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“The S-3 Is Right for the Coast Guard”
(See J. M. Pesci, pp. 106-107, April 1994
Proceedings)
Robert F. Dorr, author Coast Guard Aviation (Motorbooks International, 1992)— In an ideal world where operating costs don’t matter. Lieutenant Pesci would be right: the S-3 Viking might be a fine stand-in for the HU-25A/B/C Guardian. The S-3 is of comparable size, has greater range, and can carry the people and equipment needed for search-and-rescue, maritime safety, drug interdiction, and other missions.
But the Coast Guard must live in a world in which its assigned missions keep increasing, its budget remains constant at best, and the worth of an aircraft must be determined not so much by its effectiveness as by its operating cost.
After much horse trading with Congress over its fiscal year 1995 budget, the Coast Guard has acknowledged that its 41 HU-25A/B/Cs are too costly to operate for the benefits they provide. Therefore, the Coast Guard is abandoning nearly all of its “single-mission” aircraft—including the HU-25B which stalks oil slicks and the HU-25C which intercepts drug smugglers. By converting existing HU-25Cs to the new HU-25C- Plus configuration, a “single-mission” aircraft will become a more versatile one. Because of a congressional mandate of 1 December 1993 to reduce “single-mission” (drug interdiction) costs by $9 million, the Coast Guard has slated five HU-25As for storage in the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona.
These facts about the Guardian have a direct bearing on Lieutenant Pesci’s argument because no one says—and Lieutenant Pesci does not claim—that the S-3 Viking is less expensive to operate than the HU-25. Operating costs for 41 or even 36 Vikings would be higher than those of today’s HU-25 fleet.
As for the author’s suggestion that AN/APG-66 air-intercept radar be installed throughout in his proposed Viking armada, this idea too would be sensible in an ideal world. But at present, the Coast Guard has the AN/APG-66 radar in its seven HU-25Cs; purchasing 34 more radar sets would be a big investment for a small service. Given the deem-
phasis of the drug-interdiction mission, ii is questionable whether an air-intercept radar is needed at all. Other sensors now' in service—including forward-looking infrared—are adequate for search-and-rescue, maritime-safety, and environmental- protection missions.
If the Coast Guard really wants a new aircraft, it should be looking at a turboprop aircraft that can fly a mission for roughly one-third to one-half the cost of a pure jet.
All things being equal, a small, twin- engine turboprop—e.g., the CASA-212 or Fairchild FH-227—might do the job- However, there is good reason to invest in a larger turboprop, namely the proposed Lockheed C-130J Hercules II with four Allison AE2100 turboprop engines driving six-bladed Dowly R391 propellers. The C-130J would have commonality with the Coast Guard’s current HC-130H fleet and would give the Coast Guard a long-range capability at a cost no greater than the medium-range capability currently provided by the Guardians- Furthermore, the C-130J would not require a new way of training Coast Guard aviators—as Lieutenant Pesci acknowledges the S-3 would. While up-front costs are a problem, a fleet of C-130Js would be far less expensive to operate than a fleet of S-3 Vikings. □
Admiral Kelso Leaves Too Early
Lieutenant Ray L. Whitehead, U.S. Navy, aviator and former Marine Corps sergeant—I am disappointed that Admiral Frank B. Kelso bowed out of the Navy before having his day in court. A military judge has stated that Admiral Kelso obstructed justice. The Navy—and Admiral Kelso, as well—would have benefited from a full airing of this issue. Many junior officers’ careers effectively have been ruined by the Tailhook investigation process. The perception among junior officers is that their senior leaders let them down and that the seniors are judged by a different measure.
By retiring early. Admiral Kelso damages his own credibility and the credibility of his associates for people like me- For others, I fear it is worse; they condemn the man and the system of justice under which we all live. □
Proceedings / May 199-1
“Bungling the Informal Contract”
(See J. H. Cushman, pp. 10-13, January 1994; C. L. Powell, R. C. Macke, pp. 10-13, March 1994; J. H. Cushman, pp. 14-16, April 1994
Proceedings)
General Wayne A. Downing, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief (CinC), U.S. Special Operations Command—I was disappointed to find a fundamental error in General Cushman’s commentary. He states:
Compounding the command-and-con- trol problem, when the United States later committed Ranger and special aviation units to Somalia .... the direction of those forces was the task of an on-scene major general other than [Major General Thomas] Montgomery; this general reported directly to the CinC, Special Operations Command. . . . creating a condition in which two U.S. CinCs were responsible for operations in Somalia, in addition to General [Cervic] Bir’s U.N. force.
In accordance with doctrine, the commander of the U.S. special operations force sent to Somalia (Task Force Ranger) reported directly to General Joseph P. Hoar, the CinC of U.S. Central Command. General Hoar put me in a position to advise and comment, but the task- force commander neither reported to me nor sought my approval or clearance for any operations. Furthermore, the commander of Task Force Ranger was in close contact with General Montgomery and coordinated all operations with him. Both headquarters exchanged liaison officers and shared all intelligence. Whatever may have been the cause of the casualties in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, it was not a lack of coordination or a problem with unity of command.
