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The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer is today’s premier combatant, but we can maintain worldwide leadership in warship design only through innovative thinking and a clean-sheet-of-paper design approach.
Ask anyone to sum up what represents a Navy more than anything else. The overwhelming answer you’ll get is: ships—warships.
The United States has always designed and built the finest warships in the world. During the past 20 years— with the arrival of the Aegis cruisers and destroyers—we have created warships that are a quantum leap ahead of all other countries’ equivalents. We must maintain this lead into the next century.
Three European defense companies have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to cooperate in developing a new frigate called the F-124 frigate program. Germany’s Blohm & Voss, the Netherlands’ Royal Schelde, and Spain’s EN Bazan drafted an agreement that would take effect when the three countries decide to develop the frigate. Germany wants to build four frigates, the Netherlands two, and Spain four. These warships are scheduled to enter service by 1999. Another program, the Horizon project, involves the governments of France, Britain, and Italy and aims at developing a 6,000-ton multimission destroyer. In addition, Japan is sure to include a new warship design in its upcoming six-year defense plan in 1994. The United States, however, appears content to produce existing designs, which will be 20 years old by the turn of the century.
The ship-design phase is the period in which creativity and innovation takes place. Ship production then turns these innovations into hardware. However, a significantly reduced SCN budget and a ship-acquisition plan that calls for the continued procurement through the rest of this century of only one warship type and its variants (designed 15 years ago) will result in the extinction of the U.S. warship design and development community as we know it— along with our ability to create the world’s best future warships.
To preserve our world leadership in warship design, we face four challenges:
► Fostering innovation in naval warfare ► Providing a flexible surface fleet that fulfills current and new naval mission needs
► Retaining an industrial base (including ship design)
> Accomplishing these goals within drastically reduced budgets.
Innovation has been, and will continue to be, the key element in naval warfare. Although strategy, tactics, and
national will to commit our forces are still the fundamental lngredients in achieving victory, superior hardware and software are essential elements—especially in light of the n°w"Common expectation of Americans that in case of ^ar’ casualties among U.S. personnel will be minimal. hus> retention of a vibrant industrial base that conceives, esigns, and manufactures the hardware and software is a basic requirement.
. Just as we maintain a degree of readiness at sea by train- the ships’ crews continuously, we must do the same *n developing new technologies, and advancing in ship es’gn and production. Warship designers should not be Put into suspended animation for the rest of the century ecause they have not been asked to design new and necessary future warships.
Major innovations in naval warfare have occurred be- Ween major wars of this century—a phenomenon that is Quite logical and expected. After all, during intense con- lch the focus is on winning the war at hand, while be- Ween major conflicts there is a period of relative luxury j° think and experiment. The years between World War and World War II ushered in the era of naval aviation— e innovation that changed the model for naval warfare r°rn large surface-to-surface battles to engagements by naval aircraft. Between World War II and the Cold War, nudear weapons mounted on ballistic missiles were conceived and have been the major deterrent to World War for the past 50 years. The ability to hide these weapons eep underwater in vehicles with high mobility—thanks ? nuclear power—has been one, maybe the key, leg of he nuclear-deterrent triad.
Two new major innovations in naval warfare now in Pr°gress have the potential for major impact on war at sea and the littoral: long-range precision strike and theater bal- lstic missile defense, both achieved from the sea. The c°ncept of attacking land targets hundreds of miles into enemy territory from the sea is not new. In fact, it was c principal mission that the Navy used to sell Congress ^ hen they sought appropriations for new aircraft carriers ring the Cold War. Then, however, the idea was to at-
in-
du;
hick the targets with aircraft dropping bombs—which ... uriably exposed pilots to deadly enemy fire, and in Urn, to possible casualties or capture.
As a result of recent technological developments—wide- area surveillance, automated target identification, precision guidance, long-range target-seeking weapons, and re- ■able high-capacity communications—a new type of Warfare is evolving. It is projected to produce decisive re- uits with little or no risk to the lives of U.S. service- The sea-based reconnaissance-strike complex consists of weapons in space, on aircraft flying from ships, ar*d on the ships themselves. The weapons are sea-based rrny Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) for the short- to~mid range (100-500 miles) and tactical ballistic, as well as cruise, missiles for the long range (up to 1,000 miles).
