U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Developments

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

The Bottom-Up Review dominated all defense considerations in the first year of the Clinton administration, as all major decisions were deferred pending its outcome. Now that it has been published, it serves as the Department of Defense’s strategy for research and acquisition.

The February 1994 departure of review architect Les Aspin, then Secretary of Defense, has changed little with regard to the review. Dr. William Perry, his successor, endorsed it and vowed to implement management reforms to make it affordable—but affordability is its Achilles’ heel.

The review is based on maintaining a capability to respond simultaneously to two major regional contingencies: for planning purposes, a North Korean invasion of South Korea and a reprise of Desert Storm. This will cost $35 to S50 billion more over the five-year planning horizon than has been allocated for defense in the Clinton budget, which leads to charges of a disconnect between the President’s national security strategy and his defense budget.

General John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of

This artist’s concept shows possible configuration of an advanced short takeoff-vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft using a gas-driven lift fan.

—

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

152

Table 1: Major Changes in the Bottom-Up Review (FY1995-99)

•        Adds Army Prepositioned

Equipment

•        Enhances Army National Guard

Brigade Readiness

•        Develops V-22

•        Provides Precision Strike Capa

bilities for F-14, F-22, B-l, B-2

•        Establishes Joint Advanced Strike

Technology (JAST) Program

•        Restructures Ballistic Missile

Defense

•        Cancels USN A/F-X

•        Cancels USAF Multi-Role Fighter

•        Cancels F-16 after FY94

•        Cancels F/A-18C/D after FY97

•        Retires A-6

•        Cuts 2 active Army divisions

•        Cuts 1 reserve Army division

•        Cuts 3 active Air Force fighter

wings

•        Cuts 4 reserve Air Force fighter

wings

•        Cuts 1 active Navy air wing

•        Cuts 1 reserve Navy air wing

•        Cuts 1 aircraft carrier

•        Cuts 55 surface ships and

submarines

•        Cuts 115,000 DoD civilians

•        Cuts 160,000 active military

Staff, told Congress early in 1994 that th‘ readiness levels and modernization spec ified by the review must be guarantee¹ for the 1.4-million-person force—also specified by the review—to meet the requirements of the two contingencies Skeptics doubt that acquisition reform wil yield the magnitude of savings required

Navy and Marine Corps force level' emerged in relatively good shape. (See ler Table 1 for major review changes fro it the Bush administration plan.) Active and reserve Air Force fighter wings, for example, are dropping from fiscal yeat 1990’s 36 to 20 as a result of the review-'- a 44% reduction. Navy active and reserve carrier air wings over the same years reflect a reduction from 15 to 11—a 27# reduction; the Marine Corps will continue to maintain three large active and one reserve aircraft wing, although som^e squadrons have been decommissioned.

Carriers drop from 15 active plus > training carrier in 1990 to 11 active plus one mobilizable training carrier (25%)- The review justified this number not on the basis of two contingencies, but on the requirements for forward presence^¹ major recognition of the peacetime value of naval forces.

^U**H|

whi

cap: at rr

sorr

Tec

bles

^Joii

1

Pro

teci

ity

Air

con

test

cor

mj

firn

for

go;

^sys

Coupled with that was an appreciation

of Navy potential for theater missile defense. The review restructured the Bah listic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) program to emphasize development and deployment of theater missile-defense capabilities, which mean* developing a sea-based endo-atmospherk (lower-tier) capability using modified Aegis ships and upgraded SM-2 Block IVA missiles. In addition, the revie'' changed the sea-based exo-atmospherk (upper-tier) program from a technology demonstration to a major acquisition program.

Nevertheless, the review dealt naval aviation a major blow by canceling the new A/F-X, although it approved the F/A-18E/F program, planned F-14 upgrades, and research into advanced shod takeoff-vertical landing (ASTOVL) technology. The decision eliminated the mosl expensive program, but provided no replacement for the mid- to long-terrU'

lot

Pla

No is • Vei sig

U._;

Re

P/.

de]

As

Gt

be

the

^ret

ha

tin

19

co

co

at,

Proceedings / May 19nt U

n wit 'vhich could leave the Navy without any uired capability to exert control over airspace level*^at medium-to-long distances from the car- (See ^rter. Mitigating the A/F-X cancellation froit> somewhat is the Joint Advanced Strike 'e and ^ethnology (JAST) program. (See Tarn ex- bles 2 and 3.) yea(

This is not an aircraft development Program, but rather an attempt to develop technology that will lead to commonality in the next generation of Navy and Air Force strike fighters. It emphasizes common components—engines, avionics, test and training equipment—rather than common airframes.

