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Adrift in Heavy Seas
Electric power stations in the Arkhangelsk region in northern Russia expect to completely run out of fuel in a week. In the industrial centers of Severodvinsk and Novodvinsk, heating and electricity are supplied only to residential blocks and life maintenance systems, while major production facilities stand idle.1
The publication of more than 100 military periodicals. . .will stop in the very near future. According to reliable sources, [Minister of Defense] Pavel Grachev has approved a draft order abolishing the military press. Officially the reason for closing army publications is financial difficulties. According to another version, however, the main reason lies in Grachev’s unhappiness over the lukewarm attitude by the subordinated press to his own personality, especially in the past few months.2
Today, “thousands of potential recruits throughout the country refuse to serve in the Army and the Fleet. Officers must literally catch them and personally bring them to reporting cadres.” [Baltic Fleet report]
Fuel and electricity shortages, political turmoil and economic uncertainty, the passing of the old guard, and retrenchment in the political and military realm combine to make this a particularly uncertain period for the Russian military services. The recent rise of individuals such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the moves by both President Boris Yeltsin and Defense Minister Grachev to reestablish some control over the press seem to presage an even bleaker period to come.
Observing Russia and its navy as they have attempted to deal with the changes of the past few years has been somewhat akin to watching a slowly sinking ship. The fall elections added to the turbulence, and the accelerating inflation coupled with the abandonment of many of the elements of economic reform seem likely to exacerbate the problems while prolonging the agony. The full scale of the economic decline can only be estimated, but it is
clearly of “Great Depression” proportions. Over the past five years, the Russian gross national product has declined by about 45%-50%, and the decline continues. Russian economists estimate that the average standard of living has declined 50%-60% over that period.3
It is clear that the economic contraction has had a major impact on the Russian military, including rapid drawdowns of forces, ship scrapping, personnel and manning problems, and repair and maintenance shortfalls. These problems have been contrasted with continued Russian Navy efforts to operate forces and to plan for future requirements. Nevertheless, the dominant news is the unprecedented level of difficulty that the Russian economy and polity present to those who must maintain and operate an effective navy within the constraints. Of course, the navy is not the only Russian service with problems, but its requirement to operate a technologically demanding enterprise in an unforgiving medium is particularly sensitive to shortages of resources.
The following sections represent a small portion of a much broader discussion that appears routinely in the Russian military press and provides a direct look at what the Russians are saying about their own situation. Some of this may sound familiar to those who served the U.S. Navy during the late 1970s and who may recall how difficult it was to rebuild the force.
Personnel Problems
► As of 7 February 1994, the Russian armed forces stands at 2,341,000, with units manned at an average of about 60%.4 By 1995, the Ministry of Defense plans to have reduced military manpower to 2 million men, and General Grachev has indicated that the Defense Ministry wants the numbers to go no lower. The 1995 Russian Navy is planned to stabilize at about 350,000 officers and men. Meanwhile, the government’s “debt” to the armed forces (wages, etc.) in 1993 reportedly climbed to 2.3 trillion rubles.
► “[T]oday there [is] one officer to each soldier in Russia’s military, ... It might well happen that next year the Russian forces would have more officers than soldiers, a factor which would not raise their combat efficiency. .
► There are now units in the Far East “whose sailor acquisition level is no more than 10%.”7
► “Almost half of the sailors who came into the [Pacific] fleet [in 1993] did not
complete their secondary education.”
► One-fifth of the servicemen in the Pacific Fleet have previous convictions or have been arrested by the militia.
► Submarine personnel issues are equally bleak. As noted in an interview with a veteran submariner: “Life treats us sternly.... Many young officers frankly say. ‘You no longer have anywhere to go, you have served so long, but we do not wish to repeat your career.’ For they
see perfectly well . . . what prospects await them.”
>• The shortage of experienced personnel is acute: .. the dearth of cadres has
a tenacious grip on the throat. There is an acute shortage of chemical specialists- . . . The situation with [nuclear] power engineers is similar. . . . Loss of Baku and Sevastopol naval schools, which trained specialists of those profiles, hit
Proceedings/ April 19tM
the Russian submarine fleet especially painfully.” These are not the only shortfalls. “For example, electricians, radar operators and ship physicians (the shortage of medical personnel broke all records, having reached 50%) are among the scarcest specialists.”
Problems in Northern Fleet
V Aircraft units have been particularly hard hit, with pilots fulfilling barely half of the “combat service plan.” Aviation of the Fleet’s efficiency declined drastically compared with 1992.7
► “Ships are frozen at the docks. . .” Many Northern Fleet ships and submarines have been or are being removed from active operational status “before their time” because of the general lack of repair facilities. This has been a problem for all fleets, with ships being effectively scrapped well within the normal 25-30 year lifetime afforded many such combatants elsewhere.
► “Despite the fact that the fleet forces have been almost halved over the past two years, the remaining ships are provided with only 22% of the necessary ship repair services.” The lack of repair causes malfunctions to accumulate, “. . . so with every passing year, more effort must be put into maintaining the combatant’s technical readiness.”
► The Northern Fleet essentially has had “only one tanker” available (the Dnestr) to support combat service ships this year. Available auxiliary shipping meets only 58% of the (much diminished) fleet’s minimal requirements—and the “Northern Fleet today is the best in the Russian Navy for many indicators.”
► More than 40% of the auxiliary ships are well beyond their service lives because of their poor state of repair and the “inexpediency of repairing them.”
