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“Bikini—‘Witch’s Brew’”
{See J. M. Weisgall, pp. 78-81, February 1994
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Robert A. Conard, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I was one of a number of Army and Navy doctors who were given special training in radiological safety in preparation for Operation Crossroads and served under Colonel Stafford Warren in the Radiological Safety Section during the operation. Based on my experience, I think Mr. Weisgall exaggerated the seriousness of the radiological hazards.
I agree that the radiological contamination following the underwater detonation (Test Baker) presented a serious problem and created a greater radiological hazard than had been expected. However, the Radiological Safety Section handled this difficult situation in an exemplary manner.
For Test Baker, I was a monitor for Dr. Ralph Sawyer, the Technical Director. For the men from his ship who retrieved instruments from the target ships, I instituted a strict monitoring regimen. They were given protective clothing and film badges. On their return to the ship, they were measured for radiation using a Geiger counter, changed clothes, and showered. The majority of the few cases of overexposure resulted in a dose range that anyone might receive over a few years’ exposure to natural and medical radiation. I doubt if such exposure would result in detectable effects.
In the light of present knowledge, I believe that the concern about plutonium absorption from the contaminated ships was Unjustified. People living on Bikini (which "'as contaminated along with the ships) have been tested for absorbed plutonium and the amounts found are quite low, 'veil within the federal guidelines. □
“A Surface Warrior’s | Challenge”
(See R. T. Rushton, pp. 26-28, February 1994 Proceedings)
lieutenant John Buziak, U.S. Navy— Commander Rushton offers the first constructive recommendations for leading the surface-warfare community out of the Quagmire it is mired in today. Rather than "'hining about shrinking resources and diminishing training time, he attacks one
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of the major obstacles to progress in the surface navy: the failure to recognize the absolute need for specialization.
This failure has ensured that department heads are ill-equipped to lead their departments, incapable of training their division officers, and under constant fire from their commanding officers. With rare exceptions, department heads come to their first sea tours with 18 months— or less—of experience in the departments they are to lead. By design and intent, our department heads are trained minimally in all areas of ship operations and are masters of none. Frequently, these officers also are working in a new ship type. Consequently, they begin their tours as students rather than leaders. Usually, it takes them between six months and a year to take control of their departments and begin to make a contribution to the ship as a whole.
Commander Rushton accurately catalogs the resulting ills in warfighting ability that arise from this arrangement. He did not address, however, the deleterious effects below the main deck resulting from the “Jack of All Trades” policy. The high rate of failures during Light-Off Exams and Operational Propulsion Plant Examinations points to the fact that engineering readiness is far from what it should be. After all the complaining about the Propulsion Examining Board (PEB) subsides, the facts remain that only the minimum standards of material readiness are enforced and the grading of basic engineering casualty control drills and main- space fire drills is quite lenient. Combat- systems officers can argue justifiably that their training suffers because so much time is spent preparing for engineering inspections. How much more rapidly could a skilled and experienced chief engineer prepare his department than a rookie? There is little empirical evidence to support this estimate, but I figure three months versus six to nine months.
The two things that will allow our department heads to become leaders and teachers rather than students are the ability to focus on their mission area and the ability to create and execute a plan. Specialization will allow the time at every step in the training pipeline for combat-systems officers to become better warfighters and engineers to become more proficient in their field.
Specialization also could open up enough time for the teaching of mean-
Contents:
Bikini—Witch’s Brew—13 A Surface Warrior’s Challenge—13
Bungling the Informal Contract—14
Retired—At the Navy’s Request—16
Why Doesn’t the Navy Make More Use of the Retired Community?—16
Shore-based Combat Information Centers in the Narrow Seas—16
Tailhook: The Morning After—18
The Albacore Advantage—24
The Gator Stumbles—26
Requiem for a Heavyweight—26
Fewer C-17s Buy More Lift—26
Death of a Squadron—28
A Farewell to (Combined) Arms, Unless . .. —28
Until the First Bloodied Body Goes By ...—28
Rethinking Graduate Education—29
Divorce, Military Style—29
Standing Up for Truth—29
It’s Time to Beach the NOAA Corps—30
How About a Permanent Waiver?—30
Less Punishment & More Patience—30
Are We Committed?—33
Creating Deployable Harbor Defense—33
13
Sea Shadow—26
Go, NAPS, Go!—29
ingful planning techniques. The more volatile the schedule becomes the more important planning skills become, not less as many mistakenly believe. There are effective techniques for modifying plans to meet changing conditions—e.g., Critical Path Management—but too few officers know them.
The move to specialization is inevitable. It was ordained the day the PEB was established. Already, many successful engineers find themselves shuffled from chief engineer, to material officer billets at groups and squadrons, to the PEB. Many convert to engineering-duty officers. The formalization of specialized pipelines would not be as much a revolution as a recognition of reality. How much more damage are we going to allow amateurs do to our sailors and our ships before we solve the problem? □
“Bungling the Informal Contract”
(See J. H. Cushman, pp. 10-13, January 1994;
C. L. Powell, R. C. Macke, pp. 10-13, March 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired)—Institutionalized by the Army in the 1980s, the stringent “after-action review” (AAR) has been a powerful tool for achieving excellence. After an exercise, observer/controllers rigorously review commanders’ and
staffs’ performances; commanders set their egos aside and join right in. The AAR concept was a major factor in the Army's proficiency in the Persian Gulf War.
At the level of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), there can be no such AAR; who would run it? Yet the CJCS, his JCS colleagues, the Joint Staff, and the unified commanders-in-chief (CinCs)—and the President and his civilian advisors, as well—surely need an open and forthright appraisal of their individ
ual performances in operational matters— however vexing it might be to them.
My commentary was an attempt at an AAR. I wrote that in President Bill Clinton’s first year, the performance both of the President and his civilian national security team—whom I called naive and inexperienced—and of the professional military establishment responsible to the President had fallen short.
In Bosnia, I laid the original fault on President George Bush, as well as on his military establishment. In Haiti, I said that President Clinton and his civilian policy team got it wrong. In Somalia, I said that the Phase I plan was faulty and that General Powell should have told both Presidents that Phase II should not be under the direction of the Secretary General of the United Nations, who was an authority unsuited for that task, and that he should have stood his ground on the matter.
That I went into print with, and still hold to, each of these views may be, as General Powell calls it, “the height of arrogance.” But his charge of “intellectual dishonesty” I do not accept.
Admiral Macke mentioned favorably my pamphlet, Thoughts for Joint Commanders. On its page eight I say that the commander's fundamental need is to understand the situation. His perception of the situation should match as closely as possible the objective reality that lies out there, and only to the degree that his
perception agrees with reality will his decisions tend to be right.
When the commander sees the situation as it is he has “insight,” and that insight comes, among other things, from willing openness to a variety of stimuli— from intellectual curiosity, from conversations and discussions, from listening to the views of outsiders. Seeking insight that way makes it more likely that the course of action decided on will be in harmony with the objective situation— and, therefore, successful.
Listening attentively to the views of the service chiefs and their operations deputies is a way for the Chairman and his Joint Staff to improve their insight.
General Powell and Admiral Macke say that these authorities were sufficiently listened to. My information came from senior officers in positions to know who perceived otherwise.