The tactical ballistic missile threat is real and growing—both in the number of weapons and in their political and military effects. More than 20 countries have ballistic missiles today and, according to projections, nearly 40 countries will acquire or produce their own missiles by the end of this decade. During the Gulf War, several Aegis ships actually tracked SCUDs en route to Saudi Arabia from Iraq, but their weapon systems were not yet capable of engaging them. Things will change. Naval forces are unique in their ability to provide the first onscene capability. To provide a warship capable of carrying out deep precision strike and theater ballistic missile defense, we need a much larger warship than the DDG-51. The insertion of Marines and follow-on Army and Air Force units will require this kind of protection from the sea, in addition to the clear need for civilian protection against ballistic missiles.
Current conflicts around the globe show that the world is more complex than it was when the presence of a Soviet Union kept regional conflicts to a manageable affair. These conflicts demand that fleet commanders—despite sharply reduced assets—have more options in the types of warship units available today. We cannot throw the same mix of assets at wildly different crises. Some situations demand more; some demand less. But if all we have are destroyers and cruisers carrying the Aegis weapon system and some (the DD-963 class) without an Aegis system—both at approximately 10,000 tons—then we have robbed the fleet commanders of valuable cost- effective options.
Other than carriers and the FFG-7s that are going rapidly to the Reserve Force, our warship fleet consists of four classes—the DD-963, DD-993, CG-47, and DDG- 51—all of which hover around 10,000 tons in size and were designed between 1968 and 1980. Although the DD-963 is actually about 8,000 tons, its hull is identical to the DD-993 and CG-47 and differs only slightly from the DDG-51, which after Flight IIA upgrades will be the same size as CG-47.
The Navy should have units of radically different sizes and configurations, so the task-force commanders can pick and choose the best combinations of ships for specific missions. The warship-design process is in part an allocation process, through which we decide to distribute a set of resources (weapons, sensors, and integrating devices) to different platforms. This process can create ships of 2,500 tons, 5,000 tons, 10,000 tons, 20,000 tons, and larger. Of course, if we built only very large warships, we could afford only a very small fleet that couldn’t be every place we might want it to be at the same time. In addition, not all missions require the overwhelming power of our Aegis cruisers and destroyers or even larger warships. For example, the FFG-7 class has limited warfighting ability compared to a fully battlegroup capable DDG. However, it is numerically the largest and most popular
Continued production of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Flight IIA upgrade is a must—to ensure U.S. maritime superiority and to preserve our shipbuilding industrial base—but the Navy needs to break free from traditional design concepts for the next warship.
warship design since World War II, having been built by the United States, Australia, and Taiwan. The U.S. ships are all over the world as the “cop on the beat,” inspecting ships headed toward Iraq and Haiti. (The Haiti force was composed of one 963, six FFGs, and a couple of PCs.) For operating with the smaller allied navies, a CG or DDG is literally too big (unable to enter the small harbors) or operationally too big (doesn’t mesh with a small-ship navy in exercises).
Our current warship production is limited to one class, the DDG-51, and while the DDG-51 is today’s finest warship, it would make sense—in view of the changing requirements for the Navy—to have other options on the drawing board. While from a standardization standpoint a single type or size warship fleet has its advantages, variety of capabilities and associated acquisition and operational costs provide options to force structure architects as well as fleet commanders. Imagine how dull life would be if zealots of efficiency and standardization ruled the world. How depressing it is to think that creativity and diversity would be sacrificed in the name of efficiency. It is creativity and diversity that open up “possibility thinking,” which at times leads to unexpected innovations and in turn to winning wars. The following three warship concepts are representative designs, in terms of their size and configuration, that the Navy does not possess today but should evaluate before plunging into designing for the next century another variation of DDG-51:
► A relatively light frigate of approximately 2,500 tons packed with a potent punch and designed with great care could present a very low-signature profile in every category of signature type that an attacker force could exploit.