Navy Secretary John Dalton predicted in December that the program would ultimately result in an operational aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps, citing a goal of 80% commonality for internal systems and avionics between Navy/Ma- rine Corps and Air Force variants. He did

iew-'i J°<nt Advanced Strike Technology :servt js re-

m

iatioii

ltinuf J on« some ted. dus : plus !5%> ot on m the :e—a value

ilock

vie\»

heric

>log)

ition

raval g the; J the 1 up- shod tech-j most, o re- errm

e de-^{1 not} rule out a STOVL airframe-power- Bal- Plant configuration for the naval aircraft, ation Not specifically cited by the Secretary evel- '^s the possible integration of JAST-de- _mis-| ^veloped systems into existing aircraft de- leansj ^s'gns such ^as the F-14 or the F/A-18. •hericA Brigadier General George Muellner. ifiei) U.S. Air Force, heads the program office; Rear Admiral Craig Steidle, former F/A-18 program manager, serves as deputy. General Muellner reports to Navy Assistant Secretary Nora Slatkin. When General Muellner steps down, he will he replaced by a naval officer, who will then report to an Air Force Assistant Secretary. Funding for the first year's effort has been set at $29.7 million, with an estimated $2 billion total planned through 1999.

The 1994 Congressional Authorization conference report was skeptical: “.. . the conferees do not support an advanced theater air management concept, such as

JAST, which appears to use technology rollover as a means of ‘treading water’ over several more years, and then leads only to a JAF (Joint Attack Fighter— the short-lived joint operational requirement for successors to the A/F-X and multirole fighter floated last summer) of a different color. By the same token, the conferees would also resist any effort which becomes a ‘science fair’ project that has no hope of yielding any fully integrated aircraft for more than 20 years. In short, the conferees cannot support such efforts. Vague, unchanneled, and ill- defined research planning is essentially ‘eating our own seed corn.’”

The report identified two missions that will require different airframe and technology combinations:

►     A single-engine, single-seat, “low-end” multirole aircraft as represented by the MRF, ASTOVL. and a conventional-take- off-and-landing ASTOVL variant

►     A multiengine, two-seat, “high end” strike aircraft, which satisfies the operational requirements of an A/F-X, and is compatible with F-22 technology

Advanced Short Takeoff-Vertical Landing

The joint Navy-Advanced Research Projects Agency ASTOVL program in 1993 moved into phase II as it considered two different lift-fan concepts. Lockheed is developing a shaft-driven lift-fan design while McDonnell Douglas focuses on a gas-driven fan. The Lockheed design employs the Pratt & Whitney FI 19 supercruising turbofan that also powers the company’s F-22. In the ASTOVL design, the FI 19 is mechanically linked to a vertically mounted lift fan for takeoffs and landings. The McDonnell Douglas team is using General Electric’s YF120, which lost the competition to power the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition won by the F-22. A portion of the ex-

haust gases from the YF120 are ducted forward to drive the lift fan in the McDonnell Douglas design.

Both teams will build full-scale wind tunnel models for evaluation at the NASA Ames Research Center in 1995. Phase II will end in fiscal year 1996 with the selection of the most promising design for construction as a flying technology demonstrator in phase III. First flight is scheduled for 2000. The U.S. and British governments have signed a memorandum of understanding that provides for British participation in phase III.

Boeing has been marketing its own direct-lift concept, rejected by the Agency at the end of phase I. Thanks to language in the 1994 Defense Authorization, funding was added for a study of direct-lift technology that might lead to a full-scale model demonstration similar to that planned for the lift-fan designs. The Agency will fund only 50% of the work, with the remaining costs underwritten by the industry team. As this issue closed for press, no contract for the direct-lift study had been awarded.

