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The Air Force Can’t Be Serious
TheTf ^man—Let me get this straight: ta . S- Air Force thinks it can perform strit'Cal m>ssions—e.g., antiarmor
in th~With 100 B‘ls and B-2s based Peer 6 ^n'ted States and, therefore, ex- craffS theNavy t0 cut back t0 seven air- tn, ,Carr'ers' because, after all, bombers tra^l faster than ships.
",ith°r ■t^e rnoment> iet s not even bother ton tr'v'a sucb as sortie rates, ordnance to na®6’ reconnaissance, and targeting— te Sa^ n°thing of dealing with enemy in- torj ePt0rs- Let’s not talk about the his- lr|- . record of intercontinental bombing LihSl.°ns e,S-’ the FB-111 strike against ya and the Royal Air Force’s effort the Falklands Conflict.
So he wiHingness of the Air Force to put "lany of 'ts eggs into two baskets is thga a°mable. The concept harks back to bee 8eneric “battle plane” idea that has fit'll' .I"* 1'1 us since 1915. One size fits all, f0 L ^rong: Witness the dismal per- Cni ianCe and h>gh loss rates tbe French MpU. r°n ^-series of World War 1 and the
eVeSSerSChmitt 110 of World War IL Not •hak11 Prec’sion-guided munitions could all lSUC^ a flawed concept viable. After ’lae Army Air Force learned the hard do^ “seiLescorting bomber”
0ne'n 1 work—just ask anyone who flew Schweinfurt raid in 1943. by isn’t the Navy responding to the jyj r F°rce claims? One wonders if the 'vhn^ "S Worsh>ping at the jointness altar 1 e other services skip church. □
“sERB’d”
Ifee L B. Waddell, pp. 39-40, June 1994 “r°ceedings)
^"tenant Raul A. Martin, U.S. Navy— ip f-aptain Waddell’s case makes plain, c ae Navy is not careful as it executes . rrent personnel reductions, it risks be- -Vln8 its most precious resource: its men
and
le
are
Women. The process seems an im- |rfrSonal and arbitrary one in which the e'hrnate concerns of officers and sailors a e swept aside callously. Thus, the Navy PPears to be just another large corpora-
I n cutting overhead by hacking away at s Personnel resources.
The Navy should behave differently an a civilian corporation, because the People who join the Navy are committed
to do their best and give their lives in the service of their country. In the balance, what they receive as compensation is trivial. Their true and richly deserved compensation is the recognition and dignity they receive for their altruistic service. Then why must my best enlisted personnel endure the humiliation of having their Enlisted Navy Career Options for Reenlistment requests denied time after time before finally being granted permission to reenlist?
The challenge for the Navy’s leaders, therefore, is to retain the best officers and sailors as they reduce personnel levels. On my ship, there is a promising young officer who is in all respects an intelligent, devoted, and outstanding officer. But he shortly will be separated from the Navy because he is fat. How much easier it is to measure body fat than it is to gauge performance or potential. Of course, there are many good reasons why the Navy should promote physical fitness. However, care must taken not to use such things as physical standards as a convenient way to cut personnel. It is easy to look at a few numbers and say, “No, these people don’t make the cut. Let’s discharge them.” But how costly such a haphazard approach would be if it causes our best sailors and officers to lose the faith and trust in the leadership and, therefore, decide to leave. □
“Is There a Doctrine in the
House?”
(See S. A. Hastings, pp. 34-38. April 1994;
F. L. Lewis, pp. 23-24, June 1994 Proceedings)
Captain Linton F. Brooks, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander Hastings makes a strong case for formal doctrine as a shared professional vision of the nature of war and the purpose of the Navy. Such a shared vision can help ensure sound tactical, operational, and strategic decisions by allowing the commander on the scene to augment his own personal experience with the accumulated experience of the profession. In a sense, of course, we always have had this shared vision; what is new is the attempt to write it down. Doing so is particularly timely. The Navy—like the nation—is trying to develop new strategic concepts to replace those of the Cold War. The discipline of drafting formal doctrine can help forge
Contents:
The Air Force Can’t Be Serious—13
SERB’d—13
Is There a Doctrine in the House?—13
Nonproliferation: Let’s Start with the Easy Stuff—16
Gatekeepers of the Gulf—16
Friendly Fire: Facts, Myths, and Misperceptions—18
IFF Update: Stalled Again—18
We’re Not Doing Enough About Friendly Fire—18
It’s Time to Beach the NOAA Corps—/?
