The Right Ship

A debate over the direction and future of surface combatant shipbuilding is in progress within the Department of Defense and Congress. The collapse of the Soviet Union has changed dramatically the national security environment that guided our defense decision making for nearly five decades. A declining defense budget, the resultant downsizing of our Navy, and a perceived decline of the global threat have combined to force a reevaluation of the Navy’s surface combatant requirements for the remainder of the 1990s and early 21st century. A related and no less important issue is the impact of reduced warship acquisition and construction on our domestic shipbuilding industrial base, which includes not only the shipyards but also more than 1,000 prime contractors and hundreds of subcontractors.

At the heart of the debate is the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)–class guided missile destroyer—the only major surface combatant under construction in our shipyards today:

• What is the proper acquisition profile for these ships, considering their cost?
• What is the DDG-51’s military effectiveness, compared to other surface combatants?
• Do we modernize the FFG-7 and DD-963 classes and build fewer, if any, additional DDG-51s or retire the older ships as the more capable DDG-51s enter the fleet?
• What is the impact of a reduced acquisition profile on the shipbuilding industrial base?

In these volatile and uncertain fiscal and geopolitical times, the question of “how much is enough?” is more challenging than ever. With increasing uncertainty comes the tendency to rely less on experience and more on quantitative analyses that provide cut-and-dried answers. The Navy and several key offices of the Secretary of Defense are struggling to define adequate, quantitative measures of performance to support their analyses. This process has often downplayed several qualitative but very relevant aspects of the debate that should serve as baseline assumptions for any analysis:

• Navy warships have been—and will continue to be—the only visible component of U.S. military might that can operate within miles of the target country without the constraints of political borders, host-country support, and other such restrictions that impact the deployment of other armed forces.
• With significantly fewer ships and less modernization money, each ship must contribute to multiple-mission areas. Specialized or restricted-capability ships reduce a battle group commander’s employment flexibility, risking damage and loss of life while participating in conflict situations where the threat exceeds their capability.
• Naval forces operate extensively in a near-land environment characterized by reduced battlespace, less reaction time, and a complex mix of high-speed, low radar cross-section antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Every surface combatant must be able to provide effective area—as well as self—defense. With barely 100 surface combatants projected in the U.S. inventory by the late 1990s, there are no expendable ships; more important—there are no expendable sailors.
• The decline of the Soviet threat has created a dangerous and widespread misperception of an equally declining global threat. In reality, however, increasingly sophisticated offensive weapons—ranging from ASCMs to tactical ballistic missiles—are readily available to littoral countries as a result of liberal foreign export policies.
• The DDG-51 class and its combat systems contribute enormously to sustaining the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. With neither government subsidies nor increases in commercial and foreign warship work, a decline in DDG-51 orders will likely result in the loss of one shipyard and many smaller, but essential, component vendors.¹

Principal Ship Characteristics

DDG-51 Flight IIA Configuration

Flight IIA Configuration
Length: 471 Ft
Beam: 59 Ft
Accommodations: 32 OFF / 27 CPO / 321 OEM / 380 Total
Displacement: 9217 LT
Speed: 30+Kts

Flight I and II Configuration

Length: 466 Ft
Beam: 59 Ft
Accommodations 26 OFF / 27 CPO / 303 OEM / 356 Total
Displacement: 8960 LT
Speed: 30+Kts

Multimission Capability

The warships we build today will be in service well into the 21st century. Numerous surface-combatant studies and analyses over the past 18 years have concluded repeatedly that the ships required for the 1990s and the 21st century must be multimission capable. A 1976 Naval Sea Systems Command study of DDG alternatives concluded that upgrading the Adams-class DDG with a New Threat Upgrade suite—a far more capable combat system than that found on today’s FFG-7 or DD-963-class ships—was inadequate against the threat projected for the 1990s.² A 1978–1979 CNO-directed DDX study defined the future DDG as a multimission “battle force combatant” with strike-warfare and antiair-warfare capabilities similar to the DDG-51 class.³

The Navy’s comprehensive 1992 “Destroyer Variant Study” (DDV) recommended continued production of Arleigh Burke–class destroyers equipped with the Aegis Combat System, modified to embark helicopters, as the warship needed to meet the threat today and into the 21st century.⁴ The study examined 10 surface combatant variants based on the DDG-51 hull, each equipped with a different combat-system suite. A New Threat Upgrade and upgraded FFG-7 combat system installed on a DDG-51 hull were among the options examined and discarded in favor of the Aegis weapon system. In virtually every warfare area, the DDV variant equipped with the upgraded FFG-7 combat system suite fell short of performance minimums established by the study. Although the New Threat Upgrade equipped variant performed well, it also fell short of the performance achieved by the integrated Aegis weapon system across all warfare areas.

