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The “In Defense Of Charleston” Naval Base response to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission was done out of my office. Every naval officer who looked at the Navy’s final summation of data, “Analysis and Recommendations (Volume IV),” that called for Charleston’s closure was aghast! Even now, I have yet to encounter a single naval offi- active duty or retired—who
can understand the Navy’s rationale for closing Charleston. Admiral Thomas A. Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quoted in the 23 April 1994 Charleston Post &
Courier as saying he was worried that the nation is disarming too rapidly and disappointed at the Navy’s decision to close Charleston. An active- duty Army colonel told me he felt the Navy had “cooked the books.”
I believe the Navy did “cook the books.”
I believe the naval base team showed the public, the Navy, and the BRAC Commission, using the local commander’s certified data, that Charleston literally was cheated out of many military value points. Our team thought it was 67.2, up from the Navy’s initial 54.1. The Navy’s final figure to the BRAC was 57.8. The BRAC staff settled on 63.9. How could the BRAC staff show so much more value than the Navy? Either the Navy and the BRAC staff should show the same scores or there should be an explanation of the differences. Also, there was no feedback to Charleston on any of the data we challenged.
We also showed where other ports were given value points
or when it was so innocuous that to use it discredited the whole process.
The BRAC staff decided the military value for Ingleside, Texas, was the same as the Navy’s score of 50.4. The Navy’s initial score was 49.5. Our value for Ingleside was 43.36. Smoke and mirrors had to have been used to raise the military value of Ingleside. There is nothing there. Much of the base still has to be built, at taxpayer expense. NAS Corpus Christi is 37
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION
Base realignment and closure commissioners met with South Carolina senators Strom Thurmond (second row, shielding eyes) and Ernest Hollings (second from right) and Mayor Joe Riley (far left) in Charleston regarding the naval base. The decision to close Charleston Naval Base is drawing fire.
when the certified data said “none’
miles away, and the city itself is 30 miles, by road, from Ingleside. How much money will really be spent to bring Ingleside and Corpus Christi up to Charleston’s level? And who will keep track of that funding? Even the Navy’s own Base Structures Evaluation Committee minutes of 21 February 1993 reveal the committee’s finding to not move the mine warfare helicopters from Alameda and Norfolk to Corpus Christi—because it was too expensive! Once again, who will keep track of the funding for this move and its associated costs?
Right up to the bitter end, a senior naval officer was saying
there was only one computer sold' tion, and it showed that Charles^11 should be closed. Actually, the Navy showed eight solutions at 115 cruiser equivalents (CGEs)- We provided the BRAC with all the solutions, showing that with ® military value of 61 or greater, Charleston always remained open' Deliberately continuing to use in' correct data, the Navy ensured th;‘[ its military value score stayed below the 61 threshold, but the { BRAC used 63.9 in its final report Why go through all that data collection? What good is the process if you do not use what it produces?
Not one of the criteria— military value, return on in' vestment, or impacts—was used in the decision process^ The BRAC Committee, by i’5 own words at the hearing, stated that only the excess capacity really mattered, tha1 “Ingleside must be the Navy’s Crown Jewel.” During the hearing, I hear several responses that I fen were less than honest. For example, when asked if the same environmental impact study required for Charleston was required for Ingleside, the response was “Yes, sir.” That was a quibbled answer. The secon naval officer briefer—all three were in civilian clothes—admitted that the Navy had taken Charleston’s job numbers to fiscal year 1999 and used those figures as the Navy’s economic impact submitted to the BRAC. What other facility received such treatment? Why was it done to Charleston? This reprehensible conduct was not even questioned by committee members. Why not’ I also heard the number $186.5 million as the figure to close the “station”; however, we are not closing the “station,” but the “base.” In Volume IV, the Navy
Sw>tched from naval station to "aval base without one word of
transiti0n.