No Napoleons Need Apply—20
Who’s to Blame When Women Don't Measure Up?—21
Full Circle: The Evolution of Sea-Control Squadrons—22
Roles and Missions—Again—22
ENTER THE FORUM
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consensus about how to train and fight111 a world of operations other than war-
littoral conflict, nuclear proliferation, an
emerging new relations with other nation4 and other navies.
Developing formal doctrine offers an other benefit. Commander Hastings note4 the Navy’s historic concern with alio" ing the operational commander the max imum flexibility and independence. Muc of our traditional objection to “join1 ness” has been driven by the fear tha other services’ commanders would m's use naval assets by constraining that fleX ibility. As Commander Hastings note4- however, “in the littoral, the sailor’s an the soldier’s views of war must coincide- This means that Navy officers need to understand the Air Force’s view of a‘r power and the Army’s vision of modem warfare. It also means that these t"a services must understand us. Navies wt be misused to the extent that they are misunderstood. It is in the Navy’s inter
est for soldiers and airmen to understai
nd
of
sea power. More important, in an age joint littoral warfare, such an under standing is in the nation’s interest.
Formal naval doctrine can play an important role in fostering a new joint un derstanding. For the Army and Air Force- doctrine is one of the foundations of training and education. Just as Commander Hastings has learned something of Army and Air Force thinking about war fr°m FM 100-5 Operations and AFM 1" Basic Aerospace Doctrine, future Arm) and Air Force officers need naval tools to help them learn our professional vision. The new Capstone publications basic doctrinal publications on naval warfare, intelligence, naval operations, logistics, plans, and command and control—should provide such tools.
This need to help our sister services understand the Navy means that—in addition to Commander Hastings’s suggeS'
tions—the Navy should do more.
should write the Capstone publications so they can be understood by those outside the Navy, and then encourage the use of those publications in the training and education of officers of all services- Recognizing the importance of join1 planning doesn’t mean turning infantry battalions into carrier battle group staffs- It does mean that Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen all need to understand the basics of each others’ contribution so that, when the fog of war thrusts us into unfamiliar territory, a shared professional military vision can help guide our decisions. As the service best suited for the mobile, flexible warfare of the post-Cold War age, the Navy should welcome the arrival of formal doctrine as a way to help shape and share that vision with our colleagues in the Army and Air Force. □
“Nonproliferation: Let’s Start with the Easy Stuff’
(See W. J. Holland, p. 9, June 1994; N. Polmar, pp. 14-17, July 1994 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. J. Holland, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In his critique of my commentary, Mr. Polmar accurately summarizes the objections of the American submarine community to construction and
Russian submarines are making rapid advances in many areas but remain inferior in some important operational aspects.
export of diesel submarines. Accusing that group of trying to protect a nonexistent technological superiority, he points out correctly that the Russians have built submarines that go faster and dive deeper than those of the U.S. Navy and that they alone have mastered the skill of fabricating submarine hulls from titanium. He implies the Russians have mastered all the technology related to submarines, and attempts by the United States to protect this technology are futile.
This argument flies in the face of the evidence of the Soviets’ surreptitious purchase of precision milling machines from the West for finishing propellers. In fact, neither side has a monopoly on all the technology related to this very complex
and still evolving field, and both continue to push research and construct new ships. Since learning from another is far easier than experimenting on one’s own, protecting what one knows from the most- likely adversary is only prudent. The evidence at sea seems to indicate that Russian submarines are making rapid advances in many areas but remain inferior in some important operational aspects. Mr. Polmar’s censure of those who would like to retain whatever little advantages they may still possess seems ill-directed.
Mr. Polmar castigates “Rickover’s disciples,” for being single-mindedly against diesel submarines. In nuclear-weapons policy, information warfare, or similar exotic issues where one intellectual opinion is likely to be as well founded as the next, the skill of the pen counts for much. But in submarine warfare and antisubmarine warfare, among other areas, there is real expertise. And the very people Mr. Polmar accuses of closed-mindedness are those who possess that experiential knowledge. Furthermore, this group is famous for its diversity of opinion on most subjects. In fact, the submarine community recognizes Landers- man’s Law: “Two submariners and any issue yields an argument.” Uniform opinion here is evidence not of conspiracy but of the validity of the position.
