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During Operation Desert Storm, a single detachment of long-endurance OV-lODs with integrated forward-looking infrared systems, laser rangefinder-designators, and trained air crews provided round-the-clock reconnaissance and served as indispensable communications links with all supporting arms agencies. The ground Marines in Desert Storm loved the OV-IOD, but the last Marine Corps squadron. Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-4 in Atlanta, Georgia, is scheduled for decommissioning in March 1994, leaving our Marine ground forces without that critical link in the combined arms system—which is not what it used to be, either.
Retaining a squadron of OV-lODs in the reserves until a suitable replacement platform is fielded would be prudent.
Marines travel light and do not have the heavy artillery assets that support their Army brethren. Naval gunfire used to fill in the gaps, but the big naval guns that served the
A Farewell to (Combined) Arms, Unless . . .
By Major D.H. Fisher, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Keeping Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-4’s new OV-lODs—here over the expeditionary airfield at Twentynine Palms, California—alive and well in the reserves would be a very smart thing to do. It’s not too late.
someone else’s problems were not being malicious. They were trying to give a good deal to a good guy. Besides, they probably rationalized that it wouldn’t hurt anyone.
What Is a Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit?
By Lieutenant Samuel W. Asbury, U.S. Naval Reserve
In any event, the VMO community throughout the 1980s was a magnet for marginally effective officers. The concentration of such mediocrity in one small aviation community represents an institutional failure of leadership, laid squarely
Littoral warfare, the new buzzword in Navy circles, is coastal warfare— coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security, executed both in coastal areas outside the United States in support of national policy, and in the United States as part of this nation’s defense.
In any event. Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) Units have been in
Corps so well in every major conflict since World War II have been silenced—victims of post-Cold War budget cutting. Most U.S. Navy ships now sport only a single 5-inch/54 caliber gun mount—and some have only a 76-mm mount; neither has the range or destructive power required. Shore-based antiship cruise missiles may force our ships farther off shore, decreasing even more their limited range. Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles are essentially useless in the direct support of Marine infantry.
Although there is much talk about new systems, there is no money in the current budget to develop, test, or buy any of them. Scratch naval gunfire from the combined arms team.
Marine aviation must take up the slack. Rotary-wing Marine air provides the ground commander with mobility, logistics support, and potent attack helicopters that can offer tremendous short-term punch for the ground commander. Their limited range and payload, how-
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at the feet of the Marine Corps.
The individual errors and failures of leadership are heartbreaking—they have contributed to 16 deaths and 25 aircraft losses. What is inexcusable is that many of the victims had been identified to the command as accidents waiting to happen. The losses occurred in peace and in war and we were fortunate that more were not lost during Operation Desert Storm. The U.S. Marine Corps, and the OV-10 com-
this business since the Vietnam War, but many otherwise knowledgeable naval officers seem to know little about their mission and capabilities. It is time for Navy exercise planners to use some valuable assets that are too often overlooked.
Proceedings/January
The units’ primary mission is to conduct surface and subsurface surveillance of amphibious objective areas, harbors
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munity in particular, allowed this to hap" ship pen. It was a betrayal of trust. ■ chor
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Captain Stolzenberg, an OV-10 pilot and 1981 N‘iV-' | t-1 Academy graduate, served as a Weapons and W ,e tics Instructor and Aviation Safety Officer with Ma" "'1th rine Observation Squadron (VMO)-l while on activ- 1 Corp duty. An honor graduate of Amphibious Warf.V; j School, he flew 18 missions in OV-lOs during Of r eration Desert Storm. He resigned from the Mari'11’
Corps in 1992 and is an associate engineer with RSVt . test Technologies in Houston, Texas. I tlity.
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and approaches, roadsteads, straits, ah' eye; chorages, advance bases, and other id' dini; shore areas of military or economic in1' and portance to support the requirements ot D mobilization or contingency plans. Sec Wor ondary mission capabilities include con1' port mand, control and communications, cod' tties trol of airborne mine countermeasure* Aral helicopters, control of surface midc
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ever, cannot replace the massive firepower of fixed-wing aircraft.
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Neither can they replace smaller, slower, turboprop, fixed- wing aircraft with long on-station times; besides, their other, very important missions would suffer. The answer is what we have—Marine Observation Squadrons, whose legacy of providing ground commanders with command and control, reconnaissance. plus artillery and naval gunfire support—is unequaled. The concept worked in the Korean War, in the Vietnam War, and again in Operation Desert Storm: the need for a dedicated observation aircraft is clear, as are its characteristics, including the ability to operate from unimproved air strips and roads.
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All Marine Corps OV-IODs have been updated with FLIR systems to provide day and night video imagery to the ground commander; advanced solid-state, multiband VHF/AM, VHF/FM, UHF, and HF radios; and effective countermeasures to protect against infrared (IR)-guided surface-to-air missiles. Most important, the OV-IOD pilot and Supporting Arms Coordinator (Airborne) team’s primary mission in life is to support Marine infantry by providing a dedicated, flexible link between all elements of the combined arms team. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has chosen to cast this aside in the name of economy.