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Whenever U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) sends troops overseas, they “chop” to the respective regional combatant commander; they never work directly for USSOCOM — which is not an operational command. The sole purpose of USSOCOM is to provide trained and ready forces to support combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors and their country teams in times of peace and war.
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Proceedings / May 1994
The idea that special-operations forces should conduct independent operations without the knowledge and approval of regional commanders—and without being under their command—is outdated. We have learned the lessons of the dangers of stovepiped operations. We pride ourselves on being team players, capable of providing combatant commanders with
highly effective forces not available elsewhere. This was true in Panama, in the Persian Gulf, and in Somalia.
Proceedings is a very influential forum for the debate of defense issues. It is important that its readers understand that today’s special-operations forces are a highly professional group of men and women, fully committed to supporting this nation’s interests. We do so as part of the joint team, not as independent operators. □
Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell, Jr., U.S. Army Reserve (Retired), former commander, 220th Military Police Brigade— It was with some surprise—and, I must confess, disappointment—that I read General Powell’s rebuttal to General Cushman’s commentary on high-level decisions about U.S. and U.N. operations in Somalia. I reread General Cushman’s article a couple of times to determine what prompted this ad hominem attack, but failed to detect any arrogance—even if General Cushman was incorrect on several points.
That said, I have more problems with the substance of our operations in Somalia than with the forms used to arrive at decisions. I do not think General Cushman went far enough when he asserted that the airfield at Kismayu should have been seized by a Ranger regiment while the Marines went ashore at Mogadishu. First, using three battalions of Rangers to take an airfield by surprise in Somalia would have been overkill. Second, as soon as the airfield was secured, then what? Unless they had vehicles or helicopters, the Rangers hardly could have chased after the Somali militias’ “technicals.” Third, how would General Cushman have eliminated the weapons caches?
General Cushman’s use of force would have required application of more of the “ad hocism” so apparent in all recent U.S. operations. For example, reports have circulated that the 10th Mountain Division sent all its “Humvees” with its task force to Somalia. If that’s what happened, how combat effective was the division until the task force—and the vehicles—returned? What units would have been stripped of their vehicles to give wheels to the Rangers?
In Somalia, we should have gone promptly to a role somewhere between peacekeeping and peacemaking and then helped the Somalis establish a framework for a new government—bolstered by an effective police force. Therefore, close on the heels of the Rangers, we should have sent several military police battalions and a civil affairs brigade.
Some might say to this, “It wouldn’t work. We didn’t have an active-duty.
civil-affairs brigade to send to Somalia. Call up the Reserves? Not likely.” Such a response makes my next point: The Army’s fixation on the division, light or otherwise, is out of step with today’s requirements. We do everything within the context of World War I thinking: Send in the division! The Army needs a hard reassessment of a force structure that certainly remains viable, but is not the answer to every future contingency. Didn’t we learn anything from Operation Provide Comfort? □
“A Better Hornet: Promises, Promises”
(See J. Stevenson, pp. 104-107, October 1993; C. F. Weideman, G. E. Hakanson, pp. 18-20, December 1993; Editor’s Note, p. 20, January 1994; M. G. Moffit, Editor’s Note, p. 22, February 1994 Proceedings)
“The F/A-18 Is ‘Catch-22’”
(See N. Hogan, p. 10, July 1993; R. D. Mixson, pp. 13-14, August 1993; J. Mulquin, p. 22, September 1993; S. D. James, D. M. Lowe, p. 18, October 1993; R. L. Simon, p. 75,
November 1993 Proceedings)
David W. Anderson, Program Manager, Precision Echo, Inc.—As a former A-6A/E bombardier-navigator (BN), I have watched the debate about F/A-18’s effectiveness with more than casual interest. The debate has been rife with contentiousness and it is time to consider putting all that aside.
At one time, it was said that 100 simple and serviceable MiG-17s were better than a handful of complex and unmaintainable F-4Js and A-6As. My classmate at Test Pilot School, Bob Randall, was had by a mob of MiGs when they could pick the time to fight. I also remember watching the YF-17 being demonstrated at Patuxent River, and wondering if the flashy concept of highly automated, single-seat jets ever could replace the sterling heritages of the F-4 and F-I4A radar-intercept officers and the A-3 and A-6 BNs.
It’s time to forget such parochialism and remember something we always have known—but forgot to acknowledge— about naval aviation. The machine we strap on is only one ingredient of the recipe. There also is the training of our flight crews, the development of our tactics and weapons, and the maintenance of our equipment, the vision of our leaders, and the sweat and talent of our sailors. We never have had to be sorry. The F4F Wildcat and the Thach Weave did the job against the A6M2 Zero. If we do our best with what is within our fiscal constraints, it shouldn’t be necessary to argue about the things that we do not
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or cannot have. We should rely more on our flight crews, tactics, and good maintenance than on a set of illusory capabilities not yet on a drawing board. Chuck Yeager always said to judge the fight in the pilot before worrying about the jet fighter.
