The U.S. Navy

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The U.S. Navy: Submarines in a Minefield

U.S. NAVY

While the New Attack Submarine is delayed, the Seawolf (SSN-21)-class program is maintaining support— two submarines of the class, the Seawolf (SSN-21) and the Connecticut (SSN-22), are currently under construction, with a third to be funded in fiscal 1996.

velopment of the New Attack Submarine (NAS).

“The Navy walked out very disappointed” after Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition John Deutch failed to give the Navy the go-ahead.' The closed discussions of the DAB were followed by Deutch calling for an unusual independent review of the NAS program, asking for a non-partisan panel of “outside” technical experts to review the submarine’s “ability to perform its military

missions from the view of its major characteristics of speed, quieting, payload, combat systems, and cost represented in the baseline study.”²

Deutch directed Nora Slatkin, the Navy’s Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition, to undertake the review “to provide an independent check that we have asked all the

right questions, and I anticipate it will help equip us for questions we will face later in the spring during congressional budget hearings.” Later in his letter of 24 January to Ms. Slatkin, Deutch directed the Navy to consider six alternative submarine building programs and schedules. The New Attack Submarine is thus on indefinite “hold” until the requested studies are undertaken and the Navy can make another run on the DAB.

The Defense Acquisition Board’s meeting for the Milestone One decision on the New Attack Submarine had been delayed several times, and the Navy’s submarine leaders—believing that they had done their homework—expected the NAS to sail through DAB-generated milestones, with the first submarine being authorized in fiscal year 1998. Indeed, the Navy had even changed the submarine project name from Centurion to New

Attack Submarine to reflect its new optimism after the Centurion ran into unexpected opposition in Congress.

Development of a lower-cost attack submarine (SSN) had been initiated in 1990 in response to the increasing costs of the Seawolf (SSN-21) class. The Navy announced plans to construct two or three Centurion SSNs per year, to maintain a force level of some 80 attack submarines. The Centurion’s design was guided by cost and the antisubmarine mission: Gerald Cann, the Navy’s previous Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition, told Congress, “While affordability must be a major consideration, this follow-on submarine must be capable of maintaining our edge in ASW against projected 21st-century threats as well as provide other mission capabilities.”⁵

But the cost of the New Attack Submarine—currently estimated at $2.2 billion for the lead unit and $1.5 billion for follow-on ships in addition to some $2.6 billion in research, development, and design costs—still seemed high to many members of Congress.⁴ Continued emphasis of the antisubmarine role in the post-Cold War era also raised questions.

Even within the Navy there has been controversy over the new SSN. After the Navy’s senior leaders stated that the Centurion would be the successor to the foundering Seawolf program. Admiral Bruce DeMars, head of naval nuclear propulsion, continued to work behind the scenes to garner congressional and industry support for building more of the Seawolfs.

Mr. Cann described a possible modular configuration for the Centurion that would permit the same basic hull and machinery to be used for attack, cruise missile, and special operations variants. This concept has been described dramatically in the Proceedings,⁵ but there appears to be little support for it within the submarine community.

By the fall of 1993, it appeared that the submarine community was finally getting its act together for a new SSN. Rear Admiral Thomas D. Ryan, Director of the Submarine Warfare Division in the Of-

Proceedings / April 1994

fice of the Chief of Naval Operations, explained that the Centurion had been renamed the New Attack Submarine and would be “optimized” for four missions related to the Navy’s new operational concepts:⁶

V covert intelligence collection and surveillance

►     covert mine detection

>• covert insertion and support of special forces

►     antisubmarine warfare.

Admiral Ryan and most senior submariners now realize that the traditional SSN emphasis of open-ocean antisubmarine operations against advanced So- viet/Russian submarines must be subordinated to the concept of operations. This message has been hammered home by the congressional and executive branch opposition to the Seawolf—under both Republican and Democratic administrations—and the decision of the Bottom-Up Review to cut the submarine force to about 55 SSNs by fiscal 1999

and to only 45 as a long-term goal.⁷

Meanwhile, the indecision over the New Attack Submarine is sustaining the Seawolf program. At this writing, construction continues on two submarines, the Seawolf (SSN-21), authorized in the fiscal 1989 budget and scheduled to be completed in mid-1996, and the Connecticut (SSN-22), authorized in fiscal 1991 and scheduled to complete in mid- 1997. Both submarines are under construction at the General Dynamics/Elec- tric Boat yard in Groton, Connecticut.

The Bush Administration proposed canceling the SSN-22 and later submarines (29 were originally planned). This led to the 1992 attack submarine debate, which became a presidential campaign issue when then-candidate Bill Clinton told Connecticut voters he would support additional Seawolf construction. At the time, candidate Paul Tsongas remarked that Clinton was supporting a military program that even Bush was against.

