This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
... can they fly it? In assessing future threats, U.S. intelligence analysts must consider more than just a nation’s ability to purchase weapon systems. Maintenance, interoperability, training, and tactics are just a few of the considerations that will affect a technology’s combat potential.
1!*'
,r
A
A
n3
d-
X
During the Cold War, the assessment of future threats could be reduced to a relatively simple extrapolation of current weapons and systems technologies out to the required 5, 10, or 20 years ahead. The accuracy of this approach, however, rested on a series of unstated assumptions that derived from our Soviet focus:
^ All non-Soviet weapons and systems could be treated ns “lesser-included cases.”
^ Economic considerations were not major determining factors in Soviet weapons development.
^ The Soviets could integrate, maintain, and use the resulting systems optimally.
Because the Cold War arms race essentially was a competition between two highly developed military-technolog- lcal complexes that no Third World state could hope to emulate, all other systems development and, indeed, all other
militaries could be regarded as lesser-included cases. The ability to deal with the Soviet threat automatically guaranteed, in theory, an ability to deal with any prospective Third World adversary.
Further simplifying the equation was a corollary assumption that the weapons and systems produced by the Soviets and the remaining Warsaw Pact states were aimed at the West, and vice versa. All the high military technology that mattered could be understood in the Cold War context of threat and counter-threat systems. This corollary was reinforced by the nature of the arms trade that both sides conducted with the Third World. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, arms were developed and produced primarily for use by their own armed forces and not for export. When arms were exported, therefore, they tended to be either older systems that were being phased out of superpower inventories or scaled-down export versions, using older or less sophisticated technologies.
Proceedings / February 1994
45
For our Western European allies, the situation was somewhat different. They were intent on maintaining independent national arms industries in the face of their superpower competition. Their production also was for indigenous use primarily. Unlike the superpowers, however, they faced a pressing requirement to export in order to achieve the economies of scale needed to maintain their competitiveness. In practice, European exports fell into two categories: the leading-edge systems and technologies traded within the alliance and to trusted other states
A
such as Australia, and the scaled-down/phased-out technologies sold to the rest of the world. In spite of this requirement to export, however, few systems were developed entirely for the Third World market.
In the absence of the Cold War, the lesser-included- case assumption no longer pertains. In the United States, the new strategic focus has resulted in a sharp questioning of the utility of new weapons and systems in local conflicts. The even sharper questions of budget constraints have forced both a slowdown in the introduction and development of new systems and an increase in the reliance on overseas sales to sustain defense industries. Budgetary constraints are more emphatic still in the successor states to the Soviet Union, and the newly independent governments have demonstrated a willingness to sell even the most advanced technologies for hard currency.
In Western Europe, the change is less dramatic. European states always have had to sustain relatively small indigenous arms industries. What has now complicated their sales problem is the sharp decline in the internal defense market as a result of force drawdowns. Given the already marginal economies of scale in many of their industries, the drawdowns have deepened the need for export sales and, more importantly, reinforced a willingness to design and build systems exclusively for Third World markets, as well as to assist Third World producers with local production under license.
Taken together, these developments not only invalidate li previous assumptions as to which producers and system* il developments need to be monitored and evaluated by U-S- ti intelligence agencies, but they also point toward an it*' V creased proliferation of more sophisticated weapons and 1 technologies to regional powers and an increasing divef' d sity of arms in regional inventories.
The second major assumption underlying Cold Waf o threat assessments was economic. Because the SovR1 t Union and its allies constituted an economy of formid3' f ble scale, and because they had demonstrated a willing' t ness to choose guns over butter in what was effectively3 f wartime economy, we could assume that the pace of de' velopment of Soviet military technologies would be die' c tated primarily by engineering and research constraint* s rather than by the availability of resources. This assumP' 1 tion permitted Western intelligence to extrapolate cuf' a rent weapons and technologies along relatively well d£' j 1 fined straight-line paths, with only a technologic3* r breakthrough likely to invalidate predictions.
Russian Fighters: Ups and Downs
By David M. North
strong engine performance without the aid of fly-by-wire technology. Performing hard turns in the MiG-29 or the Cobra maneuver—a 90° pitch-up to get the nose on target—in the Su-27 convinced me that either aircraft in the hands of a good pilot would be a match for current Western fighters during a close-in fight.
A lot has happened since 1990, and the Russians now are competing with the U.S. and Europe for fighter sales throughout the world. Both Mikoyan and Sukhoi have updated their fighters with cathode-ray tube displays, enhanced aerodynamic features, and other modern technology- The Malaysians recently ordered MiG-29s, but did not opt for the ex- , port version with the newer features- jj
The Russians also are endeavor- ! ing to improve their reputation for I building aircraft whose engines have | short service lives and for failing to :
the 1950s and is akin to that of the F-4 Phantom.