I think my old pilot Craig Steidle has shown as much guts in the past several years managing the F/A-18 program as he did the night we ran our first low-level mission into Haiphong. Why should we remain so bitter now that the decisions are made? Instead, let’s deal with this piece of naval aviation as we have in the past. Potential enemies should know that there is no hope in tangling with us— regardless of things like wing loading, specific excess power, and pounds of fuel per nautical mile. □
“A Surface Warrior’s Challenge”
(See R. T. Rushton, pp. 26-28, February 1994;
J. Buziak, pp. 13-14, April 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Lee J. Geanuleas, U.S. Navy—I applaud Commander Rushton’s intelligent efforts to address the issue of how to ensure that future surface warriors develop adequate warfighting skills. However, his proposal to split the community into two distinct technical proficiency groups is somewhat misguided.
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The notion that the complexity of modern shipboard weapon systems mandates a policy of technical specialization and the creation of two communities— one of warfare specialists from whose ranks will come our ship captains and one of engineering specialists who will not be eligible for command—is attractive but short-sighted. Commander Rushton fails to account for the fact that our modem warships are best understood as integrated systems—including electrical distribution, power generation, propulsion, damage control, and air-condition- ing/chill-water systems. For the past few years, surface-warfare training has focused on developing a tactically useful understanding of the ship as a total system. Afloat Training Groups have pushed ships to master the Total Ship Survivability (TSS) philosophy of integrated battle training. This philosophy recognizes that the most brilliant tactical genius won’t be particularly effective if he doesn’t understand the workings of his electrical-distribution system when power is lost to his only operational missile 5 t launcher. Our tacticians must be trained to “fight hurt”—to engage the enemy ion1) even after their ships take a hit.
This is not to say that every tactical action officer must be an engineering expert, but it does highlight the importance
of thinking of the ship as a complete system. Under Commander Rushton’s proposal, the officers who devote much of their careers to engineering would be ineligible for command at sea. This will send an unequivocal signal to the surface- warfare community that understanding a ship as an integrated system has little tactical value and that “combat tactical officers” should focus on only topics of obvious tactical relevance. The fallacy of this approach will become obvious only after it is too late.
For those who would deny that the tacticians would lose their appreciation for things below the damage-control deck, I offer the current shipboard supply system as an example. The typical surface warrior’s understanding of logistics (configuration control, for example) is relatively superficial. All too frequently, the attitude is: “The ‘Chop’ will handle that; it’s a Supply Corps problem.” In a sense, the line community has abdicated its logistical responsibility to a community of (thankfully superb) specialists. The result is a general lack of understanding among junior surface-warfare officers about the way storerooms are stocked with particular parts and how to ensure that your systems have the correct support. These are not trivial matters; they are important concerns for the line officer.
Under the specialization concept, en
gineering probably would go the way of shipboard logistics, and with it, our hard- won gains in training our crews as integrated teams. Damage control and complex TSS general drills would become “engineering problems.” We would forget—and inevitably have to relearn the hard way—that anyone can fight a ship with all systems operating, but only a crew that works as an integrated team from Main Control to the Combat Information Center to Combat Systems Maintenance Central can still win a fight after taking a couple of licks. □
“The U.S. Naval Academy:
Where to in the 21st Century?”
(See D. A. Smith, pp. 75-79, April 1994 Proceedings)
John M. Hill, Professor, Department of English, U.S. Naval Academy—While seemingly concerned about recent honor code and ethical problems at the Naval Academy—not to mention the performance of the football team—Colonel Smith actually attacks the Naval Academy’s majors program.
23
Proceedings / May 1994
But to what does he object? According to Colonel Smith, liberal arts majors, which in the West traditionally include the hard sciences, music, and mathematics—not just literary study, history, and
the social sciences—are both inferior and expensive at the Naval Academy in comparison to such majors at other colleges and universities. Moreover, they are inappropriate and should be eliminated. 1 presume the expense in question is the four-year investment to educate and train midshipmen generally. But is this so— and in fairly adjusted comparisons to which institutions?
Besides the Naval Academy English department, I have taught in four English departments and been in close, residential contact with three others: at the University of Washington (graduate school assistantship). Smith College, The Catholic University of America, Baruch College of the City University of New York, Barnard College, Denison University, and Sweet Briar College. Of the seven, four are departments at very good, private liberal arts colleges or universities, institutions where the cost of four years of tuition, room, and board soon will exceed $100,000 (a figure representing approximately half the cost per student in institutions like the Naval Academy, where humanities majors are far less expensive than science or engineering majors). I gained considerable insight cumulatively regarding the pedagogical commitments, skills, and research activities of the various faculties. Believe me—and like any native I have doubted my own home—the Naval Academy English Department compares well on all counts. Thus Colonel Smith’s sensing of weakness in our liberal arts programs mystifies me. Perhaps he knows of comprehensive data I haven’t seen.
Colonel Smith rightly claims that eliminating liberal arts majors at the Academy could free resources for an enhanced, more “lock-step” type of curriculum as well as for such “martial” sports as pistol shooting, water polo (because of the water?), and boxing, and for more shipboard training—all of which will help produce the kind of officer Colonel Smith says the Navy and Marine Corps need. He states these points well but he offers no grounds other than his own comfort, and that of his peers, upon graduation into the fleet. Surveys of our graduates in the fleet show liberal arts majors generally doing as well as engineering majors, even outperforming many of their technically focused peers in such areas as written and oral fluency, with concomitant skills in the analytical presentation of complex reports.
