Professional Notes

Professional Notes

Full Circle: The Evolution of Sea-Control Squadrons

By Commander Bruce Bole, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Edmund Turner, U.S. Navy

On 20 February 1991, while on an armed surface-reconnaissance mission in the northern Arabian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, an S-3B from the USS America (CV-66) detected, engaged, and sank an Iraqi patrol boat. Less than a week later, an S-3B flying from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) destroyed a second high-speed Iraqi vessel.

Although not strategically significant to the outcome of the Gulf War, these

scouting aircraft of the late 1930s and early 1940s were the first true carrier- based over-the-horizon targeting platforms that could also deliver an offensive punch. Dormant for decades, this capacity exists once again.

World War II carrier air wings on board the larger carriers included four kinds of squadrons: fighter (VF), dive- bomber (VB), torpedo-bombing (VT or VTB), and scouting squadrons (VS) flying Vought SB2U Vindicators. The scout

time usually consisted of composite squadrons (VC) flying various aircraft; the VC squadrons flying TBF Avengers over the North Atlantic in the battle against the German U-boats are generally seen as providing the impetus for carrier- based offensive ASW aircraft.

Their mission received more attention as the Soviet submarine threat increased during the Cold War and, in 1950, fixed- wing carrier ASW units changed their designation from VC (ASW) to air anti

events were milestones in the evolution of modern sea-control squadrons. Not since World War II had an enemy vessel been successfully engaged by carrier- based antisubmarine warfare (VS) aircraft in time of war.

Today’s VS aircraft and crews, with expanded mission and combat capabilities, represent the spirit of the early scouting squadrons of World War II fame. The

ing squadron’s mission was to seek out, fix, and attack the enemy—well away from the task force. The importance of accurate over-the-horizon targeting and attacking increased as the at-sea battle lines separated. Although the VS designation officially changed during World War II, its original mission remained intact.

Air wings on smaller carriers at the

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Proceedings / April 1994

S-3 Vikings emerged as true multimission aircraft during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These VS-24 S-3Bs flying from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) on station after the Gulf War show the aircraft’s capabilities—the lead is armed with two Harpoons and the wingman is carrying 10 Mk-82 500-pound bombs.

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This HU-25C crew (author at right) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in late November 1993, had just completed three successful intercepts—indicated by the three cocaine snowflakes on the nose. VAYV-122 E-2C in background also participated in the intercepts. The HU-25s have done a good job, but a Coast Guard S-3 would offer many advantages.

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The S-3 is Right for the Coast Guard

By Lieutenant Joseph M. Pesci, U.S. Coast Guard

external fuel tanks, the S-3A’s range is significantly greater than that of the HU-25A. The S-3A can search larger areas and stay on scene longer on search-and-rescue missions.

The probability of detection decreases rapidly with time. Delays in reaching the search area inevitably increase the

size of the area in which the victims may be located—and the amount of stress on them. Jets become very cost-effective compared to turboprops when this factor is considered.

Equipping the S-3A with an aerial refueling package would increase its versatility in the Coast Guard role. The internal weapons bay could be modified to include self-contained pumps and rafts for aerial delivery to vessels and persons in distress. Datum Marker Buoys also could be stored internally. The side-by-side cockpit configuration offers excellent visibility; modified observer windows aft of the flight deck, similar to those on the HU-25A, should be installed.

Maritime Law Enforcement includes surface surveil-

The HU-25A Guardian—the key to medium-range search—has reached the midpoint of its service life, and the best replacement option for the Coast Guard is the Navy S-3A.

While the Marine Corps’ proposed V-22 Osprey tiltrotor might seem the ideal choice to succeed the Guardian, funding and development delays dictate that the Coast Guard should procure another aircraft to perform medium-range search until the V-22 proves itself in operations.

The Lockheed S-3A Viking is the most attractive replacement for all versions of the HU-25A because of its versatility and high potential to perform Coast Guard missions effectively.

