A Conventional Approach

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Conventional—not nuclear— weapons are the way to deter w orldwide aggression, if only because we can and will ^

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As we near a future in which the United States is no longer one of two but rather the sole superpower, the time has come to reexamine the role and place of strategic nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy. The dissolution of the Soviet Union—and the division of its nuclear forces—has shifted the concern of U.S. strategic planning from a specific nuclear threat to an extremely complex international situation where regional aggression is more likely than it has been since the period before World War II. Our experience, including the Gulf War, teaches us the unlikelihood of nuclear weapons being useful in deterring aggression under these circumstances. Instead, the United States should convert its principal strategic deterrent from nuclear weapons to a more credible deterrence, based upon smart conventional weapons.

The general case in favor of choosing strategic, high- precision smart conventional weapons over strategic nuclear weapons is clear: Smart conventional weapons are

safer, cause less collateral damage, and pose less thre^} j_tecj of causing escalation—therefore offering far greater fie* y^e ibility for use in situations where nuclear-weapon us¹ q_uj would be politically or militarily impractical. The print? pal questions challenging reliance on conventional strata gic weapons are also clear:

►    Can they adequately carry out their combat missions >' called upon to do so?

►    If they can execute these missions, will that fact def aggression and the use of hostile strategic weapons &•' effectively as we believe strategic nuclear weapons ha*¹ deterred conflict in the past?

The answers to these questions are generally positive bringing hope that we may, in the foreseeable future, safel) choose a conventional strategic military option for man) strategic missions previously thought of as a preserve fn⁽ nuclear weapons.

The Gulf War showed the utility—as well as the lim* tations—of strategic conventional smart weapons. The wn*

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confirmed that these weapons have a practical, operational combat role. Against Iraq, smart conventional weapons countered rapidly and rendered essentially useless the offensive weapons, the command and control, and the military forces of a powerful and ruthless dictator. Although advanced conventional weapons do appear to have performed well in combat, we still must evaluate carefully how valid a model that war provides for understanding the future utility of such weapons as a deterrent against aggression. We still have much to learn.

The Gulf War highlighted the frustrations and problems that arise in trying to create a credible strategic deterrent : against a determined aggressor. Aside from the invasion of Kuwait itself, the best example of failure to deter Saddam Hussein was found in the case of the Iraqi Scud missiles. The Scuds were Iraq’s principal offensive weapons but, with relatively limited warheads, posed lit- I tie threat to allied forces in the region. The real, political, and therefore strategic danger of these weapons lay in the possibility that Iraq would use them to strike at Israel. The prevailing speculation at the time was that, if attacked, Israel might enter the conflict and in doing so break up the new association of Arab powers arrayed with Western powers against a fellow Arab state. Such a disruption would have handicapped allied efforts to stop Iraq, let alone restore Kuwaiti independence.

Some observers hoped that massive allied superiority in all strategic weapons, particularly nuclear ones, would deter any reckless Iraqi attacks upon Israel. Despite this array of weaponry, however, an undeterred Iraq did attack, appearing indifferent to whether or not the allies could retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons or conventional weapons. Allied use of nuclear weapons was politically improbable, and Iraq could expect the allies to deploy strategic conventional weapons in a range of missions. Deterrence simply failed—not because of the limitations of allied weaponry or lack of allied resolve, but because these risks were acceptable to Iraq when compared with the political gain of embroiling Israel in the war. In short, Saddam Hussein perceived no added risk for Iraq in attacking Israel, and launched what missiles he could.

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As we absorb the lessons of advanced conventional weapons as a strategic deterrent during the Gulf War, we must recognize that the war once again showed the limited value of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression. There was no useful role for nuclear weapons in the Gulf War. Iraq could and did ignore allied nuclear weapons as virtually chimerical. Similarly, Iraq would have gained little by employing a nuclear weapon. It would not have been possible for Saddam Hussein to diminish significantly the overwhelming military superiority of the forces arrayed against him, and for him actually to have used such a nuclear capability as he might have developed would merely have reinforced the determination of the major powers to eliminate him.

A nuclear capability in Saddam Hussein’s hands might well have undermined U.S. efforts to cause him to conduct himself in a responsible manner. Nuclear weapons used in desperation, or from wild plans of revenge against Israel, could have resulted in great human tragedy. Would Saddam Hussein have used nuclear weapons had he possessed them? Could the allied nuclear threat have been

counted upon to deter him from using them? Probably not. After all, Saddam Hussein chose to start a nuclear weapons program in the very face of the overwhelming nuclear power of the states arrayed against him, including the Israelis he sought to provoke. There was no logical reason for Iraq to build a nuclear weapon outside of this very threat of irresponsible behavior: the looming threat of a wild card, regional nuclear power. Saddam Hussein’s decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program itself demonstrates that there was no nuclear deterrent at play in Iraq’s evaluation of the strategic situation in the Gulf.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, as the lessons of the successes, failures, and potential of conventional, strategic, high-precision strategic, smart weapons are digested by all nations, one message rings loudest: The United States, when provoked, can and will use strategic conventional weapons against whatever targets it considers appropriate. As if to reinforce this point, the United States has employed these weapons against Iraq since the war. Understanding this one lesson may provide the first credible and therefore useful strategic deterrent we have seen since the early days of the nuclear era. It may well be that strategic conventional weapons will one day perform their primary mission of deterrence immeasurably better than nuclear weapons—if only because we can and will use them.

