The Gator Stumbles

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It’s the gators’ day in the sun. With the advent of the new world order and the official emphasis on littoral warfare as outlined in .. From the Sea,” amphibious sailors, long victims of institutional paranoia, suddenly see their underappreciated art at the forefront of naval strategy.

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The future seems rosy, indeed, for our amphibious forces.

But not so fast.. .

As capable as our Navy/Marine Corps amphibious team may be and as evident as its demonstrated skills have been, there still is reason to be concerned about the survivability of our amphibious forces in the post-Cold War era. Several shortcomings in these forces have been evident for some time: aging amphibious ships, outdated command-and-control systems, and a chronic shortage of lift for Marine Corps landing forces. Add to these a general misunderstanding of both the capabilities and limitations of amphibious power projection by the rest of the U.S. military establishment, and it becomes apparent that our amphibious capability is far from assured in the evolving Navy.

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Many of the problems facing our amphibious forces can be associated with the larger problems of downsizing. A scarcity of resources will challenge all of our services to think creatively and change traditional ways of doing business. However, in the case of the amphibious force, this challenge is complicated by a variety of issues.

Will the Real Gators Please Stand Up?

The shift in the naval service’s operational focus to littoral war fighting has led to a flurry of new tactical concepts—all touted as fresh and innovative, many oblivious to the seminal truths of amphibious warfare.

Primary among these new trends seems to be the urge to put Marines on any available ship, from submarine to aircraft carrier. The most publicized of these is the embarkation of a 600-Marine force on board a carrier as a special purpose Marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF). Added at the expense of one or two of the air squadrons normally embarked on the carrier, the task force supposedly gives the carrier battle group the capability to ac-

complish certain Marine special-operations-capable missions, such as raids, rescues, and merchant ship seizures. The short-windedness of this less-than-battalion-size force is evident. The carrier based SPMAGTF has virtually no sustainment and only a limited capability for mobility. The loss of the aircraft squadrons also hampers the carrier’s ability to conduct its other missions. The tradeoff, from the perspective of overall capability, is questionable.

The most disturbing aspect of the carrier-based SPMAGTF is that we know better. Projecting power ashore through land forces is a complex business, and the addition of a Marine unit alone will not an amphibious force make. Unfortunately, the challenge to be creative in the era of declining resources creates a market for glitzy ideas that ignore experience. The SPMAGTF may be new, but is it tactically sound? Most gators—both Navy and Marine Corps—say no, or they give the force such narrow mission capabilities that its tactical value becomes negligible.

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Proceedings / January 1994

The Gator Stumbles

35

Nonetheless, we will try it and probably declare the experiment a success, opening up the likelihood of making this pseudo-amphibious force a permanent tactical formation. The real cost, in addition to the loss in actual deployed capability, probably will be measured in terms

of some other amphibious ships—LHDs, LXs—that we really need but will be unable to squeeze through the budget process because “carriers can do that mission now.”

A variation on the carrier-based SPMAGTF theme is the integration of Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons with carrier wings, replacing Navy F/A-18 squadrons. The logic behind this concept is hard to beat: it supports the littoral focus and appears to be a sound use of assets. The tactic only makes sense, however, if we dedicate those “green” F/A-18s to direct support of the amphibious mission. In World War II, this meant moving Marine Corps aviation assets off the carriers to expeditionary airfields ashore. Today’s carrier battle group commanders are reluctant to do so, seeing the Marine squadrons as needed on board the carrier for traditional sea-based power projection. If we are not willing to let tactical air bearing Marine Corps markings follow the troops ashore, we should not put it on the carrier.

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plans for employing amphibious assault ships (LHAs and LHDs) in a sea-control mission have been drawn up and exercised. Undoubtedly these ships can perform the mission; they have excellent command-and-control suites and enough room to embark a very capable mixed helicopter and V/STOL wing. Doing so on any large scale, however, obviously would be at the expense of the ship’s amphibious capability. Should amphibious forces take part in the battle to control littoral waters? Absolutely, and amphibious force commanders need to learn how to perform surface surveillance, maritime interdiction, war-at-sea strikes, and a variety of other tasks needed to keep the

seaward side of the amphibious objective area secure. The.'Ject may even have to protect themselves in the open oceafjecti when no carrier battle group is around. But the essentit^and question is how much “blue water” bombing Marine Corpmect pilots should do. The answer is: only enough to help tfocess troops ashore.    1

