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We welcome brief comments on material published in Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of Proceedings is to provide a forum where ideas of importance to the sea services can be exchanged. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in Proceedings. Please include your return address, your social security number, and a daytime phone number.
“Integrity: In All Circumstances”
(See A. Rouland, pp. 76-77, October 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mark Brooks, U.S. Navy; Operations Officer, Carrier Air Wing Nine—I commend Ensign Rouland for his essay on a topic that bears some review in our Navy—and our nation. However, lest some of my fellow aviators feel guilty about that five minutes of flight time they have been tacking onto the end of each hop, please note the following definition under “Flight” from the “Explanation of Terms” section of Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3710.7 series:
For record and reporting purposes, a flight begins when the aircraft first moves forward on its takeoff run or takes off vertically from rest at any point of support and ends after airborne flight when the aircraft is on the surface and either: (1) The engines are stopped or the aircraft has been on the surface for 5 minutes, whichever comes first. (2) A change is made in the pilot in command.
So, fear not, guys. You aren’t “fat-fingering” and your honor and integrity are intact. □
“The Navy Got It—Desert Storm’s Wake-Up Call”
(See T. A. Parker, pp. 32-36, September 1994; J. Barnett, pp. 14-16, November 1^94 Proceedings)
“Jettison JAST—Fast”
(See J. George, p. 40, September 1994
Proceedings)
Brigadier General Richard J. Toner, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—As a Naval Academy graduate and a career Air Force officer, I am a long time reader of Proceedings and Air Force. Both are excellent advocacy journals for their services. But, Air Force seems to strive to place air power in the context of joint warfare—admittedly, with generous credit given to the Air Force’s contribution. Proceedings generally impresses me as a forum for protective insularity, a “go-it- alone” mentality.
Commander Parker’s remarkably in
sightful article was a marked departure from that thinking. He gave the Air Force credit for being better organized and equipped for combat operations against Iraq—because of its decades-long development of theater-wide operations concepts. He contended that naval aviation was unable to play a more significant role in the Persian Gulf War air campaign because it was organized and equipped to fight more limited, small-scale contingencies. Central control of all theater air resources has been the linchpin of air power doctrine since well before the U.S. Air Force was created in 1947. While this thinking does not necessarily prescribe the service of the central manager, it does assume that the predominant force will supply the theater air commander. As Commander Parker pointed out, that doctrine had never been fully exploited until the Persian Gulf War—during which it was extremely effective. Commander Parker stated convincingly that naval aviation has seen the wisdom of these beliefs and is revising its doctrine, training, and organization.
My buoyant hopes that the Navy’s insular thinking was a thing of the past were dashed, however, by Dr. George’s exhumation of the hackneyed contention that the Air Force is the cause of most of the problems in naval aviation. Along the way, he made many incorrect inferences and assertions; two of which are particularly worthy of comment.
The Air Force is well-positioned with modem, flexible aircraft and weapon systems for one reason: air power is its primary mission. It is concerned only with aerospace control: therefore, it does not have strong internal competition for the development and procurement of unrelated systems. The wide scope of the Navy’s missions, however, means that very expensive aviation, surface, and subsurface systems compete for funding. Thus, Dr. George’s assertions that the Air Force somehow siphons money from naval aviation is patently ridiculous.
His loose analogy between the TFX of the 1960s, the stealthy A-12, the Joint Attack Strike Technology (JAST) program, and Lucy holding the ball for Charlie Brown is equally specious. The Air Force was on board the Navy-managed A-12 program right up to its unfortunate end; resource constraints (and other difficulties) caused the Navy to withdraw from the stealthy air superiority fighter program, now the F-22. Thus, it’s hard to
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g 1 who is Lucy and who is Charlie . r°Wn when Dr. George advocates an l,T|mediate Navy withdrawal from JAST. . As the defense budget keeps getting ’■ghter and the debate on service roles and ^lssions intensifies, I am hopeful that ornmander Parker’s opinions represent le direction of thinking within Navy— ar|d the rest of the defense establish- nient—and Dr. George’s views are the Vestiges of a parochial past. □
farmers, Naval Officers, or
Roth?”
