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The physical constraints to naval forces engaged in littoral operations—reduced sea room, radar clutter, and restrictive rules of engagement—differ markedly from those the Navy has confronted in planning for open-ocean warfare. As a result, the service is examining electro-optics and laser technologies initially developed under a variety of Strategic Defense Initiative programs for potential roles in communications and battle management, surveillance and targeting, and for ship defense.
Communications and Battle Management
Submarine communications. Developments in compact, solid-state blue-green wavelength laser transmitters and receivers have enabled the Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Tactical Airborne Laser Communications Program and the Navy’s Submarine Laser Communications Program to develop and test new communications systems that promise two-way communications with submarines at operational depths and speeds.
Any theater missile defense should employ all available assets—sea-, land-, air- and space- based—to counter the threat posed by tactical ballistic missiles. The potential is there and, in some cases, real hardware has been fielded. Defense Support Program (DSP) and commercial satellites, U.S. Air Force airborne warning and control system (AWACS) E-3s, and U.S. Navy carrier-based E-2C airborne early warning aircraft linked to U.S. Army ground-based radars (GBR) and theater high-altitude air defense (THAAD) missiles, U.S. Marine Corps Hawk Missile batteries, and Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers could form an integrated system.
Non-cooperative identification and battle damage assessment. Widely varying programs are under way in the Department of Defense and private industry to develop and apply the unique capabilities of laser radar, also called ladar or lidar. This developing technology, which uses light waves in place of the traditional radio waves, is producing systems that under proper conditions are equal to or better than even the most advanced millimeter-wave radars. In an unpredictable environment, there are advantages to using both in concert.
The key difference between laser radars and conventional radio-frequency (RF) radars is
the extremely short wavelengths at which the laser systems operate. This permits them to receive hundreds to thousands of times more signal returns over a comparable period of time, which results in much finer resolution in imaging applications. They can provide precision guidance for smart munitions and even help low-flying aircraft to avoid power lines and other obstacles.
Because of the wavelengths at which they operate, ladars are capable of detecting and tracking low radar cross-section stealth aircraft and non-metallic vehicles and water craft. Some systems under development may be used to detect submerged submarines and mines; others can be employed to detect clouds of poison gas or biological agents.
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A laser-radar project code-named Radiant Outlaw is being developed as part of a Navy Advanced Technology Demonstration Program. It will exploit the frequency stability currently achievable in high-energy carbon dioxide gas lasers (infrared wavelength) to develop a laser radar capable of detecting and measuring small surface-skin vibrations of targets such as ships and aircraft from a great distance. The tiny mechanical vibrations of a target’s surface cause slight Doppler shifts in the laser light as it bounces off the target and returns to the sensor for detection, where it can be processed to produce a characteristic micro-Doppler signature of the target analogous to the sound signatures obtained from a sonar’s acoustic hydrophones. Since the sound
waves collected by a sonar’s hydrophones are caused by the mechanical vibrations of a ship’s hull, the Radiant Outlaw Program will look for correlations between a target’s micro-Doppler and acoustic signature in cases where this is possible.
If strong correlations are found to exist between micro-Doppler vibration signatures and acoustic sonar signatures, this technology may play an important role in gaining back some of the range and effectiveness sonar presently loses in moving from the open ocean environment to crowded coastal waters.
The highly directional nature of the laser radar’s beam means that it will be able to collect high-quality data on a particular target even in the presence of heavy background traffic. Its quick scanning, narrow beam also will complicate hostile attempts to use it to locate or target the laser radar’s platform. Ladar systems promise the active gathering of precise information under covert conditions, allowing them to be used under all but the most stringent emission-control conditions.
The Radiant Outlaw Program’s laser radar (or micro-Doppler vibrometer, as it is also called) is being installed in a pod for carriage by P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. After completion of land-based tests, it will begin making airborne signature measurements this year. The technology could have many important applications in developing new systems to address urgent problems in target discrimination and identification in the littoral environment.
The ability of Radiant Outlaw’s laser radar system and others like it to track a broad variety of targets, even those stealthy ones that conventional RF radars might miss, while simultaneously providing additional micro-Doppler information for target classification, has great potential for clearing up the tactical picture—of increasing importance in cluttered littoral situations where commanders must distinguish potential threats from friendly and neutral traffic.
