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The Battle of Leyte Gulf
LCDR Thomas J. Cutler, USN (Ret.). New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 450 pp. Bib. Illus. Maps. Notes. Photos. $25.00 ($22.50).
Reviewed by Richard Frank
In every quantifiable attribute, the Battle of Leyte Gulf is the greatest naval action of all time. In a set of diverse actions from 23 October through 25 October 1944, more ships and men grappled than at Jutland and over a vastly greater expanse of ocean. Every type of warship— from the largest battleships ever built, through the aircraft carrier and the submarine, down to diminutive PT boats— played a role. The opposing sailors and airmen wielded just about every weapon in the U.S. and Japanese inventories— bombs, torpedoes, and rifles from 18.1- inch to 50 caliber—and the Japanese added a new one: the kamikaze.
The U.S. Navy had two huge fleets in the battle. The Seventh Fleet under Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid put General Douglas MacArthur’s troops ashore on Leyte from a mass of amphibious shipping and protected and supported them with 18 slow and fragile escort carriers and a host of surface combatants—including six old battleships. The Third Fleet under Admiral William F. Halsey essentially comprised four extremely potent fast-carrier task forces, numbering 17 heavy and light Beet carriers and their escorts, including six new fast battleships.
The Imperial Japanese Navy planned to offset its marked material inferiority with a shrewdly calculated strategy and divided its force into three separate contingents. The mission of the Japanese Mobile (Northern) Force of carriers laden with few planes—and still fewer capable aviators—under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa was to decoy Admiral Halsey away so that the Force “A” (Central Force) under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita and the Force “C” (Southern Force) under Vice Admirals Shoji Nishimura and Kiy- ohide Shima could converge in a pincer attack on Leyte Gulf and destroy the U.S. invasion force—especially, its precious amphibious shipping. The Japanese hoped such a defeat would inflect a strategic check on their adversaries, but they recognized that there was no point in retaining a fleet while losing the Philippines. These plans and hopes spawned four named battles—Sibuyan Sea, Suri-
gao Strait, Cape Engano, and Samar— and the ultimately narrow margin by which U.S. sailors and aviators frustrated the Japanese aims yields a tale with ample suspense and excitement.
Lieutenant Commander Cutler is not the first author to tell this story, but he has assembled a fast-paced and colorful narrative that is particularly insightful on command and strategy—both as to the decision to invade Leyte and the subsequent great naval battle. His bibliography demonstrates that he has worked from a splendid array of secondary sources, supplemented well with oral histories and his own interviews with U.S. veterans. He casts important illumination over how the controversial decision of Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance during the Battle of the Philippine Sea to absorb the first blow from the Japanese rather than sail out to meet them resonated down through the orders given to Admiral Halsey for the Leyte operation. Commander Cutler explains that whereas Admiral Spruance’s orders placed primacy on protecting the landing forces, Admiral Halsey’s orders for Leyte provided explicitly (via some tortured prose) that: “In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offers or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.” The author also has dug out and demonstrates how an exchange of letters between Admiral Halsey and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the commander-inchief of the Pacific Fleet, confirms that Admiral Nimitz was certain that Admiral Halsey understood those instructions and would execute them with vigor.
There are a number of outstanding virtues in Commander Cutler’s work. Of fundamental importance is his sound architecture. This campaign is a sprawling canvas with critical events occurring simultaneously among at least five majoT commands. Commander Cutler marches his account smartly and keeps the focus sharp so that the reader is not overwhelmed, yet gains a keen sense of the complexity of these events. He is evenhanded in his judgments and misses no important command decision. He is particularly generous in giving General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey their due. Commander Cutler chooses anecdotes that meld very well into the narrative and underscore important points. He provides a superb description that conveys both the facts and the texture of the experience
of the incredible heroism of the imm°(' tal escorts of “Taffy Three,” the surprise^ and hugely out-gunned escort carrier task unit at the Battle of Samar. Finally- ^ follows up the often bitter post-war con' troversy concerning Admiral Halsey s performance during the battle.
By design, Commander Cutler did no1 set forth to retell the battle in dense de' tail, but even so the terse handling of the Battle of Cape Engano seems out of bal' ance in his overall structure. Those look' ing for a comprehensive recitation of th® tactical details still should look to Saniue Eliot Morison’s account. Nor does the al1' thor set out to add to our understanding of the Japanese perspective, except f°r his fine use of Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki’s diary.