(See M. W. Collier, pp. 74-76, August 1994 Proceedings)
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eutenant R. B. Watts, U.S. Coast Hard—As the operations officer of a aecir (WMEC-90l)-class cutter that par- ,lc'pated in Operations Support Democ- rjjcy, Able Manner, and Able Vigil, I take I ne strongest possible issue with Com- I l,1ander Collier’s commentary. While he , raises several interesting points regard- j lng trai ning for naval operations, his ;irgunicnt that Coast Guard officers are |gnorant of naval strategy or the world | Ur°und them is both ludicrous and I ’^suiting.
I r ^*lc main fallacy with Commander Ollier’s argument is the concept that to earn naval tactics, afloat officers must . e spoon-fed—or rather, force-fed—the '^formation. Nothing could be further r°m the truth, as recent events have ernonstrated. Coast Guard cutters are a norrnal part of battle-group operations and are required to maintain the same stan- ards for training readiness evaluation Ul>d refresher training as their Navy coun- ^Parts. The excellent performance of '-oast Guard cutters in these evolutions ocrnonstrate that attendance at the Navy’s |actical-action-officer course was not a 'vaste of time.”
Ashore in the 1980s, the Coast Guard ^perienced intense interaction with the Navy because of the formation of the
Maritime Defense Zones concept and Joint Task Force 4.1 operations—hardly the "lone wolf” approach Commander Collier describes. Experience in joint operations is far more widespread in the Coast Guard than Commander Collier implies. For example, recently on the USCGC Tampa (WMEC-902), the three senior officers are qualified surface-warfare officers; two of them have had joint staff tours, and two are graduates of the Naval War College. They are hardly perplexed when it comes to working with the Navy.
The idea that any officer on a cutter would fumble with the “complexities” of naval operations is a fantasy bred of limited perception and stereotypical viewpoints. Working with the Navy is something that the Coast Guard has been doing—and doing admirably—throughout its distinguished history. □
“Nonproliferation: Let’s Start With the Easy StufF’
(See W. J. Holland, p. 9, June 1994; N. Polmar, pp. 14-17, July 1994; W. J. Holland, p. 16, August 1994 Proceedings)
“Here Are the Submarines. . . .
Where Are the Tactics?”
(See W. B. Walker, pp. 26-30, July 1994;
A. M. Weigel, pp. 16-20, November 1994
Proceedings)
Captain David Van Saun, U.S. Navy; Commander, Destroyer Squadron 24— Admiral Holland’s arguments for not building conventional submarines in U.S. shipyards for export are as hollow as the arguments made for years as to why the United States should not build advanced conventional submarines.
I agree with Mr. Polmar that the hardcore adherents to nuclear propulsion need to come to periscope depth and take a look around at the changing world. Lieutenant Commander Walker—another submariner—had it right: the time has ar-
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rived for the U.S. Navy to build advanced conventional submarines and employ them . ■ From the Sea. LJ * I
Fregattenkaptain Raimund Wallner, German Navy; Commander, Submarine Squadron Three—I agree completely with Admiral Holland’s plea to halt the proliferation of advanced submarine-related technologies to other than the most trustworthy states. And 1 agree with him that “even one submarine of little intrinsic worth can cause difficulties out of proportion to its real capability.”
I do not intend to lobby for the German submarine industry; however, I am compelled to say that German submarines are never among those which are “of little intrinsic worth.” Anyone who has faced them at sea knows that. Furthermore, Type 209s are not “old boats with limited mobility.” True, the Type 209 design is about as old as the design of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class, but, like the Los Angeles class, it has been updated continuously. In fact, the current design— Type 209/4—is the fourth variant. In re-
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lation to other conventional submarines, the Type 209’s mobility—speed and endurance related to size—is outstanding.
