Revisiting the Balkan Cauldron

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—--   Can the concerted efforts of NATO and Russia—here,

_{s f|}         Russian peacekeepers arrive in   the former  Yugoslavia—end

ions         the carnage in the Balkans and restore peace    to   Europe?

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For the first time since the fighting began in 1992, there is reason for opti- misim in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Three key developments in February of this year have al- | tered the complexion of the conflict and offer hope for a possible solution to this three-sided .» war:

► A new focus on the Bosnian’s i plight as a Muslim survival ) cause, which generated fears of emerging fundamentalism in ¹ Europe.

> The 10 February truce lifting the Serb siege of Sarajevo, t forced by a new show of NATO and U.N. resolve and aided by Russian pressure on the Serbs.

> The U.S.-brokered agreement to form a joint Croat-Muslim I* Federation in Bosnia, which

I poses a serious threat to the gains made by the Serbs.

Despite these new elements, Serb forces continue to : consolidate their gains. They have achieved nearly all their t objectives and now occupy what Serbian nationalist leaders and Yugoslav Army planners originally called “the map.” This depicts a horseshoe-shaped area (nearly 70% of territorial Bosnia) designated before the outbreak of full-scale war in Bosnia in 1992 as the territory that would be seized and annexed to Serbia if Bosnia were to secede from Yugoslavia (See Figure 1). These gains now are threatened by the plan to combine Croat and Muslim forces, a result of the March negotiations in Vienna headed ^! by U.S. envoy Charles Redman. Both sides signed an : agreement providing for the disengagement of Bosnian and Croat forces, including neighboring Croatia’s regular army, the Hrvatska Voyska (HV), which began fighting openly in Bosnia in late 1993. Bosnian-Serb leaders of the self-proclaimed Serpska Republic quickly rejected the Croat-Muslim agreement, calling it an end to the for-

mer Yugloslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, they refused further negotiations until international sanctions against all Serbs are lifted—underlining the goal of merging all seized Bosnian and Croatian territories with Belgrade into a Greater Serbia. If the March Croat-Muslim agreement solidifies, the Serbs may be forced tactically to give up a portion of their captured territories.

Not a Religious Conflict

73

The support for Bosnia shown by a number of Islamic countries since the beginning of the conflict has failed to transform the struggle into a popular Muslim survival cause. The lack of material support from the major powers for the Bosnian government, however, has encouraged a move toward Muslim militancy in some areas of Bosnia. There are consistent reports of a trend toward the imposition of Islamic indoctrination for young people in army

units and of veils on women.

On 2 February 1994, Prime Ministers Tansu Ciller of Turkey and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan visited Sarajevo in an attempt to galvanize world opinion of the conflict as a drastic struggle for survival by ill-fated Bosnian Muslims. The four-hour visit conincided with U.N. reports of vicious brutality committed by a group of several hundred Islamic fighters from Iran and Afghanistan against Serb inhabitants around Travnik.

Reports of the presence of Muslim volunteers and mu- jahadin have been varied. By September 1992, there was a total of 400 mujahadin in Bosnia, mostly near Visoko and Mehurici, west of Sarajevo. Serbs claim there are about 4,000 Muslim volunteers from abroad fighting in Bosnia. One Turkish report tells of 160 Turkish volunteers operating in Bosnia. Other sources have reported a 1,500-man Islamic legion Kata’ib el-Mumittin (Phalanx of Believers) on the ground in Bosnia. Sources close to the ground fighting, however, maintain that there are no more than 600 volunteers

The conflict stems from the radical political transf' mations that occurred when more than 40 years of strcl Communist control in Yugoslavia came to an end. Thl movements emerged complete with demagogues, "I seized the convenient banners of the region’s diverse] ligions for their crusades. Partisan extremists thrust I idea of a Greater Serbia on alarmed minorities of Ortlj dox Serbs living in isolated pockets in Croatia and Bosj when those two former Yugoslav republics declared thf independence in 1991 and 1992, respectively. This, in tU caused other minority clusters of Catholic Croats Bosnian Muslims to fear for their security and set the sta| for a conflagration fanned by religious intolerance.