The S-3A’s flight envelope is similar to the Guardian’s—good low-altitude/low-speed maneuverability coupled with jet aircraft quick response. Its two General Electric TF34-GE400A/B high-bypass ratio turbofans have excellent specific fuel consumption figures; with

submarine squadron (VS). Most of the aging TBMs were replaced with new AF- 2S and AF-2W Guardians; although the aircraft were equipped with upgraded radar, sonobuoys, and other weapons, their operational life was short. In 1954, they and the remaining TBMs were replaced by the Grumman S-2F Tracker, which was designed specifically for carrier ASW and represented the latest in airborne ASW technology, including magnetic anomaly detection gear. The S- 2Fs continued to operate from World War II-era carriers redesignated CVS—antisubmarine support carriers.

With the advent of the CV concept in the early 1970s, the VS squadrons were integrated into strike carrier air wings. The S-3 A Viking soon replaced the S-2 Tracker and, by 1976, was fully operational. This mixture of attack, fighter, and ASW aircraft enabled an air wing to be effective in any warfare discipline, whether it was sea control or power projection.

The arrival of upgraded S-3Bs in 1987,

with improved weapon capability, expanded the aircraft’s mission potential in an era when single-mission aircraft are no longer affordable. True to its heritage, however, the S-3B carries the most advanced ASW acoustic processing equipment. But crews now also train for antisurface war-at-sea, electronic warfare, counter-targeting, in-flight refueling, mine warfare, and strike support. S-3 ready rooms now often provide strike leaders for war-at-sea or aerial missions.

Although many realized early that the new Viking had more to offer the fleet than just its ASW capabilities, it was not until Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm that the Viking was able to demonstrate its flexibility. With no submarine threat, commanders were free to use the S-3B’s advanced sensors for overland and surface reconnaissance.

During the blockade, S-3B crews located, identified, and tracked merchant vessels throughout the region. The sheer number of ships and the requirement to maintain 24-hour surveillance of an ever-

changing plot stretched reconnaissance assets. Using the S-3B’s APS-137 inverse synthetic aperture radar, forward-looking infrared system, S-3B squadrons exploited the aircraft’s long legs and dash speed to provide an accurate surface picture to the Red Sea and Mediterranean battle groups.

The inverse synthetic aperture radar is by far the most significant upgrade. The quickly adjustable modes include small- target resolution, originally intended to detect submarine periscopes, and an imaging capability that enables operators to classify ship types out to the radar’s maximum range. The new radar helped make maritime embargo reconnaissance more effective.

Prior to hostilities, S-3Bs from the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69), Saratoga (CV-60), and John F. Kennedy (CV-67) flew several missions using the aircraft's new electronic support measures suite to detect, classify, and fix Iraqi emitters. Working in concert with various aircraft. Vikings flying near the Iraqi border

Proceedings / April 1994

lance, enforcement of the Economic Exclusion Zone, and air interdiction. The S-3A’s inherent capabilities also suit it to replace the specialized HU-25C for this mission, since any replacement must have sufficient speed to intercept medium-sized turboprops from astern and still be able to slow down to minimum airspeeds and track a small Cessna 182. The S-3A’s size and multimission capabilities make it a more cost-effective choice for this mission than surplus Marine Corps’ OV-lODs or Air Force A-lOs. Installing the HU25C’s APG-66 air-intercept radar, inertial navigation ^! system, forward-looking infrared system, and avionics communications in the S-3A would be cost effective.

Installing multimode APG-66 radars in all Coast Guard S-3As—rather than in just a few dedicated to air interdiction—would eliminate the logistics and maintenance requirements for servicing and maintaining different systems.

¹ External fuel tanks, aerial refueling, and low-speed flight characteristics would provide more alternatives concerning end-game surveillance.

The HU-25B AIREYE sensor system used in marine environmental protection includes a side-looking airborne radar, active-gated television, infrared-ultraviolet line scanner, and a KS-87B aerial camera. The system is designed to map oil spills accurately, and two HU-25As were deployed t to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm. It could easily be mounted on S-3A wing pylons.