► A warship half the size of the Navy’s Aegis ships (approximately 5,000 tons), but with a better design than a conventional monohull, would be much easier to arrange functionally than the conventional monohull (which narrows down on both ends and has a shape along both sides, not vertical walls)—a SWATH design. This hull form pitches and rolls less than the twice-as-large monohull ships, and its topside allows for more flexibility, especially with respect to its organic aviation.
► A 20,000-ton power-projection (aviation-capable) capital warship would provide to the Navy a combatant that
could act totally on its own in certain situations. The Navy has 94,000-ton carriers; the Marine Corps has 40,000- ' ton LHAs and LHDs. Shouldn’t we examine the need , for a larger warship than DDG-51 for the two new mis- ^ sions mentioned earlier (deep precision strike and theater j ballistic missile defense)?
When these three clean-sheet-of-paper designs would join the fleet, fleet commanders would have the choice | for task forces comprised of a combination of ship sizes of 2,500, 5,000, 10,000, 20,000, 40,000, and 94,000 tons.
As mentioned earlier, the warship design phase is largely one of resource allocation—how many eggs we put in each basket—and these decisions belong rightfully to those responsible for force structure architecture, not to the ship designer, whose role is to present to the force structure architects what is possible in terms of technology and ship configuration.
However, often consumers—in this case, the force structure architects—cannot reason what they would like to have in terms of individual ship unit configurations, until the ship designers provide the new, real hardware, 1 and let the operators exercise with it. Therefore, if you ask the force structure architects and ship operators what they would like to have in the future, their response is most often more of the same they already have, with minor improvements incorporated. There are many documented case studies proving this point. One such well-known case is the creation and selling of the little yellow sticky pads that are present in nearly every office. Some years ago, I when in the 3M company (the producer of the little yellow sticky pads), someone came up with the idea for the t pads, naturally turned to the marketing department of 3M, and asked whether they could sell such a product. The marketing department came back with a definite negative response. However, the developers didn’t give up and produced a limited quantity of the pads and distributed
ern internally in the 3M company. The offices started Us>ng them, but when they ran out of the supply and called e developers for more, they were told to call the marking department. After the marketing department was coded with demands for the sticky pads, they called e developers to tell them that, yes, there was a demand for their idea.
in the same sense, there was no widespread customer cmand from the fleet for aircraft carriers when the Lan- ^ ey (was) issued to them in 1922. The customer need §rew after operational experience showed how such a |1°VeI sh*P could be used. Going out now to the fleet or ,° OPNAV, the response to the question “What would you 1 c the next-generation warships to be?” may very well e more DDG-51s and minor variants of it.” That is not necessarily the best answer.
To envision future warship design configurations, we eed visionaries, which the Navy has plenty of, at all levs> all the way to the top management of the Navy. But , 'P designers have to fire the imagination of the top Navy ecision makers with new concepts and not allow those 0 want to preserve the status quo prevail. With such ^ew systems as:
Tactical non-nuclear ballistic missiles to be fired from ^arships
y ^arships configured with the Army’s ATACM missiles Long-range surveillance, targeting, and endo-exo at- y aspheric munitions for deep-precision strike y j^arge, very long-range electric guns f,. tent'al incorporation of the V-22 Osprey vertical take- ^ and landing fixed-wing aircraft ^uper stealth-configured warships—visual, acoustic, [Magnetic, IR, and RCS
e argument that we don’t need a radically new warship ^°nfiguration for our next warship beyond that of the ^G-5l js diffjcu]t to justify.
recent years, the emphasis for innovation in warships
In
as been on the combat system side. Clearly, major m- °vations such as the Aegis radar, sonars, missiles, new °mputers, new communication systems—including con- ectivity to satellite surveillance—and many other comments have changed radically the conduct of war on the arface of the oceans.
However, there are many significant innovations that uring recent years have been in various phases of de- e,°pment on the ship platform side as well, which the should attempt to incorporate into the next warship
Drastically reduced manpower through substitution of echnology. Manpower represents one of the most ex- ensive elements of an at-sea warfare system. Numerous j-apons require the on-scene support of many people— ,ch differentiates warships from the trends in weapon ^sterns on land and in air. Analysts keep asking whether e need all the people, and whether we could substitute to°re machines for personnel. Clearly, if we are willing accept new basic precepts for operation together with emerging technologies—such as fault-tolerant long-life Asterns, distributed computing, fiber optics, robotics, and automation—drastic changes concerning the use of manpower in naval warfare are feasible.