Those who are prone to suffering palsied spasms over relatively modes'1 technical or factual errors are forewarned to bring their medication of choice. There are a number of small niggling points-" e.g., like the weight of the U.S. 16-inch armor-piercing shell (which is 2,70® pounds, not 2,200 pounds) and the length of U.S. fleet carriers (given as 700 to 850 feet, which fits neither length between perpendiculars or length overall). The au* thor misidentifies the savaged Japanese cruiser pictured at Midway (it was the Mikuma, not the Mogami), and outfit Japanese fleet destroyers with 4.7-inch (rather than 5-inch) guns and demotes the Japanese light cruiser Abukuma to a destroyer.
All of these are peripheral or collat' eral matters, however, and do not detract from Commander Cutler’s overall achievement, which is to spin a fresh and splendid account of the greatest sea and air fight of all time.
Mr. Frank is the author of Guadalcanal (Random House, 1990) and currently is working on a book about the end of World War II in the Pacific.
The Edge of Honor
P. T. Deutermann. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 456 pp. Gloss. $22.95 ($20.66). \
Reviewed by Captain Ted Hontz,
U.S. Navy
In his new novel The Edge of Honor- P. T. Deutermann, a retired Navy captain and career surface-warfare officer, cap' tures the feel of the sea and life on sur-
ace combatants with technical accuracy, exctting dialogue, and a cast of well- rawn characters. He establishes his cre- sntials as an accurate, believable story- e ter in the first several pages of the book p11*1 an emotional description of Navy 'eutenant Brian Holcomb and his new w'fe Maddy during their last night together before Brian’s ship—a fictional Stnded-missile frigate, the USS John Bell ood—deploys for Red Crown duties off °rth Vietnam in 1969. All who have experienced naval deployments, including sP°uses, may see at least some of them- Se ves in this scene:
Brian’s nights at home during the 'ast thirty days had been punctuated hy dramatic mood swings on Maddy’s Part, from loving wife who poured on the affection to shrill harridan who railed against the deployment, the Viet- tam War, and his Navy career in general. The hell of it was he was excited to be going. He was beginning a prime assignment aboard a modern guided- missile ship. . . bound for the Red Crown station up in the Gulf ot tonkin, to the heart of the carrier-air- war action. . . .
, As this passage indicates, much of the °°k centers on Lieutenant Holcomb’s exPerience as the weapons officer of a §Ulded-missile frigate that is designated as the PIRAZ, (positive radar advisory jtette) ship in the Gulf of Tonkin, duties at demand independent steaming within ange of enemy fighters and, therefore, C°astant vigilance. However, this is much ^ore than a novel about deployments,
be out of touch—drug problems are never reported, and the perpetrators are not discharged from the Navy. Instead, the executive officer oversees a system of gun- deck justice in which the ship’s chief petty officers clandestinely administer corporal punishment. Realizing that, nevertheless, the risk remains that one of the drug users may be on watch at the wrong place at the wrong time, Lieutenant Holcomb rejects this unofficial—and illegal—approach to the problem. He fights to have things done “the Navy way,” and wrestles with his own concerns about his future in the Navy as he is squeezed to get along by going along.
Tailhook, the cheating scandal at the Naval Academy, cases of sexual harassment, and the overall sad state of integrity and ethics in the Navy have been front-page news for the past several years. Today’s senior officers were the Lieutenant Holcombs of 25 years ago; their mentors were the junior officers of World War II. Many people blame the decline in the level of integrity and honor in the Navy upon a parallel decline in the civilian populace from which our naval officers are drawn. Few have considered, however, that the continuity of our profession, the closed nature of our society with no infusion of outsiders after initial recruitment, and the choosing of our own successors from this closed pool of talent are major factors in determining the overall moral climate of the Navy.
Captain Deutermann paints a bleak picture of the Navy’s morality and integrity in 1969. In an unpopular war with no clear strategy to achieve victory and open questioning of the civilian leader
• • • the continuity of our profession, the closed nature of °ur society ... and the choosing of our own successors from this closed pool of talent are major factors in determining the overall moral climate of the Navy.
Pha strikes, missile systems, and midbatches that characterized the war at Sea during the Vietnam era. As the title su8gests, it also concerns honor, integrity, rn°rality, and doing the right thing for the r,§ht reason. Thus, much of the plot con- ^err>s how Maddy and Brian Holcomb • eal with their moral dilemmas. At home ln San Diego, Maddy wrestles with incasing loneliness, doubts about the mar- r,a§e and the Navy, and her increasing attraction to a man who rescues her from e'ng raped.