The Russian-Serbian Tradition

The recent Russian diplomatic offensive in the Balk£ which assisted NATO and the United Nations in lift'¹ the siege of Sarajevo, has been characterized by the me<)

as a polarization of Ru^;

from Muslim countries actually in Bosnia. Some of them have been sighted fighting in Travnik, Zenica, and Visoko. The mujahadin reportedly are from Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

There also reportedly are regular officers from Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran in Bosnia. These are believed to be hardened guerrillas who have spent years in Lebanon or Afghanistan. Some reportedly are serving as advisers, but few have been seen in actual combat.¹

The presence of a few rag-tag mujahadin from failed causes in other areas merely reinforces the fact that the conflict in Bosnia

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□ _                      between Muslims

Crotian and Croats

I I Serbian — Front Lines

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS / REDRAWN BY WILLIAM J. CUPSON

ian support for their n> ural ally—the Serbs' against traditional U' support for the unck dog—the Bosnian M*' lims. It has spurred w quent references to tl “traditional alliance ¹ Russia and Serbia.” Tl¹ is a mistaken simplify tion. A quick look at k history of this relatio^f ship shows the associate was far from that of t" close allies. It was k^f cosmetically close by tl* shared Communist ide<>' ogy and, more practical!) by Yugoslavia’s near tot* reliance on Soviet arm* The primary hea' weapon systems mai¹¹ tained by the Yugosb Army and Navy sim World War II—except t‘

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is not one between religious groups but rather among vicious political tyrants vying for territory. Most Europeans view the Slavic-Muslims in Bosnia as the result of the historical misfortune of 500 years of Turk occupation. In fact, there has been little trend toward the entrenchment of Muslim fundamentalism in Bosnia. The U.N. plan to invite Turkey (85% Muslim) to augment peacekeeping forces in Bosnia may not be helpful in this regard. The longer the Muslims are targets of “cleansing,” however, the deeper the roots of fundamentalism may become. If for no other reason, these European Muslims have been receiving support on the battlefield from Islamic nations—hence the symbolism of the prime ministers visit in February. It is ironic that within three days of the visit, the death toll for Sarajevo civilians came to more than 60 and precipitated the Russian-assisted pullback by Serb gunners and the truce around Sarajevo.

a brief period of post-war Western military assistance^ were direct imports from the Soviet Union. They include Soviet-licensed imports from former Warsaw Pact met¹¹ bers and domestically produced weapons based on Sovi^f licenses, such as the M-54/55 and M-84 (improved v^£( sion of the T-72) tanks, Koni-class frigates, missiles ai* artillery of all categories, MiG-21 and MiG-29 aircrat¹ and Mi-8 and Ka-25 helicopters. Yugoslavia’s techn^ logical dependence on Soviet weaponry was by far tl* greatest among the European non-bloc states. In addition the Yugoslav military enjoyed far greater access to tl* newest generations of Soviet weapons than most Wa^f saw Pact member armies. For example, Yugoslavia ok tained the T-72s and MiG-29s earlier than its Warsaw Pm¹ neighbors. It also served for years as the USSR’s non'¹ nally nonaligned, proxy arms supplier to national liber³ tion causes and terrorist organizations worldwide.

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Despite the relationship that existed between the Yugoslav arms industry and the Soviet armed forces, there was not a great deal of mutual affection between the two Orthodox brotherhoods. In fact, Russians and Serbs have shared a mutual disdain and distrust ever since the Nazi occupation of the Balkans. During World War II, the Western allies actually provided the anti-German Yugoslav partisan forces more support than did their Communist brother Stalin. Only when the Red Army liberated Belgrade in 1944 (an event considered a mixed blessing by most Serbs who survived the debacle) was wartime camaraderie shared between Tito’s partisans and their Soviet allies.