Mr. Polmar characterizes the arguments of the submarine-warfare community as
“bogus” and describes the motives of1 group in harsh and judgmental fashi°: His ad hominem attacks on those * hold a contrary opinion warp his atf, ments and belittle his otherwise nortf1 useful observations. Mr. Polmar W0, do better to develop why he believes strongly in ancient technology, 1 “diesel boats forever.” □
‘Gatekeepers of the Gulf’
(See J. Kraska, pp. 44-47, March 1994;
T. Leech, pp. 19-20, July 1994 Proceeding^
Lieutenant Timothy C. Gallaudet, Navy—Lieutenant (junior grade) Kras^ article is both well-written and W® founded. Few will debate the point Iran is a threat that must be deterF1 What may be debated, however, is0 of Lieutenant Kraska’s opening premia He states that Iran’s pursuit of regi01* hegemony stems partially for its “r®| tively stable domestic political envif0* ment.” On the contrary, the headline1 an article in a recent issue of Jane’s & fence Weekly reads: “Iranian Coup Fef Threaten Middle East” In fact, further11 vestigation reveals that Iran’s volatile *
lb,. '
s
dynamic domestic climate is represen1' | tive of the Middle East region as a wh®]
In light of today’s New World Ord‘; “relatively stable” is a relatively ra$ ingless term. □
The U.S. Naval Institute Announces the 33rd Annual Naval & Maritime
PHOTO CONTEST
The U.S. Naval Institute is proud to announce the 33rd Annual Naval & Maritime Photo Contest.
The contest is open to both amateur and professional photographers. The winning photographs will be published in a 1995 issue of Proceedings, the monthly magazine of the Naval Institute. Cash prizes will be awarded as follows:
1st Prize $500
2nd Prize $350
3rd Prize $250
Honorable Mention (15) $100 each
Entry Rules:
1. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest.)
2. Limit: 5 entries per person.
3. Entries must be either black-and-white prints, color prints, or color transparencies.
4. Minimum print size is 5" x 7".
5. Minimum transparency size is 35mm. (No glass-mounted transparencies, please.)
6. Full captions and the photographer’s name, address, and social security number must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print or printed on the transparency mount. (Do not write directly on the back of a print. No staples, please.)
7. Entries may not have been previously published, and winners may not be published prior to publication in Proceedings. Prior publication could result in the relinquishment of the prize awarded.
8. Entries must be postmarked by 31 December 1994. Only photographs accompanied by self-
addressed, stamped envelopes will be returned- Photographs not awarded prizes may possibly be purchased by the Naval Institute.
Deadline: 31 December 1994
Write for details or mail entries to:
Naval & Maritime Photo Contest-U.S. Naval Institute-118 Maryland Ave.-Annapolis, MD 21402-5035—(410) 268-6110
‘Friendly Fire: Facts, Myths, and Misperceptions”
(See C. F. Hawkins, pp. 54-59, June 1994 Proceedings)
‘IFF Update: Stalled Again’
(See G. Cornelius, pp. 58-59, June 1994 Proceedings)
“We’re Not Doing Enough About Friendly Fire”
(See R. J. Kalil, p. 60, June 1994 Proceedings)
Richard A. Parks, President, Parks Associates, Inc.—In July 1988, U.S. military leaders tried to explain how the USS Vincennes (CG-49) misidentified an Iranian airliner and shot it down.
Many people wondered how this could have happened. Wasn’t the cruiser’s Aegis system the last word in electronic sophistication?
The sad truth is that the Vincennes Incident did not have to happen; the technology that would have prevented it was readily available. Unfortunately, five months earlier, the Navy had canceled the development of a tar
get-identification technology—non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR).