When called upon, all Guardian variants can be directed | to support Maritime Defense Zones in the defense of the nation. Coast Guard S-3A Vikings embody the flexibility to ! adapt to any requirements that might emerge.

Buying S-3As makes sense operationally, but it also makes sense from an engineering point of view. The S-3A Viking has been in service with the Navy for more than 15 f years; most of its problems have been identified and solved. Replacing the Guardians with a proven aircraft and avoiding the inevitable growing pains associated with maintaining a modified version of a new civilian aircraft makes even more sense. Coast Guard HU-25 maintenance person-

helped the Coalition to form a detailed picture of the enemy’s electronic order of battle.

i During the first Desert Storm air i strikes. Vikings from the USS Ranger i (CV-61) deployed tactical air-launched

nel are familiar with turbofans and are well aware of their reliability and power advantage over turboprops.

Currently, Coast Guard student aviators selected for Coast Guard fixed-wing aircraft complete primary and intermediate flight training at Naval Air Station Whiting Field, Florida, and then go to Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas, where they complete the advanced maritime syllabus and are designated Coast Guard Aviators. Prospective Coast Guard S-3 pilots could compete to select a slot in the tactical jet training pipeline. Since they already would be slated to fly Coast Guard S-3As, they would not be required to complete carrier qualifications, and the cost of their training would be significantly reduced.

Although the production line closed in mid-1978, the Navy has continued to upgrade its fleet of S-3As into S-3B versions, US-3A carrier onboard delivery aircraft, KS-3A aerial refuelers, and ES-3A electronic reconnaissance aircraft. With downsizing, the Navy may have extra KS-3A and US-3A variants available with a good deal of service life remaining. Modifying these aircraft into Coast Guard HS-3A variants might prove far less expensive compared to purchasing a civilian turboprop and converting it into a Coast Guard aircraft. Reopening the production line is an option that has been discussed many times.

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that joint operations between the different military services are vital. Coast Guard HS-3As, with crews properly trained and qualified, could augment carrier air wing long-range search-and-res- cue capabilities. A joint-operations capable Coast Guard S-3 can eliminate some redundant players.

The diverse and demanding missions of the Coast Guard require an extremely flexible and capable aircraft. The S-3A fills the bill.

Lieutenant Pesci is an HU-25A and HU-25C pilot assigned to USCG Aviation Training Center, Mobile. He graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in 1988 and served as weapons officer on the USCGC Escanaba (WMEC-907) before attending flight training.

all their weapon stations to offensive ordnance. Vikings with decoys and ALR-76 electronic support measures supported many carrier air wing strikes.

An accurate real-time picture of active surface-to-air missile and radar-directed

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decoys in support of inbound strike forces. In coordination with active jamming from EA-6B Prowlers, the decoys helped confuse Iraqi air defenses. Using S-3s to launch the decoys meant that other strike aircraft were able to devote

U.S. NAVY

antiaircraft artillery positions is invaluable in the final phases of a strike. Vikings operating in coordination with E-2Cs and EA-6Bs helped provide this picture and many ingress and egress

Vikings have emerged as potent sea control assets. This VS-32 S-3B launching a Harpoon air-to-surface missile can carry many other weapons and sensors to support battle-group operations.

routes were modified after S-3 aircraft identified active missile sites.

S-3 contributions amounted to far more than electronic surveillance. The standard S-3 weapon configuration during Desert Storm included four Mk-82 500-pound bombs in the bomb bays and a fuel tank and aerial-refueling package on the wings. This allowed Vikings to shift from electronic warfare or armed surface reconnaissance missions to aerial refueling missions. U.S. Air Force tankers provided the preponderance of combat air patrol and interdiction mis

sion tanking, but Vikings routinely flew strike support missions and still had enough fuel remaining to act as recovery or mission-egress tankers. Tanking around the carrier (launches and recov-

ery) and specified individual mission tanking was done predominantly by S-3s. Five Viking squadrons delivered more than 2.5 million gallons of fuel during Desert Storm. Only the USS Midway (CV-41) lacked S-3s in her air wing.

