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If the Navy does not significantly improve its ability to clear mines ahead of an amphibious assault, the fate of the Marine Corps mission—as we have known it and 'vish it to continue—will be seriously in doubt.
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he Navy cannot sweep in stride, so the Marines will have to think up some other way of getting ashore.1 Sweep in stride? For more than a century, mine c'earance has been a slow, laborious, and dangerous ^siness more reminiscent of a hastily cobbled-together engineering task than of the well-oiled execution of a vital ^vy mission. In one sense, the Navy cannot now or ever Svveep in stride if that means clearing mines just ahead °f an amphibious assault at the speed preferred by the as- s&ult commander. On the other hand, if “sweep in stride” ^ans that the Navy deals with the mine problem in ways ll'at allow the amphibious forces to launch when and where t[>ey had planned—with their speed of advance in no way "^Peded by a mine threat—then it can be achieved, at a ^enable cost to the mine-warfare budget. However, that 1 iChievement means that the mine-countermeasures prob- jern must be treated as a total system, and the mine-war- are community must begin thinking like the anti- '’ubmarine-warfare, antiair-warfare, and strike-warfare immunities—not like a Third World navy occasionally ^lven the opportunity to play with the big boys.
In the last two years, information warfare has assumed greatly expanded dimensions in the minds of military commanders. According to the past chairman of the Defense Science Board, intelligence and surveillance are the two most important missions in the post-Cold War world. The mine-warfare community, however, has placed intelligence at such a low priority that it has been surprised by nearly every encounter with mines (including Operation Desert Storm). By far, most mine-countermeasures operations have been conducted in water that contained no mines. And except for those cases during World War II when it swept for days under the protection of battleships and aircraft carriers, mine-countermeasures forces never have achieved the capability to clear mines without impeding the execution of other Navy and Marine Corps missions. If we are to sweep in stride, intelligence gathering for mine warfare must demand a level of priority befitting the mine’s emergence as a world-class threat.
Surveillance technology today—already embodied in satellites, atmospheric vehicles, intelligence-gathering submarines, and rapidly deployable acoustic arrays—provides the capability to interdict mines in the stockpile-to-mine- field transition or to record the location of minefields so that our mine-countermeasures assets can be applied with the highest efficiency. Intelligence and surveillance, however, are not always enough. The mine’s greatest strength—a lack of visibility to most sensors—creates a psychological threat in which the imagined situation is always worse than the reality. For cautious commanders, on-site reconnaissance will be required to round out the intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) continuum
before the mine-countermeasures forces are committed. Electro-optical sensors with gated receivers, mounted on helicopters or fixed- wing aircraft, will provide ground truth against antipersonnel mines, antiarmor mines, and beach obstacles; bottom mines in relatively shallow water of good quality; and moored and floating mines set against surface targets. In the subsurface arena, ROV and UUV technology—when married with suitable sonars. LIDAR and/or low-light-level television, and modern inertial navigation—will allow investigation and mapping of known or suspected minefields.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) represents the greatest addition to mine countermeasures since World War II.2 A GPS receiver enables all surface and airborne mine-countermeasures platforms, as well as all surface ships and craft needing to transit lanes cleared by the
MCM forces, to navigate to a precision of fewer than 30 feet. The resulting reduction in the width of the lanes to be cleared of mines for different naval activities has enormous relevance to clearance time and required force levels—two factors that have always plagued mine countermeasures. The ability to mark a mine contact and return to it is of similar improvement and relevance to clearance time and force levels. When combined with a modern C41 capability, GPS will allow the mine-countermeasures forces to rise to fleet standards as a finely tuned, choreographed, and integrated fleet element. To achieve the full potential of GPS, every platform transiting the minefield must be equipped with a GPS receiver; personnel must be fully trained in its use; and plans and tactics that make maximum use of its potential must be carefully drawn and exercised. In addition, the vulnerability of GPS to jamming must be minimized.
Unless the mine-countermeasures forces are provided with a modern C4I capability, they will continue to be decoupled, persistently late, difficult to coordinate, and lacking much of the information required for efficient and effective operations. Though not an insignificant budget item, the mine-warfare community should accept nothing less than a complete and fully integrated C4I system- inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), GPS, and C4I are vital and essential elements of in-stride mine clearance.
Properly equipped, the surface and airborne mine-countermeasures forces can clear mines in to water depths as shallow as 10 to 15 feet. For shallower water depths, the surf zone, and the beach, however, there is no acceptable procedure for clearing mines and beach obstacles. Consequently, the terminal end of the assault run-' where the greatest speed, flexibility, and surprise are required—is the point of greatest vulnerability for the Marines and amphibious forces.