Moreover, it is debatable that most officers in ships of whatever kind need a greatly focused technical education. They will surely learn their jobs on the job and find out what they need to know from other specialists among the officers and enlisted personnel with whom they serve.
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Finally, as a ploy perhaps. Colonel Smith would admit the liberal arts as part of an educational underpinning, but not as specialized majors. Why not? If they are essential at one level, why not even more so as part of the superstructure of the Academy’s curriculum, which at the moment is a remarkable hybrid of technical and non-technical courses found in few other institutions? Colonel Smith misspeaks when claiming that the Naval Academy’s academic program is like that of many other colleges and universities. Concentrating on the percentage of graduates in each major distracts us from the reality of our curriculum, from seeing the matrices through which all of our students move to success at the Academy and in the fleet. The terminal degree, by the way, is still a Bachelor of Science with, say, a major in English, Electrical Engineering, or something else.
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In parting, I wonder whether or not the good old “boats” education, out of which Colonel Smith and his peers came—and in terms of which he and they have no doubt succeeded admirably—really was unimprovable? Were its products really the best officers the Naval Academy could have produced? Indeed, were those officers clearly superior to their counterparts today, when we compensate for changes in secondary education over the last 30 years? 1 have seen no proof to sustain this Golden Age nostalgia. But then Colonel Smith perhaps has supporting data his opinion piece cannot rhetorically accommodate. Exchanging such information would help us all focus productively on the great questions of curriculum and the education naval officers will need for the rest of this fading century and into the next. □
“Welcome to Our World”
(See J. P. Cordle, pp. 63-65, March 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Dave Dahl, U.S. Navy—“There are no new problems .... Only new solutions.” That statement by the captain of a Federal German Navy fast patrol boat (FPB) skipper rings especially true with respect to the growing antisurface warfare (ASUW) threat posed by these nimble and potent craft. The geographic and tactical realities of littoral naval warfare, as envisioned in “.. . From the Sea,” weigh heavily in favor of FPBs that go up against conventional U.S. Navy frigates, destroyers, and cruisers. However, the tactical naval helicopters currently in service on board all air-ca-
pable U.S. Navy surface combatants offer an in-place, cost-efficient, and com bat-proven counter to the serious am growing threat posed by FPBs.
While armed U.S. naval helicopters di‘ not score a kill against a FPB during th* Persian Gulf War, they did detect thes small ships and vector Royal Navy Lyb helicopters, armed with Sea Skua mis siles, in strikes against Iraqi FPBs. Mis^P11 sile-armed Lynx helicopters had the be>sPaci weapon-to-kill ratio of all air-delivered01'1! weapon systems used against FPB during the Gulf War. The ongoin! LAMPS III weaponization program wii provide a similar antisurface pund to more than 200 SH-60B Seahawks GAU-17 mini-guns and Hellfire missile will give the Seahawks the capability tt take out even the largest and fastest FPB' more than 150 nautical miles from thei' mother ships. The superb LAMPS III sen sor suite, operationally tested in the Per sian Gulf from 1986 to 1991, combine electronic-support measures, radar, am infrared detection and tracking capabili ties that cannot be defeated easily b; ground clutter or camouflage netting Specifically, the APS-124 multimock radar can detect and track FPB-size tar
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gram is complete, hostile FPB crews wii know that an APS-124 radar hit on thei1 ESM receiver means that there are missiles inbound. The Hellfire’s stand-ofl range—mated with the SH-60B’s sensor and its 150-knot dash speed—will mea*1 that FPBs no longer will be “invulnera ble” in the brown water of the world's littorals. These weapon systems improvements—along with advanced littoral tactics currently under development—will significantly reduce the FPBs’ advantages over U.S. Navy surface combatants.
Even without the added punch of LAMPS III weaponization, the aircraft's integrated tactical data-link can provide its mother ship with the targeting data required for anti-FPB Harpoon strikes. Sue!1 targeting would allow the surface ship to launch her missiles without closing within range of the FPB’s missiles. When combined with the Navy’s new Cooperative Engagement Concept, one LAMPS helicopter can provide targeting data to several Harpoon-capable units. So much fot FPBs’ “invulnerability” in the littoral!
Finally, while the LAMPS system provides the best anti-FPB defense in littoral waters, this multimission system also provides proven capability against the burgeoning diesel submarine threat. Tim LAMPS 111 ship-air system is a cost-efficient and thoroughly pragmatic solution to the serious and growing threat posed by missile-armed FPBs. □
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Proceedings / May 199*
tants“Visi°n for Naval Space con) Strategy”
S an1 (See C. S. Grey, pp. 63-68, January 1994; T. G. Siegel, pp. 12-14, February 1994 Proceedings)
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^Lieutenant William Kelly Henderson, U.S. the|Wy—As a recent graduate of the Naval j^ n,Postgraduate School’s Space Systems Op- •. erations curriculum, I have views and per-
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ceptions about the Navy’s future role in 1 beS|SPace *^at were reinforced by Dr. Grey’s vereicomPellin8 article. pp0 I agree that it is a “Time for Deeds” >0jn for the development and implementa- l wil1'011 well-conceived, comprehensive unCfnaval space strategy. Nevertheless, Dr. Grey misses the mark by stating that,
. . . [t]he Navy never has formally decided that it would accommodate space capabilities. Consequently, it has not fully appreciated its massive dependency on space and has lacked the necessary infrastructure (institutions, space-trained people, space-educated naval consumers, and suitable concepts for the guidance from which force requirements can be derived).