Tactical Aircraft Developments

Work began on the first Engineering and Manufacturing Development version of the F/A-18E in November 1993; first flight is scheduled for December 1995. A Critical Design Review is scheduled next month and the Navy plans to achieve an initial operational capability in 2001.

The Marines transferred their last A-6Es to the Navy in April 1993, but the last Navy A-6E squadron is to be decommissioned in September 1997 and the A-6 upgrade program has virtually stopped—as of January 1994 only the remaining aircraft from the 174-aircraft Lot I rewinging effort remain to be delivered. When the A-6Es are gone, naval forces will have little all-weather bombing capability; any medium-range bombing will have to be done by upgraded F-14s or multiple-refueled F/A-18s.

F-14 modernization is proceeding along three separate tracks:

►     The F-14A/B upgrade

>       The F-14 Block 1 strike program

>■ The Congressionally mandated F-14A- to-B conversion program

153

, i9*q *Yoceedings / Ma.V 1994

The F-14A/B upgrade program began in 1992 when the F-14D (Remanufacture) program was canceled; Grumman will deliver the last F-14D(R) this month. The F-14A/B upgrade—designed to keep F-14s in the fleet until 2010—is a service

The Navy, lead service for the joint standoff weapon (JSOW), began airborne tests of the weapon at Patuxent River last November (right). The Magic Lantern system (below, mounted on the SH-2’s starboard sponson), used in Desert Storm, is being adapted to locate mines in the surf and near-surf zone.

life extension program for 197 A- and B- model Tomcats. The upgrade incorporates avionics systems designed to improve survivability based on Operation Desert Storm combat experience. It is on schedule thus far.

The Block I Strike program, which begins this fiscal year, will equip 210 F-14As. -Bs, and -Ds with a precision air- to-ground capability. Improvements include a forward-looking infrared/laser- designator pod. night vision cockpit lighting, improved displays, and provisions for precision weapons. Current F- 14A/Bs can deliver Mk 80-series general- purpose bombs and cluster munitions.

Though replacing the F-14As’ TF30 engines with General Electric FI 10s is a high priority for naval aviation in general—and the number one priority of those who fly it—the upgrade officially is “unaffordable.” Nevertheless,

Congress in fiscal years 1992 and 1993 authorized and appropriated funds for a total of 15 conversions and a contract was awarded to Grumman in December 1993. The resulting F-14Bs also will go through the service-life extension program.

The Navy plans to maintain a fleet of 251 F-14s consisting of upgraded F-14As and Bs and new and remanufactured F-14Ds; 210 of these will get the Block 1 Strike upgrade.

The Navy continues to improve F/A-18C/D new- production aircraft even as it develops the F/A-18E/F.

This summer, McDonnell Douglas will begin delivering Lot XVI Hornets with APG-73 radars that should achieve an operational capability next year.

The Navy plans to retrofit F/A-18C/D(N-night) aircraft with the new radar back through Lot XII. Other upgrades programmed include global positioning system, soft

ware updates to integrate the new joint direct attack munition (JDAM) and the joint standoff weapon (JSOW), a positive identification system, new AN/ALE-47 chaff dispensers, new voice radios, and an improved radar warning receiver.

All 11 S-3 squadrons have transitioned to the S-3B and all 119 S-3A to S-3B conversions should be completed this fall. No additional S-3 upgrades or conversions are planned.

The Navy’s fiscal year 1995 budget request formally notified Congress of the end of the EA-6B remanufacture pro

gram. In fact, the service never got any remanufactured aircraft and no aircraft are in the pipeline—although one test aircraft does exist. Grumman delivered the last new aircraft in 1991 and cancellation of the remanufacturing program effectively ends procurement of this versatile aircraft. The Navy also is scaling down the advanced capability upgrade for existing EA-6Bs.

The E-2C Hawkeye may be the one Grumman aircraft that survives. Although the last new-production U.S. Navy E-2C was originally scheduled for delivery last month, the Navy' has determined that it is more cost-effective to buy new aircraft than upgrade existing models. Accord ingly, the service in this! year’s budget requested four new aircraft and plans to buy four a year through fiscal year 1999.