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The two-seat F/A-18D, touted as the OV-lOD’s replacement, is inappropriate for the mission for various reasons. In fact, it offers everything you do not want in a FAC(A) platform: high speed (try picking out a six-digit grid on a target at 420 knots at 5 G’s—just unfolding the 1:50,000 map is tough enough); short endurance (even if a tanker is always available, the F/A-18D must frequently leave the area for 20-30 minutes to refuel); large geographical separation of the aircraft and crew from the ground forces; and a part-time approach to supporting arms coordination (which probably does not rank in the top five training priorities for F/A-18D air crews).
The AH-1W has also been suggested as a replacement, and although it resolves many of the F/A-18D’s inherent problems, it still suffers from the problem of task saturation and
short endurance. Given limited flight time and training opportunities, the AH-1 community cannot be expected to add new missions and retain a reasonable degree of proficiency in the plethora of missions already assigned. The AH-1W also lacks the OV-lOD’s FLIR and laser designator and there just are not enough attack helicopters to go around.
• The OV-lO’s survivability on the battlefield has been questioned. Granted, it is slower than the F/A-18 and cannot hover in defilade like a Cobra, but its IR-suppression system, IR jammer, and decoy flares controlled by a missile-launch detector provide it with an unmatched capability to survive against IR-guided missiles. (The two OV-lOs lost in Desert Storm were OV-lOAs without IR suppressors or advanced countermeasures.) In comparison, the F/A-18, with the largest infrared signature of any aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory. lacks a missile-launch detector and an IR jammer—and the threat from IR missiles is increasing.
Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) have their place above the battlefield, but they currently offer no direct link between the ground commander and the RPV control site and their field of view is very limited. As a result, ground commanders cannot get an overall picture of the battlefield.
Augmenting VMO-4 reserve flight crews with a limited number of active-duty personnel would ensure continued support for ground forces and preserve the highly perishable skills of the pilots and SAC(A)s. When a suitable replacement platform is obtained, possibly an AH-1W or a smaller V-22, such as the XV-15, modified specifically for the SAC role, the reserve squadron can train the new active-duty air crews.
Some argue that the Marine Corps cannot afford to maintain a small number of special-mission OV-IODs; Marine Corps ground forces must decide quickly if they can afford not to.
Major Fisher, a Supporting Arms Coordinator (Airborne) with VMO-4, is a survivability engineer with Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company. He was an Electronic Countermeasures Officer with VMAQ-2 while on active duty from 1977 to 1984.
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sweeping craft of opportunity, control of ship movement within harbors and/or anchorages, and as operational test units.
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In short, units monitor and facilitate command and control in littoral zones. The missions put the units squarely Within the primary Navy and Marine Corps focus on littoral warfare.
The Total Force policy—integrating regular and reserve units—is probably best exemplified in the MIUW community. The 28 units are commissioned and have active-duty personnel. The active- duty to Selected Reserve (SelRes) personnel ratio within each unit, however, is about 76:93%.
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During fiscal year 1992, personnel participated in Projects North Star, Fuertas Defensas, and Blue Star; Operation Wall- eye; and Exercises Dragon Hammer (Sardinia), Ocean Venture (Camp Lejeune), a»d Display Determination (Turkey).
During Operation Desert Storm, units Worked closely with U.S. Coast Guard Port security units in friendly port facil- 'hes at A1 Jubayl and Dammam in Saudi Arabia, and Manama, Bahrain. Units also
feedings/January 1994
provided security, communications, and logistic support for port clearance operations in Kuwait.
The units have no active-duty counterparts; consequently, they must be fully equipped to perform their mission—there are no regulars to draw from. Their primary piece of equipment is the radar sonar surveillance center (RSSC) van, basically small combat information centers with sonar processing equipment. Without the vans, units cannot conduct surface-subsurface surveillance or control surface craft or aircraft—they cannot accomplish their mission. Outdated vans with obsolete equipment are of no help, yet 12 of the 28 units have old vans configured largely with obsolete equipment that is no longer supportable within the Navy supply system and only four new vans were funded for fiscal year 1993.
Along with reserve construction battalions, MIUW programs have had the most significant surface-equipment shortage problems. According to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 20% of the units
have been unable to perform their mission because of equipment shortages. The Naval Reserve purchased 20 pieces of civil engineering support equipment— trucks, generators, etc.—in fiscal year 1992, but such equipment only indirectly supports the mission. The Navy to date seems to be accepting the current reduced readiness. Given the demands of littoral warfare, however, reduced readiness is unacceptable; moreover, it can be remedied.
Quick response is a hallmark of Navy and Marine Corps forces. Properly equipped, 28 mobile inshore underwater warfare units can be ready for lift in 72 hours. A single C-5 or three C-141B aircraft can lift the unit and its vans, which can be placed in precise locations by CH-53ES.
Alternatives: Reduce eight units to C-5 operational status and use their assets to provide replacement personnel and gear for the other 20 units; or decommission several units outright. Realize, however, that any reduction in the number of
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