This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Contents:
Cutting Back ... Some More—12
A Vision for a Naval Space Strategy—12
The Coast Guard: Semper Paratus—14
How About a Permanent Waiver?—14
Balancing Corps & Marriage—15
Fewer C-17s Buy More Lift—15
Pushing Them Out the Back Door—16
Desert Storm’s End Game—16
Surface Navy: Still in Search of Tactics—18
Heavy Helicopter Kings—19
Red Sky in the Morning—19
Twilight of the Supercarriers—20
Are We Committed?—20
Standing Up for Truth—20
The Red Cross Marks the Target—22
A Better Hornet: Promises, Promises—22
The Commission—25
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of Proceedings is to provide a forum where ideas of importance to the sea services can be exchanged. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in Proceedings. Please include your return address, your social security number, and a daytime phone number.
“Cutting Back .. . Some More”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 105-106, December 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander T. W. Strother, U.S. Navy—As a "gator sailor,” I was happy to see . . From the Sea” published because I believed that it would place greater emphasis on the Navy’s amphibious fleet. Mr. Polmar’s article made it abundantly clear, however, that I could not have been more mistaken and that the amphibious forces remain the unwanted stepchildren of the Navy.
In these uncertain times, it is a mistake to decommission all of the tank landing ships (LSTs) in the fleet. The LST is the only “beachable” landing ship that the Navy owns. It also is the only ship that can handle causeways and, therefore, the only one than can move heavy equipment directly to the beach.
The LST also is the prime mover of amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) to the amphibious operating area. Indeed, no other Navy ship is better suited, because on an LST, the AAVs do not compete with landing craft for deck-loading space—as they do on a wet-well ship. An LST can deliver AAVs closer to the line of departure than any other ship. Therefore, the AAVs spend less time in the water—a critical survival factor. Sending the AAVs ashore from some other type of ship and sending other vehicles ashore in air-cushion landing craft would delay the arrival ashore of the vehicles that the Marines need for most mobile operations.
Judging from the draconian cuts in the gator Navy, it appears that the surface Navy’s primary focus in a littoral campaign will be on firing Tomahawk missiles. Therefore, in the next war, the U.S. Navy might well be embarrassed by its inability to move large amounts of troops, supplies, and equipment ashore . . . from the sea. □
“A Vision for a Naval Space Strategy”
(See C. Gray, pp. 63-68, January 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Thomas G. Seigel, U.S. Navy, U.S. Space Command—Dr. Gray correctly asserts that there is a compelling need for the Navy to develop a space strategy. As an integral part of this overall plan, a doctrine that deals with the ap
plication of space assets to warfighting also must be developed.
Since future U.S. military efforts almost certainly will be conducted in the context of a joint task force, any naval space strategy and naval space doctrine! must fit within a generalized unifying1 space principle for all military forces. 1 proposed such a doctrine in my article “The Application of Space to Military and Naval Operations” in the Wintd 1993 edition of The Naval War Colleg1 Review. Essentially, this approach view* space control as the ultimate goal for the military exploitation of space. There are two complementary conