Myths of the Balkans

"l^he current Balkan war is now _e j JL almost three years old and is

an ac^,n^ ^^e8'ⁿⁿ*ⁿS ^t0 sh°^w signs of , -ibating. It has been an intractable , j^tnd frustrating policy problem for ’ he NATO governments and the object of intense press coverage.

slavifl⁶ ^^a^^{an war}*^{s not}' however, as , _t!t is portrayed on the evening news.

and ^{1S an enormous}ly complex politi- ¹  ^,-'al    quagmire with few constants and

Jo resolving the crisis can be successful, policy-makers must understand the war for what it really is.

10 absolutes. Before any approach

tr in ving

* ^an f Myth 1: The Conflict Is a Con- _attaa          ^J

tentional War Between Opposing

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mtc T'he Balkan war is primarily a po- "ⁿ litical, unconventional, low-inten- ^e.^resity, guerrilla war between an inde- ^atl0ljterminate number of loosely '^ere affiliated military, paramilitary, ^criminal, and terrorist groups. To •ty- 'say that there is a Bosnian Serb ¹¹³¹¹ Army, a Bosnian Muslim Army, and ^ont^a Bosnian Croat Army, and that ^{e 0} these armies are fighting against one ^caS.^e another, is a gross oversimplifica- ^^rl1 tion. The simplest accurate state- ^suc^ment about who’s fighting whom is ¹¹¹¹ j that there are three major ethnic '^strl'groups in the former Yugoslavia, ⁾P^ea. and there are members of each eth- ^ nic group fighting with each major = ^a , faction, and every group fights iss, every other group, as well as within ^air®, itself.¹ This means that formulations ; of conventional linear warfare and application of force do not apply.

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'uld y Myth 2: The Balkans Can Be ' Pacified By Using Force NA The Balkan war consists of many 'ho¹¹' tiny engagements of limited lethal- ^{in cJ} ity, extensive clandestine political '^e- _: and military negotiations between group leaders, some terrorism and other covert political action, a very few conventional military offensives, and a massive, comprehensive ^ofa', propaganda campaign conducted by , j all sides. The tiny engagements re- r pA semble a series of violent domestic disputes more than organized war- — | fare and are responsible, along with de terrorism and ethnic cleansing, for '0.

the great majority of casualties. This type of violence is neither dependent upon nor closely associated with any military or civilian chain of command and cannot be alleviated by military action.

> Myth 3: Air Strikes Will Help End the War The threat of air strikes does have a psychological impact and can be used to leverage some behavior, as we have seen around Sarajevo. But the Serbs know we cannot destroy their artillery from the air unless they leave it abandoned in an open field. They are smart enough to do

just that—with the obsolete and useless weapons they don’t need—to draw our attention from other areas.

The Serbs also know that we can damage their conventional military capability by striking fixed targets, but they are not afraid that such attacks will force a change in their basic strategy. This is because their strategy is based on the longstanding Balkan tradition of “partisan warfare,” and that doctrine does not

depend on any resources vulnerable to air strikes.

In addition, air strikes against Serb targets will have little or no effect on the Muslim-Croat situation or on Muslim internecine conflicts.

► Myth 4: The Muslims Are Innocent Victims

It is true that Serb aggression is the fundamental cause of the war, but they are not the only party guilty of aggressive action. The Muslim government, whose legitimacy is largely self-declared, also has been guilty of aggression and provocations designed to extend its

control to areas not traditionally inhabited by Muslims and to encourage, through disinformation, an international intervention against the Serbs. The Muslims have demonstrated a disturbing tendency to target their own people and U.N. troops in their efforts to implicate their enemies.

Proceedings / May 1994

> Myth 5: The Factions Cooperate When Threatened Another idea currently circulating

is that the ultimatum regarding artillery in Sarajevo can be extended to other areas. The Sarajevo initiative was effective in one sense—the Serbs have withdrawn some artillery and the shelling has been suspended—-but the efficacy of the ultimatum is an illusion. Most weapons were not removed. Some were placed “under U.N. control”—often one or two unarmed U.N. troops observing an artillery position surrounded by armed Serbs. The Serbs know there is nothing the United Nations can do to prevent them from using or moving the weapons, and they initially only put unneeded, inoperative, or difficult-to-move weapons under this limited control.

The Serbs were able to give the appearance of cooperation, secure the deployment of Russian troops— which all but guarantees they will not be attacked—while maintaining the siege of Sarajevo without having to waste ammunition. It was a great victory for them. The more important issue is what the Muslims will do when it dawns on them that they have been bamboozled again.