It could make the important difference between having the confidence to be able to shoot first or having to wait and react to someone else’s first shot. Being able to interrogate and formulate covertly a target track—without using RF radars— should reduce incidents in which a potential target mistakenly assumes that a fire-control radar has locked on to him.
Micro-Doppler measurement techniques can also improve battle-damage assessment. Damaged machinery and surfaces are apt to produce a very different vibration signature from unaffected ones. Measuring and analyzing these from aircraft at a safe distance in real time may be of invaluable assistance in determin
ing strike effectiveness when used in combination with visual data, photographs, and radar images produced by either RF or laser systems.
Surveillance and Targeting
.
Unfortunately, the development of laser radar and other electro-optical systems has been slowed because of a tendency to view them as competitive with micro-wave and millimeter-wave RF radars. In fact, the two technologies have different strengths and weaknesses. In a complex and unpredictable environment, distinct advantages may be gained from using both in a complementary or cooperative fashion. The unparalleled computational and processing capacity now available for Navy ships and aircraft, coupled with the modern communications systems now reaching the fleet, can perform this type of sensor and data fusion in real time to multiply our effectiveness and flexibility. Combat effectiveness will increase measurably if commanders have access to information from both RF and electro-optical systems.
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) is an important area in which conventional RF and laser radar may soon complement one another. The objectives of TBMD are:
► To prevent launch of ballistic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and areas of vital interest
► To protect these same forces and areas from ballistic missiles after launch
► To minimize the effects of damage caused by a ballistic missile attack
A very accurate airborne surveillance- and-cueing sensor is a key part of the system. The integration of a lightweight, compact, solid-state ranging ladar and an infrared optical search and track (IRST) system can meet these requirements. [See “Killing Scuds From the Sea,” and “Fielding a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,” in the June 1993 Proceedings, pages 52-58.]
Studies sponsored by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization have shown that use of an IRST system for launch detection and initial target acquisition, and a ladar to provide precise fire-control solutions at extended ranges is both achievable and desirable. Early and accurately refined state vectors provided by such sensors can be handed over to ground- and ship-based interceptor systems permitting an earlier launch or launch at extended ranges; defenders also might have time to launch multiple shots, increasing hit probability.
These in-theater surveillance-and-cuing sensors could net with other detection- and-tracking systems using an appropriate link to disseminate track information
or pass on remote cuing data. This capability could lead to a theater defen sive grid of systems composed of seal based Navy Aegis; land-based U.S. Arm!' theater high-altitude air defense and PH triot missiles; and Marine Corps Hawk missiles.
Since such systems may confront hundreds of missiles on dispersed, highly mobile launch platforms, some perhaps armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads, the range and velocity resolution achievable with ladar may add a very important capability. State vectors from such systems will include very accurate predictions of a given missile's launch point and impact, which will permit commanders to determine quickly whether a missile is enough of a threat to launch interceptors—always a consideration given the finite number of interceptors available at any given location-
The real-time availability of accurate launch-point locations will permit defense forces to target even the most mobile of launch platforms for strikes by cruise missiles or aircraft. Tactical ballistic missiles may become one-sho> weapons, whose use will cost an attacker dearly. A high-probability of loss may cause belligerents to reconsider before launching their missiles.
Ladar’s accurate state vector information may help develop reliable algorithm' for identifying or typing TBM threats, enabling defensive countermeasures to be tailored for maximum effectiveness- These same attributes also should help 1'’ developing real-time assessment of in- terceptor effectiveness. The active laser radar might be employed to designate targets for interceptors, much like other laser-guided weapons. In fact an airborne IRST/ladar system may be particularly' f effective as a targeting and fire-control system for advanced, long-range, lock- j on-after-launch interceptors.
Ship Defense
Air- and surface-launched antiship i cruise missiles have become increasing!) | sophisticated and difficult to counter, especially in coastal waters where a ship s j speed and maneuverability may be restricted. Lasers offer a technological edg6 j for surface forces in such an environment I [See “Point Defense Is a Necessary Pm ority,” in the June 1993 Proceedings> ' pages 92-94.]