General Powell and Admiral Macke defend the December 1992 Somalia plan and say that it reflected not Marine but “joint” thinking. Fair enough, but I still find it faulty in that it did not, as I wrote, “involve the swift, simultaneous, and overwhelming application of multidimensional force that would go directly and decisively to the enemy's center of gravity ... the weapons in the hands of the clan and sub-clan leaders.” While a systematic step-by-step process also was called for in Somalia, thought and experience tell me that the way to enter that situation was as I wrote, and I am not alone in that belief. This critical doctrinal issue calls for a treatment longer than this space can provide, and I defer it.
I grant that weapons and ammunition were “collected” (although the troops avoided the use of force to do so). But what was collected was in large part not placed under U.N. control. Clan leaders could still get at their stocks.
To discuss a major failure of insight in Somalia, I use this figure from page six of Thoughts for Joint Commanders- Modified to include other than purely military means—psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, nation-building cadres, for example—this portrayal holds for Somalia.
While behind the simplified picture ke matters of great complexity, the four basic levels of direction—political, strategic, operational, and tactical—will apply in virtually every case of joint or combined force employment. The boundaries between levels can be matters of discussion case by case, and doctrine writers and war college faculties can tinker at length with the language level by level, but the basic ideas are simple enough to be conveyed in this one chart-
For an operational employment of virtually any kind to be concluded with adequate success, eminently satisfactory pef" formance is required at each of these meshed levels of direction. Whether an | operation is to be United States-only or- which is more likely, multinational, if U.S- forces are committed to action, Americans have a right to expect the highest quality performance, level by level, in the one opportunity given to do it right.
The Direction of Operations
Orchestrates the units—the divisions, brigades, wings, task forces, and task groups—and their logistics toward the execution of successful campaigns
Strategic
Direction
Estafc
Political
Direction
X ie,s I \ Lays
Sets policy objectives
out basic strategy to achieve these objectives Provides basic guidance for operations, including
Operation Just Cause (Panama, December 1989-January 1990) the Gud War, and Provide Comfort (northern Iraq- March-June 1991)—all of them sue-
Proceedings/ April
cesses—were each done satisfactorily, even superlatively, at every one of the four meshed levels of direction shown in the figure. General Powell justly received credit for his role in them.
But when Somalia's Phase II was handed to U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it was doomed. In the Persian Gulf War and Operation Provide Comfort, the President and his advisors, including the CJCS, coordinated with Coalition partners the political and strategic direction of the combined force responsive to resolutions of the U.N. Security Council (which the President's team helped to write), and a U.S. chain of command built a working coalition in the field.
Nothing like this came to pass in the Somalia effort. There the United Nations was the venue for developing guidance, and Boutros-Ghali and his on-scene representative, retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, a combination neither fit nor resourced for the task, were the agents for its execution.
According to The New York Times, in early September 1993, General Joseph Hoar, CinC of the U.S. Central Command—who was taken out of the picture in May when the U.S. Joint Task Force closed down and the Turkish Lieutenant General Cevic Bir (who would not be under General Hoar's command) took over—cabled Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner and General Powell that “a coherent plan that involves the political, humanitarian, and security needs of [Somalia] has yet to emerge.” Without such a campaign plan there could not be the coherent orchestration of effort essential for successful operations; thus, whatever their dimensions, the military forces and other means could not be used to their best effect. (General Powell and Admiral Macke can defend if they choose the command arrangement existing in Somalia when the abortive action of 3 October 1993 took place, but I doubt if its like will soon be repeated.)
However unpleasant the two Presidents may have found the news in early January 1993, the straightforward route to success was to tell them (and thus the Congress and the American people) that “mission creep” had set in, that the U.N. Secretary General was not competent to direct Phase II’s peace-enforcing requirement, and, given a U.S. commitment to the broader mission, to write a Security Council resolution under which General Bir’s Phase II force would be under General Hoar’s command. General Hoar, pulling all national contingents together, would report to the Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, and do properly the job undertaken by the United Nations.
General Powell evidently either did not
then see that to turn Phase II over to the U.N. Secretary General would gravely jeopardize its successful outcome, or, seeing as much, he failed to represent that belief in the strongest of terms to superior authority. If the latter, I no longer speculate on why.
About Bosnia, I wrote that President Bush and his politico-military team should have urged a NATO line of action directed at Serbia, the primary culprit. The action would have included a massive psychological warfare operation aimed at the Serbian people and army, and would have made clear NATO’s willingness to use force to stop Serbia's support of criminal behavior outside its borders. The major force to be used would be precision air attacks on Serbia and on the bridges across the Drina River. After countless horrors, a limited use of NATO airpower finally came—two years late.
Few are unaware that the “formal” contract between political and military authorities at high levels is established in law. The “informal” contract is that each of the two parties will do its part well. I wrote that in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti each party bungled it; readers can choose their own term.
In Proceedings and elsewhere, let an after-action review continue. □
“Retired—At the Navy’s Request”
(See D. B. Sheehan, pp. 57-58, February 1994
Proceedings)
John N. Datto—Lieutenant Commander Sheehan pretty much sums the thoughts and feelings of many former career-military people. There is, however, some solace to be found by being active in organizations friendly to the Navy—e.g., the U.S. Naval Institute—where one can still promote and support the service.
Also, it might help to take an objective historical perspective and remind ourselves that regular and consistent advancement is a relatively new concept for the U.S. Navy. Indeed, for most of the 19th century, stagnant promotion opportunities were the norm; a man could languish well into his middle age as a passed midshipman. Connections ashore also played an important part in the promotion system of the period. However, many promising naval officers of that era managed to overcome the system and advance.
The Navy just might be returning to the conditions that characterized it for so many years. That is, extremely infrequent promotions in a service that has been relegated to the backwaters of the public mind and the bottom of the government list of priorities—until, that is, the next unanticipated international confrontation
I
occurs. History has an odd way of repeating itself. □
“Why Doesn’t the Navy Make More Use of the Retired Community?”
(See L. W. Brooks, p. 81, January 1994 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Hospital Corpsman Joe B. Havens, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Although Captain Brooks’s interesting perspective seems directed mainly toward retired officers, it certainly focuses on a void of measurable talent for advocacy, leadership, and camaraderie throughout the entire retired community. Whether interested or not, I believe the majority of Navy retirees—particularly those in business—can provide a wealth of wisdom in any venture, be it base closures, the utilization of unused military facilities, or the temporary manning of hospitals and other medical facilities. □
“Shore-based Combat Information Centers in the Narrow Seas”
(See N. Friedman, p. 92, January 1994 Proceedings)
Commander H. W. Rohlfs, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Dr. Friedman makes an important point when he writes that the current emphasis on littoral warfare makes the study of foreign coastal-defense systems important. I had the good fortune to work 15 months as the contractor team leader and master of the Hiddensee, the Soviet-built, ex-East German Tarantul-class missile corvette that Dr. Friedman cites as an example in application of shore- based coastal defense coordination.
