China's Navy Stirs

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With

fastest

growing econ- 0niy in the world,

China is rapidly acquiring the eco- n°mic means to build and support a first- rate navy. The challenge for the United tates is to bring China into an East Asian security organization, to ensure peace, pros­Perity, and a regional balance of power.

nee             he effective use of sea power has played an im-

suS! I portant role in shaping world history. A nation can- ’L\l not, however, become a sea power without first ac-

ea'      Tu.irin® t^ie economic means to support a first-rate navy.

tur.i    h'his h°lds esPecially true today, given the prohibitively

nnc igh cost of obtaining the latest technology and training :on Personnel in its use. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) ’s rapidly acquiring the economic clout to finance a mod- 1 m0 navy- Without a far-sighted U.S.-inspired policy to tie iv a          e PRC into an Asian security framework, China will be­

en • c0me the preeminent naval power in Asia by early in the up next century.

•di Generations of Western businessmen have been lured— uc and ultimately frustrated—by the fabled “China Mar- et- As the saying goes, if every “Chinaman” lengthened —-        ls shirttail by one inch, the mills of Lancashire would be

0y. i ununing for a generation.1 For decades, the huge Chi- fly aese market never materialized. That is changing. China on. as the fastest growing economy in the world, and, ac­cording to the International Monetary Fund, it ranks

third

in gross national product behind the United States and Japan. The World Bank states that “the combined economies of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan will be larger than the United States economy in less than a decade.”2 Considering that Hong Kong is sched­uled to become part of mainland China in 1997 and that tiny (albeit affluent) Taiwan has only one-sixtieth the pop­ulation of the PRC, Beijing could be capital of the world’s wealthiest nation by early next century. Of course, any number of political and/or economic developments could conspire to slow or halt its breakneck growth, but each year that China continues to post staggering rates of eco­nomic expansion reduces its “magic number”—the num­ber of years before it surpasses the United States—by one. Failure of the U.S. Navy to plan for this ever-increasing likelihood is strategic procrastination of the highest order.

While China’s newly acquired affluence will give the PRC the ability to create a world-class navy, Beijing’s strategic outlook, profoundly altered by its new world po­sition, will give it the rationale for building that navy. Just as sea power influences history, so too does history (po­litical and economic) influence sea power. It is not sur­prising that Britain and the United States were considered equals at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, despite the Royal Navy’s only recently abandoned policy of main­taining a fleet twice the size of the second-largest navy. By 1914, U.S. national income was more than three times larger than Great Britain’s.3 Conversely, the former So­viet Navy, arguably the U.S. Navy’s equal only a few years ago, lies mostly idle, in large part because of Rus­sia’s greatly diminished economic strength. Assuming that the People’s Republic of China may soon become the next

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WASHINGTON POST (COMPILED BY J. BELLIVEAU, MAP BY L. FOGEL) / W. CLIPSON

economic superpower, the question arises: “How will this development affect its naval interests and its naval power?” The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s official budget has doubled since 1989 and China has a large surface and subsurface fleet, but fewer than 50 vessels (including auxiliaries) are capable of sustained deployed operations

and those vessels are limited by their 1960s’ technology.4 Furthermore, the much ballyhooed rumor that the Chinese are purchasing the aircraft carrier Varyag from the for­mer Soviet Union has, as of this writing, proven un­founded. They are modernizing, but so are many regional navies. It would be a mistake to sound the general alarm

 

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solely on the basis of China’s cur­rent military buildup. China’s power ljes in its potential. The economic and political forces Beijing will use to rationalize its future naval ex­pansion exist today. These forces fall under two broad categories: re­active and active.

The end of the Cold War saw a substantial reduction in defense spending by European nations. Long-established defense and eco­nomic alliances such as NATO and the European Economic Commu­nity and the inclusion of Eastern Europe in the Conference on Secu­rity and Cooperation in Europe itave minimized fears of external threats. Such is not the case in Asia. Jonathan Pollack of RAND states that Asian geopolitical calculations have shifted from “threat-driven” “uncertainty-based decisions.”

 

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Asia’s powers, mindful of history, both ancient and modern, think that, despite the present lack of tension, almost any one of them could quickly become an out­right enemy of any of the others. The overriding disci­pline imposed by the cold war kept these regional ri­valries in check. No longer. Hence Asia’s new era of uncertainty and the build-up of its armies.'