These concepts are only examples of the rush to includTo e “expeditionary” (read: “amphibious”) forces in our tact:hare cal planning. Ultimately, any new tactic should be gauged ^UP I on its ability to put the best weapon on target. As innov whe ative as many of the current proposals for new amphibi ^corr ous forces are, they fail the acid test of supporting the pro ^ jection of power ashore by a landing force.                 hrin

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One Size Does Not Fit All                ^are

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The composite warfare concept (CWC) has dominate^^lsts our naval tactics for the past 20 years. Its approach—split’ dow ting the task force mission into component parts, such a- ^nat( antiair warfare, antisurface warfare Nat and strike warfare—not only seem‘ h^att logical, but it also has become sec^- °f < ond nature in our conduct of nava¹ f°^rc operations. ^emi

The composite warfare commac ^env der concept has served us well in dc fending our task forces and con ^ ducting sea-control operations Shoehorning the gators into tW CWC structure, however, has bee¹¹ P^i a perennial problem for tacticians ^eral The notion being discussed mos¹ ^ frequently these days attempts to *"^in< make the commander of the aim ”^la phibious task force (CATF) anothe⁽ warfare commander within the CW^ ,ⁿ

come just another mission for an im ^rori tegrated naval force.    ^{us       1}

As reasonable as this sounds $ |^ec first blush, the theory falls shot^{1 a}' on several counts. The role of th* commander of the landing force (CLF) is ill defined: does he work for the composite warfare coni' mander, who is coordinating th^£ entire naval mission, or for the am' phibious commander? Most pro' posals for integrating the amphibi' ous task force into the compost warfare structure lean toward the former, but the CWc commander usually is a battle group commander with lit' tie amphibious experience. More important, the battle group commander must focus on fighting the entire naval battle, usually from his carrier flagship somewhere far offshore. Despite advances in CT technology, am' phibious warfare remains by necessity a hands-on disci' pline. Vesting the ultimate responsibility for its accord plishment in a remote commander already bogged doW in a complex tactical problem invites failure.

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The discussion of the composite warfare/amphibiou- warfare issue usually is centered on tactics, but the sub'

The.'ject actually is command relationships. If amphibious ob- jceafjectives are part of a larger campaign, the landing force entiaiand amphibious task force commanders must report di- ^orp^rectly to the commander of the campaign to ensure suc- p tblcess. Moreover, the CATF must have tactical control of the forces supporting him in the amphibious objective area cluddo ensure that his tactical priorities have primacy. In tact!hard terms, this means that other naval forces must give iuge«^uP part of their assets to the direct control of the CATF, inoV' ^who is best served by having his own composite-warfare- ihibi commander structure within the amphibious objective area, pro Attempting to integrate amphibious tactics and the CWC brings out the worst in naval planners, and such efforts usually degenerate into turf battles. The CATF and CLF are worried that their forces will be left unsupported when —^ the going gets tough on the beach, and CWC traditional- _iateJ ists at the battle group level are concerned that a watered- ₅p|it down CWC structure will result in a confused, uncoordi- _;ha<nated attempt to manage scarce tactical resources. f_are, Naturally, each view has some validity. However the de- a_eifi< bate is resolved, it is clear that the key to employing all _sec- of our naval forces effectively—including amphibious _laVal forces—is a command structure that is responsive to the emerging threats we face in a dangerous tactical nan- environment, i dc

_coii- The Raid Mentality

Those who claim we will never do another Iwo Jima or Normandy probably are right. Unfortunately, there are plenty of likely situations where we may need to commit an amphibious force of even modest size for an extended operation. Saying that we won’t wishes away some tough problems that should be faced: logistic support, deployment of follow-on shipping, rapidly deployable field medical care, and combat engineering at the ends of the earth. Recent experience—in the Gulf War and Somalia—indicates these requirements are still valid.

The Vision Thing

Our naval forces face inevitable drawdowns in the future, and the gators are no exception. More distressing than the expected precipitous drop in amphibious hulls— from more than 60 today to as few as 30 by the turn of the century—is our failure to provide a coherent plan for a succeeding generation of amphibious task forces. Concepts for amphibious systems abound: over-the-horizon assault, high-speed amphibious assault vehicles, centralized landing craft control, special purpose Marine air- ground task forces, etc. Missing is an integrated sense of what the amphibious force of the future should look like.

