This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Embracing maneuver warfare as common doctrine for both the Navy and Marine Corps is perhaps the most important milestone in accomplishing the goals outlined in . . From the Sea.” But maneuver warfare cannot simply be doctrine; it must become the central idea around which all else revolves. Our first effort, therefore, should be to develop and implement a con- cePl—called operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS)—that meshes the tenets of maneuver and amphibious warfare.
By publishing Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, the Naval Doctrine Command accomplished the initial task adopting maneuver warfare.1 That is, maneuver warfare officially will be the preferable warfighting style of the Navy and Marine Corps. The next and perhaps more difficult challenge is concurrently to develop and employ OMFTS as tactical doctrine. This will be an evolutionary—not revolutionary—process.
Indeed, combining maneuver and amphibious warfare
requires a new way of thinking. If we hope to go beyond the abstract concept to consistently performing OMFTS in the littoral battlespace, then everyone—especially expeditionary sailors and Marines—must participate in proposing, trying, and adopting tactics, techniques, and procedures that support maneuver warfare.
Components of Maneuver Warfare
The underlying philosophy of OMFTS dictates that the principles of maneuver warfare will guide our actions. The ideas that form the foundation of maneuver warfare are nearly as old as war itself and have been validated by sue- cessful commanders throughout history.
► Aim: Instead of terrain or casualties, the objective of maneuver warfare is to collapse the enemy’s will to fight. It seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions, creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the
enemY cannot cope. This is accomplished by using tempo, ?Peed, and surprise to apply strength against selected critical vulnerabilities of the enemy.2 b-nemy Critical Vulnerability: Warfare by maneuver ems from a desire to attack an enemy from a position advantage rather than meet him straight on. In other °rds, we stand a better chance of success acting against n enemy’s vulnerability than against an enemy’s strength.
0r a vulnerability to be considered critical, it must be capability the enemy cannot do without. If we attack a u nerability that is not critical, the enemy will be able to °ntinue the fight. If we attack an objective that is criti- to the enemy but not vulnerable, we risk our own de- j ruction by fighting strength against strength. We there- °re roust identify and attack that part of the enemy’s rocture that is both essential to his ability to resist and ’uroerable to our forces.
efnpo: Given sufficient time, an enemy will perceive (,reats t0 his critical vulnerabilities and take steps to make ero either less vulnerable or less critical. A critical vulnerability may not be a permanent characteristic of an eroy force but rather a window of opportunity. For v ls reason, any attempt to focus efforts against a critical nerability or to shift the main effort from one objec- an°ther must be made rapidly. Without exception,
.1 c'T’S operations must be conducted at a tempo higher y an that of the enemy.3
st .-^aces and Gaps: An attack is, quite simply, a bid to ad*1 6 31 3n enemy’s critical vulnerability by creating an n Vantage and then exploiting it. To get to the critical vulnerability, we begin a series of multiple, rapid, and un- ^,Pectod thrusts that avoid enemy strengths (surfaces) as 1 e exploiting soft spots or weaknesses (gaps). As soon ou 'Ve ^etermine the most successful thrust, we make it 1 Wain effort and concentrate our capabilities against it. aPs roay be physical gaps in the enemy’s disposi- 1 j1’ 0r they may be weaknesses in time or space. Simi- be a surfacc may be an actual strong point, or it may estV^0rnent w*ien enemy has just replenished or has e . Wished an integrated air defense system. If no gaps Xlsh we must create them.
j ^ gap—or enemy weakness—is not the same as a crit- n a Vulnerability. This is an important point. A gap in ma- k^uver warfare theory is an area between surfaces that can I ^.exploited. For example, it is a point that the enemy has 1 undefended or lightly defended, a moment in time in 6n enemy's overexposed and vulnerable, or a seam an air defense umbrella.
* critical vulnerability, on the other hand, is that part jt tae enemy’s structure that is both essential to his abil- to resist and vulnerable to our forces—the military 9uivalent of the jugular vein. Gaps are useful only as our s,ute to the critical vulnerability. In other words, we don’t j °°t gaps for the sake of shooting gaps. Our main ef- 0rt must always go for the jugular.
GMFTS: Maneuver Warfare Amphibious Operations
OMFTS is the application of the tenets of maneuver ■ arfare to amphibious operations. Using the sea, air, and and as one maneuver space, the aim of OMFTS is seam- essly to project the Marine air-ground task force ashore,
striking decisively at the heart of the enemy’s will to resist. The question is how best to place the landing forces ashore.
During World War II, most of our landings were conducted with tactical separation of the naval and land components. This distinction created an artificial seam between the Navy and Marines at the high-water mark: there was a break in the flow after maneuver on the sea was terminated and before land maneuver began. This was necessary in order to establish a beachhead and methodically consolidate power ashore before breaking out of the beachhead and moving on to inland objectives.