As the Gulf War progressed, S-3s conducted more armed surface-reconnaissance missions. Initially, Vikings were limited to standoff targeting of surface vessels in the northern Persian Gulf, but as strike aircraft concentrated on overland power projection, the S-3s began targeting and striking Iraqi patrol craft—a logical progression. Both Iraqi vessels struck by Vikings were located, identified, targeted, and sunk by an individual aircraft.

The attack on 20 February was conducted between Bubiyan and Faylaka Island, and the 27 February attack occurred just south of Bubiyan and A1 Faw penin-

)

sula. Both patrol craft were defended by antiaircraft artillery and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles fired by nearby shore-based forces and by the vessels’ crews. Directed by the northern Gulf surface coordinator and flying without close escort, the S-3 crews relied on medium- altitude tactics and employed aircraft maneuvering and on-board flares to help defeat the defenses.

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Both aircraft struck their targets using train-release of their Mk-82 instantaneously-fuzed 500-pound bombs. On the 20 February attack, operating with good visibility, the crew used visual dive- bombing techniques and destroyed the target using all four bombs on a single pass. The 27 February attack was hampered by poor visibility caused by smoke from extensive oil fires. On this attack, the crew identified the target from low altitude, then popped up to make a radar delivery using precalculated parameters and on-line assisted release; two bombs were dropped on the first pass and these were enough to take out the target. In both cases, visual bomb damage assessments confirmed success.

From its introduction into the fleet, few doubted S-3B capability to stand off outside enemy air defenses and launch Harpoons against larger targets, but these two engagements demonstrated that S-3s could press into defended littoral airspace and place short-range weapons on small maneuverable targets.

L

Rear Admiral Philip A. Dur, then Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight, said that “the Vikings have demonstrated more versatility in ASW/ASUW [antisurface warfare]/EW and strike support than [he had] ever seen from a single weapons system. [The] enduring value to the battle group is now a matter of record.”

The recent employment of carrier- based VS aircraft may be new, but the character and spirit of the mission is not- The ability to search large areas, exploit enemy weapon systems, survive defenses, and identify and then destroy the enemy were hallmarks of the scouting squadrons of the late 1930s and World War II. Now, sea-control squadrons once again provide an essential multimission capability. The VS community has indeed come full circle .. . and then some.

Commander Bole is the executive officer of VS-31- A graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, he was most recently the executive officer of VS-27, the East Coast Fleet Replacement Squadron. He was the pilot on the 20 February 1991 strike, flying with VS-32 from the America. Lieutenant Commander Turner is the operations officer with VS-24. He has served on the Carrier Air Wing Eight staff and was the Tactical Coordinator of the S-3 during the second successful strike on 27 February 1991, flying from the Theodore Roosevelt.

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Proceedings / April 1994

Variable Draft Broadens SWATH Horizons

By Rear Admiral M. D. Van Orden, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Roy D. Gaul, PhD.

Small Waterplane Area Twin-Hull (SWATH) ships, in use for various specific tasks, have been slow to catch on in the maritime industry. Now, however, variable draft can make them practical—and economical—for many more applications.

The technical reasons SWATH ships have not been bought in large numbers boil down to three:

> Excessive draft V Trim variation with load shifts > High calm-water propulsion requirements compared to monohulls

The variable-draft concept can alleviate or overcome these deficiencies in ships displacing up to at least 5,000 tons. Model tests of designs developed for the offshore oil industry, research, and passenger service indicate that operators can continue to benefit from the SWATH concept in a ship whose draft can be adjusted for optimum performance.

This is important because the compelling reason to select a SWATH ship rather than a monohull is to gain better seakeeping in moderate-to-high wave conditions

The SWATH concept itself is not new. A U.S. patent granted in 1905 contained essential elements of a semisubmerged ship. Somewhat later, a concept for a “Mobile Seadrome,” which had the essential characteristics of recent SWATH

ships, was developed by F.G. Creed, and model tests were run in 1942. More recently, the oil industry has perfected semisubmerged floating platforms for drilling in deep offshore waters. These platforms have demonstrated that steadiness in a seaway is maximized when a large fraction of the displaced volume is underwater in the form of submerged hulls.

