The New Nuclear Threat

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Just when we wanted to forget about nuclear weapons, a new team of prolifer- ators has stepped on the field—making the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent as necessary as ever.

Russia’s Zhirinovski

As the Cold War fades into memory, U.S. political leaders and the U.S. military face the challenge of adapting to what has come to be called the “New World Order.” For the Navy, this challenge has many dimensions:

► The need to replace the professional vision embodied in The Maritime Strategy with the new vision set forth in “. . . From the Sea”

> The need to analyze the new international order to see what threat or threats should replace the Soviet Union in shaping the Navy

> The need to maintain quality, morale, and operational proficiency, while reducing the Navy by 40%

Navy leaders facing this panoply of challenges will naturally take comfort in those few things they no longer have to worry about. The resupply of Europe in a major conventional war, for example, need dominate our planning no longer. And we all know that we don’t have to worry about nuclear weapons any more. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the conclusion of two START treaties,

and the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Na' ^ ships mean that the Navy can put the nuclear era behi" ■ it. At a time of great uncertainty and confusion, the Na' can unite behind a few broad principles, including the a¹ _Vaj deniable fact that nuclear weapons no longer matter. _Su Or can it? Unfortunately, the truth is exactly the a jyj verse. Nuclear weapons are likely to become more rath ^ than less important to the Navy in the coming decad gj_c While some past nuclear missions will vanish, others W¹ remain, and new ones will emerge. The Navy must co< tinue thinking about nuclear weapons for at least thN 3^ reasons: ^

>                                             The traditional Navy            role  in         strategic deterrence           _0ri(

>                                                                    An emerging counterproliferation          mission f_0]

>      A possible future in which nuclear weapons are in tl* _v

hands of rogue states hostile to the United States and^f f_0l its allies  ₀p

52

Pro

Proceedings / May ¹

Each will require the Navy to adapt to new thinking _tj_n none will allow it the luxury of treating nuclear weapo^ cl_e as artifacts of the past.

he Traditional Mission: Strategic Deterrence

The most obvious mission for which nuclear weapons nil continue to be relevant is strategic deterrence. The ollapse of the Soviet Union made it possible to reach igreements on strategic arms reductions that would have een unthinkable a few years ago. Theories of deter- ence and nuclear war that were subjects of intense de- ate in the 1980s now seem archaic.

It is too early, however, to relegate strategic nuclear eapons to the history books. The strong showing of a eo-fascist in the December 1993 Russian elections— erily similar to Hitler’s electoral success in the early (1930s—serves as a stark reminder that the battle for 'emocracy in post-Cold War Russia has not yet been won. merica yet may see a return to the days where nuclear eterrence dominates defense policy. If so, as the premier eterrent force, ballistic missile submarines will be even ore important than they are today. At a minimum, this eans that current proposals to reduce the size of the Tri- ent force in the interests of economy must be resisted. Navy strategic weapons will be equally relevant if Russia continues the desirable trends of the past two years. Should political conditions make it possible to bring the two START treaties into force in the next year, there will be strong pressures for further reductions. Even now, in advance of any binding agreement, a former Chairman of ithe Joint Chiefs of Staff has called for an additional 50% (reduction in strategic arsenals. A year ago, many argued :that such reductions were impossible in the next few years, but it would be wrong to make that assumption today. |What is “possible” in the arms-control business can change [quickly. In 1991, for example, while I was one of the U.S. START negotiators, a senior official suggested that the United States establish a goal of reducing to 3,000-3,500 warheads in a follow-on treaty. He was derided as hopelessly unrealistic. Two years later, START II established precisely those levels.

So what? Why should it matter to the Navy whether or not there is a START III? Most Americans like the idea of reducing weapons. Additional cuts should let the Navy devote resources to other areas. If the practical impact of new reductions will be small, and if what impact there is will be favorable, it may seem that the Navy should be indifferent to what happens.

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It may seem that way, but it just isn’t so. Whatever the value of additional reductions to the nation as a whole, such reductions could have a significant effect on the Navy. Additional cuts in strategic forces will inevitably call into question the continued relevance of the strategic triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers that has characterized U.S. strategic forces for 35 years. The logical part to eliminate is the ICBM leg, which will consist only of aging Minuteman III missiles once START II is implemented. With the strategic bomber force both shrinking and increasingly focused on conventional missions, only the ballistic missile submarine force will be left as a full-time deterrent. Even in the most optimistic future, the Russian nuclear arsenal will continue to exist—and will remain formidable. Strategic nuclear deterrence still will be indispensable, and Navy sys

tems will be called upon to dominate that deterrent even more than they do today.

The Emerging Mission: Preventing Acquisition

Leaving the realm of strategic deterrence does not mean walking away from nuclear issues. The Navy will find its future role in countering nuclear proliferation far more challenging. In his much heralded Bottom-Up Review, former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin identified proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as one of the four major national-security challenges facing the United States in the post-Cold War era.¹ Because of their immense destructiveness and the mystique associated with them, nuclear weapons are far and away the most important proliferation concern. Preventing nuclear proliferation, henceforth the domain of academics and arms controllers, is about to blossom forth as a major military mission.

Historically, the U.S. approach to preventing nuclear proliferation has been two-pronged. On the supply side, the United States has sought to limit access by potential proliferators to nuclear technology and to fissile material, primarily through cooperation with other advanced technical nations. On the demand side, U.S. diplomats have tried to limit incentives for proliferation by encouraging widespread adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and by limiting the perceived need for new states to develop nuclear weapons through such devices as security assurances.