The E-2C’s Group II upgrade completed its operational evaluation in 1993 but was rated “Operationally effective/not operationally suitable.” The lack of operational suitability referred to a reliability and maintainability problem that will hold up continued introduction of Group II upgrades to the fleet (Group II aircraft achieved an initial operational capability in April 1992). The Navy plans additional upgrades beyond Group II including better mission computers and a cooperative engagement capability.

With the cancelation ot the Update IV avionics program—designed for open- ocean prosecution of Soviet submarines—the Navy has shifted P-3C emphasis from mid-ocean to the littorals- Approximately one-third of

Proceedings / May 199-1

Systems & Weapons Advanced Technology ning System Aircraft (T-45)

fctical Airborne Reconnaissance

rsea Warfare and MCM Development

ace Ship Torpedo Defense ^-Acoustic ASW

Vface ASW

Advanced Submarine System Development Advanced Surface Machinery Systems

Marine Corps Assault Vehicles

Ship Self Defense (6.3)

(6.4)

Gun Weapon System Technology

^'3 Modernization Program

AFX

^V-22A

Design SSN

Gnguided Conventional Air-Launched Weapons Tri-Service Standoff Weapon System

Airborne MCM

^°int Direct Attack Munition ^°int Standoff Weapon System

distributed Surveillance System T/A-18 Squadrons

Integrated Surveillance System ^*14 Upgrade

^J°int Advanced Strike Technology

Uefense Agencies

^°int Unmanned Air Vehicles Program

TTieater Missile

Table 2: Selected Aircraft and Systems in RDT&E

AIM-9 Consolidated Program

Defenses (6.3)

(6.4)

(6.4 Dem/Val)

Table 3: Selected Aircraft and Weapons in Production, Remanufacture, or Major Modification

the reduced P-3C force will get enhanced antisurface warfare, command-and-con- trol, and joint surveillance capabilities. The antisurface warfare improvement program should improve the aircraft’s autonomous quick-reaction capability as well as its ability to function as an integral element of expeditionary force operations. It will use commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental items to accelerate the process. Included are:

►     AN/APS-137 high-resolution inverse synthetic aperture radar to improve long- range detection, classification, tracking and targeting in all areas

►     Cluster Ranger optical system to pro

vide long-range, day-night standoff electro-optical imaging with a near real-time downlink to commanders at sea and ashore for targeting, continuous surveillance, and battle damage assessment > AN/AAR-47 passive missile warning system and the AN/ALE-47 countermeasures dispensing system

These improvements are a direct result of the Navy’s joint assessment process, which found that these relatively low-cost improvements could deliver a big payoff across a broad spectrum of missions.

Other programs include the sustained readiness program, which is designed to extend P-3C service life by about nine

years; continued transition of the naval reserve force to the P-3C aircraft; and conversion of remaining P-3C aircraft to the Update III configuration. In 1994, three of the remaining seven reserve P-3 squadrons flying P-3B aircraft will transition to the P-3C and four will be decommissioned. The transition to an all Update III force will commence in 1998. The existing 109 Update I and II P-3Cs will be upgraded to join the 138 Update Ills in the remaining 16 active and nine reserve P-3 squadrons.

The last active SH-2 LAMPS I squadron, HSL-33, was decommissioned in March 1994. The last two reserve

Search for New Trainer Continues

What $7-to-$10 billion aircraft development and procurement program has seven major American aerospace companies battling tooth and nail to win it? What competitive contract involves participants from Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Argentina, and Brazil, teamed with those seven major American aerospace companies? What contract will probably result in the production of more than 750 aircraft for the United States alone—not to mention the potential for at least that many foreign sales?

Certainly not the F-22.

The answer to all these questions is the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) program, the Air Force-Navy effort to replace all their T-37s and T-34Cs respectively. Although it’s not high-tech, it’s highly desirable, because it means a steady business base for about 30 years.

After a series of delays, it now appears that the JPATS aircraft competition is back on track. Considerable debate raged over cockpit accommodation for student pilots of all shapes and sizes; Congress finally dropped its insistence on a 95% accommodation rate and, in December 1993, settled for 82%. Requiring a cockpit to accommodate 95% of all American males and females in their early 20s, otherwise physically qualified to serve in the armed forces, would have driven all the competing teams to an extensive aircraft redesign, further diluting the original plan to save money by buying an off-the-shelf trainer.