The Hiddensee's Korall-E missile fire- control system has no provision for receiving automatic digital targeting or remote control. There is no data link through which the ship or her missiles could be remotely controlled. The missile-control panel abaft the pilothouse has four operating modes: visual, radar, casualty, and KVNP. KVNP stands for katernyy vynosnoy nablyudater’nyy “ship’s remote observation post”—and this mode facilitates launching missiles against a target that is over the horizon and being tracked by a forward observer. This might imply an automatic data link and remote control, but the system actually is much simpler, more reliable and robust, and quite elegant in its functional efficiency.
Documents, templates, and other tactical-decisionmaking aids found on board, discussions with one of the ship’s former officers, and the capabilities and charac-
teristics of the ship convince me that KVNP is intended to be the primary attack mode. The forward observer acts as an extension of the ship’s surveillance suite; he marks the target’s range.
No match for sophisticated U.S. systems on the open ocean, the relatively simple technology of many small combatants—e.g., a Soviet- designed Tarantul-class missile boat—would pose a potent threat in littoral waters.
bearing, course, and speed while the ship marks the observer’s range and bearing at the same time. The ship manually inputs the observer’s targeting data into the Korall-E, and the system solves the third leg of the triangle and generates a dynamic launching solution that is valid for about ten minutes. As long as data are marked simultaneously, real-time transmission isn’t essential; even if the target’s course and speed aren’t exact, or if it changes course and speed, the geometry can’t change much in a few minutes.
A forward observer could be a coast- watcher, a friendly coastal freighter or fishing boat, a surface combatant “tattletale,” a coastal radar site, a helicopter, a fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, or even a buoy or navigational reference point from which a shore-based surveillance and coordination center can determine (directly or indirectly) target range and bearing. Communications may be in any part of the military or commercial radio spectrum, or even visual in certain circumstances. Brief, innocent-sounding voice transmissions would suffice to set time on target and mark it.
Maneuvering from concealed dispersal locations, any number of missile boats could take part in the attack. Each boat
could mark the forward observer and use the same targeting data and each commander could subtract his missiles’ flight time and launch them at the proper time to achieve a time-on-target attack.
Virtually every nation with access to the sea can afford a squadron of missile craft like the Hiddensee and with them challenge the transit of a choke point, oppose an amphibious landing, and disrupt other littoral operations. Mines also are readily available, and in many of the coastal areas where we might operate there would be submarine, air, and shore-based opposition. The political situation is very likely to be convoluted and sensitive, and the tactical situation probably will be congested, complicated, and ambiguous.
All too often, we have discounted low-technolbgy opposition at the price of shipmates’ lives. We cannot ignore the plethora of small, fast, lethally armed ships nor assume that they will offer to meet us (and be destroyed) on the open ocean where our sensors and combat systems work the best. Individually, these platforms don’t seem particularly threatening to our Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, but several fast missile craft operating in concert, with surveillance support, effective coordination, and the advantage of surprise—fighting when and where they want—could wreak havoc on an amphibious task force or underway replenishment group. □
Tailhook: The Morning After
Rear Admiral Ned Hogan, U.S. Navy (Retired)—For more than two years, the Navy’s political and civilian leaders have been consumed by an event that occurred in September 1991 at a Las Vegas hotel. Many men and women were involved, the majority of whom—by no means all—were associated with naval aviation. All of the major decision-making players in the Navy Department have changed— by choice, election, or direction. Still, little has been resolved.
The now-infamous Tailhook circus that followed the event is symptomatic of bigger problems of America in the 1990s. As a nation, we have allowed the concept of political correctness to overcome our common sense, shared values, civility, institutions, and—most important—our traditional values of individual accountability and due process. People who believe that the ends justify the means
are rolling over those concerned with process and fairness. Unfortunately, our political and professional leaders have decided not to resist this tide of correctness.
The situation often has seemed a theater of the absurd—a burlesque—except that real people, not actors, are getting hurt on stage. With a few exceptions, no one has come to their defense.
I am an old fighter pilot and have spent most of my adult life flying from, working on, commanding, and arguing for aircraft carriers. I am a tailhooker, reckless as a youth and conservative in my old age, and I am not happy with the trashing of my life’s vocation. I was trained as a test pilot to make my judgments and assessments on observations and facts. I have no inside information or unique evidence; my views and interpretations are based on my analysis of the circus-like aftermath.
Since World War I, the fighter pilot has been portrayed in print and on the screen as a risk taker, a high achiever— a warrior with courage and dash. As author John Terraine points out, air combat is unusual in that, for the most part, the officers go into battle while the conscripts stay behind. There is no rank in the cockpit and youth, as often as not, ends up Top Gun.
Along with these traits goes a style of competitive and outrageous behavior at organized events—usually stag—as depicted so graphically in the movie version of Pat Conroy’s The Great Santini- The work hard/play hard pattern is hardly unique to aviators. It resides in the psyches of most elite combat units.
For the past several decades, the armed forces have benefited from an expanded entry pool, to include the full spectrum of American society. During this same period, society has come to accept, or tolerate, significant changes in behavior related to the free expression and sexual liberation trends of the 1960s and to the expansion of equal opportunity and freedom of choice initiatives. Youth of both genders, perhaps attempting to differentiate themselves from the generation before, have changed from spectators to participants. Outrageous behavior has been part of this liberating trend; it is not in any way the exclusive domain of the tail' hookers and their friends.
Other societal trends also have been at work. The women’s rights movement moved center-stage in the 1980s as attention focused on the role of women in the military and women in combat. The latter was a major source of contention that weekend in Las Vegas, and the linked issues of women’s rights and sexual harassment became an even more fractious and contentious element in the aftermath. [See ‘Tailhook 1991 and Other Perplexities,” by Captain Richard Lin-
1<W4
Proceedings / April
nekin, U.S. Navy, pp. 36-40, September 1992 Proceedings, which explores this issue in detail.]
The movie “Top Gun” also was a catalyst—both in setting the stage for the event and in causing the post-event reactions to assume such vindictiveness. Tom Cruise’s ego and macho swagger were larger than life in the movie and no doubt offended some; the incident in Las Vegas afforded an opportunity to bring the “Top Guns” back to earth.
Adding to the ferment, Tailhook ’91 was the first gathering of the many young tailhookers who participated in the Persian Gulf War. To have Las Vegas—the capital of outrageous behavior—as the
stage to celebrate their performance was almost surreal, even though the Tail- hook reunion has been held there for almost three decades.
In 1991, all of these circumstances combined to exceed current perceived politically correct limits, and the broad, changing societal ingredients were ignored in the rush to assign blame.
Many factors at play that weekend in Las Vegas make it difficult to assess blame. I wasn’t there; the reports I have received from on-scene observers and the picture painted by the investigators are at best confused, largely because of the differing adjectives used to detail the event: “rough and rowdy” connotes an
entirely different scene than does “lewd and licentious.” But whatever descriptors are used, there was a great deal of youthful and sexual energy on display, some of it funny and outrageous and some that may have exceeded the bounds of propriety—whatever they are in the 1990s.
The party ebbed and flowed during a professional symposium lauded by the Navy leadership as the best ever. Came the late-Saturday-night return of the alleged victim/complainant to the third floor burlesque and the now-infamous gauntlet. Upset at her treatment, over the next several weeks she discussed the incident with boss and his staff. Her subsequent official complaint, when framed and released to the media several weeks later, prompted a number of other civil suits against the Tailhook Association and the Las Vegas Hilton. To my knowledge, no criminal charges have been filed with the Las Vegas police.
