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Mariners, Naval Officers, or Both?
By Commander Michael W. Collier, U.S. Coast Guard
The new captain sat perplexed in his bridge chair. His 1,800-ton, 270-foot “Famous” (WMEC-901)-class patrol cutter had just arrived off the coast of Haiti to join Operation Support Democracy, the multinational task force conducting maritime interdiction operations in support of the United Nation’s oil embargo against Haiti’s anti-democracy leaders. The new captain was confused because of what had happened at the morning conference on the task force flagship.
OPTASKs, OPGENs, JOTS, FOTC, LINK 11, ROE—these and a cascade of
other all but unintelligible acronyms had poured forth from the flagship briefers. The “Famous-”class cutter was assigned to a surface action group operating along Haiti’s northern coast. The new captain understood the interdiction mission—after all, he had been boarding vessels at sea most of his career—but the requirements of surface action group operations were a complete mystery. “What are these SAG, SSC, and MPA-HELO tactics the briefers kept mentioning?” He wondered.
As the new captain sat in the familiar surroundings of his own bridge, he re
joining a large-scale naval operation Support Democracy!
Unfortunately, scenes like this hav‘ t become all too common as Coast Guaf high-seas operations have changed ft01" the predominantly single-ship, indepe13' dent, autonomous operations of the 19''; and early 1980s to the multi-ship, mul11' national, more tightly controlled nava 5 operations of today. Coast Guard ship skippers now face a changed world—'3'1' the training to prepare them for it has do1 kept pace.
Coast Guard officers have lots of experience conducting independent operations with cutters such as the “Famous”-class Thetis (WMEC-910), facing page. But operating with the U.S. Navy in Support Democracy offers another set of challenges and often different languages to Coast Guard professionals.
fleeted on his career: This was his fifth cutter assignment in 16 years of service. He had commanded two cutters previously, both smaller and less complex than his new command. He had earned an excellent reputation as a leader, professional mariner, and staff officer. By Coast Guard standards, he was fully qualified for this command. But nothing in
Coast Guard officers report to the|f first cutters from the Coast Guard Acad' emy or Officer Candidate School with J basic knowledge in seamanship, navig3' | tion, and cutter administration. Few ar' | rive with any training or experience ifl | naval tactics or large-scale naval opera' 1 tions. Once on board, the new office^. | concentrate on qualifying as officers
j!*e ^eck and other important watch sta- °ns boarding officer, for example. As
with
junior officers in any naval service,
ey are deluged with mountains of divi- IQnal and collateral duty work. Not only are naval tactics and naval operations
train
Guard
lng not high priorities for Coast
junior officers, they are not even
fcluded in their initial training programs.
1 he Coast Guard does not have a pro- ?ram like the U.S. Navy’s Surface War- re Officer course or Surface Warfare lcer Qualification Program. First-tour
Nor can junior officers on large cutters always look to their immediate superiors for help. Not until the mid-1980s did operations officers and some weapons officers on “Famous-” and Hamilton-class cutters begin regular attendance at the six- week U.S. Navy tactical action officer course. Even so, many of these officers resented the tactical action officer course as a waste of time: with the large cutters still conducting primarily single-ship, autonomous operations, they believed that carrier battle group tactics had little rel
1 CO«T
|jutter officers are trained on-the-job using Very basic personal qualification stan-
syllabus, which contains neither tactics nor naval operations mod-
8e-cutter gunnery or combat informa-
dard
havai
larS ^°me junior officers assigned to
*'°h center division officer billets do re- l^1Ve three-four weeks of training at U.S. tQavy courses, but little of this applies ^ actual operations at sea. Unfortunately, Qj.e G.S. Navy is now canceling many lhe junior officer basic naval tactics °hrses on which the Coast Guard relied. when suddenly thrust into a large- ale naval operation as an officer of ne deck or combat information center CI atch officer, the Coast Guard junior of- Cer must turn to either senior enlisted . rsonnel or their immediate superiors r help.—and the senior enlisted have ref Ved little more formal training than the uuic
‘ech
lettis
Plo
'ask
cers. The senior enlisted are usually n>cal experts on their particular sys- S’ but have limited backgrounds in de- ying these systems in a multi-unit ^ group environment. f | uring the 1970s, junior officers could ^ y °n Coast Guard radarmen to nurse tri through complicated naval warfare skings Now, except on board the
/"nilton (WHEC-715)-class cutters, mei
able
•ack
re are not enough radarmen avail-
to make up for the junior officers’ 7Jc|c of expertise. Worse yet, in 1980 the °ast Guard Radarman “A” School— ct'ch had provided them their solid ayal warfare backgrounds—was re- aced by the current shorter and less 'ttprehensive program.
evance to their daily fisheries, counternarcotics, or search-and-rescue missions. On other cutters, there is still no formal naval operations training of department- head-level officers.