Multimission capability is all the more important when viewed in the context of naval operations anticipated in the late 1990s and projected into the next century. The Navy’s shift toward a regional focus, as outlined in the Secretary of the Navy’s “ . . . From the Sea” white paper, requires naval forces of the future to be flexible and capable against an array of threats.⁵ The Mission Need Statement underpinning the recently completed “Twenty-First Century Surface Combatant Study” (June, 1993), a follow-on to the “DDV Study,” clearly outlines the Navy’s requirement for multimission surface combatants in the future.

The 21st century surface combatant must be multimission capable to deploy forward for independent operations in the face of a variety of threats, including antiship cruise missiles launched from the air, surface, and shore; theater ballistic missiles; mines; gunfire emanating from shore batteries, ships, or small craft; torpedoes; and various types of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. The future combatant must also contribute to offensive power projection, establish battlespace dominance, and be fully interoperable with other naval expeditionary, joint, and allied forces in support of U.S. security interest.⁶

With a five-year timeline from contract award to commissioning, the ships we build today will depart for their first deployment at the turn of the century. The combat systems of the FFG-7s and DD-963s were designed to deal with the threats of the 1970s and 1980s. Today, the principal threat to ships at sea—the antiship cruise missile—flies lower, faster, and with less radar cross section than its predecessors. Our deploying battle groups have grown smaller, and operating areas have moved closer to land. The near-land operating environment poses new and complex tactical and technical challenges in command and control, surveillance, battlespace dominance, and power projection. Unlike the restricted capability FFG-7 and DD-963-class ships, the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers are multimission warships capable of dealing with the threats of today and tomorrow.

The DDG-51s are being built in three configurations called “flights,” which incorporate several evolutionary war-fighting and survivability improvements. All three flights are equipped with the Aegis weapon system, virtually identical to that found in the larger Aegis cruisers. Three key aspects of the Aegis weapon system distinguish it from the combat systems installed on the FFG-7 and DD-963-class ships: the SPY-1 phased-array radar, the vertical launching system, and the integrated combat system.

The SPY-1 phased-array radar is the single most important component of the Aegis weapon system.

Its introduction on the Ticonderoga (CG-47) revolutionized the traditional detect-to-engage sequence. Following detection, the radar updates a track up to several times per second, depending on the target’s speed and type (surface or air). A firm, fire-control-quality track is achieved in seconds. A traditional rotating radar, found on the FFG-7 and DD-963-class ships, updates tracks only as fast as the rotation of the radar, nominally 15 r.p.m.—an update rate of once every four seconds. A fire-control-quality track takes three to four times longer than the phased-array SPY radar.

The operational advantage of the phased-array radar is most apparent, and important, against high-speed, low-altitude antiship cruise missiles (ASCM) such as the Exocet and SSN-22, both of which are readily available in today’s weapon-export markets. At best, radar detection of these low-altitude ASCMs occurs at or near the radar horizon, approximately 11-13 miles from the ship. Traveling at speeds greater than Mach 1 (more than 10 miles per minute), these ASCMs leave little reaction time for shipboard decision makers—and even less room for error. With the earliest initial detection—and alert operators—the FFG-7 and DD-963 have one (self-defense) engagement opportunity before the missile closes to inside the minimum-missile-engagement range. In addition, neither ship has an effective crossing-target engagement capability required to protect other ships in the vicinity against incoming ASCMs, leaving the aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, or other ships of the battle group to fend for themselves—with even less-capable combat systems.

In comparison, the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers in the same scenario will likely have several engagement opportunities against the incoming ASCM, as a result of the rapid conversion of the initial radar detection to a fire-control-quality track and high rate of fire of the vertical launching system. In severe or saturated (i.e., many missiles) threat environments, the commanding officer of the Aegis destroyer has the additional and unique option of enabling an automated detect-to-engage sequence, further reducing the delays associated with a manual firing sequence. This powerful war-fighting tool is not an option available to the

FFG-7 commanding officer. In addition, the DDG-51 provides effective area defense for the battle group against crossing targets. With our ships operating in near-land environments potentially 12–25 miles offshore, the battlespace management and reaction time gains in the detect-to-engage sequence provided by the automated SPY-1 phased-array radar are not merely significant—they are lifesaving.

If the SPY radar is the brains behind the Aegis weapon system, then the vertical launching system (VLS) is the brawn. The older above-deck missile launchers, such as the MK 26, are limited to a rate of fire no faster than the complex magazine-to-launcher reload process. Moreover, the above-deck launchers are limited to firing Standard missiles.