Detection, Tracking, and Fire Control The Radiant Mist program is exploring the possibility of combining an infrared- wavelength ladar with an IRST system i11 order to augment radar detection of low- cross-section antiship cruise missiles. I* | would offer significant improvement5 over stand-alone passive IRST systems
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Proceedings / February
High-energy laser weapon systems —here, in an artist’s concept on the foredeck of the USS Fahrion (FFG-22)—show potential for defending ships against supersonic, sea-skimming antiship missiles.
ity of our interceptor technology to develop reliable defenses. In addition, ships’ magazines are stretched to the limit to carry the numbers of offensive and defensive rounds required to support an intense campaign. Countering ever- faster maneuvering bullets with even faster, more maneuverable, and more expensive bullets is a tail chase that is proving harder and harder to win. More than two decades of development, testing, demonstration, and study based on the deuterium fluoride mid-infrared advanced chemical laser and sea lite beam director at the White Sands Missile Test Range have shown both the feasibility and effectiveness of laser defense systems against missiles and other airborne threats at tactically significant ranges.
Once again, the active laser subsystem could illuminate targets for laser-guided weapons.
The fleet needs an electro-optical fire-control system to detect and track high-speed antiship cruise missiles at sufficient range to ensure effective engagement. Combining this system with other detection and tracking systems such as the SPS-49 air-search radar, the Mk-23 Target Acquisition System, the Mk 15 close-in weapons system radar, SLQ-32 electronic support measures, and various hard- and soft-kill defensive weapon systems to form an integrated combat capability promises significantly shorter reaction times.
The increased effectiveness provided by integrated sensor and weapon systems can give the fleet a multi-spectral capability that can adapt to the broadest range of conditions.
Defense at the speed of light. The proliferation of increasingly sophisticated and specialized missile systems is taxing the capabil-
The Radiant Mist program combines a laser radar with infrared search-and-track systems for use in detecting and defeating antiship missiles.
The advantages offered by a laser shipboard point-defense system over more traditional kinetic- kill systems are especially important in the littoral environment. Since a laser’s destructive beam
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travels at the speed of light, it is virtually insensitive to inherent reaction limitations affecting missile and gun systems in trying to cope with high-speed or highly maneuverable targets. Its ability to concentrate tremendous energy into a narrowly focused, accurately directed beam ideally suits it for countering high threat densities. Its beam can quickly shift from target to target with minimum hazard to surrounding friendly forces or neutral traffic. The chemical storage tanks that constitute the system’s maga
zine can support repeated use and can be easily replenished. Laser shipboard-defense systems are efficient and cost-effective—with a kill probability approaching 1.0 for about $10,000 a shot.
A recently concluded shipboard feasibility study shows that a laser shipboard point-defense system can be designed to be compatible with a USS Bunker Hill (CG-52)-class Aegis cruiser or equivalent with minimal impact on ship’s support systems and sea-keeping ability. The laser and beam-director systems would
fit in the spaces currently occupied b; the forward 5-inch/54 gun and its magazine, resulting in a net decrease in both weight and overturning moment. Plan* for the preliminary phase of an advanced technology demonstration are under way
Commander Martin is the Assistant Branch HeaJ Surveillance (Laser Radar and Strategic Systems),K the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command She has taught at the Naval Nuclear Power School served as Electrical Repair Officer, USS Hollan» (AS-32), and was a Military Research Associate ^ the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Prescription for Future Combat Casualties
By Captain Raphael F. Smith, U.S. Naval Reserve, and Captain Edward Lally, U.S. Naval Reserve
The fleet hospital program was established in the mid-1970s to address deficiencies in medical advanced-base functional components. At the time, our national security concerns were focused on global war with the Soviet Union, and the hospitals were designed as large units, movable but not truly mobile, capable of
PHOTOS COURTESY OP THE AUTHORS
This soldier, wounded by an Iraqi Scud missile during Operation Desert Storm, was treated by orthopedic surgeons, nurses, thoracic and general surgeons, and internists with special expertise in nephrology and pulmonology—all from Fleet Hospital Six.
treating the large number of combat casualties that would result from such a conflict.