About two weeks after the event, the complainant chose to resolve the matter by sending an official letter through her chain of command. To my knowledge, she did not file charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but rather sought relief through administrative procedures, writing to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare), with an endorsement from her boss. The letter was hand-carried to the Pentagon and seemed to satisfy her concerns.
In concert with the letter, her boss alerted appropriate Pentagon officers. Also, he called the president of the Tailhook Association, an active-duty carrier air wing commander, who then sent a letter under the aegis of the association to fleet squadron commanders, calling them to task for improprieties at Tailhook ’91— a form of self-policing action outside the official chain of command. The quasi-official relationship between the Navy and the association prompted this action, and it seemed appropriate at the time.
Coincidentally, the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation confrontation began to unfold and, within this sexually charged climate, the complainant provided the Chief of Naval Personnel a copy of her complaint without its forwarding endorsement. In San Diego, the letter from the Tailhook president emerged in the press. The action moved to Washington and the circus began.
The Navy’s leaders removed the matter from the commanders in the field, began damage-control operations, brought the complaintant to Washington to tell her story, and began investigating. The Naval Investigative Service and the Navy Inspector General conducted the first inquiries, which were rejected by the p°' litical management. The Secretary of the Navy resigned. The Department of De-
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Proceedings / April 1^
fense (DoD) Inspector General then began an investigation of the first inquiries, expanding the focus beyond the alleged assault to include all aspects of potential improprieties by anyone remotely connected with Tailhook ’91 or any of its predecessors.
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The expanded investigation became a witch hunt, with guilt by association, implication, and innuendo. About 130 Navy and Marine Corps officers—all male— were accused of some form of misconduct. The head of the Naval Investigative Service and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy were dismissed. For some reason, female officer participants in the third- floor burlesque were never targets of either investigative activity.
Finally, the Navy Department designated two special prosecutors, both of whom were convening authorities under the UCMJ.
The cases of the officers accused in the DoD Inspector General's report were referred to them for disposition. At this point, for virtually the first time, due process entered the picture and it soon became apparent that very little of what passed for evidence in the Inspector General’s report could stand judicial scrutiny. Cases that were referred to courts-martials were, without exception, dismissed for lack of evidence or grounds.
As a result. Admiral’s Masts—the Navy’s term for non-judicial punishment under UCMJ—were held for male officers charged with conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. The unbecoming conduct did not involve any kind of sexual attack or harassment and, in other circumstances, would have been more appropriately handled by their commanding officers. The Marine aviator accused of the gauntlet attack was exonerated and to date no other perpetrator has been identified.
The investigative process is not a pretty picture. There is a Keystone Kops quality to it, but there is no comedy be
cause the Kops in this case are responsible for the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps. The most harmful result of the Tailhook saga is the undermining of the traditional chain-of-command relationship, accountability, and loyalty— up and down. The decision to remove the responsibility for the matter from the commanders in the field was ill-advised. Special trust and confidence, the hallmark of the Navy and Marine officer corps, was dealt a serious blow.
The administrative letters of censure
and caution recently issued to approximately 30 flag and general officers— solely because of their association with Tailhook '91—is an astonishing development. Particularly abhorrent are the letters of censure issued to the active-duty aviation program deputies on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. Harsh and damning, the letters constitute judgment calls by the current political leadership and the officers have no recourse except a rebuttal for the record. These letters equate a failure to terminate consensual leg-shaving in a Las Vegas hotel with the disaster at Pearl Harbor in 1941—for which Admiral Husband Kimmel also received a letter of censure.
The Tailhook saga has generated a complex set of entwined themes and agendas that have captured and emasculated the leadership of the Navy and must be addressed.
If the assault took place as described, where was the gallant knight who should have come to the aid of the damsel in distress? I have no answer. I would have ex
pected someone, even an inebriated someone, to deck the assailant.
Given this inconclusiveness, it might be appropriate to provide the information gathered to date to the Clark County. Nevada authorities, for a grand jury to determine whether the evidence warrants any indictments. If not, the criminal cases are closed. The civil suits already in play will be resolved in the courts. Doing this would separate these highly charged issues from the other aspects of the Tailhook saga and let the appropriate courts resolve the affair.
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The Secretary of Defense should appoint a five-member advisory panel to take an objective look at the fairness of the entire process. The panel’s charter would be to evaluate-^ not investigate—and to report within two weeks in an abbreviated letter. Because the Tailhook saga relates principally to standards of social conduct and behavior, the panel should include social commentators of prominence. Potential members could include Ellen Goodman, George Will, Jim Webb. Richard Cohen, Nina Totenburg, and Tom Wolfe—with a young and an old tail- hooker thrown in to provide some insight.
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What about the Tailhook Association? Why were these people in Las Vegas in the first place? Why was the government involved and subsidizing the action? The Tailhook Association has sponsored an annual reunion, which evolved into a convention and symposium, for more than 40 years. It has no official government connection although it has done a marvelous job of supporting naval aviation. The current format always has received rave reviews from the Navy Department—Tail- hook ’91 included—and was commended by the DoD Inspector General. Its past performance cannot be faulted on substance, although it certainly can be faulted on image.
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Proceedings / April 1^
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approved portion of the action is a major component. Appropriate government agencies should consider whether consolidations and reductions are in order.
The subject of women in combat constituted a major issue heatedly debated by the young, active-duty aviators, men and women, at Tailhook ’91. In the aftermath of the investigations. Navy leaders changed course rather abruptly and made the politically correct decision to put women in combat—apparently believing that only in this way could the service demonstrate support for women’s rights in general and commitment to the policy of zero-tolerance for any form of sexual harassment.
The issue is not that simple. As the recent commission report and the congressional debates point out, there are many different kinds of combat. Women clearly can do some of the tasks—such as piloting aircraft—quite well. Ground combat is a different story.
We keep asking the wrong questions in the name of equal opportunity. Equal opportunity really means making sure that women are not discriminated against for promotions because they are excluded from serving in combat units. In aviation, the Navy for years has maintained a special duty category—aeronautical engineering duty—for which promotion through flag rank is based on performance in the acquisition-management career path; combat participation has no relevance. Currently, there are six active-duty aeronautical engineering duty flag officers. Women who want to fly tactical airplanes can serve in this demanding and challenging field without restriction and on an equal footing—with the opportunity to go to the top.
As for the three- and four-star ranks, most people fail to realize that these officers are not selected by promotion boards; they are appointed by the President and must be confirmed by the Senate. Combat and command experience are not prerequisites and the criteria vary over time. Excluding women from combat assignments does not deny them selection to these grades.
But whether combat exclusion keeps women from achieving flag rank is not the critical question. The question should be: Does America want women to do its fighting? The only way to find out in absolute terms is to conduct a national referendum on the issue and put it to a vote in the next election.
The Navy has been under serious assault by the forces of self-righteous indignation. To appease these special interests, the top leadership in the Pentagon blew the events of Las Vegas out of proportion and conducted a witch hunt that has gravely damaged the fleet’s confi
dence in those responsible for chartin; the Navy’s course.
