Navy strategy in the post-Cold War period has, by default, opened the operational door wider for Naval Special Boat Squadrons, whose dual missions of Coastal Patrol and Special Warfare will be central to the Navy's future employment. The leadership has correctly recognized that the Cold War's "blue water" threat has substantially faded and that future conflicts will likely occur in unstable littoral areas: Somalia, Haiti, the Korean Peninsula, and Yemen today—others tomorrow. The Navy has not, however, arrived at any consensus on ways to integrate small combatants into the its littoral strategy.
As all services continue downsizing at a near post-World War II pace, the Navy is being asked to do the steaming mission of the Cold War and assume such new missions as peacekeeping and drug interdiction—plus new experiments such as the Atlantic Command metamorphosis.
In making a case for the near-term strategy in " .. . From the Sea," what the Navy really did was to reemphasize the Navy-Marine Corps team as the historical best-choice force for far-flung regions; it is the best rapid deployment force because it is already deployed on station. " . . . From the Sea," at bottom, repackages two hundred years of business as usual-Navy ships with embarked Marines and Army troops hitting beaches around the world's trouble spots. This does not sound altogether new in light of this summer's tributes to the veterans of Normandy.
Compounding early ship retirements is a flat—at best—budget. That the commitments are required is not the issue. Rather, what must be addressed is that many of the new missions can be done more flexibly and at less cost to the taxpayer with assets specifically designed for the job. Assigning Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class ships to Third World operations is overkill.
"... From the Sea" implies that, in addition to reinventing the Amphibious Force Type Commands (a good idea!), we need a less-expensive mix of ships, better suited to the task in terms of cost, capability and risk acceptability. "Keep it simple, Stupid'" in the strategic planning process: keep the expensive, high-technology command assets farther out and let the 'Gators slug it out—as they always have—near the beach.
The various service colleges agreed once that staff studies required rigorous answers to the following criteria: feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. Accordingly:
Is the littoral strategy feasible? Can the new ships do the inshore mission for the Marine Corps with naval gunfire support? Are there enough bottoms to get the Marines where they want to land and provide the essential follow-on support?
Is the littoral strategy acceptable? Is it worth the risk to lives and assets? Is the loss of an entire crew an acceptable risk? Was the loss of the Marine barracks in Beirut acceptable? Were the troops lost in Somalia acceptable? Would, say, a three-salvo Silkworm hit on the USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) be acceptable in terms of lives and repair costs?
Is the littoral strategy suitable? Could it be done with fewer resources? Is the job worth the cost it will take to get it done? Were the repair costs to the ships damaged in the Persian Gulf worth it? Could the damage have been avoided or the job done at less cost? Could a couple of older LSTs and a few combatant craft do the job at a fraction of the cost? Is there a case here, too, for resurrecting older destroyer designs such as the 2,100-ton Fletchers (DD-445)?
Should billion-dollar assets such as Aegis cruisers—or 21st century destroyers—be risked, close in, where Silkworm missiles and cheap, shallow-water mines can get them. Restricted waters are not the place for ships configured primarily for antiair (Soviet Backfires), antisubmarine and, even, antisurface warfare. What happened in the restricted waters of the Persian Gulf is instructive: the repair bills for the capital ships damaged in the Gulf were higher than the cost of several newly commissioned Cyclone (PC-1)-class patrol craft. Consider these recent repair bills for ships hit while operating in restricted and littoral waters:
- Exocet hit on the Stark (FFG-31)—$42 million plus roughly SI million towing bill
- Mine damage to the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)—$96 million after heavy-lift transfer to the United States; laid up for 18 months
- Mine damage to the Tripoli (LPH-10)—$4 million repair bill (foreign yard); out of action three weeks.
- Mine damage to the Princeton (CG-59)—$17 million; out of action two months
Consider acquisition costs of some of our high-technology ships and the new Cyclone class. Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis cruisers average $1.2 billion; The Arleigh Burkes average $905 million—U.S. Navy Cyclones cost less than $20 million. In executing the littoral strategy, the U.S. Navy would be well advised to consider "downsizing" not only in its fleet force levels but in the specific types of ships and craft it builds. It is in this operational milieu that the Navy's Special Boat Squadrons can have greater impact.
Today's Special Boat Squadrons offer the Navy great flexibility in the near-shore littoral, and their operations and maintenance accounts do not begin to approach those of the deep-draft warships. They can show the flag and provide specific training opportunities to allies, many of whom are the developing nations where strategy " . . . From the Sea," will be exercised. Such operations could well give U.S. shipbuilding a much needed boost; few of these countries could buy and maintain Aegis-class vessels, but virtually all of them have a requirement for Cyclone-class patrol craft.