In OMFTS, the Marine air-ground task force begins its maneuvering from a sea base rather than waiting to begin it from ashore. The seabase is located within the battle- space that we intend to dominate, and it also serves as a beachhead, but afloat instead of ashore. From this floating beachhead, we can fully exploit maneuver warfare ashore by relying less on things that would tie us to static defensive positions—such as airfields, fuel farms, supply dumps, and a large command post. So rather than focusing on establishing a beachhead ashore, the task force can focus on maneuvering against an enemy’s critical vulnerability while situated on its own floating beachhead.
Operational maneuver from the sea presupposes that the maneuver of ships at sea and the maneuver of Marines on land form a single continuum, with no dividing line—either in time, space, or operational concept. Accordingly, OMFTS can exploit the extraordinary mobility offered by the naval expeditionary force without loss of momentum during the transition from sea to shore. Viewing the sea as an avenue of approach, land forces rely on naval vessels to be the tactical sea maneuver force. Instead of long linear assault waves across broad beaches, we launch multiple probes across much narrower landing points, to search for gaps and surfaces. In doing so, we retain the ability to develop situations while committing minimal forces, or to exploit opportunities with maximum resources. Once the attack has begun, the primary plan of routes, penetration points, intermediate objectives, and fires can be changed as necessary. For example, if a landing site proves unproductive, we can disengage and probe again. If, however, a landing site provides a gap, we can shift our forces and push our reserves forward and exploit it.
Historical Battles Emphasizing OMFTS
Operational maneuver from the sea is not new. Several examples throughout naval history illustrate the application of maneuver warfare in littoral operations. It has been demonstrated to be effective not only in terms of the maneuvers themselves, but also in terms of other key components of maneuver warfare on land, such as mission orders based on a shared way of thinking, throwing strength against weakness, and concentrating all of one’s own forces, or main effort, against a portion of the enemy’s.
>• Battle of Quebec: British Amphibious Assault on French Quebec: An excellent example of the seamless maneuver of ships at sea and landing forces is the British capture of Quebec in 1759. The achievements of British Major General James Wolfe and Vice Admiral Sir Charles Saunders are a shining example of navy and infantry cooperation.
Located almost a thousand miles within the heartland of the continent on a commanding bluff on the St. Lawrence River, Fortress Quebec was the key to the British conquest of French Canada. The British were outnumbered, but the fact that their army had the tactical mobility of sea transports gave them a great advantage in maneuverability. By creating gaps, identifying critical vulnerabilities, and operating at a faster tempo, the British were able to make up for their numerical disadvantage.
With the British armada safely anchored just out of cannon range off Quebec, General Wolfe decided against a frontal attack on the entrenched French main position below the city. He felt he could achieve success instead by drawing the enemy out of their entrenched positions and into action.4 To do this, Wolfe sought to identify a French critical vulnerability that, if threatened, would force them to fight. Soon the general discovered that the French had moved their supply depot upriver 30 miles, which meant they depended on the free use of the river and the inland road networks to resupply their large force. If the British could cut off this exposed line of supply, the French would be forced to fight or starve.
Immediately, Wolfe sought to exploit this critical vulnerability. First, Admiral Saunders moved the fleet upriver, effectively cutting off the water resupply route. Wolfe and Saunders then focused their efforts on an amphibious landing to cut off the land resupply.
Through raids and personal reconnoitering, Wolfe en-
Capitalizing on their higher operating tempo, Japanese forces under General Tomoyuki Yamashita marched down the Malay Peninsula to Singapore, intimidating a superior British force into surrender.
In a shining example of navy and infantry cooperation, British Major General James Wolfe and Vice Admiral Sir Charles Saunders created a gap in the French defensive line—drawing French forces upstream and then moving in to threaten their supply lines—to capture Quebec in 1759.
ARCHI^*
Bypassing Japanese strongholds, General Douglas MacArthur’s troops teamed up with Admiral Daniel Barbey’s amphibious forces to leapfrog to success in the South Pacific. The mobility afforded by Admiral Barbey’s forces gave the Allies the flexibility either to reinforce or to evacuate quickly, as the situation dictated.