*4 SWATH combatant, super stealthy, and a step in
crease in operability in heavy seas. It is time for the Navy to design and build a nominal 5,000-ton SWATH frigate. The T-AGOS-19-class ships (the Navy has built four that are operational) are about 3,300 tons and provide a sound technology base for the larger T-AGOS-23 (approximately 5,000 tons) under construction. Also in 1993, commercial industry in Europe built a very successful 20,000-ton SWATH cruise ship—so the question of size in the regime of 5,000 tons should not be an issue.
The SWATH hull form provides a two sea-state improvement in helicopter operability over an equivalent- size monohull and significantly reduces seasickness. Another major advantage of the SWATH is that it decouples the beam of the ship from hydrodynamic performance. Unlike monohulls, the width of the SWATH deck area is not controlled by how much power is needed to achieve the prespecified ship speed. This decoupling provides much additional freedom to the warship designer in flexibility of internal arrangement. The SWATH’s specific geometrical features provide more depth on each side of the hull, which in turn allows storage of vertical-launch missiles along each side of the ship. This frees up the fore-and- aft locations for aviation and other vital functions of a modern warship.
Recently, the Navy released to the media a strange looking ship—the Stealth SWATH Sea Shadow. The Sea Shadow was developed to exploit the application of stealth technology at sea in conjunction with the SWATH hull form. Thus, the Navy has done enough experimentation to convince itself that the SWATH is amenable to advanced stealth treatment—possibly more so than a conventional monohull. If the Navy builds one or two such 5,000-ton frigates and puts them into the fleet for exercises—to develop tactics for this type of platform—the operators might come back and demand an entire new class of such ships.
>• Modularity that leads to affordable warships through commonality. An acquisition policy that makes full use of the flexibility that combat-system modularity brings should be implemented by the Navy. This includes the need for facilities that can assemble, test, and install modular combat equipment, as well as an appropriate configuration management system for adherence to standards.
This concept now in the advanced stages of development within the Navy, and which may have a significant impact on future naval ship design, is known as Affordability Through Commonality (ATC). Being developed with the Navy, it is the lineal descendant of Ship Commonality Engineering Standards program (SCES), earlier called SEAMOD program (SEA systems MODifications and MODernization by MODularity) initiated in 1972. The idea is the planning for equipment as P3I (pre-planned product improvement). Whatever it is called, the basic intent is to separate the process of developing an acquiring payload systems from the process of acquiring the basic ships that are to carry those payloads. Separation is achieved by using reasonably well-defined standards for all physical characteristics—volume and dimensions primarily—of the payload that interfaces with the ship. By designing replacement payloads to fit into the same space and to use the same electrical couplings, for example, one has, for all practical purposes, a truly variable payload
ship capable of accommodating any set of standard payload modules suitable for its size. Concurrent development and acquisition of several different types of payloads is thereby possible, with complete interchangeability between the various payload modules. ATC has expanded the SSES combat systems focused into the hull into mechanical and electrical (HM&E) areas as well, and is just entering the demonstration phase of a multiyear development program.
► An Integrated Power System that provides new flexibility to the ship designer and higher efficiency to the operator. The Advanced Surface Machinery Programs (ASMP) effort is the single most important program for future machinery systems and will provide several major advantages over current technologies. It consists of five elements: the intercooled regenerative gas turbine engine with increased fuel efficiency; the Integrated Power Sys-
Multiple missions demand multiple warship designs—so the taskforce commanders can pick and choose the best combination.
tern (IPS), an evolution of the earlier Integrated Electric Drive (IED); the Zoned
Electrical System (ZEDs); the Standard Machinery Monitoring and Control System (SMCS); and system architectural efforts allied to the aforementioned ATC program.