Major contributions by Dutch, Japanese, British, Canadian, and Scandinavian designers have helped the SWATH concept capture the imagination of seagoing persons throughout the world. The U.S. Navy, which explored the SWATH concept with the Kaimalino in 1973 and then neglected it for decades, finally acknowledged the merit of SWATH designs for steady platforms and began building SWATH-design Victorious (T-AGOS- 19)-class ocean-surveillance ships in the late 1980s.

The recognized and generally accepted advantages of SWATH designs need no longer be debated. There is no question concerning seakeeping: ships can be designed to suffer only one-half to one-fifth of the heave, pitch, and roll motions of a monohull of equal displacement in seas driven by wind speeds above 20 knots. Furthermore, SWATH ships can be configured such that motions are nearly independent of wave direction relative to

the heading of the ship, both under way and dead in the water.

SWATH ships can steam in storm conditions at much higher speeds than can comparable monohulls. Variable-draft vessels can operate comfortably at storm draft in weather conditions that would defeat a monohull’s ability to maintain course and speed. The submerged hulls exposed to reduced wave motion and the main hull elevated above the waves by the slender small-waterplane columns (struts), together with some other design tradeoffs, can make moderate-size vessels relatively immune to slamming.While doing so, the SWATH vessels would use less power and thus consume less fuel than the monohulls.

The most advantageous SWATH hull form uses its greater beam to provide larger deck area and usable volume than can be achieved with a conventional hull

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hroceedinRS / April 1994

109

This artist’s concept depicts a typical twin-strut, variable-draft, oceangoing research ship with its flat-topped pontoon-shaped hulls just below the surface. Ballasted-up, the hulls resemble surface ships’ hulls with very low freeboard; ballasted down, they provide excellent resistance to wave motion and excellent flat-plate damping.

form of comparable displacement.

A properly designed SWATH ship need not suffer unduly from the disadvantages often cited by critics. Proper design means variable draft—by far the change that has the greatest potential for disarming the critics.

Some SWATH designers have adapted many of the techniques of the offshore oil industry to solve SWATH problems. A common factor in the offshore oil service business is that work typically is done in exposed waters and at slow speeds.

The industry understands small waterplane and variable-draft technology because of its extensive use of semi- submersible drilling platforms. Variable draft is the distinguishing feature of those designs. Sufficient allowance for ballast transfer is made to enable the ship to vary its draft under all load conditions. The shallowest draft for vessels up to 5,000 tons displacement is well within usual harbor limits and can give the lower hulls a slight freeboard for transit in low sea states.

This elevation looking aft shows the alignment of the struts on the centerline of the lower hulls. The lower hulls’ rectangular cross sections enhance seakeeping at deeper drafts and give best propulsion performance at transit depths. The center bow provides a cushion against slamming and affords convenient overboard access for handling equipment.

Here are some specifics on the way innovators have overcome the problems of draft, propulsive power, displacement, and trim variation with load shifts:

►     The oil industry uses a number of semisubmersible platforms of 10,000- to 20,000-tons displacement with buoyancy compartments some 60 feet below the surface for offshore drilling operations. These platforms must be brought into port periodically for overhaul, maintenance, and refitting. The solution to their excessive-draft problem is simple: a segregated ballasting system that allows the platforms’ draft to vary. With ballast tanks empty, the platforms draw as little as 20 feet for entering ports and harbors, and SWATH ships can be designed with the same capability using ballast tanks and pumping arrangements.

>       The frequent statement that SWATH designs require excessive power assumes that large amounts of propulsion power will be expended when the ship is under way with hulls submerged to maximum draft, as is the case for conventionally designed and built SWATH ships where more wetted surface results in increased drag. Variable-draft designs, however, permit the hulls to be deballasted enough to give the lower hulls slight freeboard, which decreases the drag and hence the required propulsion power.