The potential for a wide variety of mines—ranging from 2,000-pound bottom mines to smaller anti-invasion mines to several varieties of an- tiarmor and antipersonnel mines interspersed with very tough bead1 obstacles (all in the transition zone from sea to land)—makes this an ex- tremely difficult and hazardous mine-clearance task. Fortunately, the Marines and amphibious forces can accept a very narrow cleared channel through this zone. Of the recent studies addressing this part of the overall mine-clearance problem, only one—the precision emplacement of large explosive charges (PELEC)—meets all of the desired criteria.
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Proceedings/ April iW[1]
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PELEC calls for the delivery by B-52 of 10,000-pound precision-guided bombs (one on each of two wing stations) designed to penetrate to a depth of around 21 feet into the bottom sediment and detonate within 0.01 seconds of each other to create a line-charge analog. Five 2,000-pound bombs delivered as a cluster by A-6s is an alternative. The bombs must impact within 30 feet of the aim point and be spaced at 22-yard intervals. The result'
ing detonation would create a channel (not a series of craters) 64 yards wide in water three feet deep or greater and 35 yards wide on the dry beach. The channel depth would be 10 to 15 feet below the previous sediment level. One of the side benefits of the resulting channel would be the significant reduction in surf height over the width of the channel. The mines—many of which would be sympathetically detonated or otherwise neutralized by the shock wave—would be excavated from the channel, and only those in a very narrow angle above the expanding explosion bubble would be expected to fall back into the excavated area. Scale tests of PELEC are required to prove the concept and to refine the impact intervals and bomb weights.
As an optional measure to account for any live mines that may fall back into the channel or be swept in from the sides as the channel refills, a remotely controlled guinea-pig barge (modified from stock) could be driven to the end of the channel and sunk by flooding select compartments. In addition to proofing the channel, the guinea- pig barge would improve the sea-to-land transition surface for landing vehicles. The mine and beach obstacle problem in the very shallow water, surf zone, and craft landing zone is a special problem, and it requires nothing less than a special countermeasure.
With few exceptions of record, mine-countermeasures operations are limited to daylight hours because of a lack of artificial horizons and night vision equipment for helicopters as well as a concern over floating and drifting mines for surface mine-coun- termeasures ships. However, the same technology and training that enabled the Army’s Apache helicopters to tlune-hop their way in darkness during Operation Desert Storm is available to the MH-53 helicopters, just as the technology for the detection and neutralization of floating mines in darkness is available to the surface mine-coun- termeasures forces. If we are to develop the capability to sweep in stride, the mine-countermeasures operation must begin the night before the amphibious assault.
Because the mine-countermeasures helicopters operate 'n a dangerous part of the flight envelope, even properly Quipped and trained night operations may prove too dangerous. Nevertheless, the helicopters would still have the advantage of rapid deployment and high-speed mine-countermeasures operations in to very shallow water. How
ever, there can be no similar deterrence for the surface mine-countermeasures forces. Both ISAR and electro-optical systems (both masthead and airborne) now available or under development can provide (weather permitting) night detection of floating mines, and shoulder or tube- fired missiles can be used for neutralization until a tailored system can be produced. The need to leverage too few mine-countermeasures assets through night operations is painfully evident, and the technology is available.
The battle for acceptance of the small waterplane area twin hull (SWATH) for certain specialized naval applications spanned 30 years, in spite of the fact that for 20 of those years the 224-ton SSP Kaimalino demonstrated all the performances the inventors and advocates claimed. It was not until after the Japanese took our technology and began building SWATH marine survey platforms and small passenger ships that we finally adopted the hull form for the T-AGOS building program.
A SWATH is ideally suited as a sensor-bearing or sensor-towing platform, an oceanographic research vessel, a Coast Guard cutter, and a mine-countermeasures ship of any size. However, the larger end of the surface mine- countermeasures platforms is now occupied by the Avenger
(MCM-1 )-class and Osprey (MHC-5 l)-class ships. The gap in coverage by surface mine-countermeasures is a 30 to 55-ton platform that can: be transported in numbers on board larger ships; be remotely piloted or require a very small crew; work in sea state 3 and survive in sea states 4 and 5; extend the reach of the MCM-1 and MHC-51 and augment the mine-countermeasures helicopters in waters as shallow as 10 feet; perform sweeping and hunting, as well as mine-neutralization functions; and
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do all of this around the clock. Such a platform would be a more capable SAM-11 and cost the same or less.
