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The relocation of Naval Air Station Dallas (below) and its tenant commands to the former Carswell Air Force Base at Fort Worth (facing page) brought to light some problems and concerns, as well as a few solutions, that should be used to guide future realignments and closures.
With the turn of the century rapidly approaching, the 1990s may well be remembered as the decade of U.S. military force reductions. Following the breakup of the Soviet military superpower, significant debate continues over what the U.S. military force “rightsizing” should be to counter today’s and the future’s unpredictable threats. At a time when more theater-level conflicts exist than ever before, creating a balance between maintaining a strong military force and operating within budget constraints has become one of the most timeconsuming and challenging issues for top U.S. military leaders. Reducing the military force infrastructure has become an absolute necessity and joint base consolidation is one proposed solution.
Naval Air Station Dallas & Carswell Air Reserve Base
Under increasing economic pressure to reduce its infrastructure, the Navy was forced to recommend closure for half of its Reserve naval air stations, as well as several active-duty naval air stations. Unlike other naval air stations, however, NAS Dallas was recommended for “realignment” rather than closure. The 12 March 1993 Department of Defense recommendation presented to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 93 Commission was for the Navy to relocate NAS Dallas and its tenant commands 30 miles west to the former Carswell Air Force Base (AFB) and consolidate additional tenant commands from other naval air stations recommended for closure. Following congressional approval of the BRAC 93 recommendation, the property at NAS Dallas eventually would be returned to the community.
Before the BRAC 93 Commission could forward th|s recommendation to the President on 1 July 1993, bas>c questions involving aircraft beddown and construction & penses had to be answered. In April, the Naval Reset''j sent representatives from the Pentagon and the Na^a Air Reserve Force and a team of engineering planned from Southern Division, Naval Facilities Command, to as sist NAS Dallas in answering these questions during 4 joint services site survey. DoD viewed Carswell AFB a- a suitable base for relocation because its extensive rart>P areas and multiple hangars could accommodate future m1 itary consolidation. And because Carswell remained a>’ active base until its scheduled closure on 30 Septembe
y Office of the Secretary of Defense Briefing. Within two weeks of the April site survey, the commanding officer of NAS Dallas and members of the naval facilities planning team were invited to the Pentagon to refine the relocation plan and estimate funding required for the project. Representatives from the National Guard Bureau, Army Guard, Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Navy were in attendance at the final briefings presented by the Navy and Air Force to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The proposal to establish a model joint Reserve and Guard base with the Naval Reserve as host was approved and the recommendation was forwarded to the BRAC Commission.
► Cobra Model. The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model, a standard accounting program applied to all BRAC considerations, indicated the return on investment for the proposed realignment (payback) was only three years. With the COBRA model averaging a payback of six years for other base realignments, this relocation not only was cost-effective, but it also eliminated potential airspace problems associated with the Dallas/Fort Worth airport, retained a Naval Air Reserve base in the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex, and offered future expansion capabilities. Considering these advantages, the Navy was willing to make the $126 million investment to create a model joint Reserve base. ► BRAC Commission Visits. Following visits to NAS Dallas, the BRAC commissioners each left with an understanding that the air station already served as a joint reserve base, hosting Navy, Marine Corps, Army Guard, Army Reserve, and Air National Guard aviation tenants, as well as Reserve Headquarters for Region 11 Readiness Command; Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing; the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command; Recruiting
Command III; and local organizations from the U.S. Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol, and Selective Service System. Relocating NAS Dallas and its tenant commands to Carswell AFB was vital to maintaining the overall U.S. military force structure, not just the Naval Reserve.
► BRAC Commission Report. The 1993 DoD BRAC Commission Report to the President gave little specific guidance for the NAS Dallas relocation. The official recommendation was to “close the Naval Air Station (NAS) Dallas and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment, and support to Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to Carswell Air Force Base: Naval Reserve Center, Dallas; Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing), Dallas; and RedCom 11. Carswell AFB, Texas,
93, the quality of the facility should have been excel- ,ent- Transferring this Air Force facility to the Navy should ^ave incurred minimum expense for the government.