The development of NCTR technology began in 1965. At the time, U.S. air- to-air missiles could kill at distances far beyond the limits of human vision. Therefore, sometimes the only way for a pilot to know what was being engaged was the World War II-vintage identification friend or foe (IFF). However, IFF is a cooperative system: a shooter sends a coded radio signal to a target aircraft, and the target, if friendly, answers with a radioed response. The IFF being used in Vietnam, the Mark XII, had been “compromised” long before. So as long as there was an air war over Vietnam, both sides found it advisable to turn off their IFF systems to avoid being betrayed
The sad truth is that the Vincennes Incident did not have to happen; the technology that would have prevented it was readily available.
by their own electronics. A group of engineers—who were working on the application of high-speed computers to
problems of pattern recognition—realized that radars can receive specific patterns from specific aircraft. Therefore, the electronic “interrogation” of a target by IFF to determine its identity before engaging it would be unnecessary. These engineers formed a company. Scope (for which I worked from 1967 to 1981), that began to develop such a NCTR system for use in fighters.
By 1969, the Navy had paid the company enough development money to fieW six copies of TRISAT, a NCTR system designed for the F-4 Phantom. By the time the system had been shaken down enough to satisfy the Naval Air Systems Command (NavAir), however, enemy fighters had been driven from the skies over Vietnam, and the program lost its high priority. Nevertheless. NavAir continued to pay f°r “keep-alive” development of the systems, improvements in computer speeds, and pattern-recognition software. Thus, second- and third-generation NCTR systems were developed, some of which were integrated completely into existing missile-system computers. At present, several U.S. fighters can use NCTR to
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identify hostile targets at long range, at ^'ght, or in bad weather. The old Mark I IFF is still in use, mainly to sort out ) Clv*lian from military airplanes in Cr°wded skies.
So, why didn’t the Navy decide to aPply such technology to ships? After all, e ships’ missile radars can use NCTR C°mPuters to identify hostile targets, or C|yilian targets for that matter. In 1972, Engineers and marketeers from Scope of- ered TRISAT and/or a second -genera- 1Qn ‘black box,” the Dual-Mode Recog- pIZer (DMR), to Naval Sea Systems ornmand (NavSea) for installation in Risers and destroyers. Although the ,°Xes were completely compatible with e radars in use at the time, NavSea edined to set up a development office and, instead, transferred token funds to jNavAir to demonstrate NCTR and col- ect data on new aircraft types. The data flection went on for years, while the t avy developed the Aegis combat sys- ei“ and designed its Aegis-equipped Cruisers and destroyers.
In 1983, NavSea’s Aegis managers got a hard-sell pitch from developers within e Navy, this time for the Advanced adar Target Identification System ARTIS). However, the Navy declined to p' the system on the grounds that NCTR °Unded on TRISAT and DMR was old at- The Vincennes Incident changed all “at. Under congressional pressure, the
Navy tested a number of ideas, chose ARTIS, and began installing it on a limited number of its Aegis cruisers.
Unfortunately, at this time, the future of NCTR technology looks grim indeed. At the present, NavSea still does not have an NCTR development center. The Navy and the Air Force—which also has a strong interest in NCTR—have directed what few funds are still available toward developing a radar image of the missile’s potential target at long range. The problem is that the achievement of high-quality radar images of fast-moving aircraft is far in the future. Even though millions of dollars already have been spent on this idea, today’s images look like connect- the-dots puzzles, and human beings can’t take the time to use a pencil to figure them out at a closure rate of Mach 2.
Worse yet, except for a few Aegis cruisers, many of U.S. antiaircraft weapons don’t have NCTR in any form. The radars for the Hawk and Patriot missiles don’t have it nor does Navy’s F-14A Tomcat fighter. The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class Aegis-equipped destroyers may not get it. Short-range ship defense systems—e.g., like the Sea Sparrow missile and the Phalanx close-in weapon system—don’t have it either. It is only good luck that has kept the Navy from experiencing another Vincennes Incident.
Until radar target imaging technology
matures to the point where it produces images that can satisfy the potential participants in a fratricide incident, it deserves the same inattention and low level of funding that has been lavished on NCTR. The technology that can provide better target identification for all the services is available right now and at prices that won’t bust any budgets.
Editor’s Note: Parks Associates currently has a support contract with the Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division in Warminster, Pennsylvania, for the development of target-identification technology. □
“It’s Time to Beach the NOAA Corps”
(.See W. Connelly, pp. 67-68, February 1994;
N. G. Millett, p. 30, April 1994; R. W. Maxson, G. A. Walker, pp. 26-28, May 1994;
L. Simoneaux, N. C. H. Daboul, p. 18, July 1994 Proceedings)
D. James Baker, Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, U.S. Department of Commerce (Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA])—The “Nobody asked me, but. . .” column always is a useful forum for provocative discussion. However, Mr. Connelly’s article contained some inaccuracies about the NOAA Corps and went too far in casting dis-
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paragement upon NOAA anti its commissioned Corps.