Admiral Holland claims that, although handled inexpertly and employed far below its capabilities, just one Type 209—the San Luis—caused great difficulty for the Royal Navy during the Falk- lands Conflict. But how could such an old and immobile boat manned by an undertrained and inexperienced crew make so much trouble for a superb ASW navy? The answer is simple: the submarine itself is superior.
The admiral’s declaration that the Type 209 will not meet U.S. standards of safety and effectiveness is baseless. The construction of the newest derivative of the Type 209 submarine is not “rote assembly from a kit;” it is a very challenging job that demands a highly skilled workforce. As far as safety is concerned, there are almost 100 Type 209 boats in service around the world—not all of which are with navies that have strong training programs. To my knowledge, not one of these boats has had an accident of any kind that can be attributed to design.
Admiral Holland must be aware that
my country—with its long submarine tradition—also “has paid so dearly” for the knowledge needed to build first-class submarines. With all due respect, if Admiral Holland really believes that “just the modifications that will have to be added to get U.S. engineers to certify [the Type 209] safe to submerge surely will compromise . . . closely guarded technical information," then 1 must think him ignorant, if not arrogant.
Admittedly, building massive 8,000- ton nuclear-propelled attack submarines and building relatively small 1,500-ton conventional submarines are different. However, the skills and knowledge required for the latter are just that, different—not inferior.
To meet the antisubmarine-warfare demands of “. . . From the Sea,” the U.S. Navy will need submarines that can operate in those parts of the littorals where bulky nuclear submarines cannot go. Why not acquire some of those swift boats that as an American submariner put it while under way in a German Type 206A “drive like sports cars”? Better yet, why not exploit Ingalls Shipbuilding’s timely license and build them in the United States? It will pay off for the both navies. The German Navy is going to air- independent propulsion with its new Type 212 design and, with a potent partner like the U.S. Navy, development would be much more efficient. □
opeaK aoniy and . .
(5er W. Locke and K. P. Wcrrell, pp 30-35 October 1994 Proceedings)
Captain Larry’ Warrenfeltz, U.S. Navy—
I strongly agree with Rear Admiral Locke and Professor Werrell that the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM) should be and is the first-choice weapon for decision makers in nearly every contingency, crisis, and campaign.
Although the TLAM is impressive, we cannot expect more lrom the missile than it is designed to deliver. The success of
the Tomahawk in the Persian Gulf and in the strike on Iraqi intelligent headquarters might have raised expects ^ tions of the American public and man! government officials too high. Some pe°' I pie believe a Tomahawk can be launch^ hundreds of miles away from a target' under any weather conditions—and PI a terrorist in his hideout ... at his din | ner table ... in the chest . . . left side-
The authors imply Tomahawk is a11) all-weather missile; they say that durin-1 the Persian Gulf War, the missiles wete used “during both day and night in both: fair and foul weather.” While it can flJ under a wide variety of conditions, it lSl critical to remember that the TLAM is3 low-flying aircraft—and not even a great' flying one at that! It is susceptible t°, many of the severe weather problems-^ e.g., thunderstorms, wind shear, hail- ice, and blowing sand—that can hampeff or ground manned aircraft.
Low ceilings or low visibility can ptf" vent digital scene mapping area correla-1 tion (DSMAC) position updates, thus de- j creasing the probability of hitting the ain1 I point. Even with Global Positioning Satellite-capable Block III TLAMs- DSMAC scenes are required for the pin' point accuracy needed in so many mis' sions. The presence or absence of snow--', even its age—complicates DSMA^ updates. Similarly, time of day and-- sometimes, time of year (foliage) mus1 be considered.
There also is the matter of tempera' ture. High air temperature mean lower aif 1 density and that, in turn, makes aircraft-' including the TLAM—less responsive-1 Early in the mission (when it is heavy with fuel) or at high altitude, temperatures that are too high could make it impossible for the missile to execute its planned maneuvers.