Now national security strategy has shifted to focus on regional contingencies and the changing role of the fleet and Fleet Marine Force in these operations will require modification of operational medical support as well. Furthermore,
providing health care may become the primary objective of some future “military” operations that are actually more humanitarian than military. These range from providing relief following an earthquake or a hurricane to providing expert medical care for control of disease that has reached epidemic proportions—as ex
emplified by the spread of cholera in South and Central America. [See “Fleet Hospitals: Full-Service Care,” in the October 1992 Proceedings, pages 77-79.]
As we move toward the 21st century, sweeping changes have been made in force structure as a result of the changing mission of all components of the naval service. “. . . From The Sea” out lines this new direction and the Secretary of the Navy has extended this vision to the Selected Reserve.
Proceedings / February
Our preoccupation with planning for war with the Soviet Union left little time or money to prepare for and carry out such missions. As we turn our attention to more diverse regional concerns, we find that, by its very nature, each
crisis contains a substantial humanitarian component.
At first glance, a Navy fleet hospital-' with its 250-to-500-bed capacity, huge inventory of equipment and supplies' considerable logistic support requirements, and large complement of personnel—may seem a relic of the past rathd than an important asset in the Navy’s vision of flexible readiness. But these flee1 hospitals offer an available and relatively inexpensive solution to many situation* in which the delivery of expert health care is a primary part of the Navy’s mission
Flexibility. Fleet hospitals demonstrated their flexibility during Operation* Desert Shield and Desert Storm when the three hospitals that were deployed functioned as community hospitals and referral centers without degrading their capability to treat effectively majof battlefield casualties. Although not specifically designed for this purpose, the ability to function in this mode before, during, and after hostilities was convincingly shown. Specialties not normally involved in trauma care—such as dentistry, dermatology, family practice, and gynecology—were especially busy.
Each of the Naval Reserve fleet hospitals has an impressive array of medical skills and experience that could be tapped to respond to a variety of challenges. Although not widely understood, fleet hospitals can treat a greater range of surg1" cal, orthopedic, and non-surgical conditions than most active naval hospitals. Although the potential providers of this can-’ are geographically dispersed prior to mobilization, they are members of one command and function within its framework they can quickly be brought together J® a variety of configurations. Shortfalls *n manning of a hospital can be filled by personnel from another hospital without j loss of unit effectiveness.
In a smaller Navy, the health care providers for the active Navy and the
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growing population of retirees will be stretched thin and there will be less capacity to respond to crises that require major medical participation. Fiscal realities will, by necessity, result in increased dependence on the medical assets of the Naval Reserve force to meet these regional needs.
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Compartmentalized function and training. A 500-bed combat zone fleet hospital at full strength has 998 people, approximately two-thirds of whom are involved in direct health-care activities and one- third in providing support in the form of food service, laundry, security, administration, and construction.
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The officers generally fill mobilization billets similar to those of their civilian occupations. Thus they hone these skills daily and require little refresher training when mobilized.
The enlisted personnel train as functional teams during peacetime. A hospital ward functional team, for example, may consist of eight enlisted members and a nurse team leader who supervises team training in the classroom or in medical treatment facilities. Security personnel, mess specialists, administrative personnel, and others in support roles receive training by functional teams led by an officer or senior enlisted member. These functional teams obviously could serve as building blocks to form units tailored for specific missions.
Responding to a situation where trauma is anticipated might involve surgeons, anesthesiologists, the staff for a surgical intensive-care unit and a ward, along with ancillary health care personnel such as X-ray and clinical laboratory personnel. The non-clinical functional teams needed to provide support also would be activated.
Responding to a cholera epidemic might be quite different. In this case, preventive medicine specialists, primary care Physicians, and internists with special expertise in infectious diseases would be mobilized along with the appropriate laboratory, ward functional teams, and support teams. Personnel who are not included in the initial response would serve as relief personnel if it is necessary for the unit to remain activated for several months.
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This malaria survey set on pallets in the ready inventory of the Fleet Hospital program is but one example of the supplies and equipment that can be assembled on short notice to support combat or humanitarian missions.
Inasmuch as all Naval Reserve fleet hospitals have similar organizations and undergo similar training, the functional teams of the entire program could be considered as interchangeable parts that
could be drawn upon to sustain the activated unit during an extended mission. No other medical unit in the Navy or Marine Corps inventory has these capabilities concentrated within one command.