Cutter commanding and executive officers’ naval operations training is no better. By the late 1980s, prospective commanding officers and executive officers of “Famous-” and Hamilton-class cutters were finally required to attend a two- week naval operations overview course, hardly enough to give them what they need. Because the “Famous” and Hamilton classes make up only half of the Coast Guard’s large cutter fleet, half of the Coast Guard’s seagoing COs usually lack even a basic introduction to naval operations and tactics.
Training of personnel actually assigned to cutters luckily does not constitute all programs where Coast Guard officers are exposed to naval operations. Each year, several officers are assigned to an exchange program where they fill division officer billets on U.S. Navy combatants. These exchange officers usually complete the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer Qualification Program. Up to eight lieutenant commanders and commanders also attend the U.S. Naval War College annually. Cutter crews do receive some basic naval tactics updates during periodic refresher training at U.S. Navy Fleet Training Groups, and an occasional cutter is introduced to naval operations when assigned to U.S. Navy fleet exercises. These programs, all very successful by themselves, are by their nature hit or
miss—and do not ensure a comprehensive service-wide understanding of naval operations. There is no consolidated, umbrella program to ensure all of the Coast Guard's large-cutter personnel are prepared to participate in large-scale naval operations such as Support Democracy.
Even worse, the overall low level of service-wide training affects other Coast Guard missions. The officers who thought the tactical action officer course was a waste of time failed to realize that what this course taught them about advanced surface surveillance coordination (SSC) also applied equally to all Coast Guard missions. Whether it’s search-and-rescue, coun- temarcotics, or fishery protection, today’s Coast Guard missions require coordinating multiple ships and aircraft searching for a target at sea—a la SSC. But, until recently in the Coast Guard, one never saw naval SSC procedures or tactics used by Coast Guard operational planners. The Coast Guard’s lack of overall naval operations understanding has even further implications in the outfitting of cutters and aircraft with proper sensors and communications equipment and the development of operating doctrines. It is tough to properly outfit and prepare cutters for complex high seas missions when there is such a servicewide lack of understanding of naval operations requirements.
Fortunately, Coast Guard personnel are dedicated professional mariners with a strong service culture that places a premium on getting the job done no matter what the obstacles—characteristics that have proven their worth in the Coast Guard’s recent successes in large-scale naval operations.
The Coast Guard Caribbean Squadron is one example. Realizing the need for an afloat squadron to control U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and foreign military services conducting cooperative counternarcotics interdiction operations in the mid 1980s, the Coast Guard formed the deployed Caribbean Squadron. This afloat naval commander staff was so successful that, in 1993, the Navy asked the Coast Guard to form Coast Guard Squadron 42 to direct maritime interdiction operations anywhere in the world. The Caribbean Squadron and Squadron 42 have proven to be on a par with any U.S. Navy embarked squadron staff, controlling SSC and maritime interdiction operations over large ocean areas.
The Coast Guard also began its own successful large-scale naval operation in 1993 with Operation Able Manner, focused on rescuing Haitian economic migrants attempting to reach the United
States in small unseaworthy boats. Originally coordinating up to 20 U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy ships and almost as many aircraft operating daily near Haiti, this operation matured into a full- scale naval operation, as complex as any controlled by Caribbean Squadron or Squadron 42. The senior Coast Guard cutter on station was usually the Able Manner task group commander. For many Coast Guard units, participation in Able Manner was both a baptism and confirmation in naval operations procedures.
The Coast Guard must decide its next step—and must ask itself two hard questions. First, does the service want Coast Guard personnel to be known both as professional mariners and as professional
Infrared Scanner
By Benkt Linnander and Porter Turpin
An equipment casualty report normally is the initial call for help in diagnosing and correcting a piece of malfunctioning electrical gear—and engineers from the Naval Sea Support Center, Pacific Electrical Division, often use their Thermovision 450 Infrared (IR) Scanner to locate the problem quickly.
This portable, thermoelectrically cooled IR scanner allows them to identify hot spots quickly and pinpoint the cause of an electrical problem, which is usually a loose or corroded connection or a problem associated with an electrical overload.