This two-pronged strategy has been a success. It may, however, be changing. Traditional methods of forestalling proliferation may be augmented by direct, coercive action directed against potential proliferators. During the Gulf War, for instance, the American people were at least as receptive—and in many cases more receptive—to the argument that Saddam Hussein had to be stopped because of Iraq’s nuclear program as they were to arguments based on oil or on resisting aggression. Compulsory monitoring of its weapons program has been imposed on Iraq to prevent development of nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense has embraced a concept of “counterproliferation,” which entails both opposing and, if necessary, reversing proliferation. The administration has discussed possible economic sanctions to compel North Korea to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Taken together, these examples suggest an increasing willingness by the United States—and to a lesser but growing extent, by the international community—to use more forceful methods to resist proliferation. The almost universal acceptance of the nuclear threat as one justification for the use of force against Iraq may foreshadow broader international acceptance of the legitimacy of using force to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The world has already established a political norm against possession of nuclear weapons by states that don’t now have them; it may be in the process of establishing a “quasi-legal” principle that such states cannot be allowed to acquire them.

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Proceedings / May 1994

53

What will this mean for the Navy? Simple: if force is to be applied to prevent proliferation, the Navy will be the service that applies it. The next decade (perhaps even the next few months) could see Navy ships enforcing sanctions designed to compel acceptance of international in-

spections of nuclear facilities or to force renunciation of nuclear weapons development. More radical steps may be called for, as well. The logical implication of the new counterproliferation effort is that the United States will take military action against those who attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.

Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described the Clinton administration’s counterproliferation program as follows:

nuclear states may not; indeed, they almost certainly "*^one

not.

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... the Defense Counterproliferation initiative . . . has five elements: One, creation of the new mission by the President; two, changing what we buy to meet the threat; three, planning to fight wars differently; four, changing how we collect intelligence and what intelligence we collect; and finally, five, doing all these things with our allies.²

Most public attention following this speech focused on development of new weapons to carry out such a mission.³ This may turn out to be the least important component. Budget realities mean few new systems will be funded. But the mission won’t go away. The Navy needs to begin thinking now about the way it will carry out that mission with its current capabilities. Doing so will place a premium on operational intelligence and on precision strike.

Will there really be new nuclear-armed states? ^ than 30 years ago, President John F. Kennedy estimaf¹¹¹³' that there would be 20-30 nudiV' ^a powers by the 1980s. It is a gr*J^les accomplishment of internatior^orF

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wrong. Attempts to control pf liferation have been a huge si cess, in part because nonprolifi^le ation was one goal on which B and West could agree, even at (_a height of the Cold War.

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shows that we may not know

certain whenever a state becoflL . Qefe

a nuclear power.                 _ar)j

The prospect of proliferati'_Cou|

means that, far from being abk_cj_ea

ignore nuclear weapons in

post-Cold War era, the Navy _Urre

the 21st century will live under

constant possibility of their us ^

Indeed, nuclear weapons will L|

more of a concern in the new a!_to ^

of littoral warfare than they e'_{a ca}

were at the height of the C<>j_n„

War. In part, this is because nuclear weapons use at $‘b_0IT

The Future Mission: Operating “. . . From the Sea’ the Face of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

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A U.S. decision to use economic or military force to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would alter the times and places the Navy will be called to act; it would have less effect on what the Navy is asked to do. Enforcing economic sanctions to prevent proliferation is no different from enforcing sanctions aimed at reversing aggression or fostering human rights. Even direct strikes on nuclear facilities are not significantly different from other strikes, although gathering the required intelligence will be a daunting task.

A bigger challenge will come if efforts to prevent proliferation fail, and the United States faces regimes that are both irresponsible and armed with nuclear weapons. It is hard to overstate the fundamental change such a development would represent. In recent decades, the United States has dealt with many irresponsible nations (Libya, Iran, and Iraq, for example). In that same period, it faced a nuclear-armed adversary in the Soviet Union. On nuclear matters, however—with the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the Soviets acted quite responsibly. New

in a U.S-Soviet conflict was never very credible, excC^ as a part of a general nuclear exchange unlikely to 1^J very long—and during which the Navy was unlikely'_serv matter.                                                                            mis

In contrast, use of nuclear weapons in a future confl^,_rnaj such as Desert Storm is at least credible and perhaps e'¹ likely. Our historical answer to the threat of nuclear us? p_re deterrence through the threat of retaliation—may not wof —■ After all, no one could have doubted our ability to de' q astate Iraq, yet Saddam Hussein was not deterred. Tra^be t

tional deterrence theory assumes some degree of ration

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nality, but leaders of future nuclear states may not¹ _anij

‘rational” in calculating risks and benefits the same ^ wej

we would.

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Even on a purely rational basis, the nuclear compon' thei

of deterrence may not be as credible or as relevant in nuc

ture conflicts as we would like. Suitable military targ^ p for retaliation may not be obvious, and retaliation agatf thir urban targets with nuclear weapons may be politically one acceptable, especially if—as is likely—the United Sta<¹ nex is operating with coalition partners.⁴         1

The use or threatened use of nuclear weapons has • to t least two major implications: den

► Staging of forces must be done out of range of wE¹ ma

ever delivery system the aggressor possesses or else

Proc

Proceedings / May