The men and women of the NOAA Corps serve a critical role in meeting NOAA’s mission of environmental stewardship and environmental observation and prediction. The NOAA Corps is far from being the self-serving institution that Mr. Connelly portrays. In fact, its officers serve in critical roles throughout the agency, not just as the operators of NOAA’s ships and aircraft. The Corps provides scientific and engineering data and analysis on everything from global warming to the assessment of fisheries stocks to the development of electronic charts for guiding mariners and aircraft pilots.
As for Mr. Connelly’s implications concerning the safety and maintenance of NOAA ships, the facts are that in more than a decade there have been no fatalities related to a NOAA ship or aircraft and the availability of NOAA vessels for mission accomplishment has been more than 98%. While these are fine achievements, they are even more notable in light of the fact that NOAA ships operate in some of the world’s most dangerous
waters, and NOAA aircraft regularly fly into hurricanes and other severe weather phenomena.
Mr. Connelly was incorrect in his assertion that the NOAA Corps stymied plans for a deep-water contract survey off Alaska. The procurement was halted following the grounding of the Queen Elizabeth 2 on an uncharted reef in Vineyard Sound on 7 August 1992. NOAA decided to halt deeper-water bathymetric surveys of U.S. exclusive economic zones and reallocate its resources to the shal- lower-water hydrography critical for marine safety. Because of the Queen Elizabeth 2’s grounding, NOAA is moving ahead with plans to contract a survey of portions of Vineyard Sound, Nantucket Sound, and Long Island Sound. This procurement is being pursued in the spirit of the National Performance Review. Based on experience gained, we look forward to addressing our critical hydrographic survey mission with an appropriate balance of NOAA and private assets.
The NOAA Corps is built upon a tradition of scientific and engineering integrity coupled with unswerving devotion to the concepts of accuracy and precision of observation. Daily, thousands of mariners and pilots stake their lives and the safety of their ships, aircraft, passengers, and cargo on the accuracy of the products to which the men and women of NOAA Corps contribute. Underlying this trust in NOAA’s products is the integrity of the NOAA Corps and the many dedicated civilians with whom they work in partnership. I am proud to be associated with them. □
No Napoleons Need Apply
Captain C. N. Sapp, U.S. Navy, Secretary of Defense’s Performance Review Team—The editorialists of The New York Times observed the 205th anniversary of the mutiny on HMS Bounty by noting that Captain William Bligh was “an ill-tempered, irascible commander . . .
courageous in battle and a superb navi gator . . . [who] was assigned new ship5 - and survived more mutinies. His inabil' ity to gain the respect of his crew*
seemed no deterrent to promotion.
He
A- ■
died a vice admiral.” William Blig^1 served in the Royal Navy during the same period when John Paul Jones stated tha1 the desired attributes of a naval ofticet included not only the skills of a capable ^ mariner, but also a liberal education- | punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.
I wonder if, after two centuries, the tension between the two leadership styleS has been resolved. In today’s Navy, leaders are expected to consider life-cycle costs, foster teamwork, and help people achieve their potential, while they strug' gle to make weapon systems last another generation and to retain the best people- Nevertheless, I am still treated to tales of micromanagers, of “screamers,” and of little Napoleons whose trails to the top of their profession are littered with human and mechanical debris. Some will say that the “softer” approach might work well U1 an office, but not in an operational environment. I refer them to an example in the U.S. Air Force.
In 1978, General Bill Creech set about ! reversing the flagging fortunes of the Ait 1 Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC)- He dealt immediately, among other things, with behavior of his senior leadership. General Creech made plain that one of the few infractions that could (and did) lead to immediate dismissal was a public display of temper. His theory was that if officers cannot control themselves, they cannot control thousands of other people.
Did this mark the end of TAC as a combat-ready force? Hardly. During the Persian Gulf War, TAC (now the Air Combat Command) deployed double the planned number of squadrons and sustained a 90% mission-capable rate. Anyone who doubts their ability to put bombs on target can check the file footage at the Cable News Network.