The specific requirements for JPATS include thresholds, or minimums, and objectives— the closer a competitor comes to the objective, the higher the score. There is little doubt that all the competitors will meet the thresholds. While the services want to begin replacing primary trainers, the Air Force’s T-37 and the Navy’s T-34C have several years of service life remaining. Given tight defense budgets, it would not be surprising if the production schedule slipped again.

Beechcraft, teamed with Pilatus, is offering a PC-9 Mk-II. Vought is teamed with Argentina’s Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FMA) putting forward the latter’s turbofan- powered Pampa. Northrop and Brazil’s Embraer are offering Embraer’s turboprop EMB-312H Super Tucano. Lockheed and Aermacchi of Italy have adapted Aermacchi’s widely used MB-339 to the requirement as the T-Bird II. Grumman and Agusta have entered the latter’s S211A tur-

160

Proceedings / May 1994

LAMPS 1 squadrons will continue to operate SH-2s until they transition to SH-60Bs.

laval and craft 994. : P-3 tran- : deli all 998. •3Cs date nine

One hundred eighty-one SH-60B LAMPS Ills will be fitted with provisions for the Navy’s 28 Penguin antiship missile kits. Forty-six SH-60Bs and ten HH-60Hs will get provisions for the Navy’s 46 Hellfire missile kits. Both helicopters are being fitted with M-240 machine guns.

Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense

The Navy can bring to littoral warfare a complete, self-contained tactical ballistic missile defense (TBMD) system. The service has been pursuing two distinct programs: a lower tier, sea-based area defense (endo-atmospheric—up to 70 kilometers altitude), and an upper tier, sea-based, theater-wide capability (exo-atmospheric—above 70 kilometers altitude).

The lower-tier program modifies Aegis SPY-1 radar software and up-

grades the newest Standard Missile—the SM-2 Block IV—to the Block IVA configuration for its joint antiaircraft/anti- TBM role. Lower-tier defenses provide close-in area defense of fleet concentrations, ports, coastal airfields, amphibious objective areas, and expeditionary forces.

bofan-powered trainer. Rockwell and Deutsche Aerospace modified the latter’s original Fan Trainer with a new composite forward section, added the JT15D-5C turbofan also used in the Grumman-Agusta entry, and created the Ranger 2000 for the competition. The last entry to fly—21 December 1993—is the only dual-engine aircraft (Williams FI29 turbofans) and only exclusively American design in the competition, the Cessna Citation Jet.

The operational requirement for the JPATS aircraft was signed on 29 December 1993, and the request for proposals was due to be issued on 1 April 1994. Flight evaluations of responding teams’ aircraft will begin next month, and source selection will commence in September, leading to contract award in February 1995.

F. Kennedy

161

The upper-tier program is investigating the use of Aegis with various types of interceptors, principally BMDO’s Light Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) kinetic-kill vehicle—already tested by the Navy on a Terrier missile— and a seagoing version of the Army’s Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The upper-tier system

Doth lower-tier and upper-tier systems, while saving an estimated $21 billion ay scaling back research on a national missile defense to a technology-development program. The Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1995-1999 that emerged from the review included the Army's PAC-3 version of the lower-tier Patriot and its new upper-tier Theater High-Altitude Air-Defense (THAAD) system, and both the Navy’s lower- and upper-tier programs. All are to be funded as major acquisition programs in the five year defense plan.

would rely on external surveillance, track- tages: they require neither airlift nor hosting, and targeting systems to cue the nation support.

Aegis radar, enabling it to engage highly The Bottom-Up Review considered sophisticated, medium-range ballistic these characteristics when it made its demissiles. An upper-tier system can pro- cisions on TMD based on the following tect an area greater by an order of mag- premises:

nitude, depending upon the scenario, than ► A regional theater ballistic missile the area protected by a lower-tier system. threat is here today

Competing with the Navy’s upper-tier system for funding are an Air Force proposal to intercept missiles during their boost phase with modified short-range attack missiles carrying a kinetic-kill vehicle and the Army’s Corps surface-to-air missile (SAM)—a mobile antiaircraft/an- tiballistic missile battery with fundamentally the same performance as the immobile Patriot PAC-3. The review deferred work on the Army’s Corps SAM until fiscal year 1999 but the Air Force continues to push hard on its boost-phase system.