. Afield Operations. The question of aircraft beddown Involved many discussions on the effects of mixing joint '§ht operations involving jets, props, and helicopters. llh the total number of aircraft expected to be 171— Nearly a threefold increase in the number of aircraft op- j-rating from Carswell when it was an active Air Force Se—issues concerning environmental impact, safety, c°nduct of flight operations, and warehousing were discussed. There was insufficient time to resolve the opera- °nal and supply issues during this survey, but a joint
element was reached on a tentative aircraft beddown Plan,
^nfrastriictw-e. Carswell AFB was well suited for °mber/tanker maintenance, but it lacked hangar facilities . a c°uld support the self-sufficient operation required j/ Navy squadrons. With few exceptions, the existing Air 0rce “nose dock” hangars, which provided maintenance
^elter for the forward sections of B-52s and KC-135s, £ re of limited value to the prospective Navy, Marine °rPs, and Army tenant commands. There was no infra- ^cture to support the Texas Air National Guard. Most these hangars, built in the 1950s from corrugated eeh lacked fire protection, operations/administrative ,e> maintenance shop spaces, and proper power re- 7 lrements. Modifications also would be required on the uips to correct drainage problems. In anticipation of its fu°SUre during BRAC 91, Carswell had received minimum nding for facility improvements and maintenance over e 'ast several years. For the BRAC 93 relocation to be Ccessful, the Navy would have to invest a substantial "uount of military construction funds to construct and en°vate facilities.
will become a Navy-operated joint reserve center and accommodate the reserve units currently there and being relocated there by this 1993 Commission.”
This language referenced tenants relocating from other bases identified for closure, but it failed to address any of the non-Navy tenants located at NAS Dallas. Navy planners were forced to assume that all these tenants would relocate. While operating under this assumption, Navy planners were later advised of proposals by the Army Guard to relocate their CH-47s three miles away to Red- bird Airport and replace their helicopters with ground tactical units at NAS Dallas. All of the services’ representatives agreed to the original recommendation in April, but it wasn’t until August 1993 that the National Guard Bureau and Army Reserve headquarters committed to relocating their respective units to Carswell AFB. At times, this political process delayed data inputs needed by the master planning team to answer additional BRAC submission requests.
► BRAC Language. More specific BRAC 93 language for
NAS Dallas could have been helpful in eliminating some issues, especially because the relocation was affected by both the 1991 and 1993 BRAC laws, and those laws were in conflict. Understandably, BRAC 93 initially was not well received by the 301st Air Force Reserve Fighter Wing because the 301st already had invested more than a year of planning under BRAC 91 to establish a cantonment area at Carswell AFB. By necessity, both the 301st and NAS Dallas had to continue planning for their respective—and conflicting—tasks; the 7th Bomb Wing was vacating Carswell AFB on 30 September 1993 and the 301st had to be able to operate independently. NAS Dallas recognized the fighter wing’s requirements but also was interested in minimizing DoD expenses during the transition. NAS Dallas planners attempted to minimize the 301 st’s hiring of DoD civilians and slow down temporary modifications to the base during the transition period before the Navy relocated. Because of conflicting doctrines, the only apparent solution was to request the two service secretaries sign joint memoranda of understanding (MOUs) addressing each specific issue. .
> Memoranda of Understanding. The first memorandum involved air traffic controllers. NAS Dallas felt it was not economical for the 301st to hire DoD civilian employees who would be affected by a reduction in force once the Navy assumed host responsibilities at Carswell AFB. Because the 301st was required to relieve the 7th Bomb Wing controllers, NAS Dallas planners sought permission for the Naval Air Reserve to assume the tower air traffic control function instead. A memorandum of understanding, signed by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force, detailed an agreement under which the Navy would augment Air Force controllers at Carswell AFB by 1 July 1993 and assume the full function by 1 October 1993. An additional provision said that should BRAC 93 not be approved, the Navy would provide controller services at Carswell AFB until civilians could be hired and trained. This action saved DoD $600,000 per year, not including potential layoff expenses.