For precision strikes, the TLAM definitely is the weapon of choice. Nevertheless, planners and commanders must remember that there are limits and involve their meteorology and oceanogra- ' phy officers during strike planning. □
“Tailhook: What Happened,
Why & What’s To Be Learned”
{See W. H. Parks, pp. 89-103, September 1994; N. Hogan, pp. 23-24, November 1994 Proceedings)
Learning the Lesson”
(See W. J. Holland, p. 12, November 1994 Proceedings)
Captain John Byron, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Tailhook ’91 was an unredeemed disaster for the U.S. Navy. The butcher’s from this dismal affair includes the service of a fine Secretary of the Navy,
uncompleted careers of several capa-
the
senior officers, and the reputation of ^ most able leader, Admiral Frank B. *velso. Naval aviation itself was espe- eially harmed. The aftermath of Tailhook 91 eviscerated the leadership of the Navy’s air arm and turned many of its best away from the Navy.
Why did it happen?
First, the incidents of Tailhook ’91 Were not the acts of sober men. We witnessed the effects of the vainglorious assumption that Navy alcohol rules and the Pharmochemistry of ethanol don’t apply to aviators. Tailhook ’91 brought back •he drunken sailor for his annual gig, and naval aviation drank its way to public hu- rniliation. In the Navy of valiant effort aud brilliant success in eliminating alcohol problems, it strains the mind to be- ueve that the Tailhook crowd could be s° profoundly obtuse about drinking. The Navy, light years ahead of the other series, had deinstitutionalized alcohol deliberately and effectively long before '991. But at this Tailhook convention land those preceding), abundant alcohol was central to nearly all the events and activity outside the symposium audito- r'Um. How could the aviators have missed 'he message?
The second reason for the disaster was a fundamental failure of leadership—most seriously within naval aviation itself. Whom to blame? Start with naval aviator John Lehman. As the Secretary of the Navy in the 1980s, he attended the conVentions and gave tacit approval to their tQne, putting his blind eye to the glass and seeing nothing. Blind, too, were the retired aviators who sustained the conations as a marketplace for the wares °f their employers in the aerospace industry. And the Commanders Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific and Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations for Air Warfare of rpcent times. The leaders of naval aviation did little and led less as Tailhook gatherings assumed more and more the faunchy character of a large and lengthy government-sanctioned stag party. Many of these leaders now echo Claude Rains’s
famous line in Casablanca; they are “Shocked. Shocked!” to discover that bad things happened in Las Vegas. Come on, guys. You hosted the party. You invented Tailhook.
Congress had warned of its interest after certain ugly affairs of the previous year had surfaced. The press had a whiff that dark things happened at Tailhook. Naval aviation clearly was on notice, and only fools could have misread the signal. Despite all this, the skippers, carrier air group commanders, and flags running naval aviation in 1991 ran the worst Tailhook convention in history. (But let me offer an appalling thought: Maybe it wasn’t the worst one.)
Guilty on charge one, these leaders then went on to greater guilt: they stonewalled. Conduct on the third floor of the Las Vegas Hilton was atrocious and most of the aviators who attended knew it. Admission? Contrition? Learn the lessons and move on? No, not these sensible actions. Instead, having just won a war, the leaders of naval aviation challenged those who would criticize heroes
Pity the poor aviators— they didn't seem to know that the American people expected them ... to act like adults ...
and gathered their chickens about them in a defensive formation to fend off any investigation of their culture or their actions. Double dumb, this approach: doomed to failure as tactic and transmuting scandalous behavior into scandal itself.
In fairness—not all were guilty in Tailhook ’91 nor duplicitous in their actions afterward, nor were the investigations conducted flawlessly (or perhaps even well). But honesty and courage were not the aviation community’s watchwords when the search for truth started. Those with guilty knowledge could have salvaged some respect for themselves and their community by forthright action. Instead, they risked naval aviation s future to save their own, placing their faith in arrogance as a substitute for honor.
What was Admiral Kelso’s sin? He trusted. Not an aviator, he was insufficiently suspicious of his fellow admirals who wore wings. His deep, good character had no room to believe that senior leaders in his Navy could ever be so dimwitted as to permit what was accused and then so guileful as to hide what they had done. Admiral Kelso trusted, and he paid the price.