To accomplish their mission, members of the 14-person division may travel halfway around the world to troubleshoot a shipboard problem in the Persian Gulf, or no farther than the piers opposite their offices at San Diego, Long Beach and San Francisco Bay, California, or Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The group has technical representatives on the waterfront in all of these locations.
Their charge is to do whatever it takes to repair electrical systems and place them back in service, returning a ship to combat readiness as quickly as possible. The Electrical Systems Division, part of the Ships Systems Department, consists of a relatively small group of veteran electrical engineers and technicians who are responsible for providing maintenance support to the electrical systems on nearly 200 U.S. Navy operational combatants in the Pacific Fleet.
Some shipboard systems have hundreds of electrical connections. The IR scanner is used to rapidly isolate the source of the problem in a few minutes, rather than wasting hours of valuable technician time tightening every connec-
naval officers—well schooled in naval tactics and procedures? Second, does the service want current naval operations procedures to be used for all multi-unit, large-scale high seas missions or only in special cases, such as Caribbean Squadron and Able Manner?
If the answer to both of the above questions is yes, the Coast Guard must quickly overhaul its cutter training. Inclusion of basic naval tactics and operations programs at the Academy and Officer Candidate School, establishment of a Maritime Operations School both to develop doctrine and tactics and teach all levels of naval operations, and an overhaul of onboard personal qualification standards are all required. Assigning
■ a ■ k
more radarmen to cutters and upgrading c
the Radarman “A” School curriculumt0 , a pre-1980 levels would also help. A ser d vice-wide renaissance on becoming a tr®£ professional naval service is needed. o
If the answer is no to both of thes« ^ questions, the Coast Guard then rtu* 1*1 e continue to accept perplexed cutter cot® ti manders as depicted at the beginning 0 t] this discussion. Professional marine15' a
professional naval officers, or both-—'1 |s s the Coast Guard’s choice.
I
Commander Collier relinquished command of ^ USCGC Thetis (WMEC-910) in June 1994 and J5' | sumed his present duties as Deputy Director of n i telligence. Joint Task Force Four, at Key West. | 1
I
Helps Troubleshooting ^
i
tion to isolate the problem area. Use of the IR scanner also eliminates the risk of missing some of the connections, or worse, overtightening a few connections in the process.
Just as important, the non-contact nature of infrared scanner allows the division to work around energized equipment, rather than directly on it. The IR troubleshooting technique does not break the plane—the imaginary wall enclosing the gear being inspected—but allows personnel to do their jobs safely without wearing rubber gloves or positioning rubber mats to stand on.
Dan Caspary, an engineering technician, has more than 11 years of experience working with IR in the shipboard environment. On one of his recent technical assistance visits to a Pacific Fleet ship, Caspary conducted an IR inspection of the main electrical switchboards and discovered several circuit breakers overheating. The apparent cause was overloading in three specific breaker locations that fed power to an air conditioning compressor, a power panel, and a generator controller. A fourth breaker, in the ship service refrigeration room, had temperature in excess of 142° Fahrenheit, apparently as a result of high resistance caused by a loose, dirty, or corroded connection.
While none of the breakers was hot enough to require immediate repair, all, if uncorrected, eventually could have caused serious problems. The apparently overloaded breakers were checked with a clamp-on ammeter as soon as possible—the IR survey was performed while the ship was under way in rough seas, precluding direct contact with the breakers—and eventually upgraded. The con
nections on the breaker frigeration room were cleaned, and reconnected.
To determine repair priorities when d11 IR scanner detects a hot spot, Electric11 Division personnel have prepared a 5e of electrical inspection repair criteria- i based on past field experience. The prl | orities, which serve as guidelines, fall inl1' one of four Severity Codes:
► Immediate—The repair priority whe1' temperature is 157° F. or more above a111 bient; component failure is imminent-
>• Mandatory—110° to 156° F. abov£ ambient; component is likely to 131 j within days.
>■ Important—76° to 109° F. over aitib1 ent; component failure is likely with13 weeks. ,
► Desirable—41° to 75° above ambien1, repair is not required until next mainte nance period or as scheduling permits- '
Although these codes provide a usef® measure for assessing the degree of P0' tential equipment or system failure an assign a priority for repair, the final fe' pair decision always must take into ac' count the equipment’s importance to the ship’s combat operations and its effect o® safety. j
The Electrical Division also uses th£ IR scanner for troubleshooting electric3 equipment where common test equipmc111 cannot do the job. For example, the sea3' ner is used to look for possible ground5 in the degaussing cables that neutrally the magnetic field around the hull ofa ship to protect it from magnetically act1' vated mines.