In comparison, the vertical launcher allows a firing rate of approximately one missile per second. Since the VLS acts as magazine and launcher, the Arleigh Burke–class ship has greater numbers as well as a mix of ordnance available, including Standard missiles. Tomahawk, vertical launch antisubmarine rockets, and eventually the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile. Loadouts can be tailored for mission requirements. The FFG-7 class carries only Standard missiles—no Tomahawk. The VLS-equipped DD-963s carry only Tomahawk—no Standard missiles. These ordnance limitations translate into mission and capability shortfalls.

Extensive integration has been achieved by the primary detection and engagement elements of the Aegis weapon system. Data may originate from on-board sensors (communications, radars, sonar, electronic signals) or non-organic inputs received via various data links. Nearly every component of the Aegis weapon system provides information to, and exchanges information with, the command-and-decision system on a real-time basis, translating to faster and more comprehensive information dissemination and increased reaction time available to decision makers.

The latest upgrade to the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers is Flight IIA and commences with DDG-79, a fiscal year-94 award ship. The final Flight IIA configuration is an outgrowth of the DDV study and responds to the Navy’s increasing emphasis on littoral operations, as well as maintaining a robust open-ocean capability. The ship will receive several war-fighting and survivability improvements, enhancing its already formidable war-fighting capabilities.

The most significant Flight IIA upgrade is the addition of a dual helicopter hangar designed to accommodate two SH-60Bs as well as to land, refuel, and rearm a variety of helicopters including Army AHIPs (OH-58D), Cobras (AH-1), H-46s, and Comanches (RAH-66). The addition of the hangar is paralleled by a separate acquisition program to equip the SH-60B with Penguin and Hellfire missiles, laser target designator, and forward looking infrared (FL1R) sensor. The helicopters will contribute immeasurably to the ship’s surveillance and identification capability, and also provide an over-the-horizon detect-and-engage antisurface and antisubmarine capability, which is particularly important against the fast patrol boats and diesel submarines common to littoral countries worldwide.

Warships and Sailors are not Expendable

At approximately $850 million per ship, the Arleigh Burkes are no small investment of the taxpayer's money. Inevitably, the surface-combatant debate has focused on the ship’s cost and, to a lesser extent, military effectiveness of the DDG-51 compared to other ships. Analysts favoring a DDG-51 acquisition profile of less than three ships (some even favor zero) per year highlight the savings achieved by reducing DDG-51 procurement and upgrading FFG-7s. A build rate of one DDG-51 per year vice three from 1995 to 1999 would save more than $8.5 billion in ship-construction funds alone. Viewed in the perspective of the total Defense budget for those same years, however, the $8.5 billion savings amounts to less than 1%. Moreover, the cost of upgrading the FFG-7s, already faced with near-zero weight and stability margins, would likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars, while achieving nowhere near the performance level of the DDG-51. Although we cannot afford to buy the best and most of every ship and weapon system, in the case of the DDG-51/FFG-7 tradeoff, the cost differences are marginal when capability and survivability are taken into account.

No less significant is the ability to upgrade our surface combatants to pace the threats of the future, best exemplified by the Anti-Navires Supersonique (ANS) antiship cruise missile, which is projected to fly at supersonic speeds at very low altitudes with high-G terminal maneuvers to defeat defensive actions taken by the target. To respond to demanding threats like the ANS and others, war-fighting improvements such as Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Standard Missile Block IV, Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD), and SPY radar upgrades are planned for the Aegis-class cruisers and destroyers. Each will be ready for incorporation into the Aegis weapon system before the end of the decade. Neither the FFG-7 nor the DD-963, however, will be able to take advantage of these essential war-fighting upgrades. During regional crises, these ships (FFG-7/DD-963) and their crews are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack by countries possessing sophisticated weaponry, acquired through foreign military sales or home-country manufacture.

The lack of threat-pacing combat system upgrades, combined with the inability to provide an effective area defense for aircraft carrier and amphibious task groups, relegates the FFG-7 and DD-963-class ships to restricted, limited-mission war-fighting roles outside of the most threatening operating areas and reduces the needed flexibility of fleet and battle group commanders to employ their ships safely and effectively in a variety of missions. Trading Arleigh Burke–class destroyers for less expensive—and less capable—Oliver Hazard Perrys does not overcome this obstacle.

Defense analysts and armchair strategists claim that the DD-963s and FFG-7s are more than adequate for missions such as evacuation, antidrug operations, and escort duties—and they’re right! When force levels exceeded 140–150 or more surface combatants, the Navy could afford the luxury of maintaining restricted-capability warships. As our surface combatant force shrinks toward barely 100 ships, however, these same analysts seem to forget the main purpose of warships—to go in harm’s way, fight, and win. From the sailor’s viewpoint, “adequate performance” isn’t good enough if he or she is on the receiving end of an incoming ASCM.