A BMDO-commissioned study concluded that 50% to 60% of the world’s major population centers can be protected by a sea-based combined lower- and upper-tier ballistic missile defense system. This, combined with the heavy investment that the Navy has already made in the infrastructure necessary for TBMD platforms, radars, and communications systems, makes a sea-based system very attractive. Twenty-two Aegis cruisers with vertical launch systems and the 29 Aegis destroyers authorized to date require only an additional 10% investment to add a lower- and upper-tier TBMD capability.

U.S. NAVY

Two Aegis cruisers—one off each            ^ A new ballistic missile threat to the

coast of the Korean Peninsula—               United States proper may emerge in the

carrying SM-2 Block I\As with Light future

Exo-Atmospheric Projectiles, could         ^ The Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

provide significant, immediately avail- still limits deployment of national defense able defenses against tactical ballistic systems; its limitations on theater defense missiles (TBMs) targeted against                                          systems are less clear

South Korea or Japan.                                 > For relatively small expenditures, the

United States can field an effective theater ballistic missile defense before the Combining the two systems would allow turn of the century without violating the a shoot-look-shoot posture.                                                                        ABM Treaty

Seabasing adds yet another dimension > Technology development can continue to theater missile defense. Ships can po- on a national missile defense system at a sition themselves in optimum locations considerably lower level of expenditure relative to the enemy’s launchers to max- than system development or, worse, de- imize engagement envelopes and mini- ploying a national system mize the amount of debris falling over The panel decided to forge ahead with land, decreasing the risk to civilians. a theater missile defense system by ex- Sea-based systems have other advan- ploiting core development programs of

To adapt the SM-2 Block IV for the lower-tier role, its seeker, autopilot, fuze, and warhead need modifications. Most difficult will be to integrate an infrared seeker with the missile radio-frequency guidance system. Much higher closing speeds dictate faster-acting autopilots and fuzes. Modifications to the Mk 133 warhead will optimize its kill probability against a ballistic target. The SM-2 Block IV missile is now in testing; some of the IVA modifications, including the IR seeker, will begin testing in fiscal year 1995, and the fully modified IVA missile will start tests in fiscal year 1997.

The Navy is conducting a cost and operational effectiveness analysis of the various candidates for an upper-tier system. The principal contenders are a kinetic kill vehicle like LEAP, or the Army’s heavier, slower, more conventional THAAD missile. Either system likely would be mounted atop an SM-2 airframe and rocket.

The LEAP technology-demonstration program has completed successfully two

tests using Terrier missiles, the first in September 1992 and the second in September 1993. Last year’s test, conducted from the USS Jouett (CG-29) at the test range off Point Mugu, California, confirmed the system’s stability and control, target missile tracking, kinematics and accuracy, nose-cone removal, and kinetic- kill vehicle ejection. Test 3 is scheduled this month and test 4 for July.

On 27 January 1994, Larry Lynn, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology, began reviewing the three services’ TMD programs. The Army-led BMDO favors Corps SAM development over the Navy’s upper-tier candidate, using the assumption that the Army would be able to insert its TBMD systems into the theater before hostilities commence. Critics question the assumption’s validity—and it would divert scarce airlift assets better employed building up other ground forces. The Navy, on the other hand, can be on station before the Army begins to deploy, enabling ground forces to come in under a TBMD umbrella.

Defense Department officials suggest that there would be no funding controversy if the Navy made its case more aggressively. Nevertheless, the Lynn review has deferred until fiscal year 1996 a decision on whether to proceed with Corps SAM, boost-phase intercept, or a sea- based upper tier.

Cooperative Engagement

The Navy, attempting to maximize its capabilities in the face of shrinking budgets and general downsizing, is developing a cooperative engagement capability that links raw radar inputs from cooperating units, and allows all units on the net to develop the same composite target track, whether or not their own onboard sensors hold contact. Such a system would improve dramatically surface antiair warfare capabilities by minimizing the effects of jamming and eliminating an individual ship’s radar horizon limitations; moreover, it would improve TBMD capability significantly. The system distributes fire-control quality sensor and engagement data from each platform on the net to all platforms and permits all to operate as a single, distributed AAW weapon system.