On his ship, Lieutenant Holcomb finds at drug use is rampant. However, in ‘tt'tter to maintain the good name of the .Op and to keep clean the reputation of e captain—a remote man who seems to
ship, the captain and executive officer decide to write their own set of rules—and almost everyone goes along. It is only when the ship is heavily damaged in battle that their neat scheme unravels.
Certainly, The Edge of Honor is a fastpaced novel that gives the reader the feel of life on a warship conducting combat operations in the Tonkin Gulf. Anyone who has put to sea in a warship in the past 75 years will feel the roll of the storm-tossed John Bell Hood as she tries to evade a typhoon in the South China Sea. It is even better, however, as a catalyst for a discussion of a full range of issues that go to the heart of the Navy’s officer corps. How much of this tale have we seen ourselves? How many decisions
have we seen made—or made ourselves—that were based solely on selfpreservation? And, by extension, do we relate today’s institutional crisis of integrity to ourselves and how we were socialized into the Navy in the 1960s?
As Captain Deutermann explains in his postscript, this tale is hardly farfetched. Drug use was rampant throughout the U.S. armed forces prior to the implementation of mandatory urinalysis. He makes no such disclaimer for the cases of the poor leadership, self-serving careerism, and dishonorable conduct. Perhaps if we take responsibility for ourselves and root out the institutional causes of our problems, to another generation of officers this book will be so improbable that it will become incredible.
A 1967 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Captain Hontz has been the commanding officer of the USS Briscoe (DD-977) and the USS Princeton (CG-59). In 1985, he graduated with highest distinction from the Naval War College. He presently is the commanding officer of the Aegis Training Center at Dahlgren, Virginia.
A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II
Gerhard L. Weinberg. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 1,178 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes. $34.95 ($31.45).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Votaw, U.S. Army (Retired)
Addressing the Reichstag on 1 September 1939, Adolf Hitler “blamed the breakdown of negotiations ... on Poland; recounted the incidents along the border . . . and contrasted these evil deeds of others with the great generosity of his own demands .... To the thunderous applause of the representatives of the German people, he announced that Germany was once more at war.” The conflict soon became a global war that involved most of the nations of the world—as the author observes, “some as victims of attack, some as eager attackers themselves, some at the last moment in order to participate in the post-war world organization.”
In this large study of World War II, Gerhard L. Weinberg—the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill—takes a “global point of view,” one that emphasizes “the inter-relationships between the various theaters [of war] and the choices faced by those in positions of leadership.” One of his stronger insights is how the leaders on both sides were influenced deeply by the experience of World War I. Dr. Weinberg’s interpretation, therefore, looks forward from that reality, rather than backward from the Cold War or Vietnam.
Thus, he gives the reader a fresh perspective to “the broader picture.”
As closely as the two world wars were linked, however, Dr. Weinberg has not missed the fundamental differences between them. “If an important by-product of both wars was the weakening of Europe and its hold on the world, the intentions [author’s emphasis] of the belligerents were fundamentally different.” In World War II, “A total reordering of the globe was at stake from the very beginning, and the leadership on both sides recognized this.”
Sweeping synthesis of large events is the most difficult of historical writing. It presumes encyclopedic knowledge, great skill of concision, and the experience to evaluate, reject, and compare often contradictory evidence. Dr. Weinberg is among those few historians of the period who is capable of crafting such a work. He has spent most of his academic career teaching and writing about the Third Reich.
A World At Arms establishes both a chronological and a geographical framework for the narrative, which is comprehensive in its scope and discerning in its analysis. It is organized intelligently with a general chronological development, but with two thematic chapters in the middle—one dealing with the home fronts; the other with the impact of technology on the course of the war. The bibliographic essay selects from a vast body of works on World War II and illustrates the author’s command of foreign-language sources. Its two main lapses are relatively minor. The 23 black-and-white maps at the rear of the volume are not of the same high quality as the rest of the book; the printing is uneven, and military information is not clearly presented.
A warning: This is a history with a strategic and political viewpoint. The author’s purpose is to present “the broader picture,” not the details of combat. In this regard, readers looking for detailed battle or campaign history will be disappointed. Even if the book does not respond to every reader’s special interest, A World At Arms nonetheless is an extremely impressive whole.
The many interconnections among the various theaters of war, which illustrate the global character of World War II, often mask the vagaries of coalition warfare. The author explains that the Axis coalition was ineffective because of divergent war aims, racial and national paranoia, personal animosities and highly secretive procedures. In the end, the principal partners—Germany, Japan, and Italy—essentially steered their own courses.