The result of our unfocused approach is evident. Although our amphibious forces are relatively low risk in terms of technology and modest in cost, we have been slow in pushing them through Congress. The final resolution of the design of the long-awaited LX—which must replace today’s amphibious dock transports, tank landing ships, and dock landing ships—is illustrative of the difficulties we have in matching amphibious tactics to new systems. The final design of this vitally needed ship class was dragged out in the debate over the ship’s size. The design finally settled on has the right stuff—big flight deck, ability to operate the latest air-cushion landing craft (LCAC), and enough square- and cubic-foot capacity to lift the lion’s share of a battalion—but our inability to articulate the ship’s requirements based on a sound tactical vision was distressing.

Our tactical concepts should make clear the amphibious forces we need to build. Modern amphibious operations must be conducted from over the horizon, with an emphasis on mobility ashore, and within a force beachhead extending up to 300 miles inland. We must be capable of mounting these missions on short notice and with limited outside support. Today’s amphibious forces must be capable of conducting multiple missions simultaneously, and the CATF and CLF need to separate their forces into small units operating almost independently. The force structure necessary to undertake such missions must be centered around multipurpose amphibious ships capable of embarking faster and longer-range vertical-lift aircraft and landing craft capable of using almost any beach.

There are several keystones for building a revitalized amphibious fleet, regardless of specifics. Big decks such as the LHA and the LHD are needed to form the center of amphibious task forces. Large air-capable assault ships with a significant cargo, troop, and landing-craft lift capability also are needed to round out the task force shipping. The V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and CH-53E helicopter are complementary vertical-assault systems needed for

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The new Naval Doctrine Command has developed a concept for integrating amphibious and carrier battle groups into a single naval expeditionary force. This concept calls for the force to be commanded by a Navy flag officer with a Marine Corps deputy.

A modified composite-warfare- commander organization would support the commander, with a sea warfare commander, an area air defense commander, a space electronic warfare commander, an air warfare commander, and an amphibious warfare commander. All of these would be Navy officers, with the exception of the amphibious warfare commander, who would be a Marine Corps officer.

fare commanders. The amphibious warfare commander apparently will be responsible for the assault phase of the operation, and it can be assumed that the amphibious ships attached to the NEF will be under this officer’s tactical control during this phase. Gone is the notion that the officer directly responsible for the critical ship-to-shore movement of the landing force must be a Navy officer embarked on an amphibious command ship with direct control over the operation.

The naval expeditionary force concept will require several significant personnel changes. Amphibious squadrons will be dissolved and their billets dispersed to man the staffs of the warfare comman-

ders. Tactical air control squadrons will meet the same fate. The senior amphibious ship commanding officer in the NEF will assume duties as transport group commander, reporting to the amphibious warfare commander. His specific duties are vague at this time, although it seems obvious that he will be responsible for shepherding the “gators” in the NEF. Training carrier groups also are being tapped to take on the role of “expeditionary warfare training groups,” to train NEF staffs.

The advantages of the naval expeditionary force concept are unclear. An integrated naval task

force may be able to accomplish some amphibious missions with an NEF organization, but the diluted amphibious expertise available throughout the structure will not support rapid, centralized decision making. In all likelihood, the NEF commander will be embarked on a carrier, far out to sea, when a critical decision will have to be made within the amphibious group.

In tinkering with the current, proven amphibious doctrine, the naval expeditionary force concept attempts to fix something that is not broken. By doing away with the concept of an amphibious task force commander in overall charge of the amphibious operation at the deckplate level, the NEF deprives the amphibious mission of senior, experienced leadership in what has proven to be the most delicate of naval operations. By tying amphibious forces to carrier battle groups, we lose the flexibility we have had in separately deployed amphibious ready groups. The difficulty we currently have in linking the deployment schedules of amphibious ready groups and carrier battle groups should be a warning in this regard.

The NEF concept appears to offer our naval forces little in terms of value added. The closer integration of amphibious forces with sup' porting forces seems attractive; however, without the strong, centralized control exercised by an amphibious task force commander, amphibious operations risk becoming confused, uncoordinated, and potentially clumsy attempts to move ground troops ashore.