Testing of the new hardware required by the data distribution system and the cooperative engagement processor began at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory in 1989. It has progressed from a two-node, land-based prototype through three-node land testing over a net that extended from Wallops Island to Dam Neck, Virginia, and then to an at- sea four-node test. The four-node test

linked the Aegis Combat Systems Center at Wallops Island and the Fleet Combat Direction System Support Activity at Dam Neck with the USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56). Eastville Tower Site on Virginia’s Eastern Shore performed land-based relay functions while a Naval Air Test Center P-3 provided airborne at-sea data relay. The tests employed both controlled aircraft and target drones, with jamming provided by a pole-mounted jammer at Wallops Island and an NKC-135 aircraft. The tests successfully demonstrated sensor cooperation and data distribution functions in the shipboard environment.

The operational implications for such a system are enormous. For antiair warfare roles, battle-force combatants gain both precious reaction time and improved target recognition when confronted by hostile manned aircraft and, more important, antiship cruise missiles. The Antiair Warfare Commander (AAWC) or Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) stands to gain an effective battle management tool to employ finite assets against massed attacks.

The cooperative engagement system may display its greatest potential in the TBMD role, when warning and response times are measured in tens of seconds. If cooperating units are properly placed, it may permit development of a TBMD C⁴I architecture that allows multiple shots from numerous (multiservice) platforms at tactical ballistic missiles.

The Navy is currently focusing on battle-force level developments for cooperative engagement. The equipment is ready to transition from development into production and then fleet introduction; cost is minimal because the major components of the system—the platforms, sensors, and weapons—are operational. The whole can, in fact, be far greater than the sum of its parts.

Other Littoral Warfare Developments

The Center for Naval Analyses has embarked on a study to weigh sea-based contributions to the joint land battle in the 2000-2020 timeframe. Entitled “Sea- Based Firepower for the Joint Land Battle,’’ the study will address the following issues;

►     Planning context—scenarios, threats, mission priorities, and other service contributions

>■ Inadequacies in Defense Department surveillance, target acquisition, C⁴I, and strike capabilities

►     Deficiencies that naval forces can meet uniquely or most efficiently

►     Overall reconnaissance-strike system architecture options

>■ New system concepts that may warrant

concept exploration and development in the 1990s

► Key issues and uncertainties affecting planning and investment

The study concludes late this year. Though sponsored by the Navy, both Marine Corps and Army personnel are involved to ensure a comprehensive look at how the Navy can best support joint littoral warfare.

Congressional conferees identified in their report several systems that they believe can alleviate the Navy’s fire-support problems. Among these are a marinized variant of the Army’s tactical missile system (ATACMS), the Navy’s electro-thermal chemical gun discussed in this feature last year, advanced technology gun systems under development by the Army that might be usable by the Navy, and improvements to the Standard and Tomahawk missiles.

The next generation of Tomahawk Block IV missiles will be Tomahawk MultiMission Missiles (TMMMs), capable of attacking both land and ship targets, and eliminating the distinction between Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAMs) and Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missiles (TASMs). Use of the global positioning system (GPS), which replaces terrain comparison and digital scenematching maps, will improve accuracy; the new Tomahawks also will have an optional hard-target penetrator warhead. Satellite communications in-flight data links will allow the Block IV to broadcast its status to strike coordinators, and in turn allow those coordinators to redirect the missile while in flight, either to alternate targets or to the same target that might have moved.

The “Terminal Flex” mode of the data link allows an operator to refine the terminal portion of the flight for aimpoint refinement, target selection override, or mission abort. These new capabilities will dramatically increase Tomahawk’s flexibility and enable it to be used effectively against mobile targets, decrease the time necessary to plan and load a mission, and limit undesired collateral damage.

Cooperative engagement, commercial off-the-shelf upgrades, tactical ballistic missile defense. Block 1 strike upgrades to the F-14, and Block IV Tomahawk are five ways the Navy is spending relatively small amounts of money to achieve major capability improvements of operational assets. These improvements are all focused on the littoral environment, and take full account of fitting into joint operations.

Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., is a senior research analyst and study director at the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria. Virginia, and is a captain in the Individual Ready Reserve.