Whether or not China’s economic maturation continues under the aegis of the present regime or under a more lib­eral government, Beijing must at the very least continue to modernize its naval forces to maintain the tenuous Asian balance of power. Many of its neighbors have embarked °n ambitious arms buildups. Alone among the industrial democracies, Japan has increased its defense budget in re­cent years and by many accounts ranks second only to the United States in military expenditures.6 Japan’s Kongo- dass Aegis destroyers are years ahead of any Chinese sur­face combatant.

The collapse of the Soviet empire has brought a vast arsenal of sophisticated weaponry to the international mar­ket. Indonesia is acquiring half of the former East Ger­man Navy (39 ships). Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Sin- 8;>pore, South Korea, and Brunei are purchasing advanced %hter aircraft from a variety of sources.7 Given the area’s passive conventional arms buildup, and the fact that China 's surrounded by two admitted nuclear powers (Russia and Kazakhstan) and two suspected of having the bomb (Pak­istan and India), China must continue its arms buildup if °nly as a reaction to external pressures.

If China only sought to maintain its relative standing among Asian powers, there would be little reason to dis- gy.4 cuss its actions. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The iese Principal “uncertainty” in Asia is China—a fact that its for- Neighbors have been quick to recognize. The regional arms un-       race is caused mainly by a very real fear of Beijing’s po-

>nal    tential. As China’s financial muscle grows, it will seek to

arm    become the region’s preeminent sea power.

China has a large surface and subsurface fleet—here, a Chinese designed and built nuclear ballistic missile submarine on a training voyage—but its true power lies in its vast potential.

And why shouldn’t it? China may soon become Asia’s richest nation, and it will be able to afford the best of navies. Democratic or despotic, Beijing possesses some legitimate claims to a powerful maritime force. As an introduction into the partic­ulars of the Chinese challenge, that nation should be held up against the yardstick of maritime strength— Mahan’s six elements of sea power.

> Geographical Position: Unlike the ice-bound former Soviet Union, China has a huge coastline that ad­joins some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. At present, the Mid- chinap,ctuhes/eastfoto(D.jnnzhao) jje Kingdom is unencumbered by land conflicts The Russian threat has subsided and China’s long-running border dispute with India recently was resolved.8

>    Physical Conformation: China’s coastline is connected to the interior by the Yangtse and Yellow river systems. Shanghai Tianjin, and Dalian are among the world’s lead­ing commercial ports; and Hong Kong is blessed with Drobably the finest deep-water harbor on earth. China is x trading nation—a fact of which the United States, faced with a trade deficit with Beijing second only to the deficit

with Japan, is painfully aware.

>• Extent of Territory: China supplies the world with many of its merchant seamen. The world’s most populous na­tion has the reserve manpower to greatly expand its mer­chant fleets.

>    Population: A great percentage of China s huge popu­lation lives in the coastal provinces. Likewise, the per­centage of the population “following the sea, or at least readily available for employment on shipboard and for the creation of naval material” is large.6 The rise of the Japan­ese and then South Korean shipbuilding industries in re­cent years reveals how quickly vibrant Asian economies can come to dominate maritime industries. As labor costs rise in those nations, China’s already large shipbuilding industry could blossom.

>. National Character: Mahan stated that “aptitude for commercial pursuits. . .must be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great on the seas.”10 Few would deny that the Chinese as a people have profound commercial skills. A recent feature in The New York Times noted:

It is often said that 70 years of communism stunted the entrepreneurial feelings of Russians, but in China tens of millions of people are racing to start new restaurants or factories. Some say that in the current economic boom, China may be the easiest place in the world to make a fortune."

Manning PLAN

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By Captain John E. O’Neil, Jr., U.S. Navy

In May 1993, as a member of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces student delegation,

I went on the National Defense University’s annual trip to the Peo­ple’s Republic of China and visited the Guangzhou Naval Surface Warfare Ship Academy, outside the old Pearl River city of Canton, now Guangzhou.

The Academy provides basic mili­tary training similar to that offered at the U.S. Naval Acad­emy. Founded in 1977, it has been reorganized several times and its cur­riculum upgraded to give its cadets the basic education they need to perform ef­fectively as junior officers in the Chi­nese Navy surface combatant force.