► Comparisons of SWATH and monohull design often assume that both have the same displacement. This is not necessarily valid, since a properly designed SWATH ship can be smaller than a monohull while offering the same, or better, operating characteristics. Smaller overall size, albeit with greater available enclosed volume, means that SWATH vessels can cost less than monohulls built for the same mission.

>■ Transverse trim of a SWATH vessel is more seriously affected by load shifts simply because the ship is wider. If distances are the same, SWATH generally lists about the same as a monohull. Longitudinal load shifts produce more change in trim than for a monohull, but this is seldom cause for concern. Because of waterplane area and wide separation of buoyancy compartments, ballast can be transferred to compensate for static load changes. The same applies to loads that cause trim variations—which can be offset easily by pumping segregated ballast. It should be recognized, however, that SWATH ships usually will not be cost- effective as transporters of high-bulk cargoes that gain no benefit from reduced ship motion.

Conventionally designed (single-draft) SWATH ships normally have elongated cylinders as hulls in order to minimize drag—but the streamlined submerged hulls themselves require various types of drag-producing struts and fins. An alternate approach is to give the lower hulls rectangular cross sections and stream

lining optimized for operating at the water surface. When submerged, the lower hulls act as large damping plates that obviate the need for fins. The hulls are essentially flat top and bottom, and so the flat-plate damping is much greater than that achieved with fins and stabilizers on cylindrical hulls. This design permits | steaming ballasted-up in fair weather on hulls that resemble those of surface ships with very low freeboard. Waves are allowed to break over the exposed hulls rather than working against them. The rectangular hull forms have an added advantage: they are less expensive to fabricate and outfit.

SWATH shares with all other ship designs the necessity to make compromises. Taking best advantage of its strong points demands that the design be tailored to the mission. The greatest advantage is obtained for mis- i sions that require resistance to wave-induced ship motion. SWATH fringe benefits include:

►     Steadiness in a seaway under all conditions and at , all speeds and headings

►     Excellent maneuvering and course keeping at slow speeds

►     Large deck space and hull volumes

>■ Good crew safety and effectiveness in all weather conditions

► Variable draft for optimum steadiness, , as well as for best transit performance ¹ i and access to shallow waterways and i harbors. i

Variable-draft SWATH ships are par- ; ticularly well suited to oceanographic and j survey applications. The potential is high , ; to design one for open-ocean operations that performs better and costs less than a ; monohull. With about 250 feet length _t overall, a SWATH vessel can be classed | for open-ocean operations. A variable- ₍

draft ship, displacing 2,000 long tons or ¹ , more, would be able to ride out major j storms comfortably on station, prepared         ¹

to resume operations when conditions  I   f

moderate.                                                        |    f

The SWATH design inherently offers          _c

much more usable enclosed volume and   ^

deck space than an equivalent mono- <j hull—especially important for research and survey applications that require large t, enclosed deck areas for equipment, op- q erations, and accommodations. Motions  _n

and course deviations of tow points _v would be lower than those experienced p with equipment deployed over the stern _S]

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Proceedings / April PW4

of conventional ships. The broad beam of a SWATH—typically more than twice that of an equivalent monohull—can be very useful for deploying research and survey equipment.

The fully submerged lower hulls of the SWATH ship, which experience much less motion and course deviations than an equivalent monohull, provide superior locations for mounting sonar transducers (including bathymetric arrays) and other physical measurement systems.

Draft and trim changes, which can be compensated for by varying draft, will have little effect on operations, particularly since research-and-survey applications have small variable load ranges. Ship motion has a large impact on operational effectiveness in research and survey applications; thus, the SWATH design is ideal for such missions.

Variable-draft SWATH research-and- survey ships ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 tons will be able to conduct technical operations in sea states 5-7. Operating sea- state limitations depend mainly on mission tolerances for ship motion. Monohulls have marked preference for headings relative to wave directions that keep motion response to a minimum. This preference is much reduced in the single-strut design and can be almost eliminated with a dual-strut SWATH. As wave height increases in head seas, monohull accelerations and pitch response increase dramatically with the onset of slamming. For monohulls of 200-300 feet length overall, slamming in sea state 5 is common with the ship heading into the seaway at 10 knots. Model tests have shown that the dual-strut SWATH can avoid slamming at sustained speeds up to

10 knots in sea state 6 on all headings.