The mine-neutralization vehicle now on board the Avenger-class is expensive and requires 30-45 minutes to launch, deposit its charge, and be recovered. The charge placement is such that only instrumentation neutralization is achieved (sympathetic detonation of the mine’s charge is desired), and it cannot be operated off a ship much smaller than the MCM-1. To augment the mine neutralization capability of the larger ships and to provide a neutralization capability for smaller surface ships (i.e., SWATH) and helicopters, the Navy needs an expendable vehicle that requires no more than 10 minutes for launch and charge placement and is capable of being guided to contact with the mine target by the ship’s minehunting sonar and its own sensors. Under the best of conditions, the larger mine-countermeasures ships, used in the minehunting mode, can account for about 12 mines per day. Around-the-clock operations would essentially double that number, and an expendable neutralization vehicle would double that number—and achieve explosive detonation of the mine in most cases.
We have looked toward the echo-ranging capability of marine mammals with awe, while clinging to a visual display for our minehunting sonarmen. We have all but ignored the demonstration 20 years ago by NOSC (now NRad) scientists that a swimmer can use the frequencies and pulse characteristics of the marine mammals and equal or exceed their performance. We should develop criteria for the selection of exceptionally talented test subjects in both aural and visual acuity and interpretation, determine which of the two displays is best for mine detection and classification, and then establish a training program to maintain proficiency.
Regardless of technological improvements, however, we will not be able to sweep in stride unless the people problem is addressed: a tour in mine warfare must be seen as a positive rather than a negative experience in an officer’s career. One solution to this problem is for the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to assure that officers of top standing are assigned to mine warfare, with the availability of early command as inducement. A positive change in the image of mine warfare would be the most productive—and cost-effective— solution to improved capabilities in the field.
Similarly, a number of changes—all of which involve education and training—need to be made throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. The Mine Warfare School should be elevated to a center of excellence attached to the Commander Mine Warfare Command. In addition to instruction for those officers and enlisted men entering a tour in mine warfare, the school should be used to provide basic mine-warfare information and instruction to Alpha Mikes (officers responsible for mine warfare throughout a major fleet element) and to select officers on all joint staffs. The curriculum at the Naval War College and the Postgraduate School should reflect the basic knowledge in mine warfare, and a chair should be established (perhaps joint between the two schools) and occupied by a recognized mine-warfare expert. No exercise or war game in which the mine threat might logically be encountered should ever ignore mine warfare. The fact that
it complicates and delays the game is a powerful lesson in itself.
Neither sea nor land mines, once planted, know any nationality or ever get the word that the war is over. Therefore, both types have a dark side that should be curbed on moral, economic, and military grounds. Following World War II, the major combatants spent up to three decades clearing mines from that conflict, and yet mines from both World War I and World War II are still being reeled in by fishermen. Between 1946 and 1974, 555 ships were sunk or damaged by “abandoned explosive ordnance.” The tragedy of land mines is even worse: 20,000 amputees in Cambodia, 20,000 in Angolla, 150 new casualties each week, and 85 to 90 million land mines unaccounted for worldwide. As civilized human beings—and as responsible civilian and military leaders—we can do better than this.
The only international agreements regulating the design and utilization of mines are The Hague Convention of 1907, which addressed sea mines, and the 1983 United Nations “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effect” protocols, which addresses land mines. The United States has signed, but Congress has not ratified, the latter. The Navy and Marine Corps should take the lead role in calling for a new convention to modernize and augment these agreements, including a fail-safe sterilization feature, installed at manufacture, which neutralizes the main charge (high or low-order detonation of chemical inerting) at a preset time on the sterilization clock. Although a modernized set of agreements—adhered to by at least the major producing companies—will do little to help the mine forces sweep in stride, they will significantly reduce the time, cost, and effort of post-war mine clearance; hasten the return to peaceful use of shipping routes and agricultural land; and reduce collateral damage to the civilian population.
Based on military threat alone, today’s post-Cold War environment is no different from that with which we have lived and occasionally engaged for half a century—minus a very credible Soviet threat against which we have sized and competed naval power. Within that adjusted environment, the mine is seen more clearly for what it has always been: a world-class threat. If in the future we are to honor the conditions of naval engagement—quick response, massive force, short and successful campaign, and minimal casualties—we must solve the mine problem. We must be able to sweep in stride. The capabilities noted above, integrated with the foundation already in place, will provide that capability—and at reasonable cost.
'Opinion expressed by a senior official during a mine-countermeasures meeting *n the fall of 1992.
’Statement made some 13 years ago by Dr. Richard Garwin, a friend and critic oi mine warfare.
■Those who recoil at the thought of 10,000-pound bombs should recall that ^ years ago, British Lancaster bombers delivered 12,000-pound bombs against th* German Tirpitz.
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Proceedings / April 1^
I Proceedings / April 1994
Mr. Hunt served on the Committee on Undersea Warfare and is cuf' rently the Director of the Naval Studies Board.