The capabilities of IR give the Elec' , trical Division a chance to focus on pie' vention—rather than just reacting to sftP 1 casualty reports. In the case of equipmc11*
serving the d-
disconnected- |
t
to
se ! st
n- l
of i
S, I
is
IK
I
0
1
:t '
novvn to run hot, the scanner Can tell how hot is too hot, and determine where thermal gradation begins.
The technology also has °lher capabilities: detecting eat loss problems in refrig- ^rat'°n equipment on board fansport ships operated by e Military Sealift Command ar|d finding steam leaks on Steam-powered ships.
. Caspary’5 experience with extends well beyond just c ecking electrical systems, J*nd suPports confidence in e versatility of 1R and its Potential for future applica- '°ns in the fleet. He once Sed IR to identify immedi- ,ev a leaking check valve in e line carrying fluid for a . ’P s propulsion plant. The tentative would have been o shut the plant down to find e faulty valve—a trial-and- PTor process that would have een very costly.
M another case, he was 'e to pinpoint a problem in tfequency control motor
AQEMA
Technicians use an infrared scanner to check a 400 Hz 28-volt circuit breaker on a line voltage regulator—part of a deck-edge helicopter electrical service station on the 26-year old USS New Orleans (LPH-11) amphibious assault ship.
that had been plaguing the crew for nearly six years. Electricians had focused on inadequate wiring, but each time the deteriorated wiring was replaced, another failure occurred in the unreplaced wiring because of unequal resistance. Caspary used IR to uncover the problem, which was nothing more than a series of loose connections, in less than a minute.
The system provides the Electrical Division’s engineers with a large measure of instant credibility with their customers. Using infrared to identify quickly sources of electrical discrepancies means that customers can see and appreciate the results on the spot.
Mr. Linnander is the Technical Director for AGEMA Infrared Systems, Secaucus, New Jersey, which manufactures the Thermovision 450. Mr. Turpin is Electrical Systems Division Head, Naval Sea Support Center, Pacific.
The Sensor Operator Still Makes the Call
By Ensign Daniel T. Dolan, U.S. Navy
; \ s dawn breaks, a trickle of amber
I flight peels across the dense storm j; °uds of the Indian Ocean. On the sur- acei difficult to see beneath the monsoon i °uds, lies a sonobuoy string bobbing estlessly in the heavy seas. The Orion’s ; . 1Ssion today is to detect, localize, and
z\C^ 3 German-built Type 209 diesel- ectric attack submarine owned and op- | Jate<J by a Third World belligerent. Ten- n'°ns are up between the two regional I P0Wers in the area, and the Orion is gening a U.S. Navy battle group oprating in the area. Below the surface, the . “marine unknowingly transits the buoy (Qe d- The Orion’s crew of 12 is poised react as the first evidence of submane contact is reported from the acoustic Sens°r operators.
jj. This hypothetical mission against a 'ghly capable Third World submarine is jTtirely realistic, if not commonplace in 6 day-to-day training and operations of “ Navy’s antisubmarine warfare.
■ oday’s S-3 sea control and P-3C mar- lrr>e patrol aircraft have proven them- Se'ves particularly well equipped to adapt and meet the challenges presented by a I hariety of contingencies, ranging from a Ue-Water nuclear-powered attack sub
marine (SSN), to a brown-water diesel submarine.
In any tactical ASW scenario there is almost always one common and critical factor that determines the success or failure of the mission: the establishment and positive verification of submarine contact. This is the very keystone of any submarine hunter’s mission.
In our hypothetical scenario, acquiring the contact ultimately rests upon the keen ability of the Orion’s sensor one, an aviation antisubmarine warfare operator (AW) rating, assisted by a multimillion dollar suite of electronics and the coordinated efforts of the Orion’s crew. There can be no mistake, however, that it is the sailor behind the machine who must make the call—whether submarine, biological noise, or surface traffic, friend or foe, the decision lies with the AW.
Making the call is basic brown-shoe aviation phraseology for the often bold and aggressive decisions that must be made in the murky world of ASW. Unlike his counterparts in the surface or submarine communities, the AW is most often left to his own resources, without a second opinion, handy reference publication, or the luxury of time to assist in
his decision. In the fast-moving world of airborne ASW, the AW often has to shoot from the hip confidently and accurately. Where will this highly skilled group of naval aircrewmen fit into the “new world order?” An examination of the changes that are reshaping the Navy’s maritime patrol forces will illustrate that aviation ASW sensor operators will continue to fulfill a vital role in the future of airborne antisubmarine warfare.