It is now vitally important that we distill a thorough understanding of both the effectiveness and limitations of strategic conventional weapons. Unfortunately, there has been little useful professional discussion about the performance of strategic conventional weapons in the Gulf War, or of the international reaction to these weapons. Much of the post-war popular evaluation of our weapons is based on perceptions drawn from media coverage—coverage often well-managed by the Department of Defense. The professional discussion has been superficial, often merely speculation about the levels of nuclear weapons required in a post-Cold War strategic environment. However, the absence of intelligent and informed discussion of the capabilities of this and the next generation of strategic conventional weapons should not keep us from opening a general debate over the future of strategic—or indeed all—nuclear weapons in light of events in the Gulf War. The most encouraging development for Americans is that it appears we may begin to envision and plan a national security strategy that does not rely heavily on nuclear weapons. For the first time, we can contemplate making nuclear weapons largely obsolete for the most practical and fundamental strategic missions.

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Proceedings / May 1994

As a coldly rational approach to a new security strategy and as a morally correct foreign policy choice, there should be a conscious decision by the U.S. government to pursue the conversion of the principal focus of our strategic deterrent from nuclear to conventional weapons. We can and should begin now to debate not whether, but in what manner, this conversion will take place. Our discussion should focus on what the strategic nuclear and strategic conventional weapons can and cannot do, and what we should do to maintain and improve the capabilities of these weapons. To begin such a discussion, however, we must separate perception from truth about smart weapons, especially strategic conventional ones.

To much of the world who viewed the Gulf War on television, smart conventional weapons appeared as miracle weapons—offering a new panacea for all sorts of conflicts, being able to do the job with few military and civilian losses. This perception caught the imagination of

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people who have the reasonable desire to limit human suffering and loss of life under any circumstances. Unfortunately, however, this is an unreasonable perception, especially at the current stage of strategic conventional weapons development. Smart weapons can do much to limit ^bettma~ⁿ loss of life, but they cannot take on all missions.

The lessons of the military utility of nuclear weapons must also be reexamined and frankly acknowledged in light of this new debate. We will never be certain of what has deterred the use of nuclear weapons since 1945. We

can speculate that the strategic nuclear arsenals, in tb^^ morbid way, did stay the use of these weapons, and tt the Mutually Assured Destruction concept may ha prevented the use of nuclear weapons among nuclear po’ ers. But in truth, using nuclear weapons has never bd ruled out entirely, and much of the Cold War nucle- strategy debate reflected this reality. In some circles, the was discussion (generally ill-considered) of U.S. use nuclear weapons in Korea and elsewhere. Furthermoi | revelations of Warsaw Pact plans regarding the first hoU of any invasion of Western Europe are said to have i eluded the use of tactical nuclear weapons against cd ventional troops and civilian targets. These are not ■ dicative of a complete aversion to employing nuck weapons in combat—even at the cost of a nuck exchange.

What inhibited the United States from using nuck weapons was a sensitivity to the implications of b weapons and their destructiveness. Nuclear-weapons was never an option for the United States, and some tro* blesome governments have known this and exploited it^; a weakness in U.S. military posture. While the McN mara-era decision to move toward flexible response k to a more credible U.S. military presence and deterred for some situations, it did not improve our strategic « terrent. We were left with a massive investment in a fl¹

clear arsenal of limited use" except in possibly deterring nuclear attack by the Sovk Union against the Unit* States, a one-use strategic ik terrent. Developing true strut¹ gic conventional weapons b fers us a flexible and credit strategic capability that no aj gressor can discount safely¹ a wide range of circumstance We may question whether not nuclear weapons are tk best response to a foreign n¹ clear threat. The United Stab would be wise to continue¹ maintain a secure and wide' dispersed array of nuck^)anc weapons and their delivery sfAs terns until we are assured tkpre the nuclear weapons of otksys nations constitute no threat ^fti_0l the overwhelming strategic fl^l'_n^ clear superiority of U.S. force- . Possession of nuclear strateg¹. ^ superiority alone does nC^llrH< however, answer whether ‘ not it would be wise for tk'Pe< United States to use su^i force—even in retaliation Mn<

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weapons by another country. If the country initiating sik use can be disarmed effectively by U.S. smart convC¹ tional forces, there would be no military reason for us¹' retaliate with nuclear weapons.

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