We need a tough Navy for the 2b1 century, one whose leaders have th< moral courage to emphasize comb* readiness and who will resist rushin;- to judgments influenced by politic* expediency. □
‘The Albacore Advantage”
(See H. F. Payne, pp. 59-62, July 1993; A. H. Konetzni, p. 12, September 1993 ProceedingsI
Captain First Rank Nikolai VorobjF Russian Navy (Retired), Senior Fello»■ Shipbuilding Institute, St. Petersburg Russia—As Dr. Payne observes, a ft® jam of the dive planes on a submari^ running at high speed and great dep1' could end in the boat’s loss. Such a m^' function can happen anytime. In fact, oi* occurred on a Victor-class attack subtil rine during maneuverability tests.
The boat was running at relatively lo* depth when it became necessary to df scend several dozen meters. When tb( planesmen received the command, the i*- dicator for the aft diving planes show^ that they were several degrees on "st*- facing.” He turned the handle on “div" ing,” but the indicator reading did a1'1 change. He put the handle on “rest.” So* nothing. He then reported to the capw|C that the aft horizontal planes had jamm^ on “surface.” Instead of checking tb£ other indicators—which showed that tbf planes had moved to ordered angle—^ reducing speed, the captain ordered tbjI the planes be put on “diving” by tb[ emergency hydraulic system. The co*1' bined effect of the two hydraulic system jammed the aft planes on the maxim111' diving angle, and the submarine dove a 30° angle. Using the bow planes a*0 the small aft horizontal planes had noel' feet on the pace or angle of descent111,1 did an attempt to reverse the engines. P nally, an emergency “blow” was ordeb" for the forward ballast tank and the bo1' changed her trajectory only a few meWp from the rocky bottom.
As this episode shows, a submari111 should have maneuvering surfaces tW1 would prevent such an accident. The V tail is attractive; however, it poses so^ problems—specifically, the practicalin'' possibility of manual control because0 their “unnatural” position and the cod1 plexity of force interaction from varied combinations of settings.
U.S. submarine designers solved control safety problem by creating a ftr standard of reliability for control sys terns—i.e., equipping them with intern11 stern plane dive stops which limit tbf stern planes’ dive effect at high speed5'
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Proceedings / April
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The use of retractable bow horizontal planes to counter a jam of the stem planes at high speeds posed many problems. Sail-mounted planes produce an even smaller compensating effect. Therefore, in addition to the normal (“big”) stern horizontal planes, “small” stern horizontal planes were installed. Usually, the shift from the big horizontal planes to small horizontal planes takes place when the boat is moving at more than half of maximum speed. Therefore, a full-dive jam of the small diving planes at high speed could be immediately counteracted by the use of the big horizontal planes. Furthermore, because the area of the small planes is 25% of the big planes, the drag penalty is very moderate. □
Major Michael Ragsdale, U.S. Army Reserve—Do my eyes deceive me? Has the CSS Virginia been resurrected in a modem format? Judging from the pho-
on the principal issues. Anyone who makes decisions about the structure, organization, or operations of amphibious warfare—or writes about it for Proceedings—would do well to review the primer provided by Commander McKeamey before proceeding. As another “unrepentant gator,” a predecessor of McKeamey on the staff of Commander, Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet; an instructor in amphibious matters at the Naval War College and the Marine Corps Education Center; and a lifelong student of amphibious warfare, I judge Commander
misses the recommendations of the MRS for more strategic airlift in the form of the wide-bodied C-17 Globemaster.
The arguments cited for a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the C-141—a proposal made by Lockheed-' predate the discovery of much more extensive fatigue within the C-141 fleet, which resulted in the grounding of some aircraft and restrictions on the rest- Furthermore, General Merrill McPeak. the Air Force Chief of Staff, has stated that, even after an extensive SLEP. C-141s would be part of the airlift fleet
tographs of the Sea Shadow, it certainly looks like the Confederate States Navy was on the right track—just 130 years ahead of its time! □
“The Gator Stumbles”
(See T. J. McKeamey, pp. 35-40, January 1994 Proceedings)
“Requiem for a Heavyweight”
(See T. J. McKeamey, p. 38, January 1994;
F. L. Lewis, p. 20, March 1994 Proceedings)
Captain Grant Carson, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Over the past few years, the Navy has done some peculiar things with amphibious warfare. Judging by the commentary in Proceedings—sometimes by those who lacked experience to address the subject well—I anticipated that those peculiar things would continue. Perhaps they will, but not if those making the decisions read Commander McKeamey’s articles. Finally, someone truly knowledgeable has provided wise comment
McKearney’s many points to be unerringly on target.
There is one additional point I wish he had made, although the matter was beyond the focus of his article. Not only is the Composite Warfare Commander approach a bad way to organize an amphibious force; but it is a bad way to organize any military force. □
“Fewer C-17s Buy More Lift”
(See G. White, pp. 72-76, December 1993;
M. R. Gallagher, pp. 15-16, February 1994;
A. C. Ekrem, pp. 23-24, March 1994
Proceedings)
David Eastman, Manager, C-17 Program Information, McDonnell Douglas Aerospace—Commander White’s initial premise—the United States needs more strategic lift—is correct. He misses the mark, however, when he advocates cutting the C-17 program, which is the essential element in current strategic-lift plans. He cites the recent Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) to bolster his case for additional sealift, but then dis-
for 10 more years at most.
Commander White also overlooks the advantages of the C-17 over the C-141 and the C-5. The C-17 carries outsized equipment—including heavy combat vehicles—into small, austere airfields. The C-5 and the C-141 cannot. He also makes the erroneous assumption that “austere’ means dirt. It really means short, paved or compacted fields with limited taxiways and ramp space. That’s where the C-l? pays off.
Commander White correctly points out that the Desert Shield deployment started on 7 August 1990, but that it was not until 23 September that the first heavy division was in place. During those critical six-to-seven weeks, all of the forces sent to Saudi Arabia went by air. True, little heavy support was provided; but only because the current airlift fleet (with the exception of the C-5) cannot carry large and heavy combat equipment. Th« C-5s, though, were extremely busy, prl" marily moving Army attack helicopters to the theater.
Few have ever advocated moving uf
Proceedings / April
entire heavy division by air. However, with the C-17, the United States would have the capability to move a smaller heavy unit—e.g., an armored cavalry regiment—needed to bolster a light force against enemy armor until additional heavy forces arrive by sea. The requirement to move armored equipment quickly was shown in October 1993, when a small number of M-l tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles were sent to Somalia by air.
Furthermore, in many parts of the world, the road and rail network is not as well developed as in Europe or Saudi Arabia. It may be necessary, therefore, to airlift heavy vehicles from the port to small airfields near the battle area. Again, that can be done only by the wide-bod- ied C-17 Globemaster. □
“Death of a Squadron”
{See M. P. Stolzenberg, pp. 72-74, January 1994 Proceedings)
“A Farewell to (Combined)
Arms, Unless . .
{See D. H. Fisher, pp. 74-75, January 1994
Proceedings)
1
Captain Harry Ward, U.S. Marine Corps—Major Fisher and Captain Stolzenberg deserve praise for their highly insightful articles about the OV-IO Bronco. As a ground forward air controller (FAC) with a rifle company during the Persian Gulf War, I had the pleasure of working with OV-lOs. I ran night A-6 Intruder beacon missions against artillery sites, which were identified by our counterbattery radar, and vehicle assembly areas identified by the OV-lOs during the first two nights of the ground campaign. They also were invaluable in providing bomb-damage assessment (BDA), correcting A-6 bombing runs, and relaying communications to the direct air support center. Indeed, because the AN/PRC-104 ground radio was ineffective, there was no other way to contact the center with BDA information.