Enlisted sensor operators have played a central part in the history of maritime patrol aviation. During the late 1950s, the growing complexity of ASW technology fitted in aircraft such as the P-2V Neptune and the S-2 Tracker spawned the necessity for a rating that specialized in the art of airborne ASW. Subsequently, the enlisted AW has been included in the aircrew complement of every ASW aircraft. Today, AWs operate radar, sonar, electronic support measures, and many other systems in the P-3C, S-3B, and SH-60B/F LAMPS helicopters. The continued development of these aircraft clearly illustrates the Navy’s commitment to antisubmarine warfare.
Each of the existing ASW aircraft carries upgraded passive acoustic processors
LOCKHEED
ASW systems. Better software, hardware, and sonobuoys will enable our airborne platforms to use passive sensors effectively for the short term and well into the future. Continued emphasis on a skilled and able force of AWs is one of the best ways to meet the increasing challenges in acoustic ASW.
Writing in these pages three years ago, Vice Admiral Admiral Robert F. Dunn aptly commented that, “the shift in priorities is no message to abandon ASW . ... the Navy’s leaders must focus more than ever on the training, tactics, and sensor development needed to gain and maintain undersea superiority.” [See “Power Projection: Back on Top, but . . . ,” Proceedings, February 1991, page 13.] His comments still ring as sound advice for today’s changing Navy. With upgrades under way, or recently completed for each airborne ASW platform, the skills of the ASW operator remain critical in the Navy’s ASW equation. No computer has yet mastered the cognitive processes and human intuition required
as its primary airborne submarine detection and localization sensors. These, perhaps more than any other ASW sensor, require highly trained and experienced operators. Although some critics believe that passive systems may have seen their day, there is presently no better method for relatively long-range detection and identification of contact characteristics than passive
to verify submarine contact.
Several passive acoustic classification programs have been developed to assist the operator in the recognition and classification of submarine contact. Fleet experience, however, has demonstrated that, while these programs may help, the final determination of target classification always rests with the sensor operator. There simply is no substitute—thus far—for an experienced and well-trained ASW sensor operator.
As the Navy anticipates what role the highly modernized and capable elements of the former Soviet Navy will assume in the new era, there are numerous other developments worthy of attention. Apart from the Soviet-designed Akulas, Typhoons, and Oscars, diesel submarines designed and built elsewhere pose a real and growing threat. As these submarines become quieter, acoustic ASW becomes exponentially more challenging. Better acoustic and non-acoustic ASW sensors are imperative if the U.S. Navy is to meet the challenge presented by the proliferation of quiet and capable submarines. More important is the continued management, training, and professional development of the AWs in ASW. A well- trained and well-managed, albeit smaller, force of aviation ASW operators is as important today as it was during the hottest cat-and-mouse chase of the Cold War. These highly skilled aircrewmen coupled with the latest technological advancements will pose a formidable defense
against any submarine threat the Na':) may have to confront.
Training and experience are the kef to victory in ASW. Multimillion dollat widgets alone cannot win the battle. Tne motion picture Top Gun illustrated this point graphically when the much olden , slower, relatively low-technology A- flown by a smart old hand was able ta ) defeat a far higher-performance F-‘ ) flown by a relatively inexperienced ere" during a close-in fight. Sure, that "as Hollywood—but superior training and perience are still the keys to winning 1(1 many endeavors. Given the importance of the AW in the Navy’s airborne AS" mission, strides must be taken to ensure that a capable force of personnel can ef' . fectively adapt to the challenges presentee by the far reaching changes taking place globally and closer to home in the flee1.
In light of these changes, the folio"1' ing suggestions for improving sensed operator training will ensure continued proficiency in airborne ASW:
► Highly selective recruiting standard for AW personnel to ensure that only the highest quality aircrewmen are entering the training pipelines
► More emphasis on developing prob' lem solving and decision-making skill5- instead of rote memorization of fad5 and figures
► Update weapon system trainers and acoustic position trainers to realistically depict the quiet diesel and shallow-watef submarine threat
► Conduct biannual, objective, testing oI ASW proficiency of all sea duty based j AWs
► Maintain high standards for on-station operational performance
► Place greater emphasis on aircrew dU' ties in performance evaluations and advancement
► Routinely provide recognition for sU' perior individual performance in ASW
Equipping the fleet with the best antisubmarine warfare sensors is only part of the solution—there is no substitute for well-trained, experienced operators.
