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Implementing total quality leadership (TQL) is a clear policy goal of the Navy. At the deckplate level, however, it has been something of a mystery. No one was quite sure what TQL was or what to do about it. When the officers and chief petty officers of the USS Maryland (SSBN-738) were invited to participate in the Navy’s introductory course as the first Trident submarine in Kings Bay, there was much misunderstanding, some resistance, and a healthy dose of skepticism. At the end of several days, not all doubts had been erased, but a certain appreciation of the value of TQL in shipboard life had developed. The point of TQL for the naval professional is briefly stated: a goal of dynamic improvement is worthwhile and can be met with tools already available.
The fundamental problem with the Navy TQL course is that it approaches the subject from a business-management perspective. Dr. Deming’s methods gained popularity as the highly publicized and successful business approach of large- scale Japanese manufacturing companies. Objections immediately start to rise when the subject is introduced. “U.S. manufacturing may be having trouble competing, but not the Navy! In fact, the Navy has never been more capable. Besides, we don’t manufacture a product, we deliver a service—national defense.” Another often-voiced objection to the Navy’s TQL presentation is that many of the leadership tools offered by TQL already are available, so TQL is a waste of time. In fact, just the opposite is true. TQL can be an effective organizational philosophy for the Navy because much of what we practice as good leadership is already compatible with it. The nomenclature isn’t important. If a ship’s officers and chiefs work to foster an attitude that encourages cooperation and improvement, there is no need to call it TQL to achieve the Chief of Naval Operation’s objectives.
As with any new program, those experienced in the field delight in pointing out ways in which the new system can
not work. A common attack is to take one tenet of the program, isolate it, and then point out its many flaws. For example, one of Dr. W. Edwards Deming’s points is to eliminate inspections. In reality, he is not quite so dogmatic. The real message is not to wait until a product is finished to inspect it for conformance to standards and then accept or reject it. It is better to train and encourage each worker throughout the process to identify flaws in the process or the product and improve them.
Dr. Deming’s logic can be applied to a Navy example. One measure of a submarine’s battle readiness is the tactical readiness examination. This is an inspection that Dr. Deming would advocate
eliminating, because it evaluates an end product rather than providing feedback along the way. A TQL alternative might be to devote the same number of manhours on the part of the submarine group to training assists instead. Crew proficiency would improve and the administrative burden of corrective action reports would be removed.
Of course, the chance that the Navy will eliminate inspections in the near future is small. At this point, TQL critics could claim a victory of sorts: “The Navy obviously is not going to eliminate inspections, therefore, TQL just doesn’t fit with the Navy’s way of doing business.” But this type of thinking is just an excuse not to act.
The real key to understanding how to employ TQL effectively in the Navy is realizing that it can be implemented across a wide spectrum. Even if the group isn’t going to modify the inspection process, a ship still can apply some of the tools advocated by TQL. For example, some commands never specifically prepare for particular inspections. Instead,
they identify what they need to be good at to be battle ready—including engineering, supply, weapons, and tactics— and then train to those areas on a continuing basis. Instead of allowing the tail to wag the dog, these commands get the priority right. The ship does well on inspections because the crew constantly works to find ways to be ready, not because any one inspection gets the spotlight. If other commands recognize this change in exam preparation as beneficial and adopt it, they will have used TQL to some extent, whether they recognize it or not.
If TQL is consistent with many leadership practices already common in the Navy, why is there resistance? The reality is that nobody likes to have an outsider come in and reorganize the way he does business. Fortunately, TQL need not be accepted without reservation to have value. Work with TQL because it promotes a philosophy of dynamic improvement. Don’t push the “I Believe” button because TQL is a Navy-wide initiative. Instead, take up the challenge. Use the ideas that you find useful and implement them when there is a process you can improve. As the concept becomes more widely accepted, large-scale changes may result. In the meantime, there is no reason to delay individual contributions.
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At the end of the Navy’s TQL seminar, many of the Maryland's officers and chiefs found merit in some of Deming’s ideas. Those who have yet to be exposed should remember going in that the usefulness of TQL is not undermined by the fact that many of the required traits and skills already exist within the Navy. TQL adds to the ethic of the naval professional by focusing those very traits and skills on this goal: Improvement of one’s own area of responsibility, ship, and Navy.
A goal of dynamic improvement is worthwhile and can be met with tools already available.
Lieutenant Commander Galpin, a 1982 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and Rhodes Scholar, is the engineer in the USS Maryland (SSBN-738 Gold). In June, he will report to the Chief of Naval Operations' Executive Panel.