Regardless, on 4 June 1992. the Congress passed Public Law 102-298 that implicitly rejected the Bush Administration’s proposal to rescind funds for the SSN-22. The law provided just over $1 billion to construct the SSN-22 and S540 million to preserve the submarine industrial base, directing the Secretary of the Navy to use the funds for: advance procurement of the SSN-23, restarting construction of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class, or pursuing any other program that is most beneficial for preserving the current submarine industrial base.

Meanwhile, despite specific directions to do so, the Navy had not terminated all of the SSN-23 contracts. The Navy decided to complete contracts for major components for that submarine, including the AN/BSY-2 combat system, main propulsion unit, and reactor core.⁸ Nuclear cores and certain other nuclear components had also been contracted for the SSN-24 and SSN-25.

Subsequently, the Bottom-Up Review

Cutbacks and Restructuring

President Clinton’s fiscal year 1995 defense budget request provides for the smallest number of new Navy ships in 45 years. The FY 1995 budget asks for only four ships: another nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier of the Nimitz (CVN-68) class and three Aegis missile destroyers of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class.

But while some pundits are already lamenting that this small number of warships predisposes the Navy to an eventual fleet of only 120 ships—four ships per year with an average service life of 30 years—the inclusion of a Nimitz-class carrier indicates a general approval of the Navy’s attempt to sell a “new” operational concept stressing littoral operations. If the Clinton Administration or the Congress had rejected the Navy’s operational concept, the $4.5 billion carrier would not have been proposed. Rather, including a new carrier that must go through difficult congressional wickets implies a general acceptance of proposed Navy concepts, publicized in the 1992 report “. . . From the Sea." Indeed, with the Navy’s credibility and image badly tarnished after the flawed Navy investigation of the Iowa (BB-61) turret explosion, the Tailhook debacle, and the Naval Academy cheating scandal, it is significant that the Navy’s strategic concept is being accepted.

Aircraft carriers: The new carrier (CVN-76) will be the target of Air Force supporters, who envision manned bombers as being the most suitable platform for future forward presence operations, and of the traditional cost-cutters, who tend to look at costs isolated from requirements and weapon capabilities. Even within the Navy, some—especially the submarine community—have gulped hard as the CVN-76 was included. The nuclear carrier is roughly equivalent to the cost of two attack submarines or 4'A Aegis missile destroyers.

The CVN-76 would bring to ten the number of nuclear carriers currently in the fleet: the Enterprise (CVN-65), now

I ______________________________

completing a multibillion-dollar overhaul, refueling, and modernization; six Nimitz-cl&ss ships in service; and two more of that class under construction. The CVN-76 will make available a force of ten nuclear carriers through the year 2010, assuming that the Enterprise operates for 15 years after completing her update.

Surface combatants: The three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers bring to 32 the number of these ships now funded. These will be the most numerous ships of the surface fleet in the post-2000 period. Shortly after the year 2000. when the last of the three fiscal 1995 ships is completed, the Navy should have between 82 and 94 major surface combatants in service:

22-27 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class 32 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class 4 Kidd (DDG-993) class

24-31 Spruance (DD-963) class

The lower numbers indicate the possible early retirement of the cruisers and destroyers without vertical launch systems (VLS). There may also be a few frigates of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class in service, but most likely these will be assigned to the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) with composite active-reserve crews.

Still, the Navy will be hard pressed to maintain the currently approved force level of 110 to 116 surface combatants, including about 16 naval reserve frigates. A new surface combatant will be proposed for construction in the early 2000s.

Submarines: No submarine construction is requested in the FY 1995 budget. There is a half-billion dollars for research and development for the New Attack Submarine (formerly called Centurion) in the 1995 budget, and it is probable that a

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Proceedings/ April 1994

concluded that a third Seawolf (SSN-23) should be built at Electric Boat to bridge the gap in submarine production until a new SSN could be started to preserve that yard as a nuclear submarine builder. (The Navy would allow Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia to go out of the submarine business; that yard would retain a nuclear capability through its aircraft carrier work.)

There were other means of preserving Electric Boat’s submarine capability other than building another Seawolf that will cost at least $2.4 billion.⁹ For example, older SSN-688s—with a decade or more of service remaining—could be converted for special roles, among them a Tomahawk strike submarine with perhaps 48 vertical-launch cells, an unmanned vehicle carrier (for reconnaissance and mine countermeasures), and SEAL carriers. These and other projects could provide major work for Electric Boat in place of an unneeded SSN-23. Apparently, no options were offered to

the Bottom-Up Review except the continued construction of Seawolfa or restarting the SSN-688 production line (the last unit having been ordered in 1989).

The SSN-23 will be built to an enhanced special-operations capability, including an internal lock-out chamber for swimmers and a torpedo room that can be easily reconfigured to support special operations personnel. Admiral Ryan has said that this special operations capability will likely be backfitted into the first two Seawolfs. While that capability is highly desirable, the Seawolf is a poor candidate for such operations because of the submarine’s large size, high cost, and inability to rest on the bottom.