During the third day of ground operations, we arrived in Al-Jahra on the west side of Kuwait City and were positioned as the blocking force to prevent the escape of the last remnants of the Republican Guard left in Kuwait City. With OV-lOs and AH-1 Cobras in support, we had close to total situational awareness of the ground threats and we stopped all enemy vehicles and personnel. Throughout ground-combat operations, the readiness and morale of the infantry Marines were considerably enhanced by the presence of the Broncos. Therefore, it would be a terrible mistake if the Marine Corps let the remnants of the Bronco commu
nity that are in the Marine Corps Reserve disappear from service. The airplane might have problems insofar as survivability is concerned, but, in the proper scenario, its capabilities far outweigh its disadvantages.
Major Fisher brings out many salient points, but his attack on the capabilities of the F/A-18D are inappropriate at best. The F/A-18D is a cost-effective alternative to—but not a replacement of—the capabilities that venerable platforms like the OV-IO, OA-4, RF-4, and A-6 provided for many years. The additional capabilities it possesses in the air-defense role far outweigh the capabilities we lost in retiring those classic aircraft.
Captain Stolzenberg puts into words what frustrates many Marine company grade naval flight officers and aviators. The problems that he describes in the OV-IO community could be found, albeit on a smaller scale, in other aviation communities—including my own, the A-6 community.
My favorite line from his article is that “leadership in a flying squadron is based on tactical proficiency.” If we heed this advice in Marine aviation, we will retain the best company-grade aircrew. By deemphasizing ground duties and highlighting tactical leadership in the air, we can ensure that very few gifted company-grade aircrew will choose to make the attention-getting resignation decision.
Captain Stolzenberg made the wrong decision when he chose to resign because he only added to the problems he described so well in his article. Additionally, I would have enjoyed flying with him in an F/A-18D Hornet. I hope that VMO-4 will survive the drawdown and I’ll have the enjoyment of working with professionals like Major Fisher and Captain Stolzenberg in the future. □
Major Charles D. Melson, U.S. Marine Corps—About 20 years ago, I served for two years as an observer with a Marine observation squadron (VMO). From those days, I can remember similar comments—we lost two aviators in accidents the year the squadron won a safety award. Nevertheless, I read in vain for the analysis of the problem to be put in context with the rest of Marine Corps aviation and, more importantly, to serve as the basis for any real solutions. As it was, the article sounded like steam venting at happy hour.
Nevertheless, I hope that the end of the Bronco does not mean the end of the one true air-exchange tour for ground officers, a tour which underlines the air- ground nature of the Marines and provides a unique postgraduate school in supporting arms—even if monitors and
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promotion boards fail to appreciate this. Air observers are not limited by aircraft or squadron. This capability was overlooked when the air-observation section was transferred from Marine divisions’ intelligence sections to the air wings’ ob- ; servation squadrons, which flew several I aircraft types at one time. Acting as a commander’s eye in the sky can be done in anything with two seats, including UH-1 Hueys and AH-1 Cobras. □
“Until the First Bloodied
Body Goes By . .
See A. M. Smith, pp. 64-69, October 1993
Proceedings)
Philippe Eberlin, Technical Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross ; (ICRC), 1970-1986—Captain Smith ar- | gues that “in light of modern over-the- horizon missile warfare, reliance upon Geneva Convention protection for hospital ships may be unrealistic.”
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With the adoption of the Geneva Convention in 1949 and two protocols to the convention that were worked out from 1974 to 1977, the 185 states that are members of the Geneva Convention have sought to improve the safety of medical units and transports on land, in the air and at sea. The first protocol was ratified by 130 states—although it remains unratified by the United States. It reaffirms the protection entitled to medical units and transport, including hospital ships and other vessels protected by the Geneva Convention. In its Annex I—“Regulations Concerning Identification”—there am provisions for the use of technical means of identification for the medical units and transports and the revision of the rules in order to account for any technological | advances.
The dangers posed to hospital ships by long-range antiship missiles was a concern during the 1982 Falklands Conflict' As a delegate of the ICRC, I helped the two belligerents work out provisions t° safeguard hospital ships. The Royal Navy ( proposed—and the Argentine Navy in'" mediately accepted—the creation ofa neutral zone, north of East Falklands, in which hospital ships would operate. This neutral zone—known as the “Red Cross Box”—gave British and Argentine hospital ships an area in which, free from the j threat of attack, they exchanged wounded' waited for orders, and transferred wounded to other hospital ships for transportation to shoreside medical facilities'
In light of advances in modern weapons since the Falklands Conflict' however, there is a lot more work to be , done to ensure the safety of hospittd ships, rescue ships, and lifeboats during times of war. □
Proceedings / April I I*
“Rethinking Graduate
Education”
(See J. A. Byme, pp. 69-70, November 1993
Proceedings)
Commander John Monsarrat, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—It is most regrettable that Captain Byrne made no reference whatsoever to the Master’s Degree program currently offered at the U.S. Naval War College. Many of his concerns and proposals have already been addressed by the fully accredited courses at the War College that lead to a Master’s Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. Through the untiring efforts of Rear Admiral Ron Kurth and Rear Admiral Joe Strasser, the former and present presidents of the college, this program has been tailored carefully to meet the needs of serving officers and is the only fully accredited Master’s Degree program available at any of the U.S. war colleges. □
“Divorce, Military Style”
{See F. W. Ault, pp. 61-64, September 1993;
S. Taft, pp. 19-20, January 1994 Proceedings)
Doris Motley, Chair, Committee for Justice and Equality for the Military Wife— As a former military wife who has worked for 13 years to make divorce fairer for military spouses, I often have found myself at odds with Captain Ault and the organization of which he is president: The American Retirees Association (ARA).
Captain Ault asserts that the major flaw in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) is that it treats retired pay as a pension and, therefore, as divisible property. Captain Ault contends that military pay is “reduced compensation for reduced services.” He maintains that the money he receives each year is for “standing by just in case” and that “retired/retainer pay has no characteristics of a pension.” However, the Colorado Supreme Court, on 30 September 1991, found that military retired pay has all the characteristics of a pension, most notably that it is deferred compensation for past service.
If retired/retainer pay is deferred compensation that the military wife helped to earn, why should her husband walk off With all of it if there is a divorce? Why should a wife have to choose between an honorable marriage and retaining her share of the property she helped to earn? If husbands can remarry, why can’t the few women who do remarry retain their share of the property?
Another goal of the ARA is to deny divorced military wives a true pro rata share of the pension by dividing it at the rate or rank the member had at the time °f divorce. Suppose a military man is married to two women for ten years each.
He retires from the military and divorces for a second time. Under the ARA’s plan, wife number two would get a bigger share of the pension than wife number one. Why should the second woman—married for the same length of time as the first— get a bigger share of the pension? Or what about a promotion that came one day after the first divorce? Can it be said fairly that the ex-wife had no part in that? The bottom line is that a military career is one ball of wax. In the case of wife number one, she helped to lay the foundation for her ex-husband’s later increases in rate or rank.