The Allied coalition also had its internal problems, partly stemming from
divergent views about colonialism and the necessity of confronting Germany directly in northwestern France. Although each western partner was wary of the growing power of Stalin’s Soviet Union, they disagreed on the approach to postwar relations. Complicating the triangular relationship were “not only ... the problems of a settlement for Europe but a continuing war in East Asia.” Unlike their Axis counterparts, however, most Allied political leaders and military commanders early on learned the value of cooperation and global vision. There were, of course, some Allied leaders who “were quite incapable of working effectively with Allied military leaders and staffs; Montgomery on the British and MacArthur on the American side are striking examples of this.” But these cracks in the Allied coalition never developed into fissures because Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill “both had a sense of the war as a global one.”
Dr. Weinberg presents sound analyses of many of the major aspects of the Second World War. Certainly, some of his conclusions will be controversial. For example, he concurs that the strategic bombing of Germany was highly successful. Although, U.S. air commanders suspended daylight raids in October 1943 because of heavy losses to their unescorted bombers, the Allied air campaign had forced the Germans “to disperse their aircraft factories, a process that cost them months of production and was, until the oil and transportation raids of 1944, itself the most important blow at German war industry.” Dr. Weinberg further notes that “strategic bombing itself so disrupted the transportation and communications systems in Germany . . . during the last half year of hostilities that messages which would normally have been sent by cable or wire, by courier or mail, simply had to be sent by radio.” Significantly, the bombing campaign impeded Germany’s timely development of “new weapons” that might have altered the course of the war.
He correctly asserts that the German decision to attack the Soviet Union “established a time limit for other German initiatives.” Indeed, it started Germany toward its ultimate defeat. From 22 June 1941 until the end of the war in Europe, “the majority of the fighting of the whole war took place on the Eastern Front: more people fought and died there than on all the other fronts of the war around the globe put together.”
Dr. Weinberg puts the Allied invasion of France on 6 June 1944 into proper perspective by describing it as part of “the assault on Germany from all sides.” By early 1944, the Red Army’s growing power threatened to overwhelm Ger
many’s armies in the East. At the same time, it was obvious to the Nazis that the cross-channel invasion had become a
question of “when,” rather than one
of
be-
“how.” As Dr. Weinberg writes, even fore the Allied invasion, “[a]!though the) would not admit it openly . . . many 0 Germany’s military leaders were . • •
would
coming convinced that they be defeated.” .
After the Allies gained a foothold ijj France, the critical issue became whic side could build up quicker to make the next move. Even though the buildup vva> agonizingly slow, the Allies had the
strength and strategic flexibility neei
ded
Pa
Pn
$5
to gain the upper hand. As Allied strengt waxed, German strength waned. Fiel Marshal Montgomery’s “big push t0 elude the German checkmate at Caen v,'aS blunted by four German panzer divisions- but—even while he knew he was spend' ing the last of Britain’s infantry re' serves—he persisted and drew German strength to him. The U.S. breakout at St. Lo beginning July 25 broke the com tinuity of the German defense. Dr. Wetf' berg gives this hard-fought battle the stature it deserves: “The Allies had u1' deed won a major land victory in the West.”
The author does not ignore the interwoven domestic and international effects of the war. The effect of the war on Americans’ idea of the place of the United States in the world was dramatic- At the close of World War II, Dr. Weim berg notes, it had become clear to many- if not most, Americans that “an tn' volvement in international affairs was an essential part of any sensible policy- Much of this change can be credited to President Roosevelt’s efforts throughout the war “to get the American people to think of the United Nations as something essential to them, not just to others, and to accustom them to a new role in the world in rearranging the internal economic and demographic picture of the country.”
Dr. Weinberg also notes one of the essential paradoxes of World War II. The war’s enormous destruction of life and property underlined the monstrous potential of modern, mechanized warfare- However, the war also demonstrated “the enormous potential for organizing constructive programs and policies to which the energies of humanity might be harnessed.” Perhaps, 50 years after this great conflagration and with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the world will try to realize that positive potential.
Colonel Votaw is the Executive Director of the Cantigny First Division Foundation in Wheaton. J Illinois. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Temple University.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
A Naval History of World War I
p3U* T Halpern. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 1^94. 476 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes.
$55-00 ($44.00).
Histories of naval operations in World War I requently have focused upon the Battle of Jut- ^nd or the U-Boat war. While these and other 0re familiar aspects of the naval war are ^ard'y ignored, this goes well be- D°nithe trad>tional.
