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Placing national interests ahead of personal glory, General '• Marshall toppled many interservice barriers to long before it was fashionable—and helped push 1 forces to victory in World War II.
President Harry Truman said he was the “greatest living American,” that he was “one for the ages.’ J I Winston Churchill wondered if he was “the greatest Roman of them all.” Others compared him to George Washington. An American titan of war and of peace, General George Catlett Marshall exemplified the qualities of the soldier-statesman. The chronicle of his roles, occupied during critical times in U.S. history—Army Chief of Staff (1939-45), Truman’s special emissary to China (1945-47) Secretary of State (1947-49), and Secretary of Defense during the Korean War (1950-51)—is reminiscent of the ancient watchman who stationed himself atop the mortar and brick of the defensive walls that protected his city He was always alert to danger, always prepared to sound a trumpet warning, and always ready to join fellow warriors in closing the breaches in the wall. When the United States needed such a man to stand on its wall or to fight in the gaps, both in war and in peace, it turned to General George Marshall.
As Army Chief of Staff during World War II, Marshall modeled qualities of leadership often forgotten, overlooked or ignored in the training of today’s officers .These leadership qualities, however, are essential principles for joint leadership that future generations of U.S. military leaders charged with forging and wielding the sword of war cannot afford to ignore.
► Joint leaders recognize that interservice cooperation is a stepping stone to interallied cooperation. In many ways Marshall was the progenitor of jointness at the top Prior to and during World War II, when Army-Navy antagonisms threatened to infect every sinew of the defense bureaucracy, Marshall attacked interservice competition head- on. By aggressively pursuing unity of command, he reduced the bureaucratic drag of interservice rivalry that would have delayed victory and cost more American lives.
Unity of command between the Army and the Navy! Marshall had noted, “will add immeasurably to our security” and will serve as a “stepping [stone] to larger decisions involved in our relationships with Allies.”' Recognizing that interservice jointness provided the framework
for interallied cooperation, Marshall hammered out agreeable relations with allies at a time when mistrust easily might have prevailed.
In discussions with the British after Pearl Harbor, Marshall helped establish the Combined Chiefs of Staff- “Combined” referred to the organizations fostering collaboration between nations. At the same time, the British proposed and the United States accepted that the term “joint” would be applied to collaboration among a single nation’s organizations—a distinction already employed to describe the activities and relations between the War and Navy Departments. To meet with the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the Army and Navy chiefs (Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King) and Army Air Corps Commander Henry “Hap” Arnold joined with Admiral William D. Leahy to become the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Leahy, as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s chief of staff, served as chairman. Yet it was Marshall who bore the most responsibility for forging unity of command among the services and across nations.
In addition, it was General Marshall’s strategic concept—defeat Germany first, hold in the Pacific—that was the foundation for Allied victory. By his force of character, he convinced both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to adopt it. Marshall literally organized the Allied victory. Churchill gave him due credit after the Nazi defeat: “It has not fallen to your lot to command the great armies. You have had to create them, organize them and inspire them. Under your guiding hand, the might and valiant formations which have swept across France and Germany were brought into being and perfected in an amazingly short space of time.”
► Joint leaders must push jointness down the chain of command. Marshall had long recognized that “military victories are not gained by a single arm.” Earlier in his career, he had forwarded plans for a reorganization effort, particularly in joint purchasing. Despite the cooperation of his coauthor, young Theodore Roosevelt (then Acting Secretary of the Navy), the proposal got nowhere because,
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as Marshall writes, “it did not have enough immediacy about it to provide potent political argument.”
Marshall’s proposal also included provisions for an exchange of officers from every section of the General Staff °f the War Department with their counterparts in the Navy department. He also suggested similar exchanges between supply departments, medical departments, and ordnance and communication services. In an effort to encourage Jointness down the chain of command, Marshall had noted that officers would serve in “positions which require an intimate knowledge of the combined arms, and a breadth of vision impossible to the man who devotes his entire interest to a single arm.” Those exchanges, however, had to have meat to them; exchange officers were not to be simply liaison officers.
Only in this way, in my opinion, will the navy ever know intimately what, why and how the army does things—and vice versa. I found both army and navy officers—or officials, strongly opposed to such a measure. . . . And, I do not think they visualized the eventual good that I think would come of such procedure. As a matter of fact, I seem to be out of step with the rest of the world in this particular idea, but to me it is fundamental, and the only effective leadup to the proper coordination of the two services—don’t quote me.
The immediacy of an approaching conflict in Europe and the Pacific forced Marshall to forge concepts of jointness in other arenas, but, unfortunately, delayed his efforts to push jointness down the chain of command. Nevertheless, his insight is echoed in today’s requirements for joint assignments.
