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There is an active counterdrug war going on in Colombia, and U.S. Marines are heavily engaged in training their Colombian counterparts—to control the situation before it spreads.
The Pentagon recently announced a shift in Department of Defense support of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy. Funding for future military counterdrug operations now will reflect an emphasis on sup- ply-and-demand reduction, vice arguably successful aerial and maritime detection and monitoring efforts in the transit zone from South America to the U.S. border.
Among the primary drug- source-area countries of Latin America, Colombia possesses the region’s most effective counterdrug military force. In particular, the Colombian Marine Corps’ riverine capability has grown from infancy to near maturity—largely owing to the efforts of the U.S. Marine Corps. The Counterdrug and Riverine Program is a unique jointtraining program that provides Colombian riverine combat elements (RCEs) an opportunity to reestablish the country’s sovereignty over its inland waterways.
The Republic of Colombia is one of the most stable democracies within Latin America. Although nearly 60% developed industrially, Colombia has remote jungle terrain complete with insurgent and narco-terrorist activity. The government of Colombia has been fighting a guerrilla war for more than 30 years, largely against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC).
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In 1989, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney directed the U.S. armed forces to become actively involved in combating the flow of illegal narcotics entering the United States. U.S. military support was designed “to increase the effectiveness of foreign forces’ efforts to de-
stroy drug processing laboratories; disrupt drug-producing enterprises; and control the land, river, and air routes.’’1
In response to the Secretary’s directive, the Comman- der-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command modified his Latin American short- and long-term plans to reflect training of host-nation military and police forces in counter- drug operations. The CinC’s focus on this training support was split between drug supply reduction activities and interdiction efforts within his area of responsibility. Drug-source-area, or tier-one, countries were the CinC’s top priority and included Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia—- which together produce more than 90% of all cocaine entering North America. Transit-area countries within the region included El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.
Counterdrug operations were the catalyst for renewed U.S. Marine Corps interest in Latin America. General A1 Gray, then-Marine Corps Commandant, issued “CMC Guidance for Latin America,” which outlined three priorities;
52 Proceedings/ July 1994
*
By Captain Darren Pitts, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
► To increase the Corps’ presence in the region by in-
creasing the number of U.S. Military Group representatives assigned to the CinC
► To offer operational support to enhance the CinC’s ability to execute his campaign plan
> To enhance the ability of Marines to speak foreign languages, with special emphasis on developing a strong cultural understanding of Central and South America, as well as sharpening Spanish-speaking skills
The vast majority of precursor chemicals—including acetone, gasoline, and cement—travel predominantly along Colombia’s 3,800 miles of navigable rivers.2 On countless occasions, ferry boats are seized while transporting coca leaves, cocaine base, and crystalline cocaine.
The problems associated with controlling drug traffic along the rivers are immense.
Colombia has four major river systems that branch out into 24 others.
In addition, four of Colombia’s borders are rivers that provide at least 20 entry points into the country’s interior.
At the request of the Colombian government, an aggressive riverine program was created to develop within its Marine Corps a full-scale mobile task force, capable of conducting prolonged riverine operations in a hostile environment.
At first, the Colombian Marine Corps possessed an infant riverine capability but lacked the equipment and expertise to conduct effective counterdrug operations. Such operations would require going ashore from the rivers and conducting raids against active drug sites—most of which were located 200 yards inland and were protected by anywhere from 30 to 200 guards.
Insurgent forces often were financed by the Colombian drug cartels. In turn, these forces conducted campaigns of widespread violence— including intimidation of the civilian populace, ambushes of government troops, terrorist attacks against political officials, and bombings—to protect drug processing and trafficking operations. This illicit relationship complicated the challenge of reducing the supply of crystalline coca exported by Colombia.
The U.S. Marine Corps Counterdrug and Riverine Program in Colombia began with drill-instructor training. In 1990, mobile training team (MTT) Covenas established a reference point from which the Colombian Marines could receive follow-on assistance. Simultaneously, mobile training team Cartagena delivered 15,000 M-14 rifles under the auspices of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which allowed the transfer of excess equipment in the form of weapons, vehicles, and clothing to support Colombia’s counterdrug effort. The Marine Corps’ initial goal was to organize, train, and equip 15 riverine combat elements to operate from 11 widely dispersed sites within Colom
bia. Initial sites for the basing of RCEs included Puerto Leguizamo, Tumaco, and San Jose del Guaviare.
A riverine combat element consists of a command group and a boat section comprised of three 22-foot Boston Whaler Piranha-class patrol boats. Each boat carries one three-man crew and nine combat-loaded Marines. These boats are typically armed with one M-2 .50 caliber and two M-60 7.62 mm machine guns. The combat power of Colombian RCEs is built around a ground assault section that consists of one officer, three noncommissioned officers, and 18 infantrymen. Rounding out the organization is a support platoon, which contains mechanics, fiberglass repairmen, armorers, and communicators.