One of the attractive features of the gas turbine when compared to its alternatives (i.e., steam and diesel) is its light weight. But without electric drive, which decouples the engines from the propeller shaft line, we cannot take full advantage of this feature—hence, the current arrangement in a warship wherein precious, potentially usable volume for people and mission functions is wasted. With electric drive, we have the freedom to locate the engines and generators virtually any place in the ship (since wires are flexible) and to provide the required power to motors located adjacent to the propeller. (The need for lengthy shaftsinside the ship would be eliminated.)
substantial portion of this part of the ship’ however, is consumed just to bring down air and push out exhaust J gases. (Unlike diesel and steam boilers, the gas turbine is a fero-1 cious consumer of air.) Thus, this high-value real estate that could
be used to enhance the combat capability of the ship is | devoted now to what is essentially and overhead function in a warship: mobility.
During the design of the DD-963, a three-unit gas turbine plant with the primitive electric drive of the day was a strong contender against the four-unit LM2500 geared ! plant. Today, a three-unit regenerative gas turbine plant with modern electric drive takes less volume, saves the weight and cost of one gas turbine, and the weight of about one third of the fuel, while meeting a destroyer’s speed requirement. It is clearly a better system with advantages in survivability. (You can run alternate cable paths, unlike with steel shaft lines.)
We need to incorporate these power system innovations into our next warship design. To do so, we have to have
As we ponder the arrangement flexibility aspect tha1 electric drive brings to a naval combatant, try to visual' ize what would happen to the passenger cabin of a Boeing 747 if, instead of the current arrangement of propul' sion pods hanging below the wings, the engines, their ai( intakes, and exhausts had to be fitted inside the fuselage' Obviously, very little (if any) space would remain for the payload (passengers in this example). In the case ot CG-47, DD-963, or FFG-7 ship classes, the fact that the gas turbine engines have to be in line with the propelled shafts located near the bottom of the hull creates to some extent a similar problem as the 747 example. As much as 25% of the internal volume of a CG-47 in the midships portion of the ship (140-150 feet in length) is occupied by gas turbine air/gas ducts. This portion of the ship is the most valuable, the easiest to arrange and utilize, and experiences the least motions in a seaway. A
a so-called clean-sheet-of-paper design. Modifications of to avoid purchasing grossly unsuitable equipment, the
^urrent designs will not suffice.
‘stributed computing that reduces vulnerability and eciSes reconfigurability. Most U.S. Navy warships follow so-called federated model, in which each mainframe
the
has
a specific function within the ship system. As a re- ^ ’ the ships are limited in growth capability, vulnera- e to damage, and expensive to maintain. In recent de- cl8ns> however, the Navy has started following the mmercial sector toward distributed computing on local rea networks. Although this will ease maintenance and Pgrades, the ships remain substantially vulnerable.
A new technology, sponsored by the Advanced Research n^<)Jects Agency (ARPA)—Hyper-D—will solve the vul- rability issue in computing. Hyper-D is a high-perfor- . ance distributed computing system that will allow the ultaneous processing of many mission-critical software ystems. If one computer becomes incapacitated, another 1 take its place without missing a beat. This innovation S° requires a clean-sheet-of-paper warship design.
0 create innovative warships, which are responsive to w mission requirements and incorporate both combat ystem and platform technology advances, we must main- s-ln lhe special skills required for this process. The de- 0 8n Process is an iterative process that turns a grouping sh,Var'e^ ecIu'Pment 'nt0 a harmoniously operating war- 'P- It starts with a clean sheet of paper and ends with to°Usands of detailed drawings that the shipbuilder uses Cut and weld metal; configure the internal physical rangement of the ship; and connect wires, pipes, and Qj.ctlng—all of which turn a dead hull into a living set systems able to detect targets and exercise effective ornrnand. The skills and tools that create these warships j Ve to be used continuously and improved if the process is !°yield true innovation in naval warfare. Unless there a specific object on which designers can carry out these ercises, such as new warship designs, these skills and evelopments of new tools will atrophy.