Modular equipment and supplies. More than 400 standard containers are required for the equipment and supplies
of a fully mobilized fleet hospital. Currently, there is no doctrinal role for mobilizing subunits of fleet hospitals and the equipment is not packaged to support the selective activation of specific components. Medical planning doctrine that has been developed for Marine Corps amphibious operations could serve as a model for fleet hospital contingency planning. Medical logistics companies of the Fleet Marine Forces’ force service support groups package medical equipment and supplies in blocks that are combined to meet the anticipated requirements of the amphibious operation.
The Deployable Medical Systems planning process, conducted under the direction of the Defense Medical Standardization Board, is another valuable source of guidance. Fleet hospital equipment is currently prepositioned through out the world and its maintenance is coordinated by the Fleet Hospital Support Office in Alameda, California. Change would be relatively inexpensive, in that it would require primarily reorganization of supplies and equipment rather than outright purchase of new items. Again, the key functional building blocks of a hospital—such as the operating rooms, X- ray units and other subunits—already exist in rugged modular form, designed for use in the Field.
Command and control. A Naval Reserve fleet hospital is an echelon IV commissioned command. In peacetime, its commanding officer reports to Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force— the fleet type commander. Upon activation, Naval Reserve fleet hospitals report to a specific operational commander or a fleet commander-in-chief. When a medical requirement is identified by the fleet commander and the decision is made to deploy Naval Reserve medical assets, the activation procedure should be the same as for other operational units. The fleet type commander will outline the mission for field commanders, and provide administrative, logistical, and fiscal support for the transition to the gaining command.
Unit identity and integrity. Fleet hospitals always have been able to establish a unit identity and instill the sense of pride so important to first-class units. Unit esprit is especially strong in the fleet hospitals that were mobilized during Operation Desert Storm. Putting together a fleet hospital in a combat zone has given the members of these units a sense of purpose and has inspired a high level of professionalism in their approach to training following the Gulf War.
All fleet hospitals, though, are profiting from the lessons of Desert Storm. These intangible factors are, by definition, difficult to measure but are exceedingly important attributes of successful military organizations.
Employing commissioned Naval Reserve medical units in naval operations, in a manner similar to that of ships and other operational units, will build confidence in the Naval Reserve medical program and reinforce the Total Force concept. There are compelling reasons to increase the flexibility of fleet hospitals to take advantage of the huge investment in the program in terms of the talent that has been recruited, materiel assembled, and dollars expended. They have proved their ability to respond when needed.
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Captain Smith, a cardiologist and Professor of Medicine at Vanderbilt University, commands Fleet Hospital 20. Captain Lally, Professor of Pathology at the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Dental Medicine, is the unit’s executive officer. Both officers served in fleet hospitals that were activated during Operation Desert Storm—Captain Smith with Fleet Hospital 6, and Captain Lally with Fleet Hospital 15. Both officers have had key roles in overseas deployments to Norway and Honduras with fleet hospital sub-units.
After the Collision—the Paperwork
By Lieutenant Glenn T. Ware, U.S. Naval Reserve
“Admiral, USS Neversail reports that she has had a collision at sea with USS Underway in the Strait of Malacca; extent of damage or injuries unknown; damage control presently under way; OPREP 3 to follow. ...”
One of the most frustrating evolutions that a group commander with general-court-martial convening authority must deal with is a major naval incident—those operational mishaps that involve multiple deaths, environmental or property damage, or congressional or media interest. The convening authority’s staff judge advocate normally will be required to sort out the varied reporting requirements, investigative measures, and resulting disciplinary or administrative actions. You have to be ready.
Consider the following scenario: During a major exercise 12 miles off the coast of South Korea the group commander is informed that a cruiser and a frigate under his command have collided. The cruiser’s Harpoon missile system sustained major damage, and the frigate sustained minor structural damage. About 50 gallons of fuel oil spilled into the ocean. There were no injuries; both vessels are seaworthy and capable of making port under their own power. The group commander also is a task force commander—and in that regard, directly involved in the operation of the exercise.