78
Proceedings / August
,994
Rate managers at all levels and review /!?enf°rce all current regulations for Ws, forcing a “shape up or ship out” Wosphere to strengthen the rate use existing, but presently under-used, raining concepts such as the riders pro- ■ am’ where aircrewmen can spend train- abf t'me °n k°arc* an SSN—an invalu- ® Naming experience Making the call is a skill that takes
training—and considerable experience. The impact of the AW’s ability could one day mean the survival of a carrier battle group, or stopping a missile attack. Despite the thawing of the Cold War and a necessary shift in strategic priorities, it would be premature to transform our sonobuoys into portable radios while there is an ocean filled with capable submarines. Research and development of
new ASW technologies must continue. In the process, a renewed dedication to innovation and training of the men who make ASW happen must be granted equal attention.
Ensign Dolan, recently commissioned in the Enlisted Commissioning Program at Memphis State University, Memphis, Tennessee, logged 1,700 hours as an Acoustic Sensor Operator in P-3Bs and P-3Cs with VP-17 and VP-31.
to [Marine Reservists] responded ° 'he mobilization call under the im-
Pressh
l°n their services on active duty e ln great, immediate, urgent demand, y t0 find themselves moved into ,,shift barracks accommodations, and jjected initially to a period of virtual ^ eness which, though it lasted only a th ■ dQys’ was demoralizing under th Clrcunistances- ■■■ It is recommended I uP-to-date syllabi, lesson plans, and l^tllres he kept available for instant use
and
feting the immediate needs of hasty Urgent mobilization training. ”
I hus a Marine Corps Reserve colonel . Ascribed the mobilization of orga- p, ed Marine Corps Reserve units at aniP Pendleton during the Korean War.
P ^°day, drawing on Selected Marine s-<jrPs Reserve (SMCR) units is not con- ered an easy way to fill gaps in under- |.rength units. SMCR units were mobi- ^ed during Operations Desert Shield and esert Storm and may be called upon (, ain- Better training opportunities for j r.Marine reservists and the modern- (watl0n of their equipment over the past
0 decades have made them a valuable
asset
feadi
to the Marine Corps’ total force f^dness. As a result, it is imperative that th^rine Reserve commanders prepare I lr Marines for the training required fol- niw‘ng mobilization. The SMCR com- 1 ander must be able to answer the fol- y ^g difficult questions:
.what are my unit’s current training Parities?
* If
.1 my unit were mobilized and the
saini
Was
lng command wanted to know what
P°mbat
Necessary to bring my unit to full
readiness, could I answer?
unit
,u°es the gaining command know my
Ho'
current strengths and weaknesses?
Pchieve
w much time does my unit need to
readiness currency with the ac-
force?
e .hat equipment external to my organic fdmpment training allowance do I need ’mmediate training until I achieve my
Mobilization Lessons Still Unlearned
By Major Francis X. Bergmeister, U.S. Marine Corps
full table of equipment allowance?
► What individuals or crews need equipment licenses, marksmanship training, military occupational specialty refresher training, etc., that cannot be provided adequately during monthly drills or annual training?
► How aggressive and flexible are the members of my staff when establishing effective liaison with the gaining command?
► What instruction external to my unit’s staff capabilities is required?
This critical self-examination requires careful consideration. The leader who comes with pat answers, such as “a week on the rifle and pistol ranges,” is taking the easy way out—and the pat answers may come back to haunt him.
It is possible that Marine reservists may have qualified more recently than their active-duty counterparts. The perception that his men must fire on the rifle range may also conflict with actual needs of other units. The Marine Reserve officer, the SMCR unit, Headquarters Marine Corps, and the 4th Marine DivisionWing Team must make a commitment to train continuously for post-mobilization needs. Individual Marines and their commanders have ideas and they can make a difference.
Captains of industry are quickly replaced if they fail to account for the vagaries of the marketplace. It is incumbent upon all Marine Corps officers to maintain expertise in their military occupational speciality—and to understand how that expertise applies to a combat expeditionary scenario. Reserve officers must be careful to tap all the peripheral sources of professional information external to the drill weekend and to stay abreast of the latest developments in modern warfare. Reading the Marine Corps Gazette, the Naval Institute Proceedings, and other military journals such as the U.S. Army’s Military Review extends the reservists’ personal experience into the institutional memories of others. A $100 annual budget for professional memberships in the
Marine Corps Association, the Marine Corps Reserve Officer’s Association, and one or two other professional military organizations is not an unreasonable levy upon the SMCR officer.