A second memorandum addressed the transfer of responsibility from the Air Force to the Navy. Recognizing that NAS Dallas could not possibly host responsibil
ities at Carswell AFB on the same day BRAC 93 be came law, this agreement provided guidance for the tram fer of responsibility from the 7th Bomb Wing to the 301s Fighter Wing on 30 September 1993, then to the Na'a Air Reserve on 30 September 1994. However, the Force Base Conversion Agency, responsible for all 0° property outside the 301 st cantonment, was not mention*- in either the BRAC 93 recommendation or the MOU. c MOU permitted the Navy to assume host responsibility incrementally from the 301st at a mutually acceptable mt£ but the 301st did not have host responsibility for mnf
base functions or any authority outside its cantonin'
area. On 1 October 1993, when BRAC 93 became l*1'' the issue of turnover responsibility remained unresoM Neither the memorandum of understanding nor t final BRAC 93 language included any specific details base boundaries, turnover issues, civilian personnel 1*9 off criteria, funding, tenant relocations, community reuse' or conflicts arising from two opposing BRAC laws. BRA language cannot address every unforeseen issue, but rn°
specific BRAC language would have assisted greatly
the development of a master plan and eliminated many the conflicts generated between BRAC 93 and BRAC 9
Operational Issues
> Live Bombs. As NAS Dallas proceeded to develop master relocation plan, it became apparent that several k0 operational issues were not adequately addressed dun11' the April site survey. For example, were live bom ■
going to be carried at Carswell AFB (NAS Fort
Wod11
Joint Reserve Base)? If they were, the off-site storaf
facility, designated for civil reuse under BRAC 91, wo*1
Jd
be required by the military. Live ordnance also requii1- bomb build-up areas, which would prevent occupation 0 much of the real estate at Carswell AFB; arcs associate with the bomb build-up areas created several unforeseen problems involving aircraft operations and tenant person nel beddown.
► Weapons Storage. Under BRAC 91, the Carswell Redevelopment Authority, a committee of community lea ers who determine the reuse of former DoD property J Carswell AFB, had been negotiating with Texas Instf11 ments for reuse of the off-site weapons storage faciliD Because these negotiations already had commenced, ^ off-site storage facility was not included in the BRA 93 DoD base boundary. If the joint services required usC of this facility, the master planning team first would hav'£ to get approval from the Air Force, which felt obligate to discuss any changes with the community commit^6' I This process often was difficult and time consuming-
The problems created between the off-site storage cility and the safety-arc requirements became insur mountable. Fortunately, the joint services agreed to df0P the live bomb requirement at Carswell because there 'v‘1 no adequate work-around. Once this decision was ma*^' it was unnecessary to pursue the off-site storage facil'D
> Supply Warehousing. While the BRAC 93 proposal v/aS being drafted, BRAC 91 funds were cut from 301st Fight(\ Wing projects without consideration for how those d1* might affect the BRAC 93 relocations. This proved detr* mental to the supply warehouse capabilities at Cars^e
PB. BRAC 91 funded a new supply building for the 1st Fighter Wing within its cantonment; once funding ^as eliminated, the 301st no longer had a facility in which a relocate—so it remains in the main supply warehouse. 0 BRac 93 funds were dedicated to construct an addi- 10nal supply warehouse to support the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, which would have opened the main Warehouse for Navy and Marine Corps supply.
Unfortunately, during BRAC 91 negotiations, another ar"e supply warehouse was awarded to the Bureau of Pris- °ns Unicor division for use as a furniture showroom and Rehouse. The Secretary of the Air Force felt an obliga- !0n to uphold the award of this building, located within e new DoD base, to Unicor. Navy planners were not con- u ted in this decision and voiced strong objections. Nevertheless, the decision stood under protest, and it forced e Mavy to use condemned wooden warehouses for cov- ^re(l storage. Following a joint services conference, the avy and 301st have agreed to share the large ware- °Use, but this still does not cover all Navy supply
^uirements.