Initial notification. The first priority is obviously the safety of the ship and crew. Damage control is paramount, and unless the convening authority can offer immediate assistance an endangered ship is essentially on her own when dealing with initial damage. The convening authority, however, should begin to assemble a full team to deal with the crisis that consists of his chief of staff, operations officer, material/logistics officer, staff judge advocate-plus any individuals who have expertise in the systems of the classes of ship involved in the incident.
Under the earlier example, with the collision causing significant damage to a cruiser, the commander should ensure that a cruiser-experienced officer is available to deal with problems unique to that ship’s systems. In addition, since a missile system has been damaged, explosive- ordinance-disposal personnel should be directed to ascertain the volatility of damaged warheads. Special equipment may be required to deal with the systems.
As the situation unfolds, the following administrative, investigative, and disciplinary actions should be contemplated:
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> Operational Report (OPREP) 3 (Pinnacle or Navy Blue)
> Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation
>■ Safety-mishap investigation/report
> Admiralty matters
>■ Environmental impact >• Non-judicial punishment >■ Detachment for cause
OPREP 3. This will be sent by the ship or designated on-scene commander. This message will provide the base data for the convening authority’s first look at the situation. This message is in addition to the other “personal for” messages that some type commanders require for major incidents. The need for current, accurate information is obvious. When the OPREP is sent, duty officers around the world will notify certain organizations (e.g.. Tomahawk fly-away teams) for potential activation depending on the facts and circumstances.
JAGMAN investigation. This investigation is important because it is the primary way to determine the cause of the accident, identify those accountable, and provide recommendations for corrective action so the likelihood of a reoccurrence of the incident is reduced. These recommendations can include proposals for ship alterations, changes in standing operating procedures, disciplinary action, and awards or decorations for actions during the crisis.
For major incidents, the commander (assuming that he will be the convening authority) must notify the next flag officer in the chain of command when he is going to conduct anything other than a court of inquiry. This notification is usually made using a “personal for” message to the type commander from the convening authority, in which he states his intentions for a planned course of action. The convening authority, acting as a task force commander, also must report his intentions to the appropriate fleet commander. In this example, a one-officer JAGMAN investigation—no hearing required—is appropriate. Despite significant property damage, there is no loss of life and there is little, if any, congressional or media interest.
In preparing for the investigation, the convening authority should appoint a team to investigate the accident. The investigating officer should outrank the most senior person to be investigated— in this case, a ship’s captain—and thus the chief of staff frequently must head the investigation. Accompanying the investigating officer should be the com
mand’s staff judge advocate, ship spe- cialists, and administrative and clerical support. In preparation for the investigating officer’s arrival—and as soon after the incident as practical—a special-category “personal for” message should be sent to the ships’ commanding officers' to advise them of the convening authority’s intentions. The message should state that certain items, such as logs and charts, are to be immediately safeguarded for inspection and possible later removal by the investigating officer.
When the investigating team arrives, all documents designated in the message should be inventoried and categorized immediately; interviews can begin after the team has reviewed the documents. The interviews should be unifornt and solicit generally the same type of information from each witness—a standard set of questions is useful. Tape-recording each witness may be possible, but that is a time-consuming task, considering that 40 to 80 interviews will need to be conducted per ship. If each investigator takes full notes on the prepared questions during interviews, these notes can be readily transcribed into a statement that the investigative team and the witness can review. All notes for each witness should be maintained in a separate file. Interview-transcription procedures should be the same on both ships.
After the data from both have been compiled—and prior to completion of the investigation—the investigating office1 should deliver his preliminary findings to the convening authority. This will assist the convening authority in making any preliminary personnel decisions.
Once the investigating team has left the ship, it should sequester itself to the extent possible and reconstruct the chronology of events leading to the incident. This written report is then submitted to the convening authority f°r endorsement.
Safety-mishap report. In incidents of this nature, a safety investigation is re- quired in addition to the JAGMAN investigation. Of critical import is the distinction between the JAGMAN investigation and safety investigation.
The safety investigation focuses on the cause of the accident and on ways to make operations safer. It does not try t0 assign blame or assess accountability f°r disciplinary purposes. The investigate11 uses the concept of privilege to meet this end: a privilege—or a qualified immunity—is granted to those individual5 providing information to the safety-111'
vestigation team. Privilege is granted to encourage full disclosure by those who [ otherwise might refuse to incriminate themselves in a JAGMAN investigation; the privileged statements cannot be used against them. The convening authority must be made fully aware of this distinction when reviewing the JAGMAN and safety investigations and making his endorsements. Disciplinary recommendations cannot be based on information obtained under privilege without thwarting the purpose of the safety investigation.