SWATH ship technology is highly developed and readily adapted to the design and construction of ocean-going research-and-survey ships. A variable-draft SWATH ship displacing more than 1,500 long tons can be produced at a cost competitive with equivalent monohull ships.

Admiral Van Orden is a director of Blue Sea Corporation. He served at sea on the USS Independence (CVL-22) with the Third and Fifth Fleets during World War II, the USS Tanager (MSF-385), and the USS Marquette (AKA-95) before becoming an Engineering Duty Officer (Electronics). He commanded the Naval Electronics Laboratory Center (San Diego) and retired as the Chief of Naval Research. Dr. Gaul founded Blue Sea Corporation in 1982 and has been active in developing variable-draft technology. He earned his doctorate in oceanography at Texas A&M in 1966 and served as a project director in the Office of Naval Research from 1971 to 1979.

New Directions Dictate Hardware Changes

By Commander Brent L. Gravatt, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Shifts in the international balance of power will inevitably bring about changes in the principal threats to the security of any given nation. These must be met by . . . corresponding changes in service strategic concepts.

Samuel P. Huntington

Huntington said this 40 years ago in reference to what the U.S. Navy would have to do in response to the Cold War. Now, once again, the new shift in international power brought about by the demise of the Soviet Union has caused the strategic concepts of the Navy and of the other services to change. Gone is the Navy-Marine Corps strategy for globally confronting the Soviet threat and gone is the Army-Air Force concept for a war in the heart of Europe.

These long-familiar, even comforting, service strategies have given way to the new direction of confronting regional and local conflicts. The services’ recognition of this new direction is found in the Air Force’s “Global Reach—Global Power” (1990); the Navy-Marine Corps’ “ . . . From the Sea,” (1992); and the Army’s FM 100-5 Operations (1993). Beyond their common focus on regional conflicts, these new military outlooks have other similarities—yet they retain distinct service viewpoints.

All three perceive the threat in similar terms—it is real but lacks definition. This perception emanates from the common conviction that the post-Cold War World is an unpredictable and violent place in which political and economic instability, local and regional strife, resid

ual Russian capability, terrorism, and the proliferation of sophisticated weapons can imperil U.S. interests. The sense of the services’ feel for the threat is best stated in the Pentagon’s view that “the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain.”

The services’ response to this ill-defined threat in the post-Cold War world is deterrence based on a recognized capability and willingness to retaliate, be it nuclear or conventional. On the nuclear side, the Air Force’s “Global Reach— Global Power” endorses continued commitment to a “balanced triad” with a modernized bomber force providing “the most stabilizing element of the triad.” The Navy-Marine Corps’ “... From the Sea” notes the importance of the ballistic-missile submarine force to national security with nary a mention of the triad. The Army, out of the nuclear business with the removal of tactical-nuclear weapons from its inventory, in FM 100-5 merely posits its reliance on the other services to deter the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. But it is to the deterrence of conventional rather than nuclear conflicts that the services' pronouncements devote greater attention.

The services believe conventional deterrence can best be achieved with a demonstrated ability to intervene jointly, and joint intervention is a common declaration in all three publications. There is little stated unilateralism in the documents, and what there is has to do with the initial operations of an intervention.

The Air Force views itself as the leading-edge force of early intervention—able

to “ . . . provide a presence, or put ordnance on a target worldwide in a matter of hours. Long-range bombers armed with conventional weapons can rapidly reach any location on the globe . . . and . . could execute such operations without reliance on forward bases or overflight rights.”

The Air Force admits that land-based fighter forces require forward basing but goes on to say that “ . . . when the interests of allies are threatened, basing will normally be made available.” A critic of this leading-edge advocacy would likely point out the Air Force’s rather optimistic dismissal of the difficulties of forward basing and overflight associated with land-based air.