Chain of Command. Perhaps some of the most diffi- cnlt relocation issues have stemmed from an unclear chain ’command. When the Navy developed the proposal to re 0cate NAS Dallas to Carswell AFB, the 7th Bomb Wing as the host command and the 301st Fighter Wing its tenant- The Air Force Base Conversion Agency assumed host ^sPonsibilities for all DoD property located outside the ' *st cantonment once the 7th Bomb Wing left. As fu- Ure host of the base, NAS Dallas was attempting to de- HeloP a master plan for the use of existing base facilities, owever, actual site approval authority for the distribu- '°n of the DoD facilities was retained by the Air Force ,ecause BRAC 93 was not yet law. The conflicts involves Property management and an unresolved chain of com- niand created many unique and frustrating situations.
To help resolve the issue, another memorandum of Uaderstanding was signed that identified the 301st as host the facility until the Navy could assume host functions y 30 September 1994. This MOU provided the Navy with Son,e necessary clout to develop a master plan, but it failed 0 8'Ve site approval authority to the Navy, which resulted l!1 Jhe loss of the supply warehouse and other equipment.
. "Is loss was subsequent to the Secretary of Defense briefly that established the new DoD boundary. A subsequent ■ effectively granted restricted site approval author- lly to the Navy and prevented any further changes to the
lister plan without joint approval by the Air Force and ^clVy.
. J°int Operations. One of the more complicated issues Evolved differing operational orientations among the ser- “Jointness” is not a normal facilities orientation at stateside military bases, including NAS Dallas. Throughout the United States, the Air National Guard
has
established exclusive operating areas, creating its own
ase within a base by having property leased directly to
b;
11 and assuming facilities responsibility for its own build- 'ngs. While this orientation is essential at joint-use civil ^fields, its continuation at active military bases leads to a duplication of effort in many areas.
The Air National Guard and Army Reserve essentially ecame their own entities at NAS Dallas, operating from
out-granted leased property from the Navy. The Army National Guard leases its property directly from the City of Dallas. The Army helicopter operations are farther removed from the naval air station as they are located on the opposite side of the runway. At Carswell AFB, the cantonment area defined by BRAC 91 made the 301st Fighter Wing a self-sufficient organization out of necessity, because it was to be the only military tenant there.
The BRAC 93 DoD direction is to eliminate as much duplication as possible at the new “model reserve base.” The Navy felt that areas such as fuels, security, billeting, vehicle maintenance, supply, communications, phones, and medical/dental could be consolidated at NAS Fort Worth.
These issues required detailed research into each command’s operational and mobilization requirements. A Joint Services Conference was convened to establish working groups and an executive steering committee comprised from commanding officers from each relocating tenant command, chaired by the commanding officer of NAS Dallas and attended by members of the joint services headquarters. This session identified some functions that could be merged, but differences in operational requirements among organizations required that other functions remain separate. Resolution of joint issues at the local level has been hindered by inconsistencies in the direction of joint policy operations at the DoD level.
> Medical/Dental. Because of manpower shortages and the lack of a facilities work-around for medical and dental work, it was impossible to provide these services at both NAS Fort Worth and NAS Dallas. The loss of the hospital at Carswell to the Bureau of Prisons meant that the only equitable solution was to keep the NAS Dallas facility open and provide emergency services at NAS Fort Worth. An emergency medical technician and ambulance were to be assigned temporary additional duty to the 301st medical building during normal working hours. As with NAS Dallas, emergency ambulance services would transport injured personnel to the local civilian hospital. Once the new medical clinic is constructed at NAS Fort Worth, the medical and dental staff will relocate from NAS Dallas.
Conclusion
The NAS Dallas relocation has been difficult, but the projected benefits of creating a master reserve base are significant. Aircrew performance is improved significantly because of joint training opportunities among interservice fighter aircraft. Joint operations are expected to become the norm for future base realignments. The benefits of this BRAC 93 relocation may not be fully realized until a new generation of reservists operate from the enhanced facilities at NAS Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, but the effort in creating this model base not only has increased Reserve readiness and training capabilities, but it also has significantly enhanced total U.S. military capability.
Commander Danielson was assigned as the Naval Air Station Dallas Relocation Officer in March 1993. He is responsible for the development and execution of the master plan to establish Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base.