We were greeted by a PL A Navy band and full honor guard of cadets and briefed by the Rear Admiral who commanded the Academy. Following the briefing and the customary exchange of mementos, we were given a tour throughout the main classroom building of their undergraduate school. The Commandant and As­sistant Commandant, also a rear admiral, accompanied us. Our tour guides were civilian female in­structors—wearing naval uni­forms—who taught English at the

Academy and spoke excellent American-style English. Although the school is land-locked, it did ex­hibit a nautical flair in its build­ings, campus layout, parade and athletic fields, and of course with the uniforms and dress of its spit- and-polish cadets.

The Academy enrolls promising

young seamen conscripts from the fleet, as well as civilians who have graduated from the senior middle schools (high schools). Approxi­mately 1,000 students, including some female cadets, attend the four-year course. The cadets study political thought, science and cul­ture, and naval professional sub­jects, and take part in physical training—all in a disciplined envi­ronment. They also study the de­sign and organization of their

fleet’s combatant ships and small craft and learn how to employ the missiles and guns of their ships, including the ability to demonstrate appropriate command-and-control targeting abilities from over the horizon. Maintenance, amphibious, and logistics skills are taught at other naval schools. Great empha­sis appears to be placed on acquiring celestial navigation, coastal pi­loting, and basic ship­handling skills.

Upon graduation, cadets are granted the scholar degree and posted to the PLA fleet as sublieutenants (lieu­tenant junior grade) fof a year of service on a destroyer-type ship. Following a successful year in the fleet, those chosen to become com­manding officers will be appointed skippers of missile craft, tor­pedo boats, and other escort craft.

The Academy also provides specialty training for destroyer de­partment heads and staff officers, as well as the prospective com­manding officers of the numerous small combatants in the PLA Navy. Those selected for the de­stroyer department-head training must have three years of sea duty before attending the department- head curriculum for the requisite year. Upon graduation, these offi­cers could be assigned to destroy-

The Guangzhou Academy trains junior officers for the steadily expanding People’s Liberation Army Navy, as well as providing specialty training for destroyer department heads and staff officers.

Another important element of national character Mahan found in great sea powers is a “capacity for planting healthy colonies.”12 While this might seem a somewhat outmoded concept, some of the world’s most successful “colonies” ever “planted” must be the millions of over­seas Chinese living in Southeast Asia. Chinese dominate or play a key role in the economies of Malaysia, Thai­land, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. These

prosperous groups in turn have reinvested billions into the mainland Chinese economy and have been a driving force in the explosion of Asian trade.

► Character of Government: Governments that recognized and nourished sea power and maintained steady and con­sistent policies to that end were most successful in es­tablishing a powerful and enduring maritime presence. R is clear that China possesses the physical and human re-

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The Academy also offers a post­graduate degree program, which ‘l es the junior officers completing

ofrr comi)atant crafr commanding 0 ‘icer tours and gives them addi- '°nal studies in naval tactical the- ary. commanding larger ships, or cadquarters operations. Upon com­P etion, graduates eventually could ® assigned as commanding officers

guided-missile destroyers or Agates or to a major headquarters s aff officer position.

i ne classrooms were large and austere, with big wooden desks for e cadets. I noted a foreign lan- §Uage laboratory with audio train- |ng aids, a tactical training simula- 0r for multiple-ship maneuvering, jjn<1 a command-and-control ship- 0ard simulator for coordinating aussile attacks against an underway essel from a shore command post 0 a missile-launching ship—also ander way. Computers available for adet use were programmed to dis- P ay English as well as Chinese.

The Academy has ship-handling ra|ners similar to the civilian con­tactor-operated ship-handling fa- v! ’ty used by the U.S. Navy in Newport, Rhode Island. The Chi- J'ese facility was relatively rudi­mentary, but could give the cadets sense of confidence in their abil- y to judge relative motion and ^Peed through the water as they ^ udied practical ship-handling. As acently as 1985, when I was the ead, Seamanship and Shiphan- lng Training Department, Naval ^[flphibious School, Little Creek, ,rginia, we did not have a com­puter-aided helm, engine order- j-frgraph bridge simulator like e one at Guangzhou. In fact, the

U.S. Navy did not have full-time access to this type of shore-based, computer-aided pilot-house train­ing capability until the mid-to- late 1980s.

