It's More Than Ships

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The shrinking U.S. fleet and the similar downsizing of other major maritime nations’ fleets will force smaller, less-developed nations to play larger roles in regional security. How ready are they? Not very, if my experience with the Pakistani Navy while on the staff of the U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan during 1989 and 1990 is typical.

When, in the last years of the Reagan administration, the “600-ship” U.S. Navy began to shrink under budgetary pressures, the first casualties were the Brooke (FFG-1)- and Garcia (FF-1040)-class frigates. Once taken out of service, these ships were made available to friendly nations,

and, when the political bidding was finished, eight were leased to Pakistan. Following a crash program to train Pakistani sailors in the United States, most of the ships were transferred “hot,” with a face-to-face exchange of crews. This was not the first transfer of U.S. Navy ships to the Pakistani Navy; it received six Gearing (DD-710)-class destroyers during the 1970s and early 1980s.

If the United States wants its military aid to foreign navies such as Pakistan’s to be meaningful, it must adhere to two principles: the recipient must be able to afford the equipment’s operating costs, and it must be able to operate and maintain the equipment.

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The U.S. Navy supports foreign navies as part of the United States' military aid program, and many former U.S. ships form important parts of foreign fleets. When offering assistance to foreign forces, however, adherence to two principles is essential if our efforts are to succeed- First, the recipient must be able to afford the operating costs of the equipment provided. Second, the equipment’s operation and maintenance must be within their technological capability. In our efforts to court a strategically placed ally during the Soviet invasion ot Afghanistan and in response to Pak' istan’s perceived need to strengthen its fleet to counter the growing Indian Navy, both principles fell to expediency.

The lease of the eight Brooke and Garcia-class frigates was fob lowed by the transfer of the ex-USS Hector (AR-7). These additions came close to doubling the size of the Pakistani fleet in less than two years, strain' ing their ability to manage the added administrative, main' tenance, and operational load. The Pakistani Navy received no additional funding or end strength, losing the budge¹ battle to the much larger and politically powerful arm) and air force. Unwilling to decommission the Gearings o^f other obsolete vessels, they were forced to operate the ne" ships with funds taken out of hide. This led to less tha¹¹ adequate resources across the board, for maintenance, man^- ning, and steaming.

By Lieutenant Commander J. T. Kemper, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)

The Brooke and Garcia frigates were unique in the U.S

19»*|

Proceedings / April

Navy, having pressure-fired boilers with state-of-the-art automatic controls. They were chosen for elimination from the U.S. fleet at least in part because we found them expensive and difficult to maintain. In addition, with steam pressures up to 1,200 pounds per square inch, the engineering plant is potentially less forgiving of improper maintenance or operation, with greater possibility of catastrophic failure than that found in other ships.

The Pakistani Navy’s attempts to absorb the technology in the frigates are typical of the difficulties developing nations face ...

Our efforts to assist the Pakistani Navy included the formation of a technical assistance team, headed by an engineering duty officer, with a Supply Corps officer and about a dozen technical reps. The team was funded by the Pakistani Navy as required by Security Assistance laws, but finding the right people fell to the Naval Sea Systems Command, which retained configuration control over the leased ships and managed the U.S. Navy’s part in the ships’ maintenance. To support a related project—assisting the Pakistani Navy to develop the capability to overhaul a frigate—personnel from the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard also worked in country.

The Pakistani Navy’s attempts to absorb the technology in the frigates are typical of the difficulties developing nations face and lead one to question the combat readiness of their ships. Many officers are graduates of prominent Western universities, but the typical sailor is not educated beyond the elementary school level and has only rudimentary English language skills. The several hundred who received language and technical training in the United States were able to communicate more effectively, but they soon became dispersed throughout the Pakistani fleet.