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The Navy’s Total Quality Leadership Program moves us inexorably toward e creation of an organization that de- ands a new role for leadership. The ange will be no less profound than I tQat bought about by the shift from sail c steam> or guns to missiles. I will not ]ause rhat metamorphosis, but I must at ast ask the question: Is today’s leader- 'P Paradigm—the one reflected by the ■ ifj°T°^0n boards, not the one reflected it ‘ » f‘tness reports—adequate to lead I e Navy of the future?
1 is a question that requires an answer. Is a debate that must take place. □
J^ho’s To Blame When Women rJon’t Measure Up?”
{feeE- Hamblet, pp. 101-102, April 1994;
■ C. Peniston, p. 16, June 1994; J. Miller,
• hompson, p. 10, July 1994 Proceedings)
n*eu'enant Paul Campbell, U.S. Naval \-\\Serve—Lieutenant Hamblet identifies e ones to blame when women don’t d easure up to Navy qualification standards: “Navy leaders who allow subor- *nates to continue doing jobs for which » are not qualified.” However, as she to SffVes’ ber solution—holding women ° 'he same standards as men—presents e risks of sexual-harassment charges. alk about a Catch-22!
From my own experience, I know that
some commanding officers pursue complaints of sexual harassment in order to resolve the issue honestly. Others do so to prevent the alleged victims from creating news-media events. I investigated a fairly serious sexual harassment complaint filed by a woman against her male supervisor. After an initial investigation, I found that the complaint was unsupportable. Further inquiries revealed the complainant was transferred from her previous work center, where she performed poorly, after filing a grievance against a superior. Her division officer and leading chief petty officer told me that her performance was poor in her new work center. At the eleventh hour, a witness came forward who said the complainant admitted she was filing the complaint in order to be transferred to yet another work center.
Armed with this last bit of information,
I made a recommendation—supported by the executive officer and the legal officer—to the commanding officer that false accusation charges be filed against the complainant. Instead, the commanding officer gave the complainant and the accused a warning about fraternization. The complainant was transferred to avoid possibly prejudicial treatment and seemed content with becoming someone else’s problem. The commanding officer told me that, while my investigative work was solid, he just “didn’t want any waves.”
I always have supported the complete integration of women in the Navy. If women are to enjoy all the rights of citizenship, they must be able to bear all the responsibilities. As women must be guaranteed a working atmosphere free of sexual harassment, men also must be guaranteed a working atmosphere free from fear of false accusations.
How big the problem of false accusations is compared to the sexual-harassment problem we don’t know. Only the big cases get even minimal attention from the press. In the 7 March 1994 issue of National Review, Elaine Donnelly, a former member of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, wrote about the case of Ensign Elizabeth Warnick. Ensign Wamick had claimed that she had been gang-raped at Tailhook, but later admitted under oath that she fabricated the charges, because she didn’t want her fiance to know that she willingly had sex with another officer.
So, while the fault for women not having their feet being held to the fire lies in part with Navy leaders who fail to exercise their responsibilities, it also lies with women who will abuse the system, confident that they can get away with it. The solution to this dilemma is for commanding officers to pursue false-accusa- tion charges as actively as they pursue charges of sexual harassment. □
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“Full Circle: The Evolution of Sea-Control Squadrons”
(See B. Bole, pp. 105-108, April 1994 Proceedings)
Mike Weeks—Commander Bole made one small error in his otherwise fine article. In the early days of World War II, Navy scouting squadrons were equipped with the Vought SB2U Vindicator, the Douglas SBD Dauntless, or the Curtiss SBC Helldiver, a biplane.
The Dauntless was the most widely used of the these aircraft, equipping the scouting squadrons of four aircraft carriers. The air wing of the Wasp (CV-7) had the SB2U; and that of the Hornet (CV-8) flew the SBC.
As a general statement concerning the role of scouting squadrons during the war, the prewar scouting squadrons were absorbed into the dive-bombing squadrons by March 1943, and the dive-bombing squadrons assumed the scouting and attack roles. □
“Roles and Missions—Again”
(See J. H. Cushman, p. 9, July 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired)—In my July Commentary I suggested that, visualizing full future jointness, the congressionally man
dated Roles and Mission Commission “ . . . could replace the principle that a service should have all the tools that it needs for its role with a principle that a joint force should have all the tools it needs for its mission . . . with no service owning all it needs to perform its role alone” (emphasis in the original).