Combatant craft in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (and Vietnam)—nations with extensive coastlines or whose coasts border strategic shipping lanes—usually conduct police functions as well as national security roles, i.e., they are Harbor Police, Coast Guard, and Navy combined. The most obvious users would be the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and others—who now are buying their craft in Europe.
Fast attack craft also can protect economic zones, often up to 200 offshore. Argentina, for example, is having a problem with illegal fishing by fleets supported by seagoing processing ships. Fish are caught without license and processed immediately by the mother ship, after which the entire fleet moves to another area within Argentine waters. The Argentine Coast Guard and Navy know this is happening but are helpless to stop it, although fines can run upwards of half a million dollars. A potent mix of combatant craft would be an affordable solution in preventing illegal fishing activity as well as establishing a cash flow from collected fines. Such a fleet, depending on its weapons suites, would not necessarily pose an unwarranted threat to Argentina's neighbors but would, at the same time. represent a credible defense.
Technology has gone small in the last 20 years. Electronic miniaturization now enables fast attack craft to carry state-of-the-art weapons systems, radars and electronic support measures sensors, infrared, stabilized guns, missiles-both antiair and antiship (remember the Israeli destroyer sunk so many years ago by the Egyptian gunboat?)—all directed by high-technology fire-control systems. A modern, missile-equipped attack boat Can give our Navy and, perhaps more significant, navies of Our allies, an offensive punch at a fraction of the cost of the Ticonderoga-Arleigh Burke mix.
The U.S. inventory of combatant craft is certainly smaller today than it was a generation ago, without considering the Vietnam-era swift boats and an assortment of riverine craft long since retired. The Peterson-built M.k III boats have been the backbone of the Special Boat Squadrons for more than 20 years. Designed to replace the swifts in Vietnam, they migrated to the special-warfare community in 1973. Properly armed, they can offer an effective inshore capability for offensive operations.
The Cyclone class, built by Bollinger in Louisiana, is the latest example of coastal ship to join the special Boat Squadrons. Owing in part to the growth in Naval Special Warfare force structure and the introduction of these ships, the special boat squadrons were elevated to major commands last year. The Cyclones epitomize the squadrons' dual missions: coastal patrol and interdiction, plus transporting SEAL platoons to their objective areas. These little ships could figure heavily in " . . . From the Sea."
Other littoral craft used by the special-boat sailors to support SEAL Team operations are naturally smaller, owing to their insertion missions. These can be deck-loaded on other ships for easy transport to an objective—no davits required. A new SEAL insertion craft, the Mk V, is funded and should be operational next year.
Future combatant craft are on the drawing boards of U.S. shipbuilders. The H-3 is a ISO-foot fast boat capable of more than 50 knots that carries Harpoon missiles, Oto Melara 76-mm. guns, and associated electronics. Its combination diesel-gas turbine engine arrangement gives it high speed and an extended range of 4,500 nautical miles at 15 knots. All-up costs for boats such as this are orders of magnitude below the cheapest Aegis system in the fleet—and the H-3 has a 19-man crew.
Combatant craft offer the geographic commanders-in-chief hard-hitting options in their general war plans as well as low-intensity conflict. Naval special boat squadrons participated in Operations Earnest Will in the Persian Gulf, Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, and Desert Storm in the Middle East. They are direct descendants of the World War II PT boat and Vietnam-era coastal and riverine units. Developing navies, in countries usually heavier in army tradition, could develop a credible maritime defense capability with combatant craft. Countries that procure their craft offshore do not buy them from the United States. For example, even after the Desert Storm commitment by this country, Gulf nations still send their boat orders to Europe. U.S. shipbuilding can participate in the patrol-craft market and it should accept the challenge and actively seek new contracts from abroad.
Using the naval attaché network and various formal navy-to-navy encounters, developing navies should be encouraged to investigate U.S. shipbuilding capabilities to fulfill their requirements. The Naval Sea Systems Command should encourage shipbuilders like Bollinger, Trinity, and Peterson on the East Coast or NASSCO, Pacific Ship, and Southwest Marine on the West Coast. U.S. builders can meet the competitions' prices if allowed to do so.
Combatant craft should play an important role in the new Navy strategy of the littoral because they offer great capability at modest cost—and they can operate across the full range of conflict, not just the low-intensity end. The developing navies of the world do not need deep-draft warships, nor is it necessarily in the national interests of the United States to sell them any. Navy endorsement of fast attack craft would improve our capabilities while giving U.S. shipbuilders the level playing field they lack today.
Admiral Worthington retired in t992 after a three-year stint as Commander. Naval Special Warfare Command. He is a consultant to industry.