This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
"…From the Sea” remains an extremely important docu- nt. We need to update and expand it, however, ntten two years ago, . . From the Sea” correctly cap- gicV t*16 c^an8e 'n 0Llr national security policy—a shift in strate- sult °CUS ^r°m a threat to regional challenges. As a re-
l ’ t'le emphasis of naval operations shifted from war at sea ^operations from the sea in littoral regions. The Navy-Marine be T* team ref°cused on how Naval Expeditionary Forces could anri U^et* *or j°'nt operations, operating forward from the sea tailored for national needs.
ity aP‘ta*'zmg on our inherent power, speed, agility, flexibil- tea'rn nCf mo*3*'‘ty and self-sustainment, the Navy-Marine Corps CQn ’ d retlL|ired to do so, can project power ashore using the the Ce^ts maneuver warfare—or operational maneuver from ^ith6 h EqUally 'ttP01"13111' however, is that our team be there mai ^ fight forCe tQ deter conflict, promote stability, and centntam the Peace- This means that even though we are con- ple rat'n§ our efforts on the capabilities required in the com- quir jtt0ral environment, we retain those blue-water tools re- maif . of a giobal naval force—the tools necessary for rP„ ntaininS a forward presence and achieving victory in a major egional conflict.
e SmCe the publication of “. . . From the Sea,” several major nts have occurred: the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, fight
ing in Bosnia, expanded Flaitian embargo operations, increased tensions with North Korea, the partnership for peace in NATO . . . the list goes on. Therefore, it is a good time to take stock of this strategy, to see how we might incorporate in a new document the insights and experience we have gained in following it.
We are only a few years into the post-Cold War era, but already we can see some things clearly. It is not the era of universal peace and international cooperation we might have envisioned. Instead, it is a period of great instability, regional crises, and bloody local conflicts.
The objective of our Navy-Marine Corps team is a constant: to support U.S. policy—i.e., deter aggression, without conflict if possible, but if conflict cannot be avoided, to ensure victory. Three enduring principles flow from this task:
>• Our desire is to deter rather than to fight potential foes.
► When we must fight, we will do so—forward.
>• We will plan to operate with—and, when required, fight alongside—our nation’s other armed services and our allies for mutual benefit.
I firmly believe that the United States must continue to build, maintain, and operate forces that remain balanced to meet threats across a wide range of violence. Some have argued that we only need capabilities for one discrete mission or another. Operational maneuver from the sea is an example. While I firmly support this concept and our current budget decisions reflect that position, it is only one of several warfighting capabilities naval forces must possess.
History tells us that our enemies will use many forms of threats and violence to challenge our national interests. If we
built if the crisis grows. This means, quite simply, that we
Despite the recent reductions, the Navy-Marine Corps team remains engaged forward—here, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD-1) with her Marine helicopters and high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles at Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates—and prepared for war.
continue to train and exercise our ability to operate with °ur coalition partners and alliance friends.
Fighting ConflictAVar: Once hostilities have commenced,1 focus shifts to containing and terminating hostilities. ThislS where the tenets of “. . . From the Sea” play a critical role. P°s sessing the operational capabilities of c°nl mand, control and surveillance, battlespace dominance, power projection, and sustain • ment will allow us to halt the aggression' l blunt the offensive, and carry the fight to the I enemy. '
Restoring Peace: The final phase of c011 flict is not simply “peace restored,” but process by which peace is restored. Thb process will be a protracted one in whic naval forces may stay in the region long afte the shooting has stopped. For example, af13 Desert Storm, naval forces remained wh> most of the joint and Coalition forces turned home. Today, we are still conduct!11? air patrols over Iraq and maritime intercep tion operations to enforce sanctions on IraP- Each of the nation’s military service has a role to play in any future conflict. H°" our leaders blend respective service cap3 bilities to maximize strength and minim'2* weakness is the key to success against a future challenges. The Navy’s primaO contributions to the nation are: the abil'1)
do not proceed carefully and preserve a range of combat capabilities, we surely will provide the opening that others can— and will—exploit.
This is not to say that the balance among our different capabilities cannot be adjusted. Indeed, I believe that the nature of the dangers we now face requires a profound shift toward mobile forces positioned forward or rapidly deployable to trouble spots on the world’s littoral where our national interests and potential foes most often collide.
Naval forces are capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict from peace shaping (strategic deterrence and forward presence) and responding to crisis to fighting in conflict/war and finally to restoring peace.
Peace Shaping and Crisis Response: Naval forces are critical to our nation’s peace-shaping role. The utility of the naval forces is to be poised to prevent crises and ready to project force for conflict resolution. The Navy accomplishes these two mission areas by strategic deterrence and forward presence.
Our ballistic missile submarines provide the key leg of the U.S. strategic deterrence triad. Protecting those strategic nuclear forces and holding opposing strategic nuclear forces at risk with forward-deployed forces also are elements of strategic deterrence.
Forward presence means operating throughout the world— not everywhere all the time, but anywhere anytime we are needed—to support peacetime diplomacy, to protect Americans overseas, to support law-enforcement operations, and to prevent or deter crises. The importance of forward operations and balanced capabilities is even more evident when we respond to a crisis. The flexible presence of naval forces in a crisis area- out of view and out of country—still offers the best military means of keeping a small crisis small. And our forward presence is the best military nucleus about which a coalition can be
to remain fully engaged overseas, even other U.S. military capabilities are brough home; the ability to develop interoperability with friendly forces in peacetime; and the growing doctrin3 and technological ability to blunt aggression in the initial stage' of conflict until additional forces arrive from other theaters 35 well as the continental United States.
As the Secretary of Navy has directed, General Mundy an^
I are working on an update to “. . . From the Sea.” Embracing the U.S. National Security Strategy of engagement, partnership’ and prevention, this update will define how the naval comp0 nent of our joint forces advances the nation’s interest of °n' larging democracy and free markets. In addition, I have direct^0 the Naval Doctrine Command to codify in its Naval Operatic115 Doctrine Publication (NDP-3) exactly what our Naval Exped1' tionary Forces are and what capabilities they bring to the warfighting commander-in-chief.
The plan I have laid out to be engaged forward and prepare0 for war—the most effective means of preserving peace—is f°r a balanced, flexible, and in some areas, smaller Navy than the one built for the Cold War. But our Navy will be a potent one' I accept the fact that we cannot be everywhere nor deploy suf' ficient forces to cover every possible contingency. We mus* count on the capabilities that our sister services bring to bean and we will look to our allies to bear their fair share of the bur' den. In short, the Navy-Marine Corps team we are building w0 be at the forefront of the United States’ effort to deal with thal changing and dangerous world beyond our shores.
Admiral Boorda is the Chief of Naval Operations and President of the U.S. Naval Institute.
Editor’s Note: In June, Secretary of the Navy Dalton and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Boorda addressed the Newport Strategy Forum at the Naval War College. Their remarks, setting a new course for the Navy, have been c and edited for publication.