The third reason for Tailhook ’91 was
a collective failure of the Navy to understand its relationship to the American people. The people love their Navy, but they also demand good behavior of it and they expect to see it accept and reflect the maturing values of society. Pity the poor aviators—they didn’t seem to know that the American people expected them to behave in public, to act like adults, to stay reasonably sober, and to not molest women. You may choose to see hypocrisy and political correctness in this public view, but you would be wrong to lose sight of the power of the people’s sense of right and wrong. The American people saw sexism and debauchery in Tailhook ’91 and found this intolerable. And their opinion prevailed.
Long ago, an aviator defined for me the essence of naval aviation, saying that in every good pilot you will find this spirit: “Death! But never look bad!” Aviators, consider Tailhook ’91. You looked bad. □ I
Derek J. Vander Schaaf, Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense—
I found Colonel Parks’s article to be of great interest; however, it contained several serious factual errors relating to the investigation conducted by the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG).
One point deserves emphasis at the outset: Throughout the conduct of the Tailhook investigation, we adhered scrupulously to the requirement to provide all due process rights. For example, all suspects were appropriately advised of their rights and signed the standard rights advisement and waiver form. Any person who requested counsel was assured of a counsel’s presence.
The gravest inaccuracies appeared in the author’s discussion of the “Tailhook Report Part 2—Events at the 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium.” The author stated that the IG investigation was “hampered” by the fact that “[w]ith one exception, its investigators were not experienced in criminal cases. Most were auditors, trained in the investigation of white collar crime.” In reality, at the time the investigation was initiated in July 1992, there were 39 full-time Defense Criminal Investigative Service special agents assigned to the Tailhook Task Force. Contrary to the author’s assertion, the agents were well-trained and experienced. The agents averaged 13.5 years of law enforcement experience with federal, state, military, or local law-enforcement agencies. Among them were agents who had been employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, and all three of the military criminal
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investigative organizations—the Army Criminal Investigation Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. All were graduates of accredited federal criminal investigative training facilities—including the FBI Academy and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center—or the academies of the various military criminal-investigative services. The Task Force members were assisted during the initial stages of the investigation by trained investigators from the office of the Assistant Inspector General for Departmental Inquiries. There were no auditors assigned to the investigation at any time.
Colonel Parks claimed he found several “serious flaws” in the report. His conclusions were based on erroneous assumptions. The alleged “flaws” are addressed individually, as follows:
> Improper Investigative Techniques'. The author criticized the investigators for using summarized reports of interviews, stating that the agents would interview witnesses all day but would not write their interview summaries until the end of the day or, in some cases, days later. It should be noted that the use of summarized reports of interview is consistent with the practice of other federal law-enforcement agencies, including the FBI. To ensure the accuracy of the summarized report, each interview was conducted in the presence of two investigators, one of whom took contemporaneous notes. The summarized report of interview was then typed, with the aid of the notes, usually the same day. The IG conducted more than 3,700 interviews. Obviously, it would not have been practical to tape and transcribe each interview or to obtain a sworn statement from each witness. However, follow-up interviews were conducted and signed and sworn statements were obtained whenever the evidence warranted.
>• Involuntary Polygraphs'. The claim that polygraphs were administered involuntarily is absolutely without foundation. In
the more than 3,700 interviews, only 43 polygraphs were administered. Consistent with Department of Defense regulations, polygraphs were administered only after each examinee was formally advised of his or her rights and waived them in writing—except in a few specific instances where the examinee was immunized and ordered to provide information. Each examinee voluntarily signed a statement of consent agreeing to undergo polygraph examination, usually after consulting with defense counsel. When requested, defense counsel was present during the polygraphs to monitor them.