,. ne marine environment places unusual demands on ’Ps and their equipment. For instance, the first class of ost-World War II German Navy submarines was conducted for operations in the shallow Baltic, where there as a severe magnetic mine threat. A weldable antimag- betlc Painless steel was selected for the hull, but after the oat was put into service, things went terribly wrong: The °sen steel was unusually susceptible to intergranular orrosion by seawater that destroyed its strength. After a
short
The
career, the class was scrapped.
current procurement environment (with the full en-
rsement of the Congress, the administration, and the ecretary of Defense) encourages off-the-shelf buying, omrnercial standards, and waiver of DoD directives in e interest of acquisition reform and streamlining. A war- 'P has to withstand many unique hazards. Thus, the Navy ous to approach the streamlining process with great care.
,rnagine the worst earthquake ever; 45 degree rolls in ^ach direction, and repetitive cycles of -1 G to +2 G. e entire ship is routinely doused with that weak battery ectrolyte called seawater. Sometimes up to four inches . 1Ce coats everything, or the so-called cooling water is P’Ped in at 100-degrees Fahrenheit outside temperature. ue bizarre nature of the marine environment means that recently:
Navy has to maintain qualified materials and products— as well as know-how. It also implies preparation of test criteria and guidance (standards) for developing new equipment, so that the ship has a chance of surviving the sea environment. This dictates a central repository for knowledge—a capacity that needs continuous nurturing. Today, this place is the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).
On a lunchtime walk through the public areas of Crystal City, NAVSEA’s ship design acquisition and maintenance headquarters, just outside of Washington, D.C., one will see naval officers from around the world. They aren’t there to see the sights. They are there as representatives of their navies to get help from the number-one ship engineering and ship program management organization in the world. Every navy in the world wishes they had such a capability. We must, therefore, maintain this capability to develop, design, and maintain warships. The only way we can do this is by exercising this talent on real designs, like those discussed earlier.
Innovations in naval warfare emerge from systems. New systems depend in turn on new and tested technology. Our research-and-development methods nurture scientific underpinnings and inventions and develop component technologies, but they stop short of forming the innovative systems that lead to warfare innovations. Consequently, we find that technologies critical to new warship designs are not fully tested as new warship acquisition gets started—eventually resulting in schedule delays and cost overruns. Prototypes/demonstrators are needed prior to entering a major acquisition process. In addition, full-scale system demonstrations provide the naval community an opportunity to experiment with the proposed system in ways that go beyond simulations. Finally, tests help satisfy skeptics and build organizational confidence in the particular innovation.
The Navy’s research-and-development community has the appropriate line item for system demonstrators, but it is focused on relatively small, subsystem-level tests. For warships, there is nothing comparable to the effort that went into the development of the Stealth Fighter Program.
In warships, the degree of difficulty is increased because of the very high unit price and the fact that the Navy has not approached the development of new warship concepts the way the aviation community has approached development of aircraft in the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force. The Navy has taken the approach to call the first of a new design the “lead ship.” Unfortunately, however, just as the name implies, a lead ship is just that—the first in a large series production—thus the Navy ship program manager is charged with a certain schedule to deliver warships one after the other, under fairly strict cost targets, forcing innovation and experimentation to take a back seat.
Today, we should not be pressured to produce ships like proverbial hot cakes. We are retiring and mothballing large quantities of fairly modern warships—and World War III is nowhere in sight. Should unexpected major hostilities arise without warning, we can call upon those recently mothballed warships. Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed this issue
With a changed threat and much longer strategic warning, prototyping, limited fielding, and other measures allow the separation of technological progress from costly full-scale deployment. Forces can be kept up-to-date by shifting away from an all-F-16 force to a series of programs like the F-117 stealth fighter. That is, place highly advanced systems in only a few selected units at a time—production prototypes, if you will— but string them together consecutively over time to form the total force. Small numbers of a particular capability are acceptable because future adversaries will be much smaller than the Soviets were. Should a new global adversary begin to arise, the long warning time will enable the United States to take the most advanced systems and put them into large-scale production in time to match the threat. But to do all this means streamlining the acquisition system, compressing the time from concept to final product, and making the acquisition cycle better able to exploit state-of- the-art technology.
Unfortunately, the traditional tendency has been to rush into a new warship design as just a replacement to a class of warship that is about to be retired.