While the overall design of two fighters exemplified the Russian goal of building superior numbers of aircraft with relatively short service lives, the basic reason was that the Russians lacked the computer technology necessary to integrate avionics and systems integration—as was being done in the West at the time. As a result, neither aircraft had the hands-on-throttle-and-stick and cathode-ray tube technology of their Western contemporaries, although they did incorporate advances in infrared search-and-track technology and helmet-mounted sights.
Their outstanding performance and handling characteristics, however, clearly put them in the same league as the newer generation of U.S. and European fighters. The Russians achieved this combat ability with excellent aerodynamics and
Combat aircraft offered for sale worldwide by the former Soviet Union offer operators some distinct advantages, but potential pitfalls associated with these aircraft must be fully understood.
I first was able to get close to Russian combat aircraft on a cold January afternoon in 1990 when I flew a MiG-29 Fulcrum from Kubinka air base near Moscow.
The following September, I flew in the front seat of a Su-27 at Farnborough, England; Viktor Pougachev was in the back seat on that flight.
These are rugged aircraft, meant to be operated from austere airfields and maintained by small crews. The same philosophy prevails in the cockpits of the two aircraft; although both were developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s—about the same time as the F/A-18 Hornet—the cockpit design dates to
This assumption, too, has been overtaken by events^ 1 as the current desperate Russian search for hard-cuf' 1 rency arms customers underlines. In fact, the constrain1* 1 imposed by economics are twofold, affecting both the pr°' ducer and the consumer. From the producer’s perspective ' when the drawdown in the defense budgets of all of tl>e 1 major powers and the resulting uniform increase in fe' s
A lot has happened since the author strapped into this MiG-29 at Kubinka air base outside Moscow in 1990—and the Russians now are marketing the aircraft aggressively worldwide.
provide maintenance and support for their aircraft. While they have yet to achieve Western standards for extended engine-overhaul times and long service lives, Russian engine manufacturers are attempting to improve their overall performance. The same can be said for doing a better job in maintaining their aircraft.
nS
ief
1
e
;0'
y'
The incentive for the Russians to correct their past liabilities and market their strengths to sell aircraft is enormous. Both Mikoyan and Sukhoi are struggling to keep their aircraft lines open and retain a cadre of skilled technicians and engineers, which means that they are willing to negotiate aircraft prices not easily matched by Western builders.
jtf
.S'
[0'
nJ
jf'
r0f
[6*
10'
r
r 0
r
<r
it*
r
ir
&
0|
liance on overseas arms markets are taken into account, it becomes apparent that economics will be a major factor in determining which weapons and systems are developed and how fast. In fact, only the United States is likely to be able to sustain a high-technology arms industry based solely on domestic sales.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the new importance of overseas markets portends a reversal of the Cold War practice of building for a domestic market and downgrading for export. In Europe, especially, future practice may entail building for export and upgrading for one’s own armed forces.
From the perspective of the consumer, the limited size of defense budgets and the rising cost of high-technology systems will limit the size of the market and thus lower the level of unit cost that is acceptable. This means that a successful Third World arms-marketing strategy is likely to focus on sales of low- and mid-range military technologies, rather than exclusively high-end systems.
f'
it5
0'
e<
*
v
Finally, the Cold War assumption that weapons and systems developed by either side would be used with maximum effectiveness rested on the paradigm of a large-scale, 'veil-trained, professional military equipped with relatively homogeneous weapons and systems. Both Eastern and Western militaries demonstrated that they could integrate the wide variety of systems developed, provide a satisfactory level of maintenance to ensure their opera
tional readiness, and then make effective tactical use of the systems in implementing a coherent national military strategy.
These assumptions never have been valid with regard to the Third World. Despite the best efforts of Third World military planners, their military forces contain an often bewildering variety of systems from different producers— who, for the most part, never intended the systems to be used together. Such unorthodox mixing of systems has the potential to produce an occasional synergy, but more often it is a headache that would challenge any professional Western military logistician.
47
Proceedings / February 1994
Next, we must add to this the problem of maintenance. For most Third World states, this is a threefold dilemma. The more sophisticated the system, the higher the complexity and cost of its maintenance. The higher the complexity, the more difficult it becomes to accomplish maintenance in-country with existing personnel and resources. The greater the requirement for outside maintenance, the greater the vulnerability of the new systems to the vagaries of politics and foreign-exchange economics and the less usable the system is likely to be in supporting national objectives. For most regional militaries, this means that real operational capability is much less than that indicated by mere order-of-battle estimates or the capabilities of any individual system. In terms of materiel readiness, the date a system is delivered by the producer probably is the only
date it may be expected to function to specifications.