Reserve officers should take advantage of all active-duty training opportunities in advancing his sense of professionalism. Before an SMCR officer goes to the Reserve Officer’s Amphibious Warfare School or Command & Staff College, he should ask his commanding officer if he should concentrate on any specific areas that would be of value to the unit.
The SMCR commander should counsel his junior officers on reserve schools, correspondence courses, and directed professional reading. This goes beyond the immediate needs of the unit and can be addressed only after the requirements of training for the mission is accomplished. This leadership training should draw upon the inspector-instructor’s experience. Success for all SMCR training reflects teamwork between the active and SMCR component.
Post-Mobilization Training Vision. Ideally, the training plan is a forecast of what a reserve unit should do to update its mission readiness, but training often is scheduled more as testimony to historical experience, time constraints, proximity and availability of training areas, and budget limits combine to delineate the scope of what a reserve unit can accomplish.
Mobilization will introduce—quite suddenly—additional training opportunities. Unless anticipated, they may be lost. A gaining command for purposes of illustration may be deployed or unavailable to take the SMCR unit under immediate supervision. It is prudent for the reserve unit to get off the bus at the gaining command’s home base with a tentative unit mobilization training plan.
To take advantage of mobilization training opportunities, SMCR commanders must look beyond the normal six- day training increments. Upon mobiliza-
tion, SMCR units can expect to work at least five days a week. Drafts of contingency training programs should be designed in advance for 6-, 12-, 18-, and 24-workday schedules.
The SMCR commander should direct his staff to develop these contingency schedules and review them frequently. Special note should be made of the available resources at the gaining command’s permanent location. The Marine Corps’ Reserve Support Units can provide detailed information on available ranges, simulators, and field courses.
Take advantage of active-duty training schedules. SMCR Marines appreci-
Approved lesson plans from the active force are a valuable source for gaining insight into the command’s understanding and application of essential warfighting concerns.
Night training is without question the most vital shortfall that should be addressed when a reserve combat and combat service support unit is mobilized. Weekend drills and the annual training period make it difficult for reserve units to stay current in such operations; at best, an occasional night can be worked into the weekend training schedule. As a result, SMCR unit will rarely have the need during peacetime to submit itself to the
U.8. NAVY ( D.W. HOLMES II)
The Marine Corps maintains a strong reserve force, but often fails to mobilize it properly. Now, as the active- duty forces get smaller, is the time to make some significant changes in the Marine Corps Reserve.
ate the art of time management. The demands of their families, civilian occupations, and reserve billets require it. Lesson plans are time consuming to construct and must be approved prior to use and the SMCR staff may be able to save time by using active-duty training plans from the active force. Do not reinvent the wheel.
Lesson plans should be obtained for virtually every training contingency. Staff members should not overlook the availability of Marine Corps Institute courses that have accompanying lesson plans.
same degree of preparation for night training compared to an active-duty unit.
Headquarters Marine Corps and the 4th Marine Division-Wing Team should make a commitment to encourage the training of its SMCR Marines. Artificialities that create a break in the peacetime-wartime line of command must be critically examined to promote a smooth and efficient transition to mobilization. A genuine focus of procedures and methodology toward warfighting should be used to eliminate any unnecessary peacetime practices.
MOS Compatibility and Prior-Service Marines. These Marines currently are recruited through the Prior Service Recruiting Force established in 1981. It is composed of full-time support Marines throughout the country who parallel the recruiting efforts of active-duty Marine Corps recruiters seeking first-time ap
plicants for the Marine Corps and t#® Marine Corps Reserve.
Marines on active duty are a capt've audience for SMCR recruiting. Any rine Corps base or installation is an cellent location for recruiting Marine into the SMCR community and the re cruiting effort can also, in instances whe1" , a change of MOS is warranted, lend Jj v self as an avenue toward acquiring skn appropriate for affiliation with an SM*- unit.
Junior enlisted personnel and office in the Marine Corps who elect not to e* • tend on active duty—or cannot, as istn case with many fine' officers because 0 keen augmentatR11 t competition—have I time to focus their ft ture in a potential' challenging train'11' environment with'1’, their initial tour 0 service. The last ! months of active du>> | provide as yet a3 tapped opportunity for acquiring or e3 , hancing an individa3 ^ Marine’s profession11 military skills in 11,1 ) ticipation of his tran f sition to a reserve career. -
Appropriate M0' matching is a man power problem 1,1 managing the Mar'ne Corps Reserve. M°r,; | than 20% of the R' ( serve population doe3 not have an MOS th3 matches their mob1 lization billet MO3' i If those Marines pin11 ning to exit acti'13 1 duty could identify their future civil'111' j location, a recruiter might be instrunie'1 , tal in mitigating MOS matching as a R serve problem.