No individual can serve on both investigating bodies. Accordingly, it is customary to have a flag officer other than the convening authority convene the safety investigation, to avoid conflicts of interest. The staff judge advocate should brief the JAGMAN team about the purpose of the safety investigation and be prepared to explain to the safety investigators the concept of privilege. In- j formation from the safety investigators cannot be given to the JAGMAN investigators. It is important to build a constructive wall between the safety investigators and JAGMAN investigators during the investigation, although this does not prevent either team from using information or other physical evidence that is available to both teams such as logs, charts, or witnesses. Information derived from privileged information or deliberative processes, however, cannot be shared with the JAGMAN investigators.
Admiralty matters. Collision at sea is an admiralty incident that must be reported to Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG), Admiralty Division. This office should be an information addressee on the initial OPREP. The staff judge advocate should also make an ini
tial voice report to the office as soon as practicable after the initial OPREP, with follow-on reports as necessary.
The convening authority also should provide an advance copy of the JAGMAN investigation to OJAG, after the convening authority’s endorsement, to allow that office to act quickly on any admiralty matters. Involvement will vary, depending on the facts and circumstances. Admiralty law is complex, and the staff judge advocate must act as liaison between Washington and the convening authority. It is imperative that the staff judge advocate have a working knowledge of Chapter XII, JAGMAN, and that he keep the Office of the Judge Advocate General informed.
Environmental impact. There is no hotter topic right now than environmental liability for commanders.
It is important to report spills quickly, especially within U.S. waters. Many of the actions listed in this paper may be more important than environmental-impact ones, but only the OPPREP 3—and maybe not even that—should be taken first. One U.S. attorney contemplated prosecution after a command duty officer waited two hours to report a 4,000- gallon spill—even though the duty officer was fighting the spill during the two hours that elapsed. In U.S. waters, spills can be reported by telephone (or telephone patch) to the National Response Center. For spills outside U.S. waters, see OPNAV1NST 5090.1 A, paragraph 11-5.5 for the appropriate reporting authority.
The staff judge advocate must notify the convening authority whenever a potential environmental issue arises.
Disciplinary action. The JAGMAN investigation may include disciplinary recommendations and the staff judge advo-
cate will be responsible for drafting appropriate charges and specifications, while ensuring expeditious processing of the recommendations.
When any charges have been prepared and the forum for disposition selected, the staff judge advocate must ensure that the case is completed expeditiously. In our example, nonjudicial punishment would be the appropriate forum for disposing of any charges. After such proceedings, reports must be made to the Chief of Naval Personnel in any case involving commissioned officers.
Detachment for cause. This is a polite term for firing an officer. If approved, the proceedings constitute an adverse entry in the official record of the officer. There is no requirement for the convening authority to wait for the completion of a JAGMAN investigation before taking action in the case of a commanding officer. In many cases, the initial information provided to the convening authority by the investigating officer is all that is required to detach a commanding officer who has lost his superior’s confidence. For officers other than the commanding officer the following bases exist:
> Misconduct
> Unsatisfactory performance involving one or more significant events
> Unsatisfactory performance over an extended period of time
Each has specific requirements and the factual chronology surrounding each must be carefully documented and articulated. In short, the process requires the convening authority to request in writing that the officer be detached for cause. The appropriate basis should be supported by documentation, usually the completed nonjudicial punishment package and JAGMAN investigation. The request is sent via the officer concerned to the Chief of Naval Personnel, the approval authority.
Although each naval incident involves different circumstances, there can be a common approach. Many have faced these issues before; they provide insights.
Use them.
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Lieutenant Ware, a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps, is an instructor in the Civil Law Department at the Naval Justice School, Newport, Rhode Island. He has served as trial and defense counsel, claims officer, and legal assistance attorney with the U.S. Naval Legal Service Office Detachment, Sigonella, Sicily, Italy, and as staff judge advocate for Commander Task Force Seven Six/Com- mander Amphibious Group One in Okinawa, Japan.