ARChM
joavored to find a weak spot in French General Louis Montcalm’s defensive line. After receiving in- 'gence that a detachment of Canadian troops, weak in and CrS an<^ mora^e’ was defending a steep cliff a mile to a a^ove Quebec, Wolfe and Saunders decided in ?{eate a gaP-5 During the night, a strong infantry force ^ lat-bottomed boats supported by frigates worked its tua^ utiles upriver from the proposed landing site with e dde as if to attack further upstream. er Meanwhile, the French marched the bulk of their south- | wn force along the shore parallel to the British force that as making its way upstream. When the tide turned, how- er, the British force turned and began rowing furiously q Wariver toward Quebec. Aided by the tidal current, they ickly outdistanced the exhausted French soldiers. Shortly °re dawn, the British assault force landed virtually un- PPosed just outside Quebec.
bat ^awn’ *^e British had 4,500 soldiers arrayed in bra e order against the fortress. The shock of Wolfe’s ^each and his potential to cut off all French supplies thoS6C* Montcalm to abandon his steady judgment. Al- ^ the British were outnumbered and caught between fQe Powerful pincers of the southern and northern French infCeS’ Montcalm feared that Wolfe was going to be re- to „rC^‘ ^ec!hed not to wait for the other pincer arm Set into position and instead attacked the British piece- ne6a ^ter the shock of the first British volley, the French V r!Cr recovered and were rapidly routed.
lngapore: Another seamless operation was the Japan- a ^.attack of Fortress Singapore in December 1941. Using a Vn ^*er °Perat'ng tempo to catch the enemy off balance, g .0’000-strong Japanese fighting force intimidated a ritish force of more than 90,000 in Singapore into ca- . ltulation. This attack illustrates how maneuver of landS forces, naval vessels, and air units can be integrated.
After a surprise attack against nearby Allied air bases, the Japanese landed their forces, commanded by the famous General Tomoyuki Yamashita, unopposed at Singora, more than 600 kilometers up the Malay Peninsula from Singapore. This choice of landing site—a gap—kept the amphibious task force at a safe distance from powerful Allied land, sea, and air forces at Singapore and gained coverage by Japanese aircraft operating from southern Indochina.
While the Japanese landing force was moving rapidly down the Malay Peninsula, these Japanese aircraft attacked the Allied ships sent against the amphibious task force and succeeded in sinking Prince of Wales and Repulse.
In February 1941, after a month of hard marching and a second month of fighting, Yamashita’s forces were on the northern shores of the Straits of Johore. Running desperately short of weapons, ammunition, and fuel, but fearful that a delay could afford the British time to discover his forces’ true strength, Yamashita ordered the final assault.
Yamashita determined the British critical vulnerability was three water reservoirs supplying the heavily defended city.6 The Japanese quickly created gaps in the enemy line and captured their targets. The British commander ordered a counterattack but was unanimously opposed by his subordinates, who argued that the defending units were too exhausted, demoralized, and disorganized to keep holding defensive positions, let alone to counterattack. With 90,000 troops and one million civilians and water supplies unlikely to last 24 hours, the British surrendered.
► MacArthur in New Guinea: In 1943, General Douglas MacArthur was preparing to launch a campaign to isolate the major Japanese base at Rabaul. This effort began with a series of amphibious operations in New Guinea. With the arrival of Vice Admiral Daniel Barbey’s amphibious forces, MacArthur’s weary troops no longer would have to make frontal assaults on skillfully prepared positions. Throughout the remainder of the campaign, enemy strong points could be bypassed and Allied troops landed on lightly defended beaches of their own choosing.7 With the temporary loan of the Pacific aircraft carriers, MacArthur was able to leapfrog the strongest concentration of Japanese troops in New Guinea. Using tempo as a weapon, he was able to transform a serious threat into a mere nuisance to his rear by cutting lines of communications between Japanese forces.
Successfully employing new amphibious tactics, Admiral Barbey used multiple narrow landing points to seek out enemy weaknesses and exploit them by shifting forces. Limited by the lack of amphibious shipping and unsure of Japanese defensive concentrations, Barbey became an expert at landing in limited visibility across lightly de-
fended landing points, rapidly reinforcing success and evacuating quickly if there were failures.8
For example, during the assault on the Japanese stronghold of Lae—an important outpost in the defense of western New Guinea and an essential step in the Allied isolation of Rabaul—MacArthur used an innovative combination of airborne and amphibious moves that kept the Japanese confused and distracted. With no air cover during the assault and a protective screen of destroyers that was too weak to ward off a Japanese cruiser attack, Admiral Barbey landed the amphibious forces on two narrow beaches, about 16 miles to the east of Lae—well out of range of its coastal batteries. Meeting no organized resistance on the initial landing, he continued the flow of reinforcements and supplies while the landing force marched toward Lae. Barbey pushed the offload as rapidly as possible so he could get his ships away from the beach before Japanese planes found and bombed them.
Within 12 days the Allies had captured Lae. Acting quickly to take advantage of the rapid collapse of Lae, MacArthur immediately ordered another amphibious assault. Six days later, Admiral Barbey had fully backloaded the landing force and launched an attack on Finschhafen, much in the same fashion as Lae.