After leaving active duty, Marine R servists may be available for only anna11 two-week military schools. It is norm3 for some Marine reservists to spend the11 vacations from work in attendance 3 . these abbreviated schools to learn t!R>r new reserve MOSs. Marines without th1 proper MOS may spend their first anna3 training for duty (AT) not with the1 SMCR unit but in a school, often ge° graphically apart from their drilling un'1, ] The problem with this, based on my , perience as a platoon and company co"1 mander in the SMCR, is that initial A is invaluable for cementing the bonds 0 camaraderie, trust, and team competent among the unit members.
The current practice of marchi11"
'
U.S. NAVY (COLE)
. arines on their last month of active duty lnto the base theater to receive a sales Pitch on continuing their Service Men’s ,l0uP Life Insurance and joining the Ma- |’ne Corps Reserve should stop. The ac- 1Ve-duty Marine should be informed per- s°nally, at the earliest opportunity, of a res>ervist’s career alternatives.
. An infantryman in the 2d Marine Di- Vls'°n, for example, could attend engi- jleer school at Camp Lejeune during his ast few months of active duty if he P anned to live near the 4th Division’s Support Company in Baltimore,
. If he planned to live near a re- S.e,Ve infantry unit, he might be a candi- ate for further infantry training or NCO
school.
. Although the time spent in such train- lng may not be oriented toward his pre- scnt duties and command would lose him °r unit training during this period, it p'Sht be better overall for the Marine Corps.
Instituting Change for the Instructor- nsPectors. The instructor-inspector staff at ’he unit is an invaluable resource available to the drilling reserve officer, y^ost of these Marines have just come r°m military schools and the Fleet Ma- r',le Force prior to their association with ’he SMCR.
Inspector-instructors should be chosen r°m active-duty units that the affiliated ’eserve unit will be attached to upon mo- ’hzation. This manpower decision would serve the total force in several ways.
First, the active-duty officers and non- c°mmissioned officers selected will be current in their specialties and will bring ^ith them the corporate knowledge of the
^"gineer
Maryland
parent active-duty unit—a real boost for the mobilization process. The Marine reservists gain confidence that they were training the right way for war and the receiving active-duty unit would recapture their former Marines from the instructor- inspector staff.
This is significant; the traditionally understrength active-duty units would be pumped up with experienced officers and NCOs familiar with the units’ standard operating procedures. This would be an incentive for the active-duty units to nominate top-quality Marines to the instructor-inspector staffs. It also would solve the problem of what to do with the instructor-inspector staffs upon mobilization.
Second, active-duty Marines would be aware that a follow-on tour with the affiliated reserve unit might be in their future. This would prompt their interest in the active-duty unit’s mission training with regard to the contribution of the reserve unit early in their tours.
Third, the instructor-inspector staff would have a common background with regard to shared standards of excellence. There would be no shock of command policies unique to the parent active-duty unit. Having been trained for three years in the same unit, these Marines would continue to implement these policies while serving with the reservists. There is a potential danger of encroachment upon the 4th Marine Davison-Wing Team’s territory, but it would serve all parties to come to terms with these sometimes subtle differences prior to mobilization.
Constructive Alternatives and Addi
tional Drills. Marine reservists sometimes have job conflicts with normally scheduled drills—and sometimes are available for additional drills. These blocks of individual training time must be effectively employed to ensure the SMCR Marine gets the best training possible. Signing in at the drill center for two weeks is not the best place for someone who has missed two weeks of crew and team training. Serious consideration should be given to encouraging these Marines to spend their time with the gaining command and doing constructive work in their MOSs.
The Marine should have at least two weeks available for such a program. The gaining command would be responsible for ensuring productive use of the SMCR Marine and the unit would correspond beforehand to express its desires for any personalized training needed for the Marine on active duty. By promoting this option, which is used frequently for members of the Individual Ready Reserve, the SMCR can shift some licensing and on- the-job training to those assets which can better serve the needs of the SMCR unit.
The nation’s active-duty components are going to get smaller and the contribution of reserve units inevitably will become more significant. The challenge is to ensure that there is a solid military foundation for the Marine Corps into the next century.
Major Bergmeister is a Marine Corps Reserve officer on active duty serving as the Plans Officer in the Training and Education Division, Marine Corps Combat Developments Command, Quantico. Virginia. He has been a company commander on active duty and in the Reserves.