Perhaps the Navy has not yet “fully appreciated its massive dependency” on space. From the infancy of the U.S. space program, however, the Navy has been an active formal participant in it. The Naval Space Surveillance Center—recently re-
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mand—operates and maintains a coast- to-coast ground-based space surveillance system and routinely serves as a fully operational backup to the critical functions performed by the U.S. Space Command. As for “space-trained people,” every year, the Naval Postgraduate School graduates a class of Navy, Marine, and Army officers from various military backgrounds and warfare communities with Master of Science degrees in Systems Technology (Space Operations). These officers have a fundamental knowledge and appreciation for military opportunities and applications in space. They also acquire a comprehensive theoretical and practical knowledge of the employment, tasking, and operations of space-based communications, navigation, surveillance, and terrestrial-sensing systems and a knowledge of payload design and integration.
Dr. Grey understands clearly the importance of military space operations’ role as a force multiplier and enhancer to support terrestrial combat operations. The Persian Gulf War highlighted this fact from a joint perspective. He probably is correct in his assessment that future enemies may attempt to deny us the high ground. Therefore, any comprehensive, forward-looking naval or joint space strategy for the next century must include an active space-control mission.
Dr. Grey also states: “The naval ser
vice must help shape the total U.S. military space program . . . [I]f we lack a vision of what naval power and space power can mean .... the agenda of U.S. military space development will be set by people and organizations not oriented primarily toward the advancement of maritime excellence.”
The Navy needs the ability to set and maintain its own space requirements; therefore, it cannot allow itself to be pushed into a role of strictly being a user—and out of the operational space arena. In a period characterized by the redefinition, realignment, and consolidation of roles and missions, it is imperative that the Navy continue to present itself to the Department of Defense and the Congress as a vital and necessary partner of the Air Force in space operations. To help in this political endeavor, it would be in the best interest of the Navy to redesignate the commander of the Naval Space Command as a vice admiral rather than a rear admiral (lower half) and to lobby for an equal rotation between the Navy and the Air Force for the position of Comman- der-in-Chief (CinC). U.S. Space Command. Currently, the billet is designated for the Air Force, while the deputy CinC is a vice admiral.
With regard to “The Strategy,” Dr. Grey hit the nail on the head by calling for “the establishment of a corps of naval
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operators with real expertise in space operations.” The time, indeed, has come to create a space-systems operations warfare community. This community must be a melting pot of space-trained officers and enlisted personnel from the traditional warfare and support communities within the Navy. As previously mentioned, a group of these trained professionals exist today. Since space is a proven environment from which joint warfare will be conducted, perhaps the time has come to develop the U.S. Space Force, just like the Air Force was established from the Army Air Corps after World War II. □
“It’s Time To Beach the NOAA Corps”
(See W. Connelly, pp. 67-68, February 1994;
N. G. Millett, p. 30, April 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert IV. Max- son, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Corps—For the past ten years, I have been a member of the Naval Institute and have looked forward to each issue of Proceedings. I have found the forum to be honestly open and the professional debates fair and constructive. In contrast with this normal equity, Mr. Connelly’s salvo against the NOAA Corps was so unsupported by fact and vindictive in nature that I kindly will label his effort as myopic tabloid.
It appears that Mr. Connelly was a member of a subcommittee that deliberated for more than a year, but failed to produce any tangible result. During the course of the subcommittee’s deliberations, Mr. Connelly somehow believed that he had become an expert on the NOAA Corps, and blamed the failure of the Oceanic and Atmospheric Management Advisory Council on the NOAA Corps. In berating the Corps, he demonstrates a lack of professionalism and objectivity that casts grave doubt on the overall ability of the subcommittee to evaluate the modernization of the NOAA fleet.
Mr. Connelly’s arguments for abolishing the NOAA Corps are unsubstantiated, sophomoric, and underhanded. It is particularly offensive to be called “incompetent or untrustworthy or both.” I contemplated those words as I climbed back into my underpowered 20-year-old aircraft and launched on two consecutive five-hour flights—flown at an altitude of 500 feet—over the central United States to measure the snow-water equivalent of the snowpack. We have had significant flooding in the Midwest over the past year and are doing our best with our limited resources to provide crucial hydrologic data to the National Weather Service’s River Forecast Centers so they can issue timely river-stage and flood forecasts. Whether we are sailing old hand-me-down ships, or flying 20-year- old aircraft, the men and women of the NOAA Corps are committed to delivering the most accurate and trustworthy scientific data in the world. This information saves lives—and is often gathered under dangerous circumstances. Perhaps Mr. Connelly would like to penetrate a hurricane in a 25-year-old P-3?