These three historical examples have several similarities. Each demonstrates the use of maneuver warfare tactics. Instead of seizing terrain or inflicting casualties, the objective in all three cases was destroying the enemy’s will. Because there was a rapid and seamless transition from sea to shore, each attacker was able to maintain a higher tempo of operations than the enemy. As a result, the enemy continually was faced with dilemmas and with insufficient reaction time, which denied him control of the battle.
Searching for or creating gaps and rapidly bringing combat power to bear on them was the norm. Likewise, each attack was against a part of the enemy’s structure that was both vulnerable and essential to his ability to resist—a critical vulnerability. They brought power to bear through a series of rapid and unexpected actions. For example, MacArthur’s amphibious navy landed close to “one million Allied troops and a million tons of supplies along New Guinea into the Philippines in a series of lighting strokes on enemy-held beaches with a casualty list of but 272 men.”9
Conclusions
Many will argue that operational maneuver from the sea is not an all-encompassing concept because it is usable only for certain local terrain situations that would support it. They will say that OMFTS examples such as MacArthur at New Guinea are misleading because the terrain supported picking weak spots to attack. The implication, of course, is that if we cannot find a gap then we cannot do OMFTS. This argument breaks down for two reasons.
First, OMFTS is a concept based on maneuver warfare, which is a fighting philosophy that applies to all situations all the time. Indeed, there is far more to maneuver warfare than a rapid movement around an enemy’s flank. But, misunderstandings of maneuver have led to the no
tion that we never use our strength to attack the enemy s strength. This is not true. When we cannot find a gap to exploit, then we must create one. This may mean we have to attack a strength we cannot avoid with even more strength of our own. If, in the larger scheme of the operation, overcoming this strength creates a gap that allows us to continue the maneuver warfare attack, then it is totally consistent with maneuver warfare theory.
Second, the reason we did not do OMFTS in other World War II amphibious operations is not because of unfavorable terrain but because doctrine dictated that we firs11 establish a beachhead before we continue the attack. For example, during the Anzio amphibious operation, we I landed at a gap. Unfortunately, we did not exploit this gap fe-t- and consequently conceded the initiative because our doc- SkA; trine focused on establishing a beachhead rather than on 3 the enemy. On the other hand, MacArthur was consistently 1 able to do OMFTS because he and Admiral Barbey con- B sciously deviated from this doctrine and developed neW I techniques and tactics.10 The culmination of MacArthur’5 I OMFTS approach was his landing at Inchon where ter- fl rain, supposedly, did not support a landing.
In sum, OMFTS is a means of bringing strength from I the sea to bear against selected enemy weaknesses or gap5 I on shore. Like maneuver warfare, OMFTS is a way of ap' fl proaching a particular set of problems. To turn maneu- fl ver warfare theory into operational practice in littoral areas, the Navy and Marine Corps, like Wolfe and Saunders a1 fl Quebec, must be prepared to operate as a single entity if 1 all aspects of an amphibious operation and in subsequent ■ operations ashore, using the surface of the sea as well as I the plains of earth for maneuver. Moreover, we must be I willing to introduce techniques and procedures that are fl designed to more effectively implement the principles of ” our maneuver doctrine.
Today, the most important contributors to this process are the fleet sailors and Marines. The challenge is to ge( 1 them educated and trained in maneuver warfare as soon as possible, so they can help shape concepts that will sup' port littoral maneuver warfare. Admittedly, this will be an evolutionary change, but the sooner the fleet begins, the sooner the Naval Doctrine Command will be able to translate those concepts into OMFTS doctrine.
'NDP-l was signed on 28 March 1994 and made available in June 1994.
2FMFM-1 Warfighting, p. 36.
’FMFM-2 The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, 12 April 1993 Draft, pp. 22-23. 4Lord Keyes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations, Cambridge 1943» p. 13.
'Christopher Hibbert, Wolfe at Quebec, World Publishing Company 1959, p. 122- 6FMFM-2, p. 36.
7Vice Admiral Daniel Barbey, MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy (Annapolis, MD: , U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1969), p. ix.
"Captain Richard Moore, USMC, “Blitzkrieg From the Sea,” Naval War College Review, Nov-Dec 1983, p. 42-43.
’Barbey p. x.
‘“Barbey, pp. 43-44.
Currently assigned to the immediate office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Commander Pierce is a former amphibious branch head of the Marine Corps Doctrine Division, Quantico, Virginia. He has a master’s degree in National Security Affairs, Strategic Planning, from the Naval Postgraduate School and is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He recently completed his executive officer tour in the USS Dubuque (LPD-8).