Instead, we should hold back and not rush too quickly into a single design. Let us experiment and build prototypes, and let us develop more than one class candidate at a time. As mentioned earlier, there are several different configurations and sizes that should be developed before committing to a whole new class of warship, and even then it is questionable that the Navy should commit itself to build one ship design at a time.
This approach is not totally new, even for warships. We did this, somewhat, in the late 1940s and 1950s for warships, and we built very small classes of warships. But starting with the DD-963 in 1968, followed by FFG-7, CG-47, and DDG-51, we committed to buy 3050 ships in each class. However, what has differentiated the design and development of warships from other major military hardware in the past 25 years is that the Navy, in the case of warships, does not practice "fly before buy.” The Navy rarely builds test-and-throw-away ships like the so-called “X” and “Y” aircraft. In the case of warships, the first unit is expected to serve a full career, and the regular crew is expected to fulfill the role of the test pilots. We don't put out into the fleet one or two ships of a new design and wait for feedback from the fleet.
NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
Future advances in the integrated power system (IPS) will make today’s conventional propulsion and ship service technology obsolete—and noncompetitive in cost and capability. Compare the nominal commercial ship size requirements for diesel (top) and IPS.
ment of new surface warships than is devoted to figh^r aircraft (Navy or Air Force). For some reason, the Doh doesn’t bat an eye when the Air Force or the Navy’s ait' craft community suggests that $2 billion is required f°r the technology demonstration portion of its new Joint M' vanced Strike Technology Aircraft. This is the prograi” that has just replaced two earlier aircraft development pr°' grams—AFX for the Navy and the Multirole Fighter f°f the Air Force. Before this development is completed,11 will consume as much as $10 billion.
In view of the strong demand placed on the existing SCN budget—which has shrunk to a mere 25% of wh^1 it was ten years ago—without any creative financing f°f the development of a new series of warships, the only alternative is to sacrifice an existing production ship ever) few years to finance the demoi1' strators. To avoid that situation' a new source of funding must be found. One creative financing approach could come from shaf' ing the cost of development wit'1 other strong Western allies °r possibly from linking the f>' nancing to Foreign Military Sales (FMS), with defense conversion monies providing the seed funding.
In the case of the first option' we should go ahead and create the team of the United States and Japan. After all, it is only with Japan that we shared oUr newest warship technology, the Aegis combat system. This ah liance will surely compete we" with the two already formed ifl Europe and will reduce substan- - daily the required funding fron1 the U.S. Navy’s budget for the development of the next waf' ship. It also has some potentially' attractive political implications- For example, this could become the centerpiece project in the so called “Perry Initiative," 11 program under current discus' sion between the U.S. DoD and the Japanese Defense Agency- In the case of the second op' tion, the FMS route, the basic idea is based on the fact that there are countries in Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf region, and even in South America and Africa, who are in the market for small- and medium-size warships. It is quite clear that these countries prefer U.S. technology and logistic systems. In addition, it is in our best political interest that they be tied to the United States rather than to some other country When they own American weapon systems, they are tied
to us.
The Navy devotes much less money for the develop
Although most of these countries prefer U.S. technology, systems, and life-cycle support, the new warship must have the so-called U.S. Navy stamp of approval if it is
,° be purchased by these countries. There have been many ^stances when U.S. industry (such as the ill-fated Northrop | b has tried to market a weapon system specifically ^signed for FMS that was not a product of the normal , . • DoD procurement process. These efforts invariably ai ed- The Navy should invest in the development of new Warship designs using the normal procurement system and ^ en> like any business, market these through FMS and °Pe for a return on its investment—thus eventually eing at least revenue-neutral and maybe even revenuePositive.