The Defense Secretary’s Bottom-Up Review, released 1 September 1993, clearly describes the tasks to be performed by naval forces in regional conflicts of the foreseeable future:⁷

• Establish maritime superiority to ensure access to ports and sea lines of communication, and as a precondition for amphibious assaults.
• Protect friendly forces from attack by aircraft or cruise and ballistic missiles.
• Support forces ashore with sea-based fire support.

The Shipbuilding Industrial Base

Like several other large and visible defense programs, the Arleigh Burke is under assault by Congress and the Department of Defense in their search to trim billions out of an already lean ship-construction budget. The Aegis cruiser construction program will end with the completion of the twenty-seventh ship, the Port Royal (CG-73) in April 1994. Like the cruiser, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer is built at two shipyards: Ingalls Shipbuilding Division in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Bath Iron Works (BIW) in Bath, Maine—the only shipyards presently capable of constructing the complex Aegis ships. Their continued viability is essential for surge construction capacity in time of national security need, for repair of battle damage, and most important, for maintaining the personnel talent and skilled work force so crucial to today’s technologically sophisticated warship construction process.

Nevertheless, the Navy’s shipbuilding plan for fiscal year-94 calls for just six ships—the lowest number since 1970—and only three are Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. For the remainder of the Future Years Defense Plan, fiscal years 1995 through 1999, Navy shipbuilding accounts will average well under $6 billion, less than half the more than $12 billion average from 1975 to 1990.⁸ The acquisition profile for the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers began in 1993 at three to four ships per year through 1999, and has now dropped to three ships per year—with further reductions likely.

After the government ended shipyard subsidies in the early 1980s, commercial shipbuilding in the United States virtually ceased. The large shipyards rely heavily on U.S. Navy construction for their continued well being. Between 1993 and 1999, DDG-51 -class destroyers will represent approximately 60% of U.S. Navy new ship construction funds, accounting for 100% of the Bath Iron Works shipbuilding and a good part of the Ingalls contracts. Any further decline in DDG-51 destroyer acquisition will significantly degrade the nation’s surface combatant shipbuilding industrial base—which includes not only the two principal building yards but also more than 1,000 combat system, electrical system, and machinery suppliers. According to a February 1993 Congressional Budget Office report, without significant other commercial work, procurement of two DDGs per year, or less, “would probably force one of the two shipyards out of the business of building these ships, and possibly out of business altogether.”⁹ The “Arleigh Burke–Class Industrial Base Study” is even more explicit, and more pessimistic:

Reducing the sustained annual buy to less than three ships per year could result in the closure of one shipyard (if no other ship work is available), damage to the vendor base, disruption and inefficiency in the Aegis weapon system production base, and erosion of the combat system engineering base. . . . Recovery would be, at best, difficult, costly, and require a long period of time.¹⁰

Perhaps the most dramatic impact, however, will be in the ultimate loss of critical shipbuilding and combat systems engineering manpower skills. Established through more than two decades of research, development, and construction, the Aegis industrial base is—above all—its people. A declining DDG acquisition profile will force layoffs and, eventually, permanent loss of irreplaceable skills—the true cost of which will not be measured in dollars but in its significant and negative impact on our national and economic security.

The decisions that emerge from the ongoing surface combatant acquisition debate will shape the future for a large portion of our core defense industries. Fiscal realities dictate that we reduce our defense spending requirements. These reductions, however, must be made prudently and with a keen eye to the future and potential security requirements. With respect to the surface-combatant Navy, three fundamental guidelines should become the cornerstones of our shipbuilding strategy through the early 21st century:

• Build no less than three surface combatants per year; retire FFG-7s at a rate to maintain the requisite inventory of 110-120; and retain DD-963s for their potent strike capability.
• Establish a long-range surface-combatant building plan to allow shipbuilders and vendors to bid more competitively, secure in the knowledge that a long-term commitment from the government will be safe from the budget surgeons.
• Subsidize U.S. shipyards to diminish the impact of declining Navy ship construction requirements and place them on even footing with their subsidized foreign competitors for commercial shipbuilding contracts.

Putting ships to sea that possess a technological edge has ensured our maritime superiority throughout the 20th century. With an increasingly challenging threat originating from a myriad of potential regional conflicts, that simple approach will ensure that our multimission combatants contribute to swift victory at sea and ashore with fewer casualties. After all, isn’t that why we have a Navy?