By breaking the “base” into seg- ’aents (divide and conquer), the ,ea( numbers did not appear great. I elieve t|le jQjjaj- vaiUe of closing |.e base” is closer to $1,445 bil- l0n and climbing. Is that a signifi- ?nt deviation from $186.5 mil- l0n? Is it true? Does that alter the Payback period? What happens to . Payback if Charleston’s operates expenses are scaled back?
,^hat are the savings if the oper- lng costs and new construction p°sts are removed from Ingleside, ^Scagoula, and New London? ere those configurations ever run lhe COBRA (cost of base rea 'gnment actions) model? In testi- e°ny, the Navy admitted it did not u,n the COBRA on all solutions! Why not?
h also appears there may not be ^jough room to dock the harleston ships in Norfolk, May- 0rt- Pascagoula, and Ingleside,
fVen though those ports did not x.aVe to absorb the submarines f ^ew London; that’s 8.5 of the
avy’s cruiser equivalents. As I reember, “certified data” claimed they could berth all the ships. Our c°rrimittee had discussed this spe- l*c issue during our deliberations.
, was told by people who do that Jnd of work that Norfolk and fLyport had “parking”—not , erthing”—plans. There is a dif- |®rcnce! In fact, the BRAC went l*)ng with the Navy in closing Heston because of too much cavity! Where is it?
officer of Norfolk Naval Station, another senior naval officer stated that the net gain of 12 major warships would place a burden on Norfolk’s ability to handle the new arrivals. He proposed assembling a team to plan a long-term battle for funding for additional pier/power upgrades, new pier construction, cranes, and tugs. The Secretary of the Navy since has denied any overcrowding problem at Norfolk.
In a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, the Secretary of the Navy stated, “The Base Realignment and Closure Commission’s recommendations were based upon the size of the Navy of the future, and not today’s.” He added, “In fiscal year 1993, the Navy decommissioned 59 ships and submarines, and in fiscal year 1994, the number will be 78.” But the BRAC was based on the number of ships submitted by the Department of Defense in Volume IV, Section III, “Projected Force Structure.” The numbers of battle force ships listed were 466 for fiscal year 1992, 427 for fiscal year 1995, and 425 for fiscal year 1997. Any other numbers used in the BRAC process would invalidate the efforts of all parties and make a farce out of the entire process.
The Navy capacity solution was 115 parking places; however, when the BRAC left New London open, the number of CGEs left on the East Coast went from a low of 123.5, up to as high as 127, if you use the BRAC staff figures. Charleston’s solution was 124 and closed six bases—not five, as in the BRAC solution—without the
A base closure can have a terrible economic impact on a host community. Here, defenders of Kelly Air Force Base meet arriving commissioners from the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.
terrible economic impact on any community, such as the one Charleston is experiencing. The Navy also is closing the only naval base in the country that has every facility needed to support the fleet—except the carriers, of course.
As it now stands, the Navy will build very expensive new facilities at Corpus Christi, Ingleside, Pascagoula, and New London, while closing Orlando and Charleston, where the needed facilities exist, in excellent condition. Charleston even has the two moored training ships at the Weapons Station for nuclear submarine prototype training. Has anyone figured in the travel and temporary additional duty costs associated with bringing the trainees from the proposed New London site to the Weapons Station? Is any other service building new facilities as part of the closure process?
On 21 July 1992, the Navy signed an “Extinguishment of Easement” for a strip of land 100 feet wide and approximately three and one-half miles long on the western side of Daniel Island. Located across from the naval base, this strip gave the Navy protection from encroachment. Charleston subsequently lost 2.8 military value points as a result of the encroachment problem generated by the loss of the easement. Why would any competent naval officer allow this protection to be taken away, unless there was a predetermined decision to close Charleston? I consider this item to be a “smoking gun.” Tailhook, the Naval Academy cheating scandal, and BRAC 93 indicate to me a chilling trend. What has happened to our Navy?
Captain Kenney, a 34-year naval veteran, served as chief of staff for Commander, Naval Base Charleston, for two years just prior to his retirement in 1988.