The Counterdrug and Riverine Program’s mobile training teams are comprised of U.S. Marines, U.S. Navy personnel (SEALs, hospital corpsmen, and small-boat specialists), and Colombian Marines. On two occasions, U.S. Army Special Forces have served as members of the training teams. The program’s 25-day training syllabus covers squad- and platoon-sized infantry tactics. All periods of instruction are conducted in Spanish, the language of the host nation. MTTs also are required to incorporate the subject of Human Rights into their lesson plans. Because of the many cultural differences between the United States and Latin America, education and leadership by example are vital aspects of the human- rights training provided to host-nation forces.
The mobile training team contains a Headquarters, a Riverine-tactics, and a Ground- tactics Section—which, by design, permit concurrent ground and waterborne training. The ground-training portion includes patrolling, formations, raids, communications, night operations, land navigation, first aid, machine gun employment, and non-electric demolition systems. The riverine-training portion provides coxswains with basic instruction in boat handling, waterborne operations, and the environment.
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Proceedings / July 1994
The counterdrug program ensures that all administrative medical and logistical tasks for the teams are complete. Minimal support is available to MTTs once deployed, because most of the training is conducted in the remote jungles of the Amazon Basin. Because of the active guerrilla war within Colombia, all training areas are considered imminent-danger zones. This requires each MTT to complete high-risk-personnel marksmanship training and a brief indoctrination on counter-terrorist tech-
niques. The counterdrug program uses a building-block approach to training, which progresses from individual to unit level in ground and waterborne operations. Although riverine warfare and boat procurement are the program’s most active components, others have equal footing: the improvement of riverine bases, the annual riverine seminar, and the continued development of the Colombian Riverine School. In addition, the future acquisition of more 22-foot assault craft and the overall professional development within the Colombian Marine Corps reflect the country’s direction of effort.
The true measure of counterdrug training effectiveness comes at the conclusion of the MTT’s course. Following graduation, each riverine combat element conducts an exercise against a target that intelligence sources identify as an active cocaine lab. Every RCE trained by U.S. Marines has participated in actual combat operations. By law, U.S. military personnel cannot participate in counterdrug operations.3
The first riverine mobile training team was MTT Blue. Team Blue deployed from April to August of 1990 and conducted counterdrug riverine training at Puerto Leguizamo. Under Team Blue, the Colombian Marine training company became proficient in the use of the M-14 rifle, demonstrated an aptitude for water survival, and conducted a long-range patrol and a company attack.
Combat training facilities for this team had to be created. A tropical medical package, complete with surgical assets, was developed to deal with the extensive field illnesses found in Colombia—including disabling diarrhea, fungus infections, snake bites, malaria, and severe reaction to poisonous plants.
Waterborne training began in earnest in January 1991, with the arrival of Team Red and the first shipment of the Piranha-class boats. In April, an RCE trained by Team Red conducted one of the first raids against an armed drug laboratory in the history of the riverine program. The
Marine Corps is aware that the Colombian 1 ^
training environment is a combat area. Ex- r tensive individual terrorist-awareness tech- t niques are employed during the entire de- s ployment. c
After Team Red returned to the United t States, an ambush conducted by insurgents ^ in the Department of Guaviare resulted in -] Colombian casualties, forcing the government. to shut down the Guaviare River to com- mercial traffic. The Rio Guaviare is the major lb. east-west line of communication for com- ■ mercial traffic within the central portion of the country. In order to reopen the river, the H Colombian government needed to reconsti- I tute the RCEs that had taken heavy casual- I ties and lost 60% of their boats, which the I government was unable to replace. The I agreement between the United States and Ej Colombia stipulated that Colombia could U receive Piranhas only with the riverine train- m ing package provided by the U.S. Marine I Corps.
This accelerated the call-up of the next I MTT in September 1991, Team Basco. During this deployment, Colombian RCEs conducted a successful raid ry against a Cali Cartel laboratory north of the base at Tu- j maco. This raid and the subsequent action resulted in the I seizure of large sums of currency, microwave ovens, small I arms, and precursor chemicals, as well as the destruction of multiple sites.4
During the August 1992 deployment of MTT Gold. Colombian Marines served as operations officer, training officer, and assistant training officer for the joint U.S./Colombian team.5 The team’s achievement was revealed in the personal observation of a Colombian Marine commanding officer during a December 1992 operation against a guerrilla unit. The local battalion commander in Tumaco, Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Per- sand, used students from the first course taught by Team Gold alongside his experienced rifle companies. After the operation was completed, the Colombian commander had observed that the U.S. Marine Corps-trained RCE had outperformed his Marines in every aspect of the mission— prompting him to request that his headquarters seek an MTT for similar training of his entire battalion.