Time did not permit us to visit other training laboratories where cadets studied antisubmarine war­fare, surface torpedo attacks, and gunnery systems.

The art of celestial navigation was reinforced by an ingenious, Chinese-Navy designed, mechani­cal-device planetarium where cadets could shoot the stars and determine their position without looking at real stars outside. With the predominantly cloudy and sea­sonal monsoon-dominated weather conditions off the South China coast, the school’s emphasis on basic coastal piloting, radio navi­gation, and celestial training could keep a young commanding officer off the shoals.

The cadets have access to sev­eral soccer fields a track and field facility, a night-lighted general pur­pose field, and a large swimming pool with diving platforms. We were told there were some 300 in­structors, including more than 70 associate and full professors and 100 lecturers in contact with the students. Some of these staff per­sonnel are involved with directed research projects from other naval activities and academies. Naval en­gineering is not taught at Guangzhou, but the Academy ap­parently has earned a good reputa­tion among its peers for its large number of research papers and translation services.

The cadets operate under the strict discipline as laid down by the central military commission and the Academy insists on developing its cadets morally, intellectually,

and physically. The system has provided the PLA Navy with large numbers of qualified commanding officers over the years. The gradu­ates have participated in numerous national military projects, ranging from assignments at the South Pole doing polar research to visiting for­eign nations to sea duty in the re­mote coastal regions of China.

The Guangzhou Academy is re­sponsible for training the junior officer to stand a watch in the slowly, but steadily expanding PLA Navy. While much of the Chinese Navy may be considered relatively coastal by nature, it does have the training and capability to make lengthy blue-water excur­sions out-of-area. The Chinese were justifiably proud that they had sent several ships to Hawaii and had demonstrated their ability to make a major out-of-area de­ployment. This achievement and others were proudly displayed in the Academy museum.

We were unable to visit any PLA Navy ships, but the esprit de corps, friendliness, hospitality, and congeniality of our Chinese Navy hosts most certainly would be con­veyed to any U.S. Navy ship mak­ing a port visit to mainland China. Reinstitution of military relation­ships, including high-level military visits, professional military educa­tion exchanges, and port visits would foster closer relations be­tween our nations and in times of increased international tension could lessen potential problems.

Captain O’Neil, a surface warfare officer, is the commanding officer. Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia. A frequent contributor to Proceedings, he attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces 1992-1993.

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p'Hiices necessary to become a great sea power. Tht I C s emerging position as an economic superpower wil ead Beijing to establish an assertive, consistent, and ac *ye maritime policy in the near future. Just as the U.S avy s ro]e js define ;n context of a comprehensive ardime strategy (“. . . From the Sea”), the People’s Lib­eration Army Navy’s mission will reflect China’s per­CePtion of itself in the regional and global arena.

China’s national character does not lend itself to the role of a global crusader. The chances of a 21st century Chinese Woodrow Wilson seeking to “Make the world safe for Confucianism” are quite slim. That very interna­tionalist state philosophy, Marxism, guides the nation in name only. Deng Xiaoping advises visiting leaders of de­veloping nations not to bother with communism. Instead, Beijing’s leaders have adopted the policy of political re-

MARTIN MARIETTA / JAPANESE MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE

Many of China’s neighbors have embarked on ambitious arms buildups. An increased Japanese defense budget has funded Kongo-class Aegis destroyers, which are years ahead of any Chinese surface combatants, and Italian-designed hydrofoils. A regionally assertive China will unlikely tolerate such a disparity.

pression and economic liberalization—a combination that has proven successful in South Korea, Taiwan and Sin­gapore—dubbed "Market-Leninism” by Western pundits.13 Many Western experts contend that the Communist party is attempting to stir up nationalist fervor as a substitute for Marxism.14 If so, Chinese nationalism will most likely manifest itself in the areas China considers its traditional sphere of influence, namely the South China Sea and east­ern Indian Ocean. Many recent developments lead to this conclusion.