Unlike some others in NOAA, I will keep my membership in the Naval Institute. It is discouraging, however, to have to endure such a poorly researched and biased article in a professional journal that I once held in such high regard. □
products and provide other services tb- are recognized throughout the world ft their excellent quality. Nevertheless, have questioned the existence of rt NOAA Corps for the last 40 years—a beit for different reasons than Mr. Co< nelly—and now believe that it’s time t disband the NOAA Corps.
The primary products provided t NOAA for use by the Department of D‘ fense (DoD) and all mariners are naut cal charts and publications. The collb tion of the data to develop and maintai these products is a major function of tf ships managed by NOAA. There af many other products and services pro vided by NOAA but those associate with the NOAA Corps, the Nation® Ocean Survey, and other related agencb are directly linked to the basic nautic® products. The Defense Mapping Agen® (DMA) also produces and maintains na® tical (and aeronautical) charts and publ> cations for use by DoD and mariners. Tb hydrographic data required to support th1 effort comes from other nations, throug procurement, from NOAA, and from U-- Navy ships under the cognizance of tb Oceanographer of the Navy.
The United States and the People’s R®
public of China are the only two nation |f ^
tbnt koiro tlio In vnrii r\r- *
George A. Walker, Jr., former Director, Hydrographic Department, U.S. Naval Oceanographic Ojfice—In my almost 44 years of federal service, I have worked for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Corps officers, worked with them, and had them working for me. For the most part, NOAA officers had high integrity and were good- to-excellent hydrographic/oceanographic engineers, technicians, and ship and boat operators. They did not spend all their time developing plans to maintain and perpetuate the NOAA Corps’ existence. Instead, they helped develop nautical
that have the luxury—or inefficiency''-,, of maintaining two major hydrographic surveying and nautical-charting operi^ Qdv tions. In the United States, there a® TIlQj NOAA, which has the responsibility f°Q\m i surveying and charting the United Stab. ' ’ and its trust territories, and the DM3 d which has the charter for all of the DoD 16 hie needs—pretty much the remainder <>le $U| the world. NOAA has approximate!j 1,000 nautical charts ready for distrib® . tion; the DMA has 4,000. The charts loO^Qde different, but they meet the same inte< national standards established by the I® ternational Hydrographic Organization The DMA, the Navy, and NOAA go 11 great lengths to ensure that their activf ties are coordinated and they do not su® vey and chart the same geographic r® gions; nevertheless, this is clearly 1
Proceedings / May 1^
■
duplication of effort. It is time to correct this inefficiency and merge these two large, strong, and reputable organizations into one stronger and more capable organization. The NOAA Corps and associated components of the organization should be merged into the DoD Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Program Element (DMA/Naval Oceanography). □
“Prescription for Future i Combat Casualties”
I (See R. F. Smith and E. Lally, pp. 72-73, 1 * February 1994 Proceedings)
> Independent verification that the “reeducation camps” have been closed and their former inmates, our allies, have been restored to full citizenship.
> Independent verification that all of the former members of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) armed forces enjoy full civil rights and equal economic and political opportunity.
> Independent verification that the wounded and disabled veterans of the RVN have the same access to medical care as any other Vietnamese citizens.
> Guarantees to the Vietnamese in exile that they will have free and untrammeled communication and commerce with their
relatives in Vietnam and the right to return without prejudice and that their relatives may emigrate freely.
>• Guarantees that the Vietnamese being repatriated involuntarily from Hong Kong are received home without prejudice or penalty.
>• A request from the Vietnamese in exile in the United States, Canada, France, and the rest of the world to restore relations.
The fact that these issues are not addressed by any leaders in the U.S. government—including senior military officers—is the reason that some of us who fought in Vietnam are not ready to “put the past behind” us.
Captain Erwin F. Hirsch, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Cap- g tain Smith and Captain Lally argue that Naval Reserve medical officers XPiwho fill mobilization billets similar to their civilian positions need lit- tie refresher training whenever they Ufg.are deployed.
Experience in all medical deployments has shown that the prac- . tice of medicine—and, in particular, surgery—in the field is completely g. different from everyday civilian practice. The types of injuries and ll- other medical conditions associated with combat operations are seldom seen in civilian practice; as such, many medical personnel are inappropriately prepared to deal with them. Furthermore, casualties re- t’g main for a finite period of time at different facilities; therefore, the concept of continuity of care—so fundamental in civilian medicine— is not possible.
In the future, military operations may well be characterized by high- ", intensity and short duration. Therefore, quality care to combat casualties can be ensured only by an aggressive readiness and prepared- A ness program in the areas of clinical and operational medicine. □
PRIDE
IN SOLID 14 KARAT GOLD
MILITARY RINGS AND INSIGNIAS
Vietnam: Putting the Past ■\q6 Behind Us
d Captain Richard A. Stratton, U.S.
Navy (Retired)—Americans are not " a vindictive people. In both vic- 3' tory anc^ defeat, we are generous to a fault. That being said, however, the full restoration of trade and the normalization of relations with Vietnam should be based on the following conditions:
► Independent verification that conditions in South Vietnam, which have caused thousands of people to risk their lives to flee, have changed for the better.