To the extent that regional powers could be considered as lesser-included cases in a military acquisition and planning process configured for an East-West confrontation, the question of real Third World capabilities could be largely ignored—and any analysis based on order-of- battle and systems capabilities would result in an enlarged margin of Western superiority over regional militaries.
As the United States shifts to a strategy based on regional conflict and begins to gauge its own forces to deal with a Third World rather than a superpower threat, neither the lesser-included case nor the optimized-use assumptions remain valid. Instead, regional militaries must be assessed on a case-by-case basis with respect to operational capability to obtain a true benchmark for U.S. planning. The Cold War approach to threat assessment, which was based on projections of technological feasibility, must now be supplemented by a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of availability and individual operational capability. In effect, two additional questions need to be considered:
► What is the international arms market likely to be offering for sale and when?
► Who are the likely purchasers, in what quantities, and with what impact on their capabilities?
As the first question suggests, economics will be a major factor in determining the nature of weapons proliferation. Diplomacy may succeed in slowing down or arresting some proliferation, but there clearly will remain a highly competitive international arms market, with a number of nations attempting to maintain or increase their arms exports.
For commercial weapons producers, decisions about whether to produce a given system, how soon, and in what numbers always have been a function of potential costs and profits. Whenever the primary market for weapons was their own government, however, production could be focused on meeting specific requirements, with profits for all intents “guaranteed.” With the necessity now to cater to a worldwide export market—no one element of which is sufficient to support a high-technology arms industry by itself—the cost-versus-profits equation changes.
When losses are no longer “covered” by government, the decision to produce demands careful calculation of the costs of research and development, setting up and maintaining production lines, requirements for follow-on services, and availability of capital investment balanced against the producer’s assessment of profitability—that is, costs versus the potential market and projections for the duration of the production cycle. These assessments may be expected to determine which technology is weaponized and which is not, how fast it is brought into production and in what quantity, and how widely it will be sold.
In large part, the decisions of arms producers will determine what is available for purchase but not necessarily which country will decide to buy how many of which system—or how well they will be able to use what they buy. Answers to those questions encompass the potential users’ perception of threat, strategy and tactical doctrine, ability to pay, and ability to operationalize what has been bought—the same questions that had been part of regional assessment throughout the Cold War.
48 .
Such assessment involves analysis of two related but distinct sets of decisions: one by arms producers and one by consumers. While both can be tracked as weapons are produced and transported to consumers, neither can be perfectly known in advance and both become increasingly difficult to estimate the farther they are projected into the future. In effect, it is not possible to predict exactly what systems will appear in each country’s inventory over the next 20 years, but it is possible to bound the problem reasonably well.
Therefore, any long-term threat assessment must make a careful distinction between those elements that we can reliably expect to know and those we cannot. In practice- this means distinguishing between intentions and capabilities. Based on current and projected capabilities, for example, one could reliably assess that Western Europe will have a modern arms industry and be an active player in the international arms market in 2014. One cannot, however, say which systems it will market in a specific country—that is, predict an exact decision train. Similarly, on? can reliably assess that East Asia and the Middle East will have economies of sufficient size and wealth to support relatively large arms purchases, but the analyst will be unable to say which systems any one country will buy. These limits or reality checks on long-term projections dictate a two-part formulation for threat assessment:
> Identification of the types of systems that should be available for purchase on the arms market in the future, based on evolving technology, producer capabilities, and the producers’ assessments of potential markets
► Estimation of a consumer’s operational capability^' based on its probable level of defense expenditures, given the likely size of a given country’s economy and its perception of threat, and on the anticipated ability to into- grate, maintain, and effectively use the weapons it buy8- given the past performance of its military
Analyses of intentions, where known or discernible- serve as a means of refining or further bounding the la1' ter assessment.
From the standpoint of both the producers and consumers of post-Cold War intelligence, such an approach is an uncomfortable departure. Instead of the relatively precise orders-of-battle and well-defined threat estimate8 of the Cold War, we will be obliged to deal with range8 of potentially available military technologies, each ele- ment of which will have a different value in different combinations and in different hands. For example, differences in infrastructure, at-sea time, training, strategy, and tactics give a Kilo-class submarine a very different combat potential in the Russian, Iranian, and Algerian navies. I” short, we face a world in which there are no definitive im telligence answers, only a definitive challenge to intelb' gence to understand and explain. Such understanding wi" be possible only to the degree that intelligence organize tions are willing to grasp the nettle of multidisciplinary- multisource analysis of all aspects of foreign weapon sys' tern proliferation and use.
Captain Smith currently is assigned to the Chief of Naval Operation* Executive Panel. He was a primary player in the creation of l^e “. . . From the Sea” strategy and previously served as Deputy Director- Office of Naval Intelligence.
Proceedings / February 1^