>■ Scope: The author asserted that the IG tailed to investigate the possibility that assailants could have been other than Navy or Marine Corps officers. The fact is that we did not exclude categorically from investigation any individuals who attended the 1991 Tailhook Convention. As documented in the Tailhook Report Part 2, we interviewed 72 Air Force personnel (63 men and 9 women) and 428 civilian men and women. No evidence was uncovered that indicated the assailants were other than Navy or Marine Corps officers.
> Number of Assault Victims: The author stated that the number of assault victims was subject to challenge, inasmuch as many of the women declared they did not consider themselves victims. In actuality, our investigation identified 90 assault victims, of those, only 10 did not consider themselves to be “victims." The individual victim summaries set forth in Appendix F of the Tailhook Report (Part 2) clearly acknowledged which women did not wish to be classified as “victims” (see summaries for Victims 1 3 14, 20. 21, 28, 37, 51, 62, and 77). No attempt was made to inflate the number of victims.
> Gender Bias: The author asserted that the Office of the Inspector General established a policy that the investigation would not include misconduct by women. There was no such policy. The investigation was conducted without re
■
gard to gender. In fact, files of three ft" male officers who may have engaged in misconduct were provided to the Navy for appropriate action. Instances involving male and female victims were described in the Tailhook Report Part 2.
The author intimated that the investi gation must have been flawed because “[n]o one was convicted by court-martial for criminal conduct at Tailhook ’91- First, it is important to note that the disposition of individual cases rested exclusively with the Navy, not with the lG- We “referred” investigative files to the Navy in the generally accepted sense of the word—for information or decision- According to The Manual for Courts Martial, only a convening authority may “refer” charges against an individual to a court-martial. In recognition of the Navy’s prerogative in matters of military justice, the IG was exceedingly careful not to advocate to the Navy a particular course of action with respect to any individual so as to avoid even the appearance of improper influence.
The Navy reviewed the evidence in the investigative files and, in some cases, asked us to do further investigative work- Based on all the evidence, the Navy made j- a determination regarding the appropri' j ate disposition. The IG conducted a thor- j ough and competent investigation. That the evidence may not have supported a court-martial is not an indication that the investigation was “flawed.” Rather, d may speak generally about the quality of | the evidence that was available. For ex- ■ ample, we knew when we were asked to conduct the investigation nine months after the event occurred that the evidence , would be stale. Other factors—e.g., the crush of people in the hallway, the dim lighting conditions, the effects of alcohol 1 on memory, the inability of victims to identify their assailants, and the stonewalling on the part of witnesses— j added to the difficulty of our task.
While there may not have been suffi' cient evidence to warrant conviction in n j court-martial, there were numerous non- ’ judicial actions, fines, and forfeitures. The 1 results were career-ending for many aspiring officers. However, the investigation should not be measured solely on the prosecutive outcome. The investigation exposed the raw nerve of attitudes and conduct demeaning to women. It has had a profound effect in raising the consciousness of the nation to the problems of sexual harassment and the treatment of women—in the U.S. Armed Forces particularly and in the American workplace at large.
I appreciate this opportunity to set the record straight. Whatever one’s opinion about the Tailhook episode, it should be based on facts—not myths. □
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“World Naval Developments”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 143-146, May 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Randal D. Farley, U.S. Naval Reserve; Patrol Squadron 65—I was disappointed by Norman Friedman’s rather cavalier dismissal of the P-3 Orion and its place in the fleet’s antisubmarine forces because of the diminished threat posed by the Russian— formerly, Soviet—submarine force. It is essential to remember that what the P-3 community does is called antisubmarine warfare—not anti-m/c/crrr-submarine warfare. And as the Navy shifts from blue- water to littoral warfare, the submarine threat remains real.
Through a combination of the retirement of obsolescent aircraft (P-3Bs), the closure of operating bases (i.e., Moffett Field and Cubi Point Naval Air Stations), and the shrinking demand for ASW platforms because of reduced Russian submarine-deployment cycles, the number of P-3 squadrons has been cut. What remains, however, is a homogeneous force—all active and reserve squadrons now fly P-3Cs, all of which will be modified to the Update III configuration by 1998—that can support the fleet in littoral waters. P-3 aircrews regularly use weapon systems trainers and work with allied diesel submarines—with special attention given to shallow-water environments.