,ur' "alpern explores significant roles
the
'he Italian and *Us'ro-Hungarian "av'es in the Adri- , lc sea, the Rus- Turks, Ger- "'ans in the Baltic a Black Seas, and e Bfench, British,
■1 Japanese navies jj 'he Mediterranean. e also reveals the importance of the neutral wers, examines the campaigns in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia, and discloses the e ails of riverine campaigns on the Danube ^ elsewhere. This incisive analysis may not 'he last word on the naval campaigns of the °rld War I, but it will no doubt be one of e most significant and enduring.
gU,c|ear Weapons Databook: Volume V: fitish, French, and Chinese Nuclear
Weapons
ft k
Hi KCrt Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and p c 3rd W. Fieldhouse. Boulder, CO: Westview p.ess* ^94. Append. Illus. Ind. Maps. Notes. not°s> Tables. $85.00 ($80.75) Hardcover.
34 95 ($33.20) Paper.
Th‘
ms Well-documented look at the “lesser nu- ear powers” is the fifth volume in the Nat- ral Resources Defense Council’s series on the 0rld’s nuclear weapons. Each country’s nu- „ ear establishment is examined in two parts, ‘story and Production” traces the develop- ent and present state of nuclear-weapon pro. rams; “Forces and Capabilities” provides f" °rmation on the deployment of nuclear s°rces as well as descriptions of the delivery .^steins. Although rich in technical detail, its n'elligent and open style makes this book an ^Cessible and indispensable reference for
general reader.
The Night the War Was Lost
Series L. Dufour. Lincoln, NE: University of .5, raska Press, 1994. 430 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes.
■95 ($13.45) Paper.
^his is a revjsed edition of a previously pub- 'sned work on the pivotal Civil War battle for eW Orleans, but the revisions have not “nged Dufour’s original arguments: that the a °f New Orleans to Admiral David Far- agut s fleet was key to the defeat of the Con-
federacy, and that President Jefferson Davis and Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory were directly responsible for the loss of New Orleans.
Paying the Premium: A Military Insurance Policy for Peace and Freedom
Walter Hahn and H. Joachim Maitre, Editors. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993. 212 pp.
Figs. Illus. Ind. Notes. Tables. $49.95 ($47.45).
Naval readers will find Admiral Harry Train’s essay “Naval Forces for the Future” of particular interest, and those with an interest in the Marine Corps will want to read General George Crist’s “Marine Forces for the Future” and General Joseph Went’s “The Need for Forward Prepositioning.” Those readers who subscribe to the new emphasis upon joint operations will find much of value in the other nine essays that comprise this forward-looking collection.
The First Information War:
The Story of Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War
Alan D. Campen, Editor. Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association International Press, 1993. 195 pp. Order directly from the publisher: 4400 Fair Lakes Court; Fairfax, VA 22033-3899. Bib. Figs. Ind. Notes. Tables. $18.95.
Information, as both weapon and target, was a key factor in the Persian Gulf War. The ways in which information was gathered, exploited, and denied to the enemy during the Gulf War is explored in a series of essays by experts in their fields. Topics include “Desert Storm Communications,” “The First Space War,” “Spectrum Management,” and “Iraqi Command and Control.”
Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats that Won World War II
Jerry E. Strahan. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 400 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $29.95 ($26.95).
In 1938, Andrew J. Higgins owned a small boatyard in New Orleans that employed less than 75 people. By the middle of World War II, he owned seven factories, employed more than 20,000 workers, and had been awarded the largest shipbuilding and aircraft contracts in history. One of his better-known design accomplishments was the landing craft vehicle, personnel (LCVP), which played a vital role in many of the amphibious assaults of the war. Another was his creation of an effective tank landing craft design in 61 hours, something the Navy’s Bureau of Ships had been attempting to do for two decades. This is no tedious industrial study, however. It is the story of a colorful character who made war not only on the Axis, but also on many domestic conventions and bureaucracies.
Dive Into History: Volume 3: U-Boats
Henry C. Keatts and George C. Farr. Houston,
TX: Pisces Books, 1994. 240 pp. Append. Bib.
Illus. Ind. Maps. Photos. $18.95 ($18.00) Paper.
This series takes the reader beneath the seas to discover the barnacle-encrusted history that lies on the bottom in quiet repose. This latest volume focuses on the wrecks of German submarines of World War II. Relying upon a combination of thorough documentary research and the exploration of actual wrecks, this book provides a unique perspective on one facet of naval history. Eleven U-boats— eight along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, one off California, one in Lake Michigan, and one in the Potomac River—are the focus of this book. Monochrome and color photographs reveal the eerie world of these sunken ships and comparison photos of the preserved U-505 (now residing in the Chicago Museum of Science & Industry) help to clarify what these undersea views reveal.
