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Some Areas to Review
Requiring the mastery of literally hundreds of concepts and split-second decision making, tactical proficiency is a perishable skill. Now is the time to review our training to address our deficiencies and maximize our readiness.
In the recent white paper, . . From the Sea,” the Navy asked itself some difficult questions, to prepare for the 21st century. With the new direction defined, our efforts now focus on refining and strengthening the equipment, people, and training triad. It is time to review our training from the unit level up and address our deficiencies.
How’s Our Tactical Proficiency?
Tactical proficiency is difficult to measure, but I would judge the U.S. Navy’s capabilities in this area to be fair. A few points to consider:
► Day One, Desert Storm Strike. A division of fighters en route to a target splash two MiG-21s. The result is U.S.: 2, Iraq: 0. This is good, but those two contacts easily could have been MiG-29s—and the score could have read 0 to 2.
► Fleet Fighter Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) Readiness Program Derby. Every fighter squadron on base had the same scenario presentation: two fighters versus two MiG-29s and three MiG-2 Is. The average score was one bandit lost, one fighter lost. Is this an acceptable ratio?
^ Aircrew often reinvent the wheel and make recurring
rv>l mistakes. Lieutenant “Jethro" Bodine’s article in the Sunlit mer 1992 TopGun Journal discusses 20 common mistakes
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aircrew make during adversary turnaround training. This highlights the perishability of tactical proficiency and the importance of structured training.
If we in tactical aviation (TacAir) admit that we are not as good as we should be, then we have won half the bat- |) *le. But this is a tough mission; literally hundreds of
gfrf concepts must be understood, ingrained, and drawn upon for split-second tactical decision making. Consider, for I C': example, a scenario with fighters on combat air patrol over M p Norfolk, Virginia, and bandits originating from Wash- - L 'ngton, D.C. This is a fairly large geographical separation.
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Vet the time until merge is only six minutes. More important, the time from a commit to weapons employment ls less than 60 seconds. Aircrew are required to assimilate and weigh a multitude of inputs and make correct and timely decisions. It is no wonder TacAir proficiency is Perishable.
, The Navy’s shift from open-ocean war fighting to lit- ti loral warfare makes TacAir an even more difficult mission. Added rules-of-engagement considerations, joint-ser- v'ce employment, and technical hurdles combined with the rise of our multimission aircraft lead to increased tactual complexity and training requirements.
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There are several areas to address in our review of training, including:
Operations Target (OpTar) Funding Swings. We’ve all been there: too much money this quarter (slow carrier operations or post-cruise stand downs) and too little during training exercises. Squadrons know their schedules and funding requirements, but they cannot roll funds from quarter to quarter, which often results in very inefficient use of OpTar funds during the year.
OpTar Cuts. The complexities driving OpTar cuts are myriad, but the effects are simple: drastically reduced readiness and training efficiency. We must strive to furnish OpTar levels as they are projected.
Carrier Turnaround Training Schedules. Every time it has an at-sea period, a squadron is severely disrupted and tactical training suffers. The belief that a squadron’s proficiency is highest on the first day of cruise is somewhat amiss. This proficiency level is not nearly what it could be if the number of predeployment at-sea periods was reduced. Carrier Air Wing 14 is a recent example. During the nine months before deployment, the air wing completed seven separate at-sea periods. Each of these periods required day and night field carrier landing practice, at the expense of tactical training. Aircrew went for nearly two months without flying a tactical sortie. We need to ensure that the number of at-sea periods is consistent with carrier training requirements and that schedules are set firmly in advance.
Cyclic Operations. Do we need to conduct cyclic operations in the traditional sense? What do aircrew gain by flying 1-hour and 45-minute maximum fuel conservation cycles (which means 2 hours and 5 minutes total time)? These longer cycles virtually preclude tactical training opportunities. Many variables drive carrier cycle times, but there is a substantial training benefit in conducting shorter 60- to 75-minute cycles, both day and night. Some carriers have used a re-spot/maintenance period after every third cycle.
Aircraft. The technological sophistication of Navy TacAir platforms seriously lags behind that of the Air Force in radar warning, electronic countermeasures, and identification. Navy frontline fighters are now comparable in performance and capabilities with newer threat aircraft. This technological parity certainly necessitates an emphasis on training, but we also need to improve our aircraft procurement process. The frequency of organizational and budgetary changes makes it all but impossible to effect long-range planning. Even funded improvements using today’s proved technology take five years for the first upgrade and up to nine years for fleet upgrade completion. We need to stay current with technology and make our procurement process more timely and efficient.
Training Officer Designation. A nugget aviator’s learning curve is steep from the moment he enters flight training until he leaves the fleet replacement squadron (FRS). Each new aviator graduates with the requisite background to learn tactical employment, but he is nowhere near ready to fly in harm’s way. The squadron’s turnaround training phase is designed to bring him to a certain readiness level. Two aviators can complete FRS stints with reasonably
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57
similar capabilities, yet, after a year in the fleet, there may be a wide readiness disparity between them. Why? It is a function of the squadron’s training program.