► Myth 6: The Serbs Have Occupied and Ethnically Cleansed 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina

This is a very popular statistic that gives the impression that Serb armies have conquered the great majority of Bosnia-Herzegovina, seizing it from the legitimate Muslim government. In reality, because most of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are peasants and rural landowners (unlike the Muslims, who are primarily urbanized), approximately 50%-55% of Bosnia- Herzegovina was “Serb-controlled” before the war.² Today, although precise estimates are difficult, the Serbs occupy about 65% of the land area.' Only 10%-15% of the territory, therefore, has actually “changed hands”—from control by Muslim President Alija Izetbe- govic’s government (which dates back to April 1992) to control by Bosnian-Serb President Radovan Karadzic’s government. And, although there have been numerous incidents of brutal and criminal “ethnic cleansing," the territory controlled by the Serbs still contains numerous peaceful Muslim and Croat communities, just as Serbs

continue to live in Muslim and Croat areas.

►    Myth 7: An International Coalition Can Take Decisive Action

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All the major European powers have long histories and many old obligations in the Balkans. Many of them, unlike the United States, also contribute combat troops to the U.N. Protection Forces (UNProFor), providing the factions with an abundant supply of potential hostages and political targets. Because of their situation, our NATO allies take a vastly different view of the conflict. They have not been receptive to U.S. proposals to lift the arms embargo or to take offensive action. A publicly unified position followed the 5 February mortar attack on Sarajevo, but some of the allies—particularly Britain and Canada, who have large UNProFor contingents—privately had serious reservations. These reservations made themselves felt locally, in the U.N. organizations, rather than in the North Atlantic Council.⁴

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Because of its diplomatic character and its senior UNProFor leadership’s desire to protect the troops, the United Nations has been solidly against any type of offensive action. The United Nations has insisted on retaining a veto over air strikes or close air support throughout the conflict—a veto that guarantees to UNProFor that no strikes ever will be conducted. The Serbs know this and are consequently unafraid of attack.

The paralysis of the international community is not the result of any duplicity or bad faith. Coalitions only work when there is broad consensus and strong unilateral leadership—factors noticeably absent in the Balkan crisis.

'Anton Bebler, “Yugoslavia’s Agony: Civil Wan

►    Myth 8: A Peace Agreement Will End the Fighting

Estimate taken from “Peoples of Yugoslavia,” p'

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Many local leaders have stated that they don’t care what Karadzic or Izetbegovic do; they will continue to fight when provoked. An understanding of this reality can be inferred from President Izetbe- govic’s repeated rejection of concessions made by the Croats and Serbs to secure a multilateral agreement.

the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Proceedings / May f

There seems to be a persistent hope among diplomats and negotia

tors, however, that if the three ma.| leaders can be persuaded to sign i treaty, then huge peacekeeping forces can be deployed and the vi lence will end. The peacekeeping' forces might be deployed, but the; almost certainly will be put in the^jp* position of standing aside while tfcjp factions get on with the fighting interfering and becoming part of t war. In Croatia, where just such agreement was signed (the Vance ^ plan), peacekeepers have been largely limited to observing and documenting violations of the cea® fire or standing aside during majof^H offensives.

> Myth 9: There Can Be a Simp\ and Neat Solution

An example of the difficulty in₍ formulating a sensible response toM this conflict can be seen in the rel* tionship between the Milosevic go'j. ernment in Belgrade and the wan Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Although the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs ultimately are depen

ership, they are equally capable ol ^ independent or even contrary actio® Milosevic has control—but not toO^B much. And that is precisely how It wants it. This allows him to disavow the actions he incites. He is able to take credit at home, securi' his domestic political position, wh¹ claiming innocence abroad, avertif military action against him.

Milosevic’s strategy works, and is used to some extent by each of the leaders. When his philosophy rabid ultranationalism causes the spread of the conflict to other are: of the Balkans, the international community may remain immobilf until the conflict becomes a major regional war.

comes Savage Agony,” International Defence R*' view, Vol. 25, No. 9, 1992.

lished by the Central Intelligence Agency, 1993- Actual data is from Yugoslav 1981 Census. /ant ’“Areas of Control in Bosnia-Hercegovina. AugU“ ™ 1993” (map published by the Central Intelligent

Agency).

⁴See "Pressure Grows on Peace Force C2,” Jan*' Defence Weekly, Vol. 18, No. 5, 1 August 1992-

Lieutenant Linder is a P-3C Orion pilot cuf’a rently assigned to SPEAR (Strike Project!⁰¹ Evaluation & Antiair Warfare Research) if

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