Despite the language difficulties, many sailors came to understand their equipment and could troubleshoot it, but they frequently hesitated to take the repair action and would leave the gear out of commission until a technical representative was available. They often were reluctant to use available repair parts because of their high cost relative to local economy and because a long supply line from the United States and the on-again-off-again nature of our military assistance meant they might not be available for future contingencies. Once a part was replaced, the defective item seldom was discarded; it was hoped that the capability would be developed to repair it locally, even though the part was not designed to be repaired. Some even may have found their way back into stock, guaranteeing equipment failure in the future.

Basic maintenance and operational requirements often Were ignored, despite U.S. training of the crews and the transfer of maintenance schedules and complete documentation with each ship. Proper boiler layups when going cold iron were seldom done nor were light-off procedures followed; when under way, total reliance was placed on the automatic boiler controls. One repetitive failure of a Weapon system was traced to their practice of cleaning dectrical contacts with ship’s fuel instead of alcohol. Unless there was an immediate adverse consequence of foiling to follow a standard, it was not likely to be done— especially if it was easier or cheaper not too. Maintenance °f torpedoes, missiles, and guns was neglected, especially costly evolutions such as returning components to the

States or bringing in a technical representative to do maintenance beyond in-country capability.

The hesitation to use available materials extended beyond routine maintenance. During a tour of the Karachi Naval Supply Depot’s South Annex, 1 saw numerous major components, in original crates, that had been provided in the 1970s as part of the provisioning for the Gearings. In the 10-15 years since that transfer, it seems likely that those components should have been used during maintenance and overhauls. That they had not been probably reflects two concerns: a tendency to patch things instead of extensive maintenance and poor communications between the supply and repair staffs (I doubt the latter knew the stuff existed). Unfortunately, this lesson was not learned and the same type of material was provided for the Brooke- and Garcia-class ships, with the end result being wasted funds and less than optimum materiel condition.

Following the PNS Moawin's (ex-USS Hector) reactivation at Subic Bay, I rode the ship for part of the transit to Karachi. Many operational areas were impressive, but the Pakistani Navy’s lack of blue-water experience was evident. Almost every man on board wore plastic sandals everywhere, making it obvious that the Pakistanis have never experienced a severe fire at sea. Even though it had been procured, little damage control or fire-fighting gear was in place on deck or in working spaces; most was packed away in the cargo holds. During this transit, ship's company finished painting the main engineering spaces while under way.

We generally were prohibited from observing operations, but what we did see often raised questions about tactics and readiness. For example, during a large fleet exercise centered around Karachi, the Pakistani Navy flew barrage balloons above the Naval Dockyard. During an earlier exercise, they fired a warshot Harpoon from one of their submarines and when the missile failed to hit the target, they declared the weapon defective and demanded a refund—even though the target, a low-lying barge, did not have the physical characteristics of a warship and was not likely to be acquired by the missile.

With no increase in end strength, the Pakistani Navy also found it difficult to man the ships, and as time went on manning was reduced on those ships awaiting overhaul and sonar dome replacement. The Pakistani Navy sent more than 200 sailors to Subic Bay to assist in the reactivation of the PNS Moawin and to bring the ship to Pakistan, but they were without officers with alongside upkeep experience and the skilled machinists and other craftsmen needed to operate the tender’s repair facilities.

47

foceedings / April 1994

After the excitement of the Brooke and Garcia transfers wore off, it became clear that the Pakistani Navy never fully appreciated the cost to operate a modem warship and her weapon systems. They continually asked us for price information for equipment, weapons, and services, while shopping around with commercial vendors. Usually the end result was an increase in the end cost and months’ delay for whatever they were buying as a result of missed quantity buys with the U.S. Navy or annual price increases. They did not understand that parts pricing information

available in the Management List-Navy represented historical information, with significant price increases to be expected. When receipts came in at higher prices, they would question them, often implying that we were making errors to our advantage.