Proceedings / May 1994
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The Vietnam War was fought not for political or economic gain, but to assist the South Vietnamese in preserving their freedom. The United States deserted them in 1973-1975—we should not do it again. While we still have the leverage, Vietnam should be subjected to the same human-rights “litmus test” that the United States applies to China, Cuba, and South Africa. Let Hanoi take the lead in putting the past behind it before Washington does the same. I owe Hanoi nothing; I owe Saigon everything. □
Editor’s Note: Captain Stratton was a prisoner-of-war in North Vietnam from January 1967 to March 1973.
“What Is a Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Unit?”
(See S. W. Asbury, pp. 74-75, January 1994 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: The ratio 76:93% on page 75 should have been 7%:93%. There also were two typographical errors that we introduced that did not change the sense of the note, but detracted from the author’s well-written note. □
“What Do You Do After
the War?”
(See G. Johnson, pp. 54-56, February 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Shelton, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—When it comes to career transition. Colonel Johnson knows of what he speaks. He had planned to fly for a major airline after retiring, but industry-wide hiring cuts made that prospect bleak. But the colonel had a backup plan! Armed with a master’s degree in Education Administration, he set out for an administrative position on the collegiate level. After substitute teaching in a high school for six months, the colonel got the inside track on a job opportunity at a major university he had been cultivating. Taking some risk, he moved to the location in order to position himself for the job and began a local job- networking campaign. He was offered a couple of good jobs, but declined in order to hold out for what he really wanted. In the meantime, he visited a local “temp” agency and was quickly given an assignment as a technical writer in the safety department of a large (locally located) manufacturing company. Within three months, he was promoted to acting director of the company’s safety department. He remained in that position until he was offered the job he really wanted.
Because of a well-developed and disciplined strategy, he attained a desir- “Cs
able job, salary, and location. Therefo (S< all those retiring should heed Colon p Johnson’s recommendations. □ Wl
Oc
----------------- 19'
“Japan’s Growing Involvement Via
(See R. L. Rau, pp. 63-67, December 1993 Na\ Naval History) C0IT1
aboi
Yoya Kawamura—It is wrong—or neei least, misleading—to say that “[t]he he l\ of [United Nations] peacekeeping acti tion ities in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, is Can Japanese diplomat.” Some readers migj Can think that this means he is a represent how tive of the Japanese government. This I: not the case. Mr. Akashi is a career Ui a re official who has never served in tl sucl Japanese government. □ Rid
________________ , Wai
onh
“Why Not Design the Best?” Car
(See H. C. Hemond, pp. 55-57, July 1993; ^
T. Rockwell, B. Bomt, p. 22, October 1993 wht Proceedings) part
_______ of
Koi
“2015” the
(See W. P. Houley, pp. 49-52, October 1993; Sistl W. Wade, p. 14, December 1993 Proceedings mis
109
Norman Polmar—Lieutenant Bomt scat4 Car me. He agrees with Mr. Hemond’s c> Car for a new approach to submarine desig1 smt but asserts that . . for propulsion, le1 Fre stick with a proven winner.” inte
I had hoped that the timeworn coned fort that nuclear propulsion is not only tl> that correct approach but the only one W as < been laid to rest with the firing of A1 pea miral Hyman G. Rickover a decade agl whi Admiral Houley appears to realize th: ble advanced submarines must have advand ( in all areas, even propulsion. His pr( not posed Presidential-class submarines w't pre have a “combined nuclear/air-indepd pan dent propulsion system.” He conclud( Cat with a statement that should be post* ser within view of everyone concerned ing the next generation of U.S. submarine* go
dor
This is a period of opportunity. 0( are nation will continue to face challenge- I The submarine force must embra3 ger technology and leap into the future|l [Ca support the needs of the United State fen in war and peace. To do less woul [wi break faith with those who went be wh fore us. in
cus
Remember, those who went before 11 na\ adopted steam in place of sail, and the1 Mo gas turbine in place of steam, and, inded of 1 even nuclear propulsion. The pressurize^ dia water reactor (PWR) replaced the diese' Foi electric system; now we must keep 3 an open mind as to what could and wh3 the should replace the PWR. □
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Proceedings / May
“Canada Is Ignoring Its Navy”
"ref01 (See A. M. Wooley, pp. 83-87, March 1993; -olol P. W. Cairns, pp. 30-32, May 1993; B. M.
Weadon, p. 23, June 1993; R. Thompson, p. 26, October 1993; M. Lindberg, p. 24, December - 1993 Proceedings)
lent Vice Admiral P. W. Cairns, Canadian >93 Navy—After reading Mr. Lindberg’s comments, it is obvious that a few points about Canadians’ attitudes toward defense —or neecj to be clarified, te he. Mr. Lindberg echoes the conven- ; acti tj0nai—but not entirely fair—notion that hi. lS Canadians are “really quite unmilitary.” > tnig Canadians are not martial or militaristic; sseitf however, they are not “unmilitary.”