* Maritime Prepositioning Force *Transport Group

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* Supporting Arms Coordination Center *Special Operations *Mine Warfare           

*Air Strike * Helicopter Element Coordinator *Air Resources Element Coordinator *Tactical Air

Coordination Center

* Antisubmarine Warfare *Mine Warfare

rapid troop deployment and heavy cargo lift, respectively. LCACs are essential for shock and flexibility in ship-to- shore movement, but a conventionally hulled, heavy lift LCU-type craft also is needed for those missions the

Requiem for a Heavyweight

Figure 1: Naval Expeditionary Force Organization

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functioning without extensive support from outside forces.

Meeting these requirements will necessitate a cohesive building plan for the Navy and Marine Corps. Con- —" sequently, the procurement efforts of both services need to be joined at the hip to present a solid, effective strat- ’h egy for buying new amphibious systems, not just indi- I¹ f¹ vidual platforms. A single program manager needs to be ^:e(J placed in charge of building our amphibious forces, reporting jointly to both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. His charter would ^,0J. be to ensure that the “wish lists” of each service meld into JEr a coherent force capable of executing the full range of am- ^{)n J} phibious operations we currently advertise. Duplicative ^:rltl” systems or those that just do not fit into our overall am- ^;d^e phibious strategy would not make it past this single procurement manager.

^e The Death of the Amphibious Objective Area

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s The amphibious objective area (AOA) has been the doc- h trinal and geographic center of amphibious operations since isk World War II. Critics contend it has outlived its useful- irg^e ness in this age of automated data links, satellite com- the munications, and joint operations. Consequently, it is being ^res chipped away by new tactical fiefdoms and the argument 3- that the CATF and CLF cannot truly control the dynam- eri' ics of battle in the AOA.

i Abolitionists have lost sight of the amphibious objects tive area’s purpose and why it remains a good idea. The f AOA was conceived to give a single commander the au- ;y thority to manage the battle he was sent to fight. Accounted for in the theory was the hard-learned lesson that am- ttl^£ phibious operations are dynamic and complex. Times and :    missions have not changed this. Modem amphibious mis

sions require the complete focus of assigned forces, and 5- a single on-scene authority is essential to keep this focus directed.

jif' The AOA is not about controlling territory, it is about unity of command. Nothing in today’s crisis-oriented world f makes this issue quaint. If anything, the CATF and CLF ir- attempting to deal with the wide spectrum of tasking they are likely to face need their chain of command and scope of authority more clearly defined. Even more important, they need the final say on operations either directly sup- iii^s porting or adjacent to the amphibious operation. Protes- ■y tations to the contrary, including those from Navy com- _Lip' manders reluctant to yield tactical control of their forces to the CATF, usually miss this point.

A final irony in this issue is that the concept around which the amphibious objective area was built is such a »f, sound one that other commanders want similar authority 0' over their forces. Operating areas for Special Forces and air interdiction, for example, have crept into doctrine over the past several years, layering tactical charts with grid after grid of exclusive zones of responsibility. The ,e) amphibious objective area often is sacrificed to these areas * in joint operations, where mission accomplishment can ^ fall victim to service parochialism. Amphibious com- _;d ¹ manders objecting to such incursions into the AOA usu- p( ally are accused of being uncooperative and anti-joint.

, ^ The real danger is that these commanders will be forced

into plans that stress coordinated efforts over flexibility. The result will be friendly fire casualties and the inability to respond effectively to a rapidly evolving tactical situation.

When Jointness Isn ’t Enough

The meshing of amphibious operations and joint operations encompasses issues far broader than just amphibious objective area boundaries. The current dictum to make all large-scale U.S. military operations joint is hard to argue against in philosophic terms: obviously, the merging of the various capabilities of our armed services represents the best employment of resources. Where this conventional wisdom goes awry is in the accomplishment of special, unique missions, of which amphibious operations are a prime example.

Joint doctrine stresses combined operations through service component commanders. Each has responsibilities that go beyond tactical ones and lie in a vague area best described as “battlefield management.” For example, control and employment of air power in a joint theater is an Air Force responsibility; the prioritization of targets is done by a joint targeting board under the joint task force commander. The CATF and CLF traditionally have been responsible for both of these functions within the amphibious objective area, for sound reasons.