► Crews on such ships have more work, yet receive less pay than their counterparts from the Murmansk Maritime Steamship Company. Therefore, “cadre turnover is increasing.” Staffing of the fleet’s auxiliary ships is about 70%, and on “individual ships with hard working conditions it is below that level.”
V Officer and warrant officer morale has suffered. “The nonoperation of the laws on the social protection of servicemen, regular delays in paying wages, the understaffing and consequent excessive work load [officers and warrants often must work 100-hour weeks) have an adverse effect on morale.”
► “The complacency of warrant officers and officers, the rise in apathy and indifference toward their career, is becoming a problem. The majority of officers have turned in on themselves, do not visit the seamen’s crew quarters, do not
receive reports on acute issues, and avoid them in talks with their subordinates.”
► Strenuous efforts have been made to cut the losses of junior officers, with the numbers leaving being “reduced fourfold in 1993.” However, separation requests continue and “During the first ten months of [1993] over 600 more men were released and half of them were under 30. At the same time, over 3,600 officer’s posts remain vacant.”
Problems of the Submarine Force
► “Warranty repairs” are impossible, or nearly impossible to obtain from the manufacturer. “. . . the warranty remains. But . . . Finding themselves in a difficult economic situation, the enterprises have stopped paying their specialists travel expenses. The people do not even receive wages. And the Fleet is simply in no condition to take on all expenses . . .”8
► To work around this, the submarine force is required to engage in “guerrilla activities”—using personal contacts at the appropriate facilities to provide some of the required parts and using their own “messengers” to maintain contacts. However this “self-servicing” is merely a drop in the bucket in responding to the overall requirement.
► “More and more often, scheduled repairs are postponed and the number of submarines with periods between repairs that have exceeded the limit is growing. As of today [17 September 1993], only one of four equipment warranty repair and servicing organizations is fully functioning. On the other hand, commercial structures grow like mushrooms after a rain. Independent, small enterprises, which lure the best specialists, are detaching themselves from ship repair yards, . . . The Fleet is forced to turn to their services in order not to be left without repairs entirely. Accordingly, prices are commercial and astronomical, but the quality of repair does not improve and time periods for work are dragged out.”
► “Objectively, the navy’s qualitative makeup has worsened, . . . The latest weapon and equipment models have almost ceased to arrive. [Weapon systems] which were at one time in the development stage remain as drawings. . . . The most terrible thing is the often irreplaceable loss of unique specialists.”
► “Very important priorities [in production] have been lost, such as in the area of developing titanium, where our shipbuilding had burst far ahead. . . . Now production has been halted (expensive!) and labor dynasties which formed over decades are forced to seek other work.”
► “Matters are even worse for SSBNs— they are not being built at all ... . new strategic submarines will see the light no
earlier than the 21st century. Meanwhile, the time is approaching for repairs of SSBNs in operation. For now there are no funds for this purpose, just as there are none for their modernization.”
► In all fleet areas, officers and men have been forced to go long periods without being paid. The supply and repair facilities also have gone long periods waiting to be paid for work already accomplished. Meanwhile, the inflation rate has shot up again with the collapse of the reform- minded government in Moscow in the last few months.
► And finally, large numbers of old and obsolete submarines have been written off and are in floating storage in the fleet areas awaiting dismantlement. This includes more than 100 submarines (and many other ships) and is in addition to the 5,000 aircraft and helicopters, 1,000 units of armored equipment, large amounts of ammunition, and 2,000 strategic missiles of various classes that are being scrapped. The Russians estimate the cost of the scrapping at ten trillion rubles [about $7.5 billion, at the current value of the ruble].9
These comments do not exhaust the problems of the Russian Navy. In the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas, authorities must relocate and build new facilities on a much diminished national coastline. The sovereignty of the former republics has fragmented an industrial infrastructure carefully constructed over the preceding 70 years and has had the same effect on military bases, the training command, and test and exercise facilities. Meanwhile, economic recovery is still not apparent on the horizon.
For now, the Russian Navy is adrift in a storm of economic troubles, with much shoal water still ahead.
'Vladimir Anufriyev, TASS Correspondent, Arkhangelsk, I TAR-TASS (6 February 1994). '■Moskovskiy Komsomolets in Russian, (9 February 1994).
'Viktor Yelmakov, I TAR-TASS, quoting economist Dr. Grigory Khanin (8 February 1994). interview with Minister of Defense Grachev, / TAR- TASS, Moscow (7 February 1994).
“Sergey Rogov, President of the Center for National Security and International Relations. Moscow INTERFAX (1734 GMT, 29 November 1993).
‘Notes regarding the problems in the Pacific Fleet are taken, in part, from Vladimir Shirokov and An- drey Gavrilenko, “Far East Draft: Unfavorable Forecast,” Krasnaya zvezda (19 November 1993), p. 2. ’Highlights of current status of Northern Fleet are taken from Vladimir Gundarev, “Northern Fleet is Russia’s Best Fleet. But Today That is No Longer Enough,” Krasnaya zvezda, (7 December 1993), pp. 1, 3.
The quotations regarding the submarine fleet come from Vladislav Pavlyutkin, “Russia’s Fleets: Burden of the Depths and Shores,” Syn Otechesna, No. 38 (188) (17 September 1993), pp. 6-7.
’Moscow: Mayak Radio Network (0900 GMT, 9 December 1993), reported in FBIS-SOV-93-235, p. 41.
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Proceedings / April 1994