The Navy-Marine Corps team also advertises itself as the first to fight. Naval expeditionary forces are viewed as intervention forces capable of “enabling”— if required—the entry of follow-on heavy Army and Air Force units. Indeed,

. . From the Sea” asserts “... the success of modern U.S. military strategy” is dependent on this “division of combat labor.”

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Sea control also is necessary for intervening, but such control is assumed for regional and local conflicts, at least up to the littoral where dominance of the bat- tlespace could be in contention. This assumption of the control of the open ocean, noted in “. . . From the Sea,” is the reason for a fundamental change in the Navy’s concept of warfare from a blue-water strategy of fighting on the sea to a brown-water strategy of fighting from the sea. Certainly, however, “fight-

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Much should change; some things will stay the same. The Army may need more paratroopers, the Air Force needs to Find a replacement for its A-10, and the Special Operations Command needs fast patrol craft, Marines will continue to hit beaches around the world.

ing from” rather than “fighting on” is nothing new for the Marine Corps.

The naval services’ claim to being the enabling force is highly dependent on being in position; sometimes, if the prepositioned afloat materiel is out of position, sea-based expeditionary forces can take longer to respond than land-based air or airlifted ground forces.

Because of decreases in the overseas- deployed ground forces, the Army now considers itself to be primarily a force- projection rather than a forward-defense force. It makes no claims, however, as do the other services, to being a unilateral- entry force. Quite the contrary, the Army bluntly states that “force projection is inherently joint in nature” and that “the Army does not fight alone.”

These admissions are not statements of humility, or of servility to jointness, but rather are realistic acknowledgements that to get there, the Army depends on airlift and sealift; to fight there, it usually needs air support from the other services; and to stay there, it relies on air and sea transport for reinforcement and resupply. The Army is joint by necessity, not by choice.

While incapable of unilateral intervention in most cases, the Army does see itself as a rapid-reaction force, capable of quick response in a crisis; “Every commander, every soldier, every unit in a force-projection army must be ... trained, structured, and postured for rapid deployment. Light forces are based close to major airports [and] armored forces are located near major rail nets, assisting rapid displacement to seaports.”

Once deployed, the Army believes it

will be the critical element in any joint intervention: “The Army is the nation’s historically proven decisive military force .... It is the Army’s ability to . . . conduct sustained land operations that make it decisive [italics in original].”

The fundamental change from forward defense to force projection has increased the dependency of the Army on the other services. Should the other services’ commitment to lift waver, the Army could find itself becoming the functional equivalent of a home-defense force.

The Army’s and Air Force’s view of interventions is that they likely will be of limited duration with low U.S. casualties. This will be the case, the two services believe, because of a combination of superior U.S. technology and the force of public opinion. From the Army’s perspective, technology affords a significant advantage to soldiers while ”... minimizing risk to the force,” and the Air Force notes that “advanced technologies will provide . . . decisive capabilities . . . at minimum cost in casualties [which is] increasingly important in an era in which . . . the American people will have low tolerance for prolonged combat operations or mounting casualties.”

“ . . . From the Sea” does not specifically address the duration of an intervention, but the emphasis is on the longterm deployment and employment of forces rather than on the short term.

With all the services now focusing on intervention in regional and local conflicts, this new direction will cause some force structure changes as the services seek to bring their hardware into consonance with the new concept—the metal will have to match the mental. Indeed, all three documents are force-structure drivers. While some of the intended force changes are clearly stated in the publications, others are implicit; and, certainly, some of the stated as well as the implied changes have occurred or are occurring.

For the Air Force, the changes center on an apparent shift in primary emphasis from long-range bombardment of targets distant from the battlefield to air operations more closely linked to the battlefield. Oversimplified, and in Air Force-ese somewhat terminologically inaccurate, this is a change from the strategic to the tactical. As the Air Force shrinks in size, fighter-attack, special operations, and transport aircraft should

1994

Proceedings / April