The U.S. Marine Corps’ most recent—and possibly last—riverine mobile training team is MTT Green, which , deployed to Puerto Leguizamo from August until December 1993. In what was the largest and longest duration mobile training team deployment, Team Green trained approximately 300 Colombian Marines to conduct combat on the inland waterways of their country. Colombian Marines trained by Team Green conducted their country’s first joint operation with the Colombian National Police in the fall of 1993, during which Colombian Marines and their police counterparts—anti-narcotics policemen from one anti-narcotics company—conducted simultaneous ground and air assaults against multiple drug targets.6
The U.S. Marine Corps has provided two additional mobile training teams that were not directly related to the riverine training program. In a 1992 training operation,
Proceedings/July 1994
jai> MTT Espinal provided marksmanship training to the Di- gX' | rectorate of Anti-Narcotics (DAN) of the Colombian Na- ch' tional Police (CNP). The National Police officials were ( so impressed that they requested Team Espinal to train cadets and lieutenants of the National Police Academy, ted; According to the team leader, “The drug interdiction com- nts panies are the tip of the spear in that country’s drug war. in They see more combat and suffer the heaviest casualties
t
- ■ of any other counterdrug force. They departed our training sites and began combat operations the next day. Before our departure from Colombia, it was reported that i I two of our former students had been killed and four wounded in the takedown of a lab.”7 The DAN is considered the world’s premier countemarcotics organization and by many estimates confiscates more drugs in one month than all Latin American counternarcotics forces combined are able to capture in one year.
Another component of the counterdrug program is the corporate knowledge presented during the annual riverine seminar, which provides instruction to senior Colombian officers in the concepts and doctrinal precepts of riverine , Warfare. The five-day seminar, conducted solely in Spanish, does not seek to produce American solutions but rather to provide a forum for crafting Colombian solutions. The program also improves Colombian riverine bases by utilizing U.S. Navy SeaBees and Marine Corps engineers to build ramps and maintenance facilities at strategic combat sites.
The key to long-term use of U.S.-provided equipment is threefold:
► The availability of needed repair parts must be sustained.
^ The conduct of preventive maintenance must be continuous.
► The use of trained mechanics must be increased.
There is a current shortage of mechanics and a limited
availability of spare parts to support the unusually high tempo of Colombian riverine operations. An Integrated Logistics System that is being developed by the Marine Corps Systems Command at Quantico will fulfill this need. '
Future U.S. Marine mobile training teams will provide specialized, small-unit training to enhance ongoing training, rather than present a foundation-based curriculum.
During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, MTTs likely will be formed to conduct the fielding of riverine assault crafts into RCEs for enhanced command and control and to train Colombian Marines in patrolling, demolition, and crew- served weapons. The professionalism and resolve of the Colombian Marine Corps will grow, and as their riverine capabilities mature, their actions on the inland waterways of Colombia will produce more quantifiable results in this regional drug war.
Colombian counterdrug forces have regained the sovereignty of their inland waterways, but the challenge continues.
Major developments in the production of illegal narcotics are emerging within Colombia. According to the Narcotics Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, traffickers have diversified their operations to include heroine production and the smuggling of a highly concentrated, liquefied form of marijuana. In fact, opium poppy cultivation, processing, and exportation could mean that—if not curtailed— heroin will replace cocaine as the major drug exported from Colombia to the United States.8 The reason for this diversification is simple: money. The current street value of one kilo (2.2 pounds) of cocaine is approximately $22,000; one kilo of heroin costs $250,000.
The opportunities for the U.S. military to provide training in Colombia’s war on drugs are few. With the cocaine industry exceeding $100 billion annually, however, supply reduction efforts such as the Marine Corps Counterdrug and Riverine Program are crucial and need to be intensified. As explained by a former CinC of the U.S.
Southern Command, “Developments in this region directly challenge two of our most immediate concerns: the security of democracies in Latin America and the need to curb the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States.”
'Richard B. Cheney, Secretary, Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, Washington, 18 September 1989.
•’Coalition and Special Warfare Division, Counterdrug and Riverine Program, Quantico, Virginia.
’Ibid.
*MTT Basco After-Action Report, Quantico, Virginia, 31 January 1992.
■MTT Gold After-Action Report, October-December 1992.
6A/7T Green Situation Report, Puerto Leguizamo, Colombia, 28 October 1993. 7M7T Espinal Training-Effectiveness Report, Quantico, 16 October 1992.
"Phone conversation with Infantry Field Advisor, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogota, Colombia. 10 November 1993.
Captain Pitts was recently a counterdrug officer with the Coalition and Special Warfare Division at Quantico. At present, he serves as a Psy- Ops/Civil Affairs Officer of the 4th Civil Affairs Group in Washington, D.C. He is writing a book about the U.S. military and Drug Enforcement Agency experience in Latin America.
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Proceedings/July 1994