Insofar as the value of military wives’ contributions is concerned, readers should ponder what Representative William G. Whitehurst (D-VA) said 12 years ago on the floor of the House of Representatives:
The only group in this country getting a Federal pension . . . that so far has been immune on this [dividing the pension in case of divorce] has been the military . . . [T]he Navy wives, and in fact all the service wives, are entitled to something more than a certificate from the admiral in charge of the naval district .... telling them what great supporters they are of the Navy, or ... a logo on a [commissary] grocery bag saying, “We are counting on you.” That is all they get for their sacrifices. We could not send ships to sea if we did not have the wives who are willing to stay back and be supportive of those men and raise those children. □
“Go, NAPS, Go!”
{See A. B. Myslinski, pp. 33-36, October 1993;
T. C. Lynch, pp. 14-16, November 1993; B. J.
Black, E. F. Palm, p. 17, December 1993; R. T.
Brophy, p. 19, January 1994 Proceedings)
Charles W. Clemens—Commander Myslinski probably raises some valid points, but as the father of a Naval Academy plebe who attended the Naval Academy Prepatory School (NAPS), I take strong issue with some of them.
He asserts that it is a mistake to use young officers fresh from the Naval Academy, who are enthusiastic but lack a teaching background, as instructors at NAPS. Both my wife—who taught at all levels in public and private schools for 20 years—and I were very impressed with the quality and dedication of everybody at NAPS—including the academic personnel. One of my son’s most inspiring teachers was a young ensign who had just graduated from the Academy and had no prior teaching experience. He helped our son to discover and develop an interest in science that we never knew he had.
The strict academic and military regimen of NAPS gave our son the tools to manage his time, something which has stood him in good stead at the Academy—and which he could not have picked up at a civilian school.
The exposure to the demands of military life (e.g., a shortened version of Plebe Summer and standing watch)—combined with athletics and academics—further prepared our son for the rigors to come at the academy—not to mention gave him an additional year of maturity.
Commander Myslinski suggests options that he asserts will be “cheap.” That’s what I’m afraid of. If you just want cheap officers, then his argument makes sense. But you often get what you pay for. However, if your objective is to produce high- quality leaders who can make decisions under stress—decisions that often cannot be measured by mere debits and credits—then stick with a proved program. Make cuts where necessary; fine tune it; improve it. But don’t abolish it. □
“Standing Up for Truth”
(See W. DeCamp, pp. 89-90, September 1993;
J. T. Willmon, p. 14, November 1993; D. M.
Walter, R. C. Stem, p. 14, December 1993;
D. R. Carlson, pp. 20-21, February 1994
Proceedings)
Captain J. Robert Lunney, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired); National President, Naval Reserve Association—We are the professional organization of more than 25,000 Naval Reserve officers and our association has been at the forefront in support of maintaining the Department of Defense policy of keeping homosexuals out of the Navy. We agree with General Colin L. Powell that the presence of homosexuals in the military is prejudicial to good order and discipline.
When homosexual activity is condoned, people should not be surprised when other notions and practices gain ground. What is the Navy to do when dmands are made that it accommodate fetishism, transvestitism, zoophilia, pedophilia, masochism, and sadism? “Sexual orientation” does not constitute a quality comparable to race or ethnic background in respect to non-discrimination.
29
Proceedings / April 1994
Some misguided politicians and writers who support the introduction of homosexuality on board our ships find the military prohibition against homosexuals intolerant. What is really intolerant is that these people, who know that the HIV virus is most commonly transmitted by homosexuals, are seeking to condone and obtain approval of a homosexual life style as a “civil right”—at the expense of the dedicated men and women of our armed forces. □
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“It’s Time to Beach the NOAA
Corps”
{See W. Connelly, pp. 67-68, February 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Neal G. Millett, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—I was surprised to see Mr. Connelly’s absurd and inaccurate article in a publication that purportedly “advances professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the naval and marine services.” His complete misunderstanding of the role and mission of the NOAA Corps, misrepresentation of the truth, and obvious privatization agenda would be more appropriate for a politically oriented forum.
His only notable point is that NOAA ships have excess and expensive crews. Certainly, even NOAA has been unable to escape the excesses of the maritime industry. But, so too has the Navy. The disastrous contract operation of the Navy’s oceanographic ships by a Maryland shipping company is well-documented.
Contrary to Mr. Connelly’s assertion, as a 387-member organization within a civilian agency that employs 14,000 people, the NOAA Corps does not have the ability to provide jobs for its own sustenance and expansion. Admittedly, the 1990 internal study recommended an expansion in the NOAA Corps; however, Mr. Connelly fails to mention that this plan was never implemented. In fact, the NOAA Corps is scheduled for a 3% reduction in fiscal year 1994. □
“How About a Permanent Waiver?”
(See C. H. Griffiths, pp. 68-71. December 1993; N. F. Caldwell, pp. 14-15, February 1994; W. J. Toti, pp. 20-23, March 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant J. A. Camara, U.S. Navy— The premise upon which Captain Griffiths’ conclusion is based is admirable and inarguable. Nuclear safety should not be compromised for any reason.
His conclusion, however, raises doubts. Some officers like Captain Griffiths— who have not had the opportunity to serve in joint-duty billets because of the manning policies of the nuclear Navy— should be exempted from the joint requirement, but sacrificing an entire generation of junior officers on the altar of nuclear safety would waste some of the Navy’s premier talent. A permanent waiver would give the Navy carte blanche to continue assigning nuclear- trained officers to engineering billets that do little to expand their joint outlook and actually hamper their efforts to become warriors.
There are other solutions. Every year, the submarine force advances some of its best to limited-duty officer (LDO) or warrant officer status, only to have them never go to sea again. These engineering experts should be placed in charge of all nuclear-engineering plants and allowed to fill critical shore billets. This would free unrestricted line officers for their true mission—learning how to fight their ships. Having nuclear propulsion plants supervised by officers and warrant officers whose entire careers have focused on engineering would enhance nuclear safety. These “nuclear engineering duty officers” also would hold the nuclear- related positions presently held by unrestricted line officers. □
“Less Punishment & More Patience”
(See J. F. Kelly, Jr., pp. 27-30, January 1994 Proceedings)
Major Edward Palm, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—The Marine Corps I joined in 1965 was certainly what Captain Kelly would term a “distinct culture,” one that included a long-standing tradition of leadership by an officer corps that was predominantly male, presumably heterosexual, and almost exclusively white. But our civilian leaders, exercising their prerogative, demanded that the Marines be
come less exclusionary and more representative of U.S. society; Marines, duty- bound, began to fall in line.
As Captain Kelly argues, it is extremely difficult to change deeply entrenched attitudes and beliefs, particularly those that one’s culture has seemed to endorse. This difficulty, however, hardly justifies preserving outmoded policies and practices. The fact remains that the Marine Corps has traveled a long way toward racial equality since 1965, and the point is that it would not have come this far if it had been left to its own devices.