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century
Janne E. Nolan, Editor. Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1994. 623 pp. Ind.
Notes. Tables. $39.95 ($37.95) Hardcover.
$19.95 ($18.95) Paper.
Contending that the old Cold War issues such as containment, deterrence, and nuclear parity have been replaced by the “cool war” considerations of peacekeeping, collective intervention, and preventive diplomacy, the editor and the contributing authors explore these changes and look to the future. They perceive that a new international concept—“cooperative security”—just might be the key to a peaceful world in this new era. The themes, applications, and inherent challenges of this new concept are discussed in the 16 essays that make up this thought-provoking book.
A Half-Century of Maritime Technology 1943-1993
Harry Benford, Editor. Jersey City, NJ: The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1993. 616 pp. Bib. Figs. Gloss. Illus. Notes. Photos. Tables. $45.00 ($45.00). Order directly from the publisher: 601 Pavonia Ave.,
Sle. 400; Jersey City, NJ 07306-2907.
A collection of essays by experts in their respective fields, this volume covers many diverse topics, including “Aircraft Carriers,” “Yachts and Other Pleasure Craft,” “Maritime Administration,” the “David Taylor Research Center,” “Hull Forms,” “Computers and CAD/CAM,” and “Fisheries of the Pacific Coast.” A wealth of information is covered in the book’s 61 chapters and enhanced by more than 500 photographs and illustrations. The various articles cover the spectrum from historical to prescient and provide both a broad and a focused look at the many aspects of the maritime industry.
« e+
The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait
. G. Winslow. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 244 pp. Appen. Bib. Ind. Notes.
Photos. $11.95 ($9.56) Paper.
In late 1941 and early 1942, Allied forces tried desperately to defend Southeast Asia against an overwhelming Japanese assault. The role played by the heavy cruiser USS Houston (CA-30) in this effort is told here by one of her scout plane pilots. Described as “an epic of men aboard a great ship facing very long odds,” this book—one in the Naval Institute Press’s new Bluejacket Books series—features detailed descriptions of the Houston's battles in the Dutch East Indies, including her gallant last stand in March 1942. It is a moving account of a brave ship and her courageous crew.
A Sailor’s Valentine
Craig Moodie. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1994. 165 pp. $17.95 ($16.15).
In 13 short stories that cover a wide range of experiences and emotions, a former Cape Cod fisherman paints brief but revealing sketches of the lives of seafaring men. “The vivid experience of fishing full time gives my writing a specific gravity, ’ writes Moodie. The danger, the beauty, the freedom . . . everything about fishing was pronounced. I wanted to
write about it because I wanted to live again on the water, to explore the power of the sea to restore balance and hope.”
Phoenix Sub Zero
Michael DiMercurio. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1994. 352 pp. $22.00 ($19.80).
A U.S. Naval Academy graduate and author of the popular novels Voyage of the Devilfish and Attack of the Seawolfi Mr. DiMercurio is back with a book that pits a U.S. submarine commander against a leader of the United Islamic Front in the not-too-distant future. Favorably compared with Tom Clancy by critics, DiMercurio melds technical detail with intense excitement to create riveting submarine adventure.
Paratrooper: The Life of General James M. Gavin
T. Michael Booth and Duncan Spencer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Bib. Ind.
Notes. Photos. $27.00 ($24.30). Hardcover.
$14.95 ($13.45) Paper.
During World War II, James M. Gavin rose quickly to fame—and high rank—as a tough, innovative commander in the U.S. airborne forces. After the war, he exercised great influence on U.S. defense policy and served as
U. S. Ambassador to France. Yet, behind his many official successes, Gavin's personal life often was rocky as were his professional relationships with many of his contemporaries— in and out of the Army. This book provides an interesting look at a complex man and his fascinating times.
Phantom in Combat
Walter J. Boyne. Atglen, PA: Schiffer ,
Military/Aviation History, 1994. 175 pp. ApPe
Ulus. Photos. $35.00 ($31.50). I
Battle-damage and gun-camera photos, recentb declassified tactical diagrams, and the v>° of the aviators themselves are some ot many features of this book that provide a v1V look at the illustrious F-4 Phantom :
bomber in combat operations over Vietna and the Middle East.