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The U.S. Navy has decided to lay up its Newport-class LSTs—so he it. But gone with them is the opportunity for scores of ‘Gator commanding officers to learn their trade.
Retiring the entire class of Newport (LST-1179) amphibious ships by the fall of 1995—before any replacements arrive—will decrease the already limited number of post-command amphibious commanders (0-5) and ultimately affect the professionalism of the amphibious forces.
Just when the Navy is acknowledging the operational need for expanding its capabilities in the littoral waters of the world, the already significant gap in surface warfare officer commanders who have held command in the amphibious arena will widen. While the financial reasons for the early ship retirements are obvious, the Navy has not addressed adequately the need to train the officers who would have manned them.
The Navy must consider more seriously the implications of the ongoing, early decommissioning of the 20 LSTs—some ten years earlier than was planned even three years ago. After they go to Australia, Spain, or the reserve fleet—the last in late 1995—what amphibious command slots will remain for ‘Gator 0-5s? Here they are:
V Five Anchorage (LSD-36) class
► Eight Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class
V Two Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) class beginning workups
In the past, the 20 LSTs and the 13 LSD-36/41 class provided most of the post-command 0-5s who filled surface warfare officer amphibious billets afloat: executive officers of Tarawa (LHA-1)- and Wasp (LHD-l)-class amphibious assault ships, amphibious squadrons chief staff officers, skippers of two of the four assault craft units, and operations officers of the three amphibious groups.
Retiring the LSTs before the arrival of the new LPD- 17 also indicates that the Navy has decided to accept the risk of conducting amphibious operations—the most difficult of all naval operations—without their time-tested level of vehicle square footage, side-loaded causeways, and bulk fuel for the embarked landing force. Retiring the ships was apparently easier than programing funds to maintain our exceptional edge in expeditionary warfare in these tumultuous post-cold War years.
Retiring the three remaining Charleston (LKA-13)- class amphibious cargo ships early also affects landing force requirements for peacetime forward presence and contingency operations, but the impact of their early retirement will be left out of the amphibious equation because they are not commanded by 0-5s.
Granted, many fine cruisers, frigates, service force ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons have been retired with service life remaining, but, overall, these warfare communities were able to absorb the billet losses without a significant degradation in the experienced senior officers needed to man their communities. This was primarily because the former Soviet Union—the Navy’s principal blue-water adversary—has become less of a threat, and there does not appear to be a significant naval threat on the horizon for the next decade.
In addition, the sheer numbers of modern cruisers.
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frigates, and destroyers in the fleet and on the building ways means that the Navy will not suffer nearly the loss in surface warfare expertise as it will in the smaller, more specialized world of amphibious warfare.
While the relatively abrupt loss of 20 commanders’ slots may not seem excessive in this era of right-sizing, the net effect of this loss will be ten fewer surface warfare amphibious officers available annually to fill a wide range of billets that require their expertise in Navy forces operating “ . . . From the Sea.” Former LST commanding officers provided more than 60% of the surface warfare post-command amphibious officers.
By the time these commanders completed their 24- month command tours, they were experienced in:
► Planning and executing many of the Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable missions for the embarked Marines
► Ship-to-shore employment of the Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicles and conventional Navy landing craft
► Use of amphibious construction battalion side-loaded causeways and the amphibious bulk fuel system, nearshore navigation, and the precise ship handling required to launch tactically the amphibious assault vehicles within two miles of beach center, close enough to shore to prevent unnecessary fatigue to the embarked troops as the vehicles churn in
> Special seamanship skills necessary to load and off load the myriad of vehicles and equipment with which a landing force is equipped
> Operating with SEALs, Marine reconnaissance units, and other special operations forces—U.S. and allied
> Marine Corps helicopter operations
>■ Special assignments ranging from intelligence gathering to Department of State missions
The surface warfare community should examine carefully the needs of the amphibious force now—before all the LSTs are gone. By 1996, there will be about 26 postcommand slots to fill and only 13 LSD-36/41 skippers to draw from, if all 13 COs screen for these positions successfully.
Major adjustments to traditional billet assignments on the big-deck ‘Gators—the LHAs and LHDs—have been proposed. The CO and XO tours may become three-year tours with surface and aviation communities alternating. Executive officers would fleet up to the CO billet after 18 months, as naval aviation squadrons do today. While this may alleviate the requirements for amphibious post-command 0-5s, we could see an aviator on his first shipboard tour as XO with a surface warfare CO, or a non-‘Gator, post-command surface warfare XO with an aviator CO. This change in assignment policy may work by putting the very best post-command aviation or surface 0-5s as XO/CO, but it creates the distinct possibility that the two top leaders on a big-deck ‘Gator will lack the strong amphibious background that is usually the case today.
Scuttlebutt has it that aviator lieutenant commanders and commanders may be eligible to fill the navigator and operations officer billets—respectively—on the big decks. This is currently the case on the small-deck LPHs and while I have no experience on LPHs, I have almost four years experience as ship’s company on two LHAs.
There are few surface warfare billets on the big decks at present, but we should remember that these officers are well trained in a very extensive system of schools and jobs as they progress through the years on surface ships. They stand countless officer of the deck and command duty officer watches, combat information center (CIC) and tactical action officer (TAO) watches, not to mention engineering watches. The big-deck ‘Gators have just 16-18 surface warfare billets assigned to the ship—out of 60 or so in the wardroom—available to stand the vital bridge and CIC/TAO watches, most of whom are at the division- officer level. The navigator, operations officer, damage control assistant, and first lieutenant are the senior surface warfare officers other than the XO or CO. If memory serves, the surface warfare community already has given up other department head and mid-grade billets on these fine ships.
To maintain the quality of leaders and watch standers on the big decks, we should continue to detail top-notch surface warfare performers to these ships—and give them their due when their tours are up. If the surface community continues to opt out of significant sea billets on our expeditionary warfare ships, other specialists—less experienced—will gladly step in.
Let’s Fix the Problem
> Change the CO tour length of the five Anchorage-class LSDs and the eight Whidbey Island-class LSDs to 18 months beginning today. This will help the amphibious surface warfare community to man the XO slots on the LHAs and LHDs, the major staff slots in the amphibious group, operations officers and amphibious squadron chief staff officer billets, plus other significant shore and staff billets demanding expeditionary warfare experience.
► Maintain at two years the CO’s tour on the Harpers Ferry-class LSDs to allow these ships time to enter the fleet. These ships eventually will help ease the shortage of post-command amphibious 0-5s.
The surface warfare community should resist the temptation to offer up any of these significant amphibious ship and staff billets to other warfare specialties. Without them, surface amphibious officers will not achieve the necessary senior experience to compete for the major command slots in the fleet.
Finally, the COs of beachmaster and the conventional assault craft units should be considered promotable to captain and eventual consideration as COs in the LCAC units, the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons, and the Naval Beach Groups. These officers have considerable amphibious and expeditionary warfare experience and can contribute as captains by leading the large, diverse beach group and prepositioning ship organizations. Other warfare specialties and non-warfare specialties promote their most talented personnel to captain based on demonstrated superior performance at 0-5 command-ashore level. The surface warfare community should do the same.
Captain O’Neil commands the Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek, Virginia. He is a surface warfare officer with LST command experience, two LHA tours, and five other surface ship assignments. He is a frequent contributor to Proceedings.
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Proceedings / May 1994