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The Flight IIA Arleigh (DDG-51)-class destroyers will not I the SQR-19 tactical towed-array sonar" thus, their ASW capabilities are dimin ished. With the demise of the KA-6 an“ the A-6E, the S-3B Viking—the only fu® capable, carrier-based ASW platform-"1* used more and more in the aerial-refuel" ing role. More often than not, P-3s are the only dedicated ASW assets available.
Certainly, P-3s have an impressive afl| tisurface capability; for example, they c3’’ fire the Flarpoon antisurface missile an“ the Maverick missile. However, becaus£ of the present and future shape of th£ fleet, the P-3 force is—and will remain" at the forefront of the Navy’s plannin?| for antisubmarine warfare. □
“Time for a . Sea’ Change”
(See J. M. Boorda, pp. 9-10, August 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Paul D. SpeC' Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—With all due respect to Admiral Boorda, th£ strong possibility that an aggressive Ru*" sia might rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union cannot be disregarded.
It is not difficult to imagine that U to 20 years from now, Russia will be fi" nancially sound and economically efficient, unburdened by the remnants of thc old Soviet bureaucracy, and benefittin" from substantial industrial investment and natural resource development foreigner* who do not remember—or have chosen to forget—the short life of Lenin’s NevV Economic Plan. Remember, too, that Russia retains the ports, the shipbuilding futilities, and many of the officers of the former Soviet Navy. Perhaps, then, the West will have won only first battle, no1 the war.
Therefore, as much as it runs contrary to the present optimism, the United State* must maintain a strong intelligence apparatus that thoroughly integrates human and technical sources, solid analyses, and an effective counterintelligence effort- The marginal additional investment in
such an apparatus will be more than paid
back by increased efficiencies in weapons f development and force structure and im' h provements in strategy and tactics.
Cutting our intelligence activities is the ^ height of folly. To make informed deci' ■ sions, our political leaders and senior commanders need information that shed* t light on a potential foe’s intentions and capabilities. For the very same reason, ® naval commander needs a well-docu-1 mented intelligence annex to his operation plan. Therefore, those who write fu- 1 ture amendments to “. . . From The Sea’ i must keep the critical nature of intelligence in mind. □
1
“Naval Aviation and Stealth”
(See D. Kreiger, pp. 59-63, September 1994
Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Schoultz, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare (OP- 05)—Unless the U.S. carrier force can conduct precision strikes with a high level of assurance of no losses, naval aviation could be drifting into ineffectiveness in the significant first-strike mission and soon may be suited only to play the role of a support force within the expanded joint doctrine. Naval aviation must drive toward the goal of getting a stealthy, extended-range, multi-mission aircraft that complements the baseline force of F-18E/Fs.
There can be no argument about the requirement; it was justified in the cases of the A-12, the NATF, the AX, and the AFX—all of which were scuttled for a myriad of reasons unrelated to the requirement. However, today there is no overt initiative to obtain a survivable first- strike aircraft that can perform the missions of the A-6, the A-12, the NATF, the AX, and the AFX.
Please don’t think that the Joint Attack Strike Technology (JAST) program ultimately will provide the Navy with the strike aircraft it needs. The JAST program is everything to everybody! General John Michael Loh, the head of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, has stated directly that the JAST product will be the multirole fighter that the Air Force needs to replace its aging F-16s. The Marine Corps is interested in developing an advanced vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft and pressure to include that technology in the JAST program in being exerted by Congress. There
is no stated Navy requirement in JAST
only some hopeful comments that a Navy version somehow will fall out of the technology development.