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Russia’s historic influence in the Balkans evaporated for the most part during Tito’s long dictatorship of Communist Yugoslavia. With Tito’s brand of Communist worker’s self-management, the relatively open borders, and nonaligned status, Yugoslav communism became an embarrassing success next to the plodding failure of the Soviet system. Both countries ruthlessly suppressed their strongest mutual bond—the Russian and Serbian Orthodox churches.

Russia Could Provide the Key tl>‘ -----------------------------                        

The potential for a Russian role in resolving the Balkan ^ dilemma surfaced during the first week of October 1993 P[ when, in Moscow, the hardline opposition and political fringes of the right collapsed in a hail of Russian tank fire P'³.; aimed at the Russian White House. The Yeltsin govern- iD¹* ment, temporarily strengthened by the October events, moved quickly to show new determination to widen Russ-

The two peoples never really shared much trust or affection after the Cominform expelled Communist Yugoslavia in 1948. Following the Soviet invasions of Budapest and Prague, the main strength of the Yugoslav People’s Army was arrayed against the threat of Soviet implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviets bitterly resented Yugoslavia’s porous borders, through which thousands of Warsaw Pact citizens fled to the West. Nevertheless, in the post-Communist period, Russia’s historic influence in the Balkans—gained primarily from successes against a mutual enemy, the Turk—with some clever diplomacy could be used with full effect against the current Serbian and Croatian governments.

Soviet arms imports, combined with a substantial indigenous production capability, left the former Yugoslavia with no shortage of arms for the current conflict. Here, a Serb soldier poses with Russian-designed antiair missiles the night before the NATO ultimatum.

ian military involvement within the former Soviet republics. On 9 October, Yeltsin approved a doctrine that endorses the use of Russian troops abroad when national interests are threatened. Initially, the policy was interpreted to apply only to the 14 other former Soviet republics. In Georgia, T-72 tanks manned by Russians already have answered Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze’s plea for help. But other moves point to Russia’s increasing interest in containing the conflicts seething around the Caucasus and in central Asia. That doctrine provides an excellent platform for casting Russia’s demoralized army into the role of international savior and European policeman, while at the same time helping to heal the lethargy and political malaise prevalent within Russia.

The poor showing of Yeltsin’s reform parties during the December parliamentary elections and the strong showing by the Russian nationalists generated concern worldwide, but the election results did force a weakened Yeltsin to shore up his stance by seeking a role in the Bosnian conflict. Russia’s move to nudge the Serbs into acquiescence to the NATO and U.N. ultimatum around Sarajevo is not a sign of a sinister revival of pan-Slavism. Nor does it point to a powerful alignment of Orthodox Christian brotherhood of Russians, Serbs, and Bulgars against the Roman Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims making a resurgence. These fears are unfounded and should not be used as an excuse for inaction. The anxiety about such a resurgence was fanned by Russian political fringes, including Pamyat nationalists, anti-Semites, neo-Nazis, and other extremists, but the key players in such a resurgence— Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria—are still too crippled economically to pose a serious threat.

The Russia of post-October 1993, however, is in a strong geopolitical position to continue acting as the hammer to assist NATO and the United Nations in forcing Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian leader Dr. Franjo Tudjman to stop the bloodletting in Bosnia.

Russian Nationalist View

During a recent conference, “Europe on Balkan Security,” Russian Major General German Kirilenko, Professor of the General Staff Academy in Moscow, referred to creeping “Balkanization”—from the Adriatic to the Azov—as a threat to Russia and Central Europe. He outlined a triangle of conflict, the corners of which are anchored in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Near East. General Kirilenko maintained that it was deeply symbolic and not coincidental that one comer threatens central Europe and the other Central Russia, while the third threatens the junction of the three continents.² The Russian general was alluding to the necessity of Russian military involvement in each of the three areas. This thinking, espoused by a few of the remaining enthusiasts of the old Soviet Empire represents the final spasms of a dying breed, and portrays