^ Joint leaders must keep the national interest in focus. Parochial interests wither before the aggressive promotion of national interests. Marshall’s superb relationship with President Roosevelt and the Congress arose from the fact that they trusted him to pursue the national interest. Marshall’s professionalism, mastery of facts, and obvious nonpartisanship often astounded and reassured congress-
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY COLLECTION / LIFE PHOTO (T. MCAVOY)
men. “He would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause,” House Speaker Sam Rayburn recalled. For example, Marshall always cooperated with congressional investigating committees and refused to challenge the “law requiring him to certify goods as nonessential before sale to Britain though he believed it unconstitutional.”2
To reinforce his nonpartisanship, Marshall consistently projected a nonmilitarist and nonconfrontational image. Before Pearl Harbor, Marshall and his staff often wore civilian clothes when requested to appear before Congress. Civilian clothes, while calming domestic fears, also represented the unity necessary to build the force needed for the upcoming conflict. Marshall continually illustrated his statement that “an officer’s ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country, and not to his service or to his superiors.” As a result of this honest pursuit of national interest, he disarmed his opponents and secured his influence within both political and military circles.
► Joint leaders must be “more than military men." After the Bay of Pigs fiasco and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy argued that his military leaders were unable to see beyond their immediate concerns. He wanted his service chiefs to be more than narrow military specialists, to “look beyond the limited military field.” Kennedy believed they must be “more than military men.”3
This may have been Marshall’s greatest secret. Though a military officer until his late sixties, Marshall was what some have called a “civilized warrior.” He expanded his focus beyond the military. He constantly thought about how democracies make war and peace. He saw the connection between economics and politics. And he argued that such thinking should be the responsibility of every officer in the Army. He challenged the officers of the Army Air Corps to:
sit down sometime and try to balance all the factors concerned with national defense. . . . Divorce yourself for the moment from the Air Corps and assume that the responsibility for the decisions regarding national defense rests solely on your shoulders. . . . Seek to obtain a clear picture of every aspect of national defense, so that you may think straight and advise wisely.
► Joint leaders must be hedgehogs and not foxes. The Greek poet Archilochus noted that the “fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” British philosopher Isaiah Berlin, in an essay entitled “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” offers insight into Archilochus’s meaning: The hedgehog is a thinker or leader who “relates everything to a single central vision ... a single, universal, organizing principle.” The fox, on the other hand, “pursues many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory.”4
George Marshall, modeling the leadership of jointness,
Recognizing early that interservice jointness would provide the framework for interallied cooperation, Marshall joined with Admiral William Leahy (far left), Army Air Corps Commander Henry “Hap” Arnold (second from left), and Admiral Ernest King (far right) to form the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
related everything to the single central vision of victory. In war, a military leader cannot be distracted from the pursuit of victory.
In peace, a military leader cannot be distracted from the preparations for victory.
Personal prestige and service loyalties must give way to the best plan for success. As President Roosevelt considered supreme commanders for Operation Overlord, he sought to give George Marshall his “place in history.” Tempted to don the mantle of command, Marshall nevertheless passed it on to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, his best field commander. He recognized that leaving Washington might imperil the delicate balance among the services and between the Allies. Too many foxes, pursuing too many unrelated and contradictory ends, waited to distract the United States from its singular pursuit of victory.
► Joint leaders must live outside themselves. In Homer’s Iliad, the gods ignited jealous disagreements between Achilles and Achean King Agamemnon over the spoils of war. Offended by the affront to his prowess, position, and privilege, Achilles left the battle to sulk among the ships. Meanwhile, Hector of Troy ravaged Achean forces and would have thrown back the invasion had not Achilles returned to his chariot. Many men died because Achilles and Agamemnon allowed jealousy to distract them and to divide their unified forces. Joint leaders cannot listen to such temptations. Marshall almost never did.
In his dealings with Congress and subordinate commanders, Marshall recognized that emotional outbursts had to give way to cold, factual analysis. “Sentiment must submit to common sense.” Service loyalties naturally produce emotional enthusiasms; joint leaders, however, must model rational, nonpartisanship leadership. De
spite their affiliations, joint leaders must learn to live outside of themselves. They must separate from their feelings to focus on. as Marshall said, the “straight business of the job.” Affective notions do not lead to effective joint warfare.
Joint leaders cannot give in to the “luxury of sentiment.” To Lieutenant Gen- | eral Delos C. Emmons, the Army Commander of Hawaii who was placed under Admiral Chester W- Nimitz in an effort to achieve unity of command, Marshall wrote, “These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency. Emmons should, Marshall continued, “therefore be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.”
