessel Black Eagle, bound for Haiti, and confirmed that her cargo included only humanitarian items such as wheat and flour. The frigate's crew includes five female officers and 26 female enlisted sailors permanently assigned.

PHOTOS U.S. NAVY (C. CUNE)

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(MCM-l)-class ships. Blue Harrier ‘93, the largest Western mine countermeasures exercise to date, was the centerpiece of the European deployment, involving the sweeping of more than 250 exercise mines that represented the full range of the threat to U.S. and allied naval forces. The U.S. group was the only element that demonstrated a clean sweep of its assigned area—and more: the helicopters

Typifying Navy commitments to training with allies worldwide, the USS Deyo (DD-989), here refueling from the German Navy’s replenishment oiler Rhon, served as flagship for the commander during Exercise BaltOps 93.

and surface ships also swept two practice mines left over from a previous exercise and detected and neutralized three World War II mines. Admiral Klaus Rehder, Commander, Naval Forces Baltic Approaches, praised the performance of the helicopters from Norfolk-based HM-14, and warned that “from an alliance point of view, it would hurt less if you decide to reduce SMCM rather than AMCM.”

Such training and exercises were complemented by mining evolutions, a sometimes ignored skill but one increasingly identified in the Navy’s Mine Warfare Plan as a key element of littoral warfighting operations. In October, for example, the F/A-18 Hornets of VFA-81 joined the USS Saratoga (CV-60) for CompTUEx. In addition to working up long-range strikes and dropping ordnance in support of special operations (SEAL) spotters ashore, the squadron conducted a flawless mining exercise with 100% of the mines delivered on target.

The real-world operations also offered the opportunity to train with allies and friends. The Persian Gulf deployment of the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) is a case in point. Setting sail in early February 1993, she participated in exercises with the forces of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand prior to taking up station in support of Operation Southern Watch. Her air wing, CVW-9, flew numerous exer

cises with Persian Gulf forces—Eager Archer, Eager Mace, and Desert Peace with Kuwait; Iran Agate with the United Arab Emirates; Impelling Victory and Indigo Desert with Qatar; and Neon Arrow, Nautical Swimmer, and Inherent Fury with Bahrain—before being relieved by the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) battle group in June.

Back at home in October, Navy aircraft participated in Air Warrior 94-01 at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Working with Army, Air Force, and Marine units, F/A-18 Hornets provided close air support in conjunction with Army maneuvers at the Fort Irwin, California, National Training Center. This exercise tested the evolving doctrines, tactics, and procedures of working in the joint combat environment. Similarly, Kernel Raider off the southern California coast in October saw the full dimension of players and tasks involved in a combined-arms, amphibious assault; naval special warfare and sea, air, land special forces, explosive ordnance disposal divers and marine mammals, air and surface mine hunting and sweeping, high-speed surface and airborne Marine assaults, gunfire support, close air support. . . you name it, and it was part of the exercise intended to test evolving principles of the Marine Corps’ Operational Maneuver Warfare “.. . From the Sea” doctrine.

The U.S. adventure in Somalia officially came to an end in late March 1994, when one Marine unit remained ashore as the rest boarded amphibious ships offshore, essentially closing the Navy’s operations in 1993. That naval presence of some 2,000 Marines and combat aircraft was to remain in the region, ready to assist the U.N. forces that stayed behind in

what most observers regarded as a futile attempt to ensure stability as a political solution continues to elude the warring factions. Still, from an “‘operationalizing’ ‘. . . From the Sea’” perspective. Operations Restore and Sustain Hope, and all others conducted during 1993, showed the real-world requirements for and capabilities of naval forces.

Institutionalizing . . From the Sea ”

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While critically important, these operations were only part of the Navy’s story in 1993. The new environment also demands new thinking and novel approaches to naval doctrine, forces, budgets, plans, and programs. As Admiral William Owens, then-Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment (N8), remarked numerous times during 1993, ‘“business as usual’ will doom us. We have to be in the forefront of change.” Two initiatives—one of which had its genesis in mid-1992—came to fruition in 1993 and will continue to shape the Navy’s institutional environment for the future.