Contrary to popular belief, however, our political leadership has never placed the military—to use Rush Limbaugh’s phrase—“on the cutting edge of societal evolution.” The military has always lagged behind society in adapting to the changing values, mores, and norms of the cultural mainstream. The desegregation of the armed forces, for instance, was not an idea that sprang up from the ranks-— nor did it originate at the Pentagon. President Truman ordered it; the military implemented his order—and with much less turmoil than many predicted. So will it be again.
Where I differ from Captain Kelly is in his apparent willingness to grant our military—particularly, the Navy—a large degree of cultural autonomy. The civil- military relationship being what it is in the United States, our military is not so much a “distinct culture” as it is a subculture answerable to the culture at large- Ours is a citizen-soldiery; we have no separate military caste. Time and again our courts have upheld the right of the military to diverge from mainstream customs and values, but only when such divergence could be demonstrated as militarily necessary.
To give Captain Kelly his due, the arguments about unit cohesion and readiness are the red herrings in this debate The real issue indeed is one of culture. Underlying the current arguments against fully integrating women and homosexu-
Proceedings / April 199-1
als in the military. Captain Kelly’s included, is a kind of nostalgia—a yearning to preserve in the military subculture at least the values and ideals of a United States that used to be. A military subculture that holds itself aloof from and morally superior to the culture at large, however, is the stuff of banana republics, not the Great Republic.
No one yet has held back, much less reversed, the process of cultural evolution or devolution, depending upon one’s point of view. For better or worse, we’ve already moved too far beyond that long- past world of iron men, tall ships, and demure, patiently waiting women—ever to return. Like its biological counterpart, cultural evolution is inevitable and irreversible, and the first law of cultural evolution too is “adapt or die.” I’m betting our military will adapt to women in combat and homosexuals in its ranks. I’m also betting that once again, within a very few years, everyone will look back and wonder what all the fuss was about.
On one point, however. Captain Kelly and I are in firm agreement: We should invite—not stifle—comment and discussion on these issues. I have every confidence that free and open debate will expose the irrational prejudices of the moment for what they are. □
“Are We Committed?”
(See S. H. Frewing, pp. 57-59, December 1993; D. J. Fitzgerald, L. A. Perry, p. 20, February 1994; P. Gregory, pp. 17-19, March 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Eugene R. Arbogast, U.S. Navy—In the Navy, just as the civilian World, the discussion of ethics flourishes while ethics themselves decline. Courses in ethics currently are among the most popular courses at high schools and colleges. There is, however, something missing from all the discussion: Virtue. Virtue, the first principle of ethics, talks to being—specifically, being good— rather than doing. But, because most of Us are more comfortable defining ourselves in terms of what we do, rather than who we are, scant mention is made of virtue in discussions about ethics.
Peter Kreeft states it succinctly in his book Back to Virtue: Traditional Moral Wisdom for Modern Moral Confusion (Servant, 1993), “Ethics without virtue is an illusion. What is the highest purpose of ethics? It is to make people good, that ls, virtuous.” He continues:
C. S. Lewis uses the image of the fleet of sailing ships to show that ethics deals with three great questions, not just one. First the ships need to know how to avoid collisions. That is social ethics, and that is taught. In the
second place, they need to know how to stay shipshape, how to avoid sinking. That is the question of virtues and vices, and that is not taught. Finally, they need to know their mission, why they are at sea in the first place. That is the question of the ultimate purpose of human life. It is a religious question, and of course it is not asked, much less answered.
Mr. Fitzgerald espouses what can be called the “collision avoidance school of ethics,” stating that the oath alone is sufficient for a naval ethic. But for one who believes that Tailhook was simply a case of bad public relations, the interest in ethics apparently does not go much beyond finding out what it takes to avoid a collision with the Manual for Courts- Martial—or getting a “not guilty” verdict if the collision occurs.
Continuing with C. S. Lewis’s analogy: the Navy Core Values training goes a little beyond mere collision avoidance and mentions just one of the four cardinal virtues—Courage (the others being Justice, Wisdom, and Moderation). It is a good start, but it is wasted because Core Values are “facilitated” instead of taught. If these values are “core,” are they not also true? Teachers teach Truth; facilitators only encourage students to state and clarify their own personal values. In the end, Navy Core Values Program fails even to suggest that there is objective truth in the realm of values, for that would mean that some of the students are wrong. Instead of teaching what it takes to stay shipshape—the virtues—we simply facilitate the student to recognize what actions conflict with Navy regulations and policy. What’s so ethical about that?
Lieutenant Frewing simply wants the Navy’s ethics “facilitation” and discussions moved to higher levels. Like Core Values, it would be ethics without the bite, without confrontation, because no one is willing to tell anyone that he is wrong. “Exploring] openly different ethical perspectives” sounds again like there would be a whole lot of discussion in Lieutenant Frewing’s curriculum, but little on discerning right from wrong for individuals genuinely struggling to master their passions, vices, and fears.
Unless we are truly committed to teaching that envy, lust, greed, pride, anger, sloth, and covetousness are faults to be avoided at all costs and at all times because they will cause the ship (the person) to sink, and that the virtues of justice, wisdom, moderation, and courage are fundamental to the making of a good man or woman, Navy should not undertake to integrate ethics training into all aspects of Navy life. A naval ethic not built on the foundation of the cardinal
virtues will be of little practical value to the sailor trying to avoid the whirlpools of rampant vice and moral confusion. □
“Creating Deployable Harbor
Defense”
(See R. B. Watts, pp. 45-47, December 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Carl Tiska, U.S. Navy, Executive Officer, Special Boat Unit Twenty— Lieutenant Watts addresses a topic that is worthy of consideration. However, his proposal to use Naval Special Warfare units as a primary asset in port-defense operations would be a misuse of their capabilities. The focus of SEAL platoons and Special Boat Detachments is on offensive operations. Typical missions include combat swimmer attacks on ships, raids, ambushes, reconnaissance, surveillance, and noncombatant-evacuation operations. Use of these well-trained and highly skilled special-operations personnel in a defensive role, such as port defense, would be an inefficient use of limited resources.
Because of their extensive knowledge of the tactics involved in operations against port facilities, SEALs and Special Boat Unit personnel would be better used as advisors to those developing port-defense doctrine and tactics. Additionally, they would be the force of choice to serve as opposition forces during harbor-defense exercises. □
Lieutenant Richard R. Jackson, Jr., U.S. Coast Guard—Lieutenant Watts left one key element out of his fine article that outlined a superb mission statement for the Coast Guard: Coast Guard aviation.
Drawing on lessons gleaned from decades of drug-interdiction operations and fisheries-protection patrols. Coast Guard aviation—helicopters and fixed- wing aircraft—could perform offshore patrol and surveillance. Rescue is one of the Coast Guard’s primary missions and has become nearly an art form. Rescue of personnel in a hostile environment would be well within the abilities of Coast Guard aviators. Coast Guard aviation could provide support—from moving cargo to the insertion/extraction of specialized teams.
During the four years I participated in Fleet Training Exercises in the Eighth Coast Guard District, as an aviator and exercise planner, I saw Coast Guard aircraft perform every one of these missions in a variety of scenarios.
The Harbor Defense Command is an excellent mission concept for the Coast Guard. But the concept must be developed fully and make use of the entire Coast Guard organization. □
33
Proceedings/ April 1994