It is the sole responsibility of the squadron, specifically the training officer, to make a nugget combat capable. Herein lies a problem. The training officer job usually goes to a senior first-tour aviator. He often has no formal training or lacks sufficient experience. Too often, he does not remain in the job long enough to become effective.
One answer could be a Bureau of Personnel-designated training officer. This individual would be a second-tour junior officer who has undergone specific, formal air-to- air, air-to-ground, and instructor training. He would have one more tour of experience to draw upon and would hold the job long enough to become effective. Squadrons insist on a formally trained officer for safety; the same requirement should hold for training. A trained, proficient unit is also a safe one. Most deficiencies in unit-level training could be corrected by a competent training officer. This concept has proved very effective in other services and would pay the Navy great dividends.
Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACTI) Program. Every Marine Corps TacAir aviator knows this acronym. The ACTI program is designed to increase tactical proficiency and safety awareness through a specific systematic training syllabus. This Corps-wide program is internally implemented at the squadron level, with completion standards evaluated by an external source. The result is a standardized internal training syllabus producing Marine aircrew whose weapon systems knowledge and tactical performance exceed their Navy counteiparts. The Air Force also uses a structured internal training syllabus that has proved equally effective. These syllabi provide orderly structured training and ensure tactical standards for all ranks from ensign to captain. In the Navy, we have no formal training syllabus with which to improve a nugget’s learning curve or to ensure all squadron members meet a certain proficiency level. Navy squadrons should implement a program similar to the ACTI program to increase our tactical proficiency and safety awareness.
Department Head Proficiency. How proficient are most department heads when they check into a new squadron? Many come from out-of-the-cockpit or nontactical flying tours, receive the cursory refresher syllabus with primary emphasis on carrier qualifications, and are sent to the fleet. There the junior officers look to them for expertise. With the new job’s responsibilities and time demands, the department head finds himself hanging on the tails tactically, especially if the refresher syllabus was inadequate. He probably received no formal department head training (other Navy communities have a six-month course), so his time is spent deciphering a two-page passdown and learning the job through trial and error. The Navy might consider:
> Expanding refresher syllabi to include appropriate tactical emphasis.
> Establishing a dedicated course to train new department heads. This is more appropriate now, with the department head screening concept.
> Limiting nontactical and out-of-the-cockpit junior officer career paths. A squadron is the basic fighting unit
of each air wing and must be composed of highly trained, tactically proficient aircrew. Our squadrons need more seasoned junior officers to provide experience and ensure proper training, yet we often funnel our young aviators away from the cockpit. We should keep these aviators
from disassociated tours until later in their
away careers.
Professional Adversaries. Under our force realignment we must continue to emphasize the requirement for real'! istic, competent, and current threat simulation. With the, sale of state-of-the-art aircraft from the former Sovie!| Union and other countries, we face a formidable threat !
These more advanced enemy aircraft are becoming the
percentage threat, and they can be employed effectively by the average enemy pilot. This trend toward technological parity between friendly and threat aircraft highlights the importance of adequate, realistic threat training
Squadron Tasking. Pop-up tasking and schedule change* happen far too often. Although changes are sometimes unavoidable, all levels in the chain of command need to W more effective in long-range planning. We in the Nav) are known for our flexibility, but this lack of long-rang£ planning greatly affects the squadron’s ability to manage its training programs.
Temporary Additional Duty Funding. As diminishing funds eliminate local professional adversary assets, adequate funding must be available to use more distant training facilities and adversaries.
Training and Readiness Matrix. Its intent is well founded—to provide squadron training requirements and measure unit readiness—but its use often misrepresent* actual readiness. The commanding officer, air group commander, or battle group commander, using his prerogative to change the reporting status, often conveys3 too-optimistic sense of readiness up the chain of command. We need to be honest about our actual readines* level.
Air Intercept Controllers (AICs). It is our responsibility to conduct AIC follow-on training. Aircrew must realize that initial AIC training is basic, incorporating onl) the fundamentals of geometry, radio communication- and airspace management. We must involve our battle group, E-2 Hawkeye, and unit controllers in our tactic3' evolutions and particularly emphasize debriefs. Formal training evolutions such as strike fighter, fleet fighter, and air-to-air advanced readiness programs and Fallon air wing detachments must be carefully planned to maximize controller learning.
The Bottom Line
Our squadrons are not nearly as well trained as som£ might believe. Our current readiness and training are affected by a great number of variables—the concepts presented here only scratch the surface—and now is the tim£ to review our training, to ensure that we are operating efficiently and effectively.
Lieutenant Burns is an instructor at the Naval Fighter Weapons Schof at Naval Air Station Miramar. He received his aviator’s wings13 March 1989 and has flown F-14s with the VF-14 Tophatters out of Nav;1 Air Station Oceana.
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