Proceedings / May 1994

The first was the new programming decision process begun in 1992 and the restructuring of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to align it with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to ensure that the requirements and programming staffs are more closely integrated in a rational, regular system for assessment and decision-making. As characterized by the 1994 edition of the CNO’s Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, the new approach uses “. . . From the Sea” as a starting point and “gets back to basics” in the alloca-

tion of increasingly scarce resources to meet still-challenging operational commitments around the world. The Navy’s budget is expected to continue its decline in real buying power that began a decade before, with (optimistic) projections that by 1999 the cumulative negative growth in budget authority will be about 40% when compared to 1985, the last year in which the Navy enjoyed an afterinflation increase in funding. Without a rational and empirical approach to resolving funding dilemmas, the potential was great for misguided policy and program decisions to thwart the intent of rightsizing and recapitalizing the force for the future. Thus, the new institutional process now includes:

►     The seven Joint Mission Area and three Support Area Assessments that are chaired by Navy flag or Marine Corps general officers and which address requirements and capabilities in the following areas: Joint Strike, Joint Littoral Warfare, Joint Surveillance, Joint Space and Electronic Warfare/lntelligence, Strategic Sealift and its Protection, Strategic Deterrence, Forward Presence, Readi- ness/Support/Infrastructure, Manpower and Personnel, and Shore Training.

►     The Resources and Requirements Review Board—or “R-Cube B” (R³B) - which is the principal forum for reviewing the results of the various Joint and Support Area Assessments. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment (N8) chairs the R-'B, which advises the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy regarding program decisions.

►     The Investment Balance Review (1BR) combines the assessment results and the recommendations of the R3B into a consensus investment strategy that is then briefed to the Navy Fleet Commanders- in-Chief; following the CinCs’ review, the IBR becomes the foundation for the Navy’s budget submission to the Secretary of Defense.

While this three-tier process did have an effect in fall 1992 on shaping the Navy’s program for fiscal year 1994, it was fully instituted during 1993 for the Program Review 95 process that also took as its guide the results of the Defense Department’s Bottom-Up Review. In late 1993 the new process passed perhaps its greatest test, the departure of its progenitor and advocate. Admiral Owens, with his relief. Vice Admiral Thomas J. Lopez, continuing the assessment and balancing efforts. His task, however, seems to be more difficult than Admiral Owens’s, as what fat there might have been in the Navy’s program was largely cut during the first two rounds of internal rightsizing, Program Reviews 94 and 95. Now the cuts are deeper, focusing on the re

duction of still more Cold War infrastructure, with an even greater potential for going into muscle if not through bone. And now the vision for the future is perhaps concentrated more on solving today’s problems than creating new paradigms for the 21st century.

The second element of institutionalizing “. . . From the Sea” was the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command on 12 March 1993. The command stood up to provide the fundamental philosophy and doctrine—not dogma—for the Navy and Marine Corps to contribute fully in joint and combined operations. Under the plank-owner leadership of Rear

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Vice Admiral William A. Owens, shown at the Naval Institute’s Washington seminar last October, oversaw the reorganization of the OpNav staff and the budgeting process before picking up his fourth star to become Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rear Admiral Frederick Lewis, shown at last year’s Annapolis Seminar, is directing the Naval Doctrine Command’s publication of the Navy’s “How We Fight” manuals.

Admiral Fred Lewis, the command’s charter is to serve as the primary authority for the development, dissemination, and evaluation of naval doctrine— the explicit statements of how we fight. It will be headed alternately by a Navy flag and Marine Corps general officer and has already shown itself to be the focal point for developing new concepts of operations, integrating Navy/Marine Corps

doctrine into joint war-fighting doctrine, and developing the overarching concepts for the naval service’s contribution to combined and coalition war-fighting.