The splitting of operational responsibilities is the smart approach to running a large campaign. However, amphibious operations must be managed at a lower level, undertaken by a single, multidimensional force totally committed and centrally commanded. The notion of such a force does not mix with the current service-oriented structure in joint doctrine. Consequently, efforts to integrate amphibious operations into a joint campaign often are strained and marked by compromises made to placate the commanders involved.

Integrating amphibious operations into joint warfare is the right thing to do, but the corporate mind set that characterizes joint doctrine must be altered. The CATF and CLF, not the various service component commanders, need to have tactical control of an amphibious operation supporting a joint campaign. An amphibious option must be seen as a unique tool for the joint commander, one that must be employed outside the realm of his other service- oriented components. The optimal solution is to establish the amphibious commander as a separate component commander reporting directly to the commander of the joint task force. This concept likely will be resisted by the naval and Marine joint component commanders, who will argue against assets being taken from their forces. However, placing the amphibious force directly subordinate to the joint task force commander provides the most flexible response with the simplest chain of command.

MPF: Force Multiplier or Gator Wannabe?

theater to “marry up” with this equipment in a secure area. While MPF shipping carries its own lighterage for offload across an unimproved beach, and the extensive logistics on board the ships provide a month’s support for the brigade, MPF operations essentially are administrative offloads and are not intended to supplant the amphibious force in seizing defended territory.

However, three-fifths of the Marine Corps’ deployable combat power is based on MPF shipping, and plans for employing already thinly spread Marine Corps forces increasingly have come to rely on the Maritime Prepositioning Force.

sailors and Marines currently forming the backbone of o'

No one involved in the practice of amphibious warfare or MPF operations will suggest openly that the maritime prepositioned forces can substitute for amphibious forces. MPF ships are not combat loaded, and the Marines deployed with the MPF must arrive in theater and constitute themselves as a force before undertaking any mission. Nonetheless, we have begun to blur the line distinguishing MPF and amphibious operations in those situations where the threat is unsophisticated and our dearth of amphibious ships makes it attractive to pencil in prepositioned ships to boost force levels. The recent deployment of a small three-ship amphibious ready group with an integral MPF ship is a supposed anomaly that could represent a disturbing precedent.

Hinting that a maritime prepositioning force is a suitable substitute for amphibious shipping is unwise politically, but more important, it is poor tactics. The relative inflexibility of MPF and the significant infrastructure that must be in place to support such an operation are antithetical to the short notice, Third World amphibious operations we are most likely to see. Yet, we will execute some well-scripted exercises where MPF and amphibious operations appear to go hand in hand, and the implication will take on a life of its own. MPF will appear a reasonable adjunct to the amphibious force. Even worse, those determined to cut defense costs in the upcoming years will attempt to force a larger portion of our Marine Corps on board merchant shipping. This concept is fiscally inviting and tactically disastrous. Landing and supporting amphibious forces requires dedicated, robust systems capable of operating under the poorest of environmental con

ditions. Ports capable of supporting modem merchant will not always be available, and efforts at off “black bottom” shipping in a tactical amphibious tion usually have been unsuccessful.    _mus|

Creativity is vital in this era of declining resources, bf ^ our key amphibious capabilities must be fostered and nta>'f_act tained intact. It is incumbent upon those of us with a b^aC si_on ground in amphibious warfare to articulate its unique P^r°*f_0rci lems and needs. It is equally incumbent upon the rest ^ the Navy to pay attention to the hard lessons of amphibj_t ^ ous warfare. Most amphibious tactics are not old f^aS*ni_Za ioned, but proven; most gators are not narrow minded, b^!_e)^ experienced. Current amphibious issues must be resoW^^ through dialogue that recognizes this.  ^

There still is more reason for hope than despair in co¹^- ¹ sidering our amphibious forces. These forces are ^ trained and experienced; the professional ability of tl> jjj

amphibious capability is unquestionable. Add to this tl¹ investment we have made in the structure of our atf phibious force to date and it becomes obvious we ha' ■ the most capable amphibious force in the world. The cW] lenge is to use the experience and technology we have d veloped as the basis for restmcturing our amphibious ford to meet a changing national military strategy.

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