This in World War I, Canadians established :r U, a reputation for military excellence by in such feats of arms as the taking of Vimy Ridge. Canadians’ performance in World
„ War II—on land, at sea, and in the air—
only strengthened it. Since World War II, ’ Canada has been a staunch NATO part- 3. ner and never shied away from combat ?93 whenever it was justified. Canada has participated decisively in the enforcement of United Nations resolutions—from Korea in the 1950s to the Persian Gulf in the 1990s—and has been the most con- 993; sistent contributor to U.N. peacekeeping dings'1 missions. At one point in 1993, almost 10% of deployed U.N. peacekeepers were scar* Canadians. In the former Yugoslavia, the ’s 0 Canadian contingent is the third largest— iesig1 smaller only than the British and the 1, let French ones. The Canadian Navy is an integral part of these peacekeeping ef- oncet forts. During the past five years, more ly tl1 than 100 Canadian naval personnel served le h* as observers and monitors with U.N. )f A1 peacekeeping missions around the world, e ag1 while ships were deployed to such trou- :e tW ble spots as Somalia, yand Canadian Forces members certainly do s pt* not enjoy the same degree of influence, :s wi prestige, and privilege as their counter- lepef parts in some other nations. Nevertheless, ;lud< Canadians are aware and respectful of our >ostf service in war, proud of our peacekeep- J wi1 ing record, and supportive whenever we rines go in harm’s way. Canadians do not endorse military action lightly, but certainly /. are not averse to it when it is warranted, engc Mr. Lindberg asserts that the 1993 braf general election was “the first time in ure1 [Canada’s] postwar history . . . that de- Statf fense policy—particularly naval policy— void [was] a major national issue.” In fact, nt b1 when the Canadian Navy was established in 1909-1910, the government was accused of creating a wasteful “tin-pot >re 11 navy”—and almost fell because of it. I thd More recently, the 1960s amalgamation idee1’ of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canalize*) dian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air jesel Force into a single, unified service was ep )' an intensely emotional national issue. In wli3 the 1970s, the antimilitary movement and
the spillover from the Vietnam War created constant debate over the military’s relevance and expense. The scope of public interest in the present defense review may be broader than in the past, but its occurrence does not represent a “first.”
Furthermore, the Canadian Navy need not “justify its existence to the Canadian people.” The Navy will educate; it will not justify. Experience has shown when Canadians are confident that they have been given the facts—not a partisan sales pitch—they respond wisely.
The interests and values underlying Canadian defense policy have been articulated in a remarkably consistent manner throughout the postwar period and
Without a “balanced, combat-capable, general-purpose” navy, Canada would find it difficult to meet its commitments at home and abroad—here, the bridge of HMCS Algonquin during Operation Sharp Guard.
they are unlikely to change dramatically. Canadian national interests may be summarized as security, prosperity, and a rule-based international order. Canada must ensure the security of its coastline, the world’s longest. Its prosperity depends on ocean resources and world trade. Historically, Canada has been committed to an international order in an increasingly interdependent world. For these reasons, a navy remains a necessity.
Canadian values have been described as “a spirit of moderation, compromise, the rule of law, and social and economic justice.” Admittedly, these are not militaristic values; however, they are not inconsistent with maintaining armed forces. They do indicate, however, that lavish spending—especially in the face of a crippling national debt—is a luxury that cannot be borne.
From these roots, the general outline of what Canada requires for its maritime defense is clear; the best, most credible, general-purpose force that can be obtained at minimum cost. That does not mean, as Mr. Lindberg contends, that the Canadian Navy must “focus on opera
tions in home waters in order to prove its worth to the Canadian public—and political leadership.” The Canadian Navy does not focus on the maritime approaches in order to prove anything to anyone—it is where we are needed. Drugs and collapsing fisheries are more immediate threats to Canada than a nuclear superpower’s attack on our sea lanes. Our worth will be proved wherever we operate. As I write, Canadian warships are enforcing U.N. mandates in the Caribbean and Adriatic Seas and engaging in operational and diplomatic duties around the world. The size of our ocean area of responsibility is greater than our landmass, itself the second largest in the world. The phrase “home waters” does not imply anything less than a blue-water capability. Sovereignty operations in the Canadian ocean approaches require the same endurance and seakeeping capability as deployment to distant waters. If Canadians continue to want a navy, the present mission to maintain balanced, combat-capable, general-purpose maritime forces is as valid as ever.
I am confident that a fair and critical examination of Canadian interests and values will endorse the traditional Canadian commitment to defense and collective security, arms control and disarmament, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Honoring that commitment is impossible without credible, balanced maritime forces. Notwithstanding the rise and fall of the nuclear-powered submarine proposal and the EH-101 helicopter project, policy must not be confused with hardware. We may have some vigorous debates over the tools for the job without necessarily disagreeing that the job must be done.
Canadians correctly expect a critical examination of the basis of defense policy and the most from every defense dollar. In June 1993, I published The Maritime Command Vision. Among other things, it was intended “to provide the Canadian public with a clear idea of their maritime forces’ role and future direction.” I am confident that a critical defense review will endorse the principles inherent in the document’s opening;
The Navy exists to protect Canadian interests in the ocean areas adjacent to the Canadian coast and beyond. To do this we need a combat-capable fleet which entails far more than simply possessing modern warships. Achieving combat capability requires, above all, dedicated people, ashore and afloat, who have the opportunity to practice and develop their skills. The Navy of the future must sail, it must sail often, and it must be ready. Our job is to make it so. □
31
Proceedings / May 1994