A 30 June Washington Post story (“Army-Marine Tank Dispute a Harbinger,” page A10) raised a topical case in point. The Washington Post says that the Marine Corps wants to own 443 M1A1 top-of-the-line tanks, that it has only 271, that it wants 84 right away to preposition afloat enough tanks to raise three Marine tank battalions worth of equipment from 30 tanks each to 58, and that the obvious source—cost free—is the Army, which it sees as having a thousand or more-excess tanks as it deactivates armored/mecha- nized divisions with the end of the Cold War. (In early 1990, funding constraints had led Marine Corps Commandant A1 Gray to stop buying MlAls after delivery of the 221 then on order. In 1994, at the Marines’ request, and with—the Army claims—assurance that no more would be asked for, the Army transferred 50 MlAls to the Marine Corps at no cost.)
The Army opposed the transfer, although it was defeated on the issue when the Senate, joining the House of Representatives, voted on 1 July to transfer 84 Army MlAls to the Marines. The
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Army’s position can be summarized 3s follows:
► The 271 MlA1 tanks are about wha1, the Marines need to make amphibioi*' i lodgements and to protect the force.
► The President’s budget did not provi® for heavying-up the Marine Corps in tin* way at the expense of the Army Nation*1' Guard.
>• A capacity for sustained armor/mech' anized operations ashore is for the Arm) i to provide.
>• The Army is fielding armor/mecha- nized brigades and battalions for rap1 deployment under joint command.
► If service roles and missions are t0 be changed, the Roles and Mission Commission should recommend it.
>■ The Army—which includes its N&' tional Guard—had no tanks to spare.
The Washington Post reported tha* some members of Congress wanted to legislate in favor of the Marine Corps* that National Guard proponents were lob' bying for the Army’s position, and tha* Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, wanted the Congress to let him deal with the issue without leg' islation. The Senate’s vote took the issue out of the hands of the JCS Chairman-
At stake here were each service’s vie"1 of what should be its, and the other’s, role with all that implies. The Army lost this skirmish, but at a time when teamwork among the services is critical, and when a roles-and-missions fight could poison the improving atmosphere of Army-Ma' fine cooperation, nothing could be mom important than both parties addressing these problems in a spirit of jointness tha1 seeks what is best for the United States-
The law since 1947 has said that the Marine Corps will “provide fleet marine forces of the combined arms ... for service with the fleet in the seizure of advanced bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” But 50 years of evolution have led the Marines Commandant to define his service’s role as “littoral operations from bases at sea and, alongside the Army, sustained operations ashore." Although the part that I emphasized upsets the Army as a de facto change in statute, it is valid historically: A Marine division fought for three years in Korea; two Marine divisions served longer than that in Vietnam; and a corps-sized Marine force fought in the Persian Gulf War.
Marines, who over the years have been able to rely on supporters in Congress to overcome many a challenge—at times to their very existence—can readily construe the Army’s position on their tanks as yet another challenge. They also can point to their development with the Navy of the amphibious warfare organization.
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°ctrine, and equipment that permitted e global amphibious operations of orld War II, to their post-World War development of amphibious assault 'Ps’ helicopters, and other special jju'Pment that have made modern am- to 'h'0US assauit a Marine preserve, and their innovations which have preposi- Q°ned 13 ships in the Atlantic, the Indian Cean, and the Western Pacific, ready to I °ve to where their materiel can be un- °aded to equip Marines flown in by air. laying that, the sea is a broad avenue its littorals a single environment in 'ch the Navy/Marine Corps team, ex- °iting technology and operational ingenuity, can in a seamless continuum ring from afloat to ashore well-sup- 0rted maneuver power that hits the ^erny fast) an£j “where he ain’t.”