Beijing’s recent military buildup has concentrated on the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the People’s Lib­eration Army Air Force, the traditional instruments of power projection. China is nowhere near acquiring a first- class navy, but the ideas that will guide that future navy (once the massive funds required to finance it are made available) exist today. Vice Admiral Chen Mingshan, Peo­ple’s Liberation Army Navy deputy commander, noted:

As the navy plays a role in all historical periods, whether peace or war, it is also a means of pursuing national foreign policy. Navies possess many specific charac­teristics that differ from those of the other armed forces. The navy has international capabilities of free naviga­tion on the high seas, and in peacetime it can cruise the world’s seas, even conducting limited operations out­side the territorial waters of hostile countries. . .'5

One of the most likely places Beijing’s future power projection capabilities will be tested is in the South China Sea. The Soviet withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay and the U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay have left a huge power vacuum, which the Chinese can fill. It lies on some of the world’s busiest sea lanes—nearly all of Japan s energy imports and a great deal of her export trade pass through that body of water. Additionally, the potential for dis­coveries of huge oil deposits on the ocean floor is great.

Perhaps even more ominous are recent Chinese procla­mations regarding Beijing’s security responsibilities in the Straits of Malacca and the access agreements to Myan­mar’s new Chinese-built naval base. Beijing also may be setting up a monitoring station on Myanmar’s Grand Coco Island, straddling the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal.1

As China acquires economic power, it increasingly will be able to finance a navy through which to fulfill its nascent foreign policy goals. Clearly, the People’s Liber­ation Army Navy will play the key role in China’s future power-projection gambits. Two additional foreign policy concerns are likely to emerge as a direct result of the PRC’s economic expansion—both will come into direct conflict with vital U.S. interests.

Sometime in 1994 China will become a net energy im­porter. Traditional Asian oil exporter Indonesia will be-

China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Viet' nam have been involved in intermittent con­flicts with one another for decades ovef control of the Spratley and Paracel island groups. Beijing claims the entire sea as Chi' ^ nese territory and reserves the right to use force to prevent free passage of foreign ships through it.16 It has backed up its rhetoric with an air base and warship docks, on Woody Island in the Paracels. Experts ( contend that China is already in a position to exert power-projection in the region, and Southeast Asians are naturally worried-' China can back up its claims with force.

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Coi^e a net importer by 2000. In addition to making con- r° of the potentially energy-rich South China Sea even Jfiore tempting, this may make Beijing turn to the Mid East 0 supply its burgeoning demand for fossil fuels. China dl never be a nation of two-car garages, but the num- er of trucks, automobiles, and motorcycles on Chinese s is multiplying at a furious rate as prosperity spreads. lv'en China’s huge population, its potential energy con- eUmPt*°n is staggering. It will be in Beijing’s best inter- 1 sts to take an active interest in Middle East politics.

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The consequences of that [increased energy imports] are likely to be as much political as economic. In the Past, Asian countries have paid little attention to mid- le eastern politics. In the future they will have to be dtore sophisticated.18

second possible outgrowth of China’s rise to eco-

•      0rn’c stardom is not as likely but much more frighten-

Japan, the world’s second-richest nation and the v n,tec* States’ most important Asian ally, is actively in- ved and has a vested interest in China’s economic °°m. An increasingly assertive China, unrestrained by y security agreements, easily could change this current Productive relationship into a classic great power strug-

•    e' Chinese nationalism could bring the long-dormant SUe °f the Senkaku island chain (south of Okinawa) to o forefront. A withdrawal or significant downsizing of

j ' ' forces in Japan almost certainly would cause Tokyo j y rearm, in spite of constitutional restrictions. Such a de- e|°pment would turn Northeast Asia into the most dan- Serous place on Earth.