If •
1 a concern arises that we are selling too much of our est weapons technology, we obviously can limit which the systems built into the new design we hold back and ' st'tute with somewhat older systems—with a potential Pgrade later always an option. This approach will pro- e to us the benefits of developing innovations in war- r 'P design for our own Navy without having to pay ^ them by giving up a production warship, such as a G-5], an(j without increasing the SCN budget. The nds allocated to this exercise can come from a different c°unt (not SCN) such as the defense conversion account, endorsed by President Bill Clinton as recently as 29 ^Ptember 1993, to assure the survival of the U.S. ship- FN/r i°g industry- Tite payback occurs when the Navy office sells these warships as FMS. he idea is that we develop and build a full-scale Ij. ITI°nstrator or maybe even two for our own Navy. Then, 'the U.S. Navy wants more, we build more. For FMS, e build only on order, not speculation, from the pur- asing country and hope to recoup the development cost, 'eh includes the demo-prototype cost. Even if we are the development costs with our allies, the second °Ption of FMS does not necessarily have to be excluded.
We can afford to develop the demonstrator alone, however> it is preferable.
t summary, the surface fleet is shrinking significantly,
0 almost half of that which it was only five years ago, ?Ven while the Navy is acquiring new missions for its sur, Ce warships. These new missions provide roles that have e Potential of breathing new life into the surface navy and will make the Navy more of a full participant in fu- re Gulf War-like encounters through its capability of eeP precision strike and ballistic missile defense. To re- T>ond effectively to these mission demands, the Navy will eed surface units of radically different size, configura- l0ri» and capability.
^hat actions are required by the Navy’s manage- Cr|t to provide the necessary options, in terms of future Urmce warships, to carry out new missions effectively ,nd within the pragmatic budgetary limitations that are e'ng imposed on the Navy? The answer is innovation in !!aval warfare and innovative approaches to financing e design and production development of our next Warship.
Achieving innovation in new military systems requires
that
individual technological innovation be incorporated
lrJt0 systems. Systems need to be synthesized into comP ete entity designs, and these designs need to be demonstrated in a real, complete, and executable, full-scale hard- 'Vare'—in full-up warships. Otherwise, most of the Navy’s research and development remains an exercise in untested
paper concepts and a lot of interesting component equipment improvements that often are adopted by other navies, before our own.
To be able to produce new warships, the Navy has to develop policies that assure that the industrial capabilities that create the hardware—and the in-house Navy design and engineering resources that create the designs—will continue to exist and will remain as good as this country can provide. The Advanced Research Projects Agency has been working hard to create a budget for improved shipbuilding productivity, in order to enhance the chances of U.S. shipbuilders to participate in a large, near-future, worldwide, commercial market.
The effects of this on U.S. shipyards’ workload, however, will not be felt before the next century. In the meantime, throughout this decade, the U.S. Navy has the responsibility to assure with its own planning and dollars that its design and development base for warships will continue to exist and be viable and vibrant. To achieve this, the Navy must:
> Continue production of the DDG-51 Flight IIA
> Respond with brand new, clean-sheet-of-paper warship designs to the two new Navy missions of deep precision strike and theater ballistic missile defense.
>■ Incorporate the many major system innovations currently in their development phase into innovative warships and in the process preserve our warship design and development infrastructure
>• Develop more than one new warship design and abandon the notion of one-to-one replacement of retiring warships
> Initiate the design development now with the objective of building prototypes/demonstrators, i.e., full-up warships, but not lead ships
> Find alternative financing approaches (if SCN is not to be used):
• Form an alliance with Japan for the development of the next warship design
• Take advantage of the President’s new commitment to devote defense conversion funding to shipbuilding by using this as one resource for seed funding of this concept for warship development and then turn to FMS to recoup this investment
Whether we find the necessary funds to develop the next warship by going it alone without forming another joint venture, a la the two European groups already in ex- istence—the United States and Japan—or without counting on defense conversion monies with FMS sales, we must act now—while we still have the required infrastructure to continue our traditional lead in developing the finest warships in the world.
Dr. Leopold is President of SYNTEK Technologies, Inc. He was the Technical Director for ship and submarine design for the U.S. Navy, during which time he was responsible for the design of most of the U.S. Navy afloat today. He is member of the CNO Executive Panel and former member of the Defense Science Board, as well as the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Science. He is a recipient of numerous prestigious naval awards and was inducted by Prince Philip (the Queen’s husband) into the Royal Academy of Engineering as the only American so honored in 1993. He is the author of more than 30 articles and books and holds four degrees in engineering, including a Ph.D., from MIT, as well as an MBA from the George Washington University.