There currently are two options available for naval aviation to achieve a stealth capability within the joint context. The F-l 17X, a dramatically updated version of the very successful Persian Gulf War performer, can be available in the near term. It would be a high-performance, long-range, afterburner-equipped, carrier- capable aircraft that could be made available to update the Air Force’s inventory and provide a follow-on replacement for its F-15Es and F-l 1 Is. The other longer- term option would be a “navalized” attack variant of the Air Force’s F-22. Savings would be realized for both services because this aircraft would incorporate
the technological advances already paid for during the development of the F-22, the increased manufacturing volume would reduce unit cost, and there would be dramatic manufacturing and logistic efficiencies. There may be other options, but none that would provide synergy with the Air Force.
Where the funding for these options would be obtained is an immediate concern. Certainly, the Navy’s priorities will have to be reassessed and adjusted. However, the risks inherent in adopting either option are greatly reduced because of
their current status. Both aircraft are flying. For the F-117X, the modifications would significantly less demanding than some other aircraft variants the Navy has put to sea. The F-22“N” would follow Air Force development efforts and benefit from all the lessons learned during development and production.
By funding the construction of another large carrier, Congress has reinforced the aircraft carrier’s status as the centerpiece of U.S. naval forces. It is now imperative that Navy prove to Congress that its confidence in carrier aviation is not misplaced. Therefore, the Navy must invest in those technologies that will provide the forces that can respond to the President’s requirements in the dangerous world of tomorrow. If the Navy is to have aircraft carriers that will be the first on-scene and first to engage with maximum survivability, then they must embark the most effective aircraft. And, as Captain Krieger pointed out, that means stealth.
The Navy must state the need, outline a reasonable budgetary plan to achieve the stealth capability, and make the request to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. Most observers believe that the administration and the Congress will support such an initiative to maintain the carriers’ first-strike capability. If we start now, first-line stealth aircraft will be on our carriers at start of the 21 st century.
But the Navy must act now, to controls its own destiny. □
“Leyte Gulf”
(See J. Sweetman, pp. 56-60, October 1994 Proceedings)
Tommy L. Wilson, Director of Corporal1 j Communications, Loral Vought Systems-''* The U.S. Navy lost 11 aircraft carriers to j enemy action in World War II—five t° air attack, five to submarines, and one-' the USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73)-—10 naval gunfire. Most of these carrier losses occurred before the Leyte Gulf fight Therefore, the illustration caption on page I 57 which states that the Gambier Ba) ( “was the second U. S. carrier to sink in the war’’ >s j incorrect.
The Gambier Bay, hotf' ever, was the second cat- rier lost in the Battle o> Leyte Gulf. She and the USS St. Lo (CVE-63II were lost within three hours of each other on 25 October 1944—the onl) time during the war tho U.S. Navy lost two aircraft j carriers on the same day'; With the loss of the j Princeton (CVL-23) the previous day, the Battle 1 of Leyte Gulf proved to be a costly j proposition for the U.S. Navy. But, as Dr-' Sweetman points out, it was even more costly for the Imperial Japanese Navy. 0
“An Ordinary Deployment”
(See I. Altunin, pp. 79-82, July 1994
Proceedings)
Captain Lloyd K. Rice, U.S. Navy (Re' j tired)—I was shocked and dismayed to read how, on Day 54 of its deployment' Captain Stakhayev’s attack submarine de- ’ tected a Los Angeles (SSN-688)-clasS boat and held contact with her for a day and a half—apparently without the Russian boat being detected. The entry credited this accomplishment to “a piece of ^ equipment of which, as far as I know, the Americans don’t have.”
The submarine community—as well as members of other warfare specialties—have been strangely silent concerning the potential problems revealed by this entry. Certainly, verification of the facts relative to the incident—as well as some explanation of the events that | will lend credence to the continuing belief that our nuclear-powered attack submarines remain virtually undetectable—- appear to be in order. If satisfactory explanations of this incident are not forthcoming, the assumed submarine i threat to the new littoral strategy “. . • From the Sea” should be reevaluated urgently. □
LOCKHEED
In order to remain a potent part of U.S. air power, naval aviation needs stealthy aircraft. One option: a “navalized” F-22.