Today, Japan’s relatively small armed forces are Asia’s I l’nest. A regionally assertive China that boasts the world’s Urgest economy will not tolerate such a disparity. Expect 0 repeats of the 19th century Sino-Japanese War. Quite i e opposite is likely. In a chilling scenario, the Econo- lst presented the possible consequences when a fright­ed Japan considered arming herself with nuclear eaPons to counter China’s military might:

• in 2009, China delivered its veto. The detonation of a Chinese nuclear war-head over the sea off Yoko- hatria . . . changed the map of eastern Asia, and from jaen on Japan was to China what Switzerland had een to its big European neighbours: a rich, efficient Provider of specialised financial and business products, 'adependent in its domestic affairs, but small and Unassertive enough (Japan’s population was now less lnan a tenth of China’s, and aging fast) to be any kind °f rival on the international scene.19

China’s control of East Asia’s shipping lanes jeopar­dizes 40% of U.S. trade and 2.3 million American jobs.20 c aTdition to threatening our commercial and energy se- ] Urity, Chinese control of these vital seas directly chal- ^enges the traditional role of the U.S. Navy in champi- ning freedom of navigation. A climate of cooperation, ud eventually trust, must be nurtured with the inclusion China within a regional security framework. Regional aval issues could be discussed and resolved through the Xlsting Western Pacific Naval Symposium. For such an

organization to be effective in averting a naval arms race, strong U.S. leadership is vital. Only the U.S. has “the re­sources, the impartiality, the trust of enough Asian coun­tries and the self-interest to keep the region from toppling into instability.”21 The United States won the 20th century Cold War with the Soviet Union; can it afford a 21st cen­tury arms race with a nation that has the potential to out- spend it?

China could still slip into economic and political chaos and never achieve its stunning potential, but each year that the PRC posts world-beating economic growth rates makes that possibility less likely. If mainland China can achieve a level of prosperity comparable to South Korea’s (about one-third of U.S. per-capita gross national product), it will have an economy larger than all of the world’s industri­alized countries combined!22 Seen as strictly a socioeco­nomic phenomenon, the emergence of one-fifth of the world’s population from poverty marks one of hu­mankind’s greatest achievements.

History is in the making in the Middle Kingdom—and that history will have a profound impact on China’s sea power. Beijing will flex its muscles through its primary power-projection tool—the Chinese Navy. The United States will play a central role in determining whether China’s new position complements or destroys Asia’s pre­sent balance of power. The challenge posed to U.S. in­terests is profound. Unless a U.S.-led initiative is suc­cessful in making China a strong partner in an East Asian security organization, that nation could jeopardize our most vital economic and political interests.

The Pacific Century is coming. Bold U.S. action today will ensure that it is a peaceful and prosperous age.

'Quoted in John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), p. 286.

!Steven Greenhouse, “New Tally of World’s Economies Catapults China Into Third Place”, New York Times, 20 May 1993, p. Al.

Table of 1914 National Incomes found in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 243.

4“PLA, pic," Economist, 1 May 1993. p. 32, and Jim Bussert, “The Chinese Navy - A Pacific Wild Card,” Defense Electronics, July 1992, p. 53.

“'Asia's Arms Race: Gearing Up,” Economist, 20 February 1993, p. 20.

‘Ibid.

’William Branigin, “As China Builds Arsenal and Bases, Asians Fear a ‘Rogue in the Region,’" Washington Post, 31 March 1993, p. A27.

“’Hands Across the Himalayas,” Economist, 11 September 1993, p. 31.

’A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660 to 1783, p. 45. “Ibid, p. 50.

"Nicholas D. Kristof, “Entrepreneurial Energy Sets Off a Chinese Boom," New York Times, 14 February 1993, p. 12.

"Mahan, p. 54.

"Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Sees ’Market-Leninism’ as Way of Future," New York Times, 6 September 1993, p. Al.

"Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous,” New York Times, 11 January 1993, p. A8.

"Gordon Jacobs, “Chinese Naval Developments post Gulf War," Jane’s Intelli­gence Review, February 1993, p. 82.

"Ross H. Munro, “Awakening Dragon,” Policy Review, Fall 1992, p. 14.

"Washington Post, 31 March 1993, p. A2I.

"“Slurp. Burp,” Economist, 17 July 1993, p. 62.

"“Looking Back From 2992,” Economist, 26 December 1992-8 January 1993, p. 18-19.

’"Quoted from Secretary of State Warren Christopher by William Branigin, “S.E. Asians Seek Security Ties With China,” Washington Post, 27 July 1993, p. Art.

21Economist, 20 February 1993, p. 22. nNew York Times, 14 February 1993, p. 12.

Lieutenant Forsythe is the navigator on board the Mobile Bay (CG-53). A graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, he has studied Mandarin and Chinese history and economics. He previously served as communications officer on board the San Jose (AFS-7).