>• Joint leaders must avoid “they-us” distinctions. As a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, President Roosevelt often referred in meetings to the Army as “they and to the Navy as “us.” In one meeting, Marshall jokingly chided him for this language of separateness and preference. Joint leaders, Marshall recognized, cannot permit the language of separateness and preference to perpetuate interservice competition. A leader’s choice of
GEORGE C. MARSHALL RESEARCH LIBRAR*.^
Always focused on the larger, national interest, Marshall secured respect and influence within both military and political circles, enjoying an especially good relationship with President Franklin Roosevelt.
Joint leaders cannot be distracted from the central focus on victory. Marshall recognized this principle when he passed the command of Operation Overlord to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, his best field commander. That role would have ensured Marshall a place in history, but he recognized the greater need for his presence in Washington.
Words helps define the interests,
Priorities, and tenor of the organizations he leads. A vocabulary that directs its energies at other services rather than at the problem perpetuates a “they-us” distinction that erodes jointness. Joint leaders must speak the language of jointness.
Marshall constantly sought to break down such distinctions of his commanders. In a confidential i memorandum for higher commanders, dated 11 September 1942, Marshall noted that indiscretions of officers in official and unofficial conversations had produced serious consequences. The higher commanders of the Army, j “by their example and through personal conversations with their prin- j cipal subordinates, should exert a I sufficient influence to provide a ' remedy in these matters.” The indiscretions involved the continued language of separateness and preference between the Army and the Navy, particularly in reference to air actions in the Pacific.
Bad blood is being stirred up between the Army and the Navy which is, to put it mildly, a tragic misfortune. Again such action defeats teamwork which is the vital essential of any joint operation. Short tempers under the circumstances are inexcusable.
. . .Vigorous action must be taken to suppress service jealousies and suspicions. It is the clear duty of commissioned officers of the Army to do everything in their power to promote harmonious relations and teamwork, avoiding ill-advised comments and attitudes.
No interservice division challenged General Marshall as much as that evident in the Pacific theater. Led by Admiral King in Washington and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific, the Navy sought a Pacific-first strategy contrary to Marshall’s efforts to defeat Hitler in Europe first. In addition, the Navy fought hard to command the entire Pacific theater, thus running up against the Army under General Douglas MacArthur in the South Pacific. Only Marshall’s superior diplomatic skill could smooth the conflict and keep the players focused on the problem. Mostly successful, Marshall recognized that the “they-us” mentality could prevent U.S. forces from achieving victory under a joint and combined forces concept.
► Joint leaders must build interservice ties through personal relationships. General Marshall’s efforts to build interservice ties through personal relationships were critical to his success. At the beginning of the war, his friendship with Admiral Harold Stark calmed the seething tension that existed between the Army and Navy over resources,
missions, and roles. His close relationship with General Arnold of the Army Air Corps kept the growing expression of a different service mission from distracting them from their primary mission.
Even with Admiral King— never his friend—Marshall realized that conflicts could be depersonalized through an objective focus on facts and issues and by occasionally soothing the egos of service prima donnas. When Admiral King stormed out of Marshall’s office in anger over treatment by an Army secretary, Marshall followed him back to the Navy Department, refusing to be bruised by King’s behavior. Relationships often form the glue that holds together jointness. Joint leaders must be relationship-oriented, emphasizing long-term common interests rather than immediate personal disagreements.
General Marshall was in many ways the Cincinnatus of his age. As with the Roman general, Marshall modeled selfless public service, an attitude of sacrifice, and humble detachment from personal glory. In this spirit of sacrifice and humility rests the secret of his ability to overcome the barriers to jointness that existed within our military forces. Before many of the structural reforms and reorganization acts, George Catlett Marshall overcame interservice competition through the quality of his leadership, a leadership that transformed the services into a common sword wielded in singular pursuit of victory.
'The primary source for Marshall’s quotations is the edited collection of his papers: Larry I. Bland, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vols. I, II, and III (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, 1986, 1991). Also Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990); Leonard Mosley, Marshall: Hero of Our Times (New York: Hearst Books, 1982); Mark A Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century (Boston: Twayne Publishers of G. K. Hall & Co., 1989); and, of course, Forrest C. Pogue’s four-volume biography: George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939', Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942; Organizer of Victory, 1943 1945; and Statesman. 1945-1959 (New York: Viking Press, 1963-86).
JStoler, George C. Marshall, p. 77.
’John G. Kester, “The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, eds., American Defense Policy, 5th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
The notion of hedgehogs and foxes is borrowed from James M. McPherson’s description of Abraham Lincoln as a hedgehog in his book, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). The citation for Berlin is Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History (New York, 1966). p. 1.
Lieutenant Colonel Lorenzen is associate professor for political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Trained as a navigator and instructor in KC-135s, he flew for the Strategic Air Command from 1977 to 1980.