The Doctrine Command’s work during 1993 had several elements. First, the command drafted and shaped its capstone document. Naval Warfare (NDP-1), to serve as what Admiral Lewis describes as “the fundamental philosophical statement of who we are as a Naval Service, what our basic beliefs as naval warriors are, and how we conduct naval warfighting.” The document was completed within eight months from a blank sheet of paper and ready for final review as 1993 closed. (It was signed on 28 March by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.) In parallel with the efforts on NDP-1, the command identified and began work on the remainder of what will become the “NDP Series” of supporting publications: NDP-2, Naval Intelligence; NDP-3, Naval Operations', NDP-4, Naval Logistics', NDP-5, Naval Planning', and NDP-6, Naval Command and Control. (The numbering system follows the Joint Publication scheme.) All were in various stages of development at year’s end, and the command had begun a review, development. and standardization of doctrine in Navy and Marine Corps training and education curricula.

At the same time, the Naval Doctrine Command commenced work on several special projects, including the preparation of an unclassified manual of naval standard operating procedures, signals, and maneuvers to complement the existing classified NATO manual, a classified study of Tomahawk land-attack missile operational doctrine, a draft publication on Naval Command and Control Warfare, and rationalizing the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) series. The last will be “a daunting task,” according to Admiral Lewis, “as the NWP series has grown almost without regard to structure or focus. We will work to bring it in line with the strategic concepts of “. . . From the Sea" and link it specifically to the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] model.” Admiral Lewis’s staff is also developing an encyclopedia-like publication, the Interagency Coordination Document, to aid commanders responding to humanitarian and peace-keeping missions. It will catalog the current status of U.S. and U.N. operations, including the number of troops and nongovernmental organizations in each country and region.

Infrastructure and Industrial Base

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Rightsizing the Navy for the future has already had a significant impact on both the Navy’s infrastructure and the nation’s

defense industrial base. As an element of the Support Area Assessment process, infrastructure—all functionally organized activities that furnish resources for the management of defense forces, the facilities or bases from which these forces operate, centrally organized logistics, per-

And so it has, with rightsizing in this case meaning downsizing with a vengeance. Prior to the 1993 round of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC), for example, the Navy had 154 continental U.S. installations, including 10 major operating bases, eight

olina, supporters, the Commission considered closing the newly built Naval Station at Ingleside, Texas. But the final voting kept Ingleside open—and condemned | the Naval Base Charleston to oblivion— on the strength of the Navy’s arguments that Ingleside was an ideal location for

Hail and farewell: The Essex (LHD-2), the Tarawa (LHA-1) [left, front and background, respectively], and the Long Beach Naval Shipyard itself will remain, but the USS Ranger (CV-61), home from Somalia, has been decommissioned.

sonnel support, and medical services— has been and will remain an area under intense scrutiny. The 1993 edition of Force 2001 explained that “today’s infrastructure is unaffordable both because it is sized to support a much larger force and because it duplicates services and facilities available from the private sector and the other services. If the Naval Service is to maintain force levels adequate to meet American global commitments, the naval infrastructure must be downsized even more than force levels.”

shipyards, 28 naval air stations, and 16 major Marine Corps bases. During the 1993 round, the Department of the Navy recommended closing 23 installations, and the result of the Commission’s deliberations in June showed the Navy bearing the brunt of the 1993 closures. The Commission added the Staten Island Naval Station in New York and the Agana Naval Air Station, Guam, to the Defense Department’s list and barely refrained (by a four-to-three vote) from adding another facility, California’s Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The commission also spared, for the time being, several Navy facilities that were included by the Defense Department: the Naval Air Station at Meridian, Mississippi; the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center at St. Inigoes, Maryland (it will, however, lose about 1,000 billets); and the New London Submarine Base. At the futile behest of Charleston. South Car-

the Navy’s new Mine Warfare Center of Excellence.

The Commission’s next round, in 1995, will see even more blood-letting, as the Navy struggles to maintain a fleet operating structure—ships, aircraft, highly trained men and women, weapons, and fuel—at the expense of the shoreside facilities. This will demand even more innovation in life cycle logistic support and training, with the latter increasingly being moved away from centralized facilities to pierside and organic training and simulation systems. One senior uniformed Navy officer commented that the laboratory structure will also be a key candidate for right-sizing and taking advantage of civilian industry capabilities, “something of a reverse ‘dual-use’ program.”

The 1993 Bottom-Up Review outlined the nation’s defense industrial base policy, which for the Navy translated into three principal issues: nuclear-powered

Proceedings / May 1994