Attack submarines are important to the Navy and to the nation in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, reasonable arguments could undoubtedly be made for even a force of 45 to 55 SSNs. However, the submarine community has yet to come up with a saleable program for even the smaller force.

'Stan Zimmerman, “Navy stumbles out of Centurion DAB meeting,” Navy News and Undersea Technology, 19 January 1994, p. 8. (Deutch subsequently was nominated for the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense.)

^:Eric Rosenberg, “Deutch Directs Independent Submarine Assessment,” Defense Week, 7 February 1994, pp. 1, 12.

’Gerald Cann, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, House Armed Services Committee, 20 March 1991, p. 10. 'Construction costs from Adm. Frank B. Kelso briefing “Restructuring Naval Forces,” Pentagon, 18 January 1994; research and development costs from RAdm. W. A. Earner memorandum “Monies in the DoN Budget for Development and Construction of Submarines,” 28 April 1993.

⁵See RAdm. W. P. Houley, “2015,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1993, pp. 49-52.

'’RAdm. Thomas D. Ryan presentation to the Capitol Chapter, Naval Submarine League, Ft. Myer, Virginia, 30 November 1993.

’Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Washington, D.C., October 1993, pp. 55-57.

"See General Accounting Office, Navy Ships: Plans and Anticipated Liabilities to Terminate SSN-21 Program Contracts, Washington, D.C., November 1992. "Adm. Kelso, op. cit., he stated that $900 million had i already been spent on the SSN-23 and that $1.5 billion was required to complete the submarine.

third Seawolf (SSN-21) will be funded in FY 1996, the latter to keep the Electric Boat/General Dynamics shipyard in Groton, Connecticut, in the submarine-building business.

Amphibious ships: The most conspicuous shortfall in the fiscal 1995 shipbuilding proposal is amphibious ships. The Navy’s new concept for littoral operations demands an enhanced amphibious capability. The current drawdown of amphibious ships, especially the retirement of the seven helicopter carriers of the Iwo Jima (LPH-2) class, will severely restrict U.S. forward presence and rapid-reaction capabilities.

The Navy now has five large helicopter carriers of the Tarawa (LHA-1) class and there are six similar ships of the Wasp (LHD-1) type in service and under construction. Thus, by about 2000 the Navy will have the core elements for 11 amphibious readiness groups (ARG), each capable of embarking and sustaining a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) of more than 2,000 troops. But with a l-in-3 deployment cycle, a 12th LHD is an obvious requirement. Similarly, the LPD-17 (formerly LX) is a needed program to maintain a forward force of four MEUs with a total lift capacity of the equivalent of 12 such units. While large-scale amphibious landings are highly unlikely in the future, the ability to land a few thousand Marines “from the sea” must be considered a vital component of U.S. post-Cold War military forces.

Aircraft: Also being cut back are Navy and Marine Corps aircraft procurement. The FY 1995 budget proposal provides for only 56 naval aircraft:

4 AV-8B Harrier VSTOL aircraft 24 F/A-18C/D Hornet strike fighters 4 E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft 12 T-45 Goshawk training aircraft 12 AH-1W SeaCobra gunship helicopters

This is a very small aircraft buy, reflecting the downsizing of naval aviation. The continuing buy of F/A-18s foreshadows the dominance of that aircraft in future Navy and Marine

air wings and the near-term end of the career of the A-6E Intruder in Navy service (it has already been phased out by the Marines).

Naval helicopters have also taken a severe hit in the fiscal 1995 budget. Terminated are buys of the SH-60 Seahawk antisubmarine helicopter, both the SH-60B for surface combatants and the carrier-based SH-60F variant, as well as the large CH-53E Super Stallion and MH-53E Sea Dragon. All of these helicopters plus the HH-60H Seahawk combat rescue helicopter were procured in the FY 1994 and previous budgets.

The above programs are intended to support a Navy- Marine Corps in the year 2000 consisting of:

12 aircraft carriers (including one NRF ship)

319 other ships (including approx. 35 NRF ships)

3,700 aircraft (including NRF)

394.0      Navy personnel

174.0               Marine personnel (forming three Marine wing/ division teams)

This smaller Navy-Marine Corps will cost an estimated $22 billion per year to acquire and maintain, compared to some $33 billion per year spent on the two services in the mid-1980s, before the end of the Cold War. By the year 2000. naval forces will have enhanced capabilities because of such systems as Aegis, Tomahawk Block IV and SLAM strike missiles, advanced satellites, the V-22 Osprey VSTOL aircraft, and SH-60 series antisubmarine helicopters. Still, as often demonstrated in military and naval operations, quantity is also quality in many situations. In the foreseeable future, the Navy and Marine Corps are unlikely to have the numbers that will be needed for effective forward presence and rapid reaction for the numerous locations where future crises and conflicts can be expected to occur.

Norman Polmar _______________________________ ^