In an effort to save money, joint management conferences would be postponed repeatedly, saving travel costs but incurring higher costs and significant delays as a result of failed communication and a lack of mutual understanding. They often failed to get the full benefit of what they did pay for. Technical assistance team members frequently sat idle during the working day, despite high daily costs, because the Pakistanis were not ready for them.

Ashore, such basics as personal computers and copying machines were slowly being introduced but not without difficulty. For example, the Naval Supply Depot at Karachi had more than one copier, but for weeks at a time none would be operational as no funds were available to pay a commercial repairman. Similarly, we obtained and hand carried into country CD ROM readers and software for parts management, but the Pakistani Navy found it extremely difficult to keep this equipment running because of chronic power fluctuations, unairconditioned, dusty offices, and lack of operator familiarity with computer equipment.

The impact on readiness caused by the lack of infrastructure is substantial. The country has only two ports of consequence, Karachi and Port Qasim. Karachi is extremely congested, being the main commercial port and the only location for unloading petroleum imports; Qasim is a more modern commercial port designed and used primarily for grain exports. While large and fairly new, it requires a lengthy maneuvering watch and has no naval shore facilities. Initially, the Brooke and Garcia frigates were based at the Naval Dockyard at Karachi and the PNS Moawin, the tender, at Qasim. This dichotomy was forced by space constraints at Karachi. Neither port has shore power, forcing the Pakistani Navy to steam in port, or more usually, to rely on the limited capacities of the ship’s diesel generators, with lack of power impeding maintenance and training.

Routine fueling in port was extremely difficult, as navy ships had to compete with commercial vessels for space at the single fuel pier controlled by the state oil company or fuel from 3,000- to 5,000-gallon fuel trailers called bowsers. Bowsers were the only means of fueling the tender and other ships at Port Qasim. The Pakistani Navy has two tankers, a Fuqing class and an ex-U.S. Mission class,

both with some measure of underway replenishment capability, but they seldom provisioned other ships, at sea or in port.

The only dry docks of size were adjacent to the Naval Dockyard at the state-owned Karachi Shipbuilding and Engineering Works, with the largest thought able to dry dock a Brooke or Garcia frigate at high, high tide. Again the Pakistani Navy had to compete with commercial requirements for sorely needed resources. A floating dry dock had been considered, but lack of a suitable anchorage and money made it impracticable. An additional port and naval base have long been desired, but getting them would require bringing in everything—roads, utilities, fuel facilities, housing, etc.—and finding a means to finance it. Until an additional port is built and the current ones improved, the Pakistani Navy will face difficulty conducting and sustaining combat operations, damage repair, and resupply.

With the eight Brooke- and Garcia-class frigates and the former USS Hector, the Pakistani Navy had the beginnings of an effective regional maritime security force. Regrettably, U.S. aid to Pakistan—both military and economic—was frozen 1 October 1990 under the terms of the Pressler Amendment, which prohibits aid to countries pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a result, the Pakistani Navy is forced to rely on commercial sources for repairs and material and agreed to return the- Brooke and Garcia frigates and the ex-USS Hector to the United States when their leases ran out in 1993-94. To replace them, six British Type-21 frigates have been purchased, for a reported $10 million-$12 million each, with transfer of the first made in July 1993. According to press reports, the Pakistani Navy hopes to equip the ships with Sea Lynx helicopters and keep them operational until about 2020.

But continuing progress in assimilating modern technology, increased funding, and more trained personnel are essential if the Pakistani Navy is to maintain some degree of operational readiness. Some aspects limiting its effectiveness may be unique, but the core problems—technology, funding, and training—are common to other developing nations.

Commander Kemper retired in February 1994. During his Navy career- he served as supply officer of the USS Ulysses S. Grant (SSBN-631)- Commander, Submarine Group Seven, and Marine Corps Air Station N Futenma, Okinawa, Japan. Other tours include Deputy Chief, Navy Sec- r tion. Office of the U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan, and economics instructor, U.S. Naval Academy.