; arines, not necessarily in a spirit of full .^'ntness but certainly mutually sharing eas with the Army, are innovating again *th their “Operational Maneuver from e Sea” doctrine.
y.*n *he 1950s and in the 1960s into 'etnam, the Army—with, for example, ,js Strategic Army Corps (STRAC)—saw ^Self as a force-projection Army. After le[nam, it concentrated on Central Eu- °Pe, paying little attention to force pro- ection elsewhere. Pioneering in its doc- r,ne and training, the Army used the
forces it had built to unparalleled effectiveness in the Gulf War. But with the Soviet Union’s demise the Army has been playing catchup, reconstructing its diminished forces, attempting to build a capability for rapid deployment, and seeking additional sea and airlift. Many in the Army see the Marines’ tank program, and their evident back-channel lobbying with their friends in Congress, as both an unnecessary and costly duplication and usurpation of the Army’s rightful role in worldwide employment.
Building around its amphibious specialty, the Marine Corps has created seven multidimensional multipurpose air-ground task forces called MEU (SOC)s [Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)] which a three- or-four-ship Navy amphibious ready group can take in the national interest to wherever there is deep water. These seven MEU (SOC)s each rotate through a cycle from workup, to a six-month deployment, to recover. Three or so are always out there on station. Some tanks routinely deploy with each MEU (SOC), to be taken ashore on air-cushion landing craft. Since the end of the Cold War, these MEU (SOC)s have been busier than they ever before have been.
When a forcible entry is required, a MEU (SOC)—if immediately available,
and along with airborne and special operations forces if necessary and available—can kick down the door through which a joint air/land/sea force can build combat power and establish itself; sustained operations ashore, in which Marines will play a valuable part, can quickly ensue.
But it is up to the joint establishment to describe how this and other operations, from those short of war to full—scale air- land-sea conflict, are to be carried out by all service forces. From this objective study and exposition can stem insights into what is expected of each service’s forces in the future.
A basic issue raised in the Washington Post story was this: Who decides how many tanks the Marine Corps (or the Army) needs? The Marine Corps (or Army) alone? Or the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the joint establishment that, one trusts, serves him objectively? The correct answer is neither; it is the Congress, whose responsibility it is to “raise and support Armies (and) to provide and maintain a Navy,” that decides. The issue then becomes, “to whom does the Congress listen?”
In this case—not without damage to the trust that must exist between that service and the Army—the Congress listened to the Marines. □
World War II in the Pacific Conference
Naval Historical Center Naval Historical Foundation Naval Order of the United States U.S. Naval Institute
iWnrld War II in the Paciffnj
Speakers:
Sponsored by:
Annerlcan Society of Naval Engineers ytarine Corps Association ferine Corps Historical Foundation vlarine Corps Historical Center
August 1994
Costal City Hyatt Regency, Arlington, Va.
Remembrances of veterans of the War it Book exhibits Contemporary film it Displays it Historical discussions
Special Events: ★ The U.S. Navy's spectacular From the Sea Summer Pageant at the Washington Navy Yard ★ The U.S. Marine Corps' renowned Sunset Parade at the 8th and I Barracks. k Admiral James L. Holloway III, former CNO and a combat veteran of the Battle of Leyte Gulf k Decorated submariners Eugene B. Fluckey and Edward L. “Ned Beach k Marine infantrymen Edwin H. Simmons, Gordon D. Gayle, and John Gustafson k Aviators John Condon and Paul Drury k Coast Guardsman Robert Erwin Johnson k Surface warriors Michael J. Hanley and C. Raymond Calhoun k Army Nurse Ruby Bradley k Army intelligence specialist Sunao Ishio k Historians Russell Weigley, E. B. Potter, Clay Blair, Edward Drea, Benis M. Frank, David Rosenberg, Ronald Spector, Michael Palmer, Ed Bearss, Diane Putney, Richard Frank, Mary Stremlow, Dean Allard, Paul Stillwell, Robert Love, Phyllis Zimmerman ★ Also invited are veterans and scholars from Japan, Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and Guam.
Full registration (includes 3-day conference, banquet, two luncheons, all events)
Member of sponsoring organization or staff $230 Non member $290 Daily Registration (includes luncheon/banquet of that day)
Member of sponsoring organization or staff (per day) $95 Non member (per day) $125 Crystal City Hyatt Regency, special rate of $89 single occupancy, and $114 double occupancy (703) 418-1234; FAX (703) 418-1289; TELEX 901943.
For registration information, contact: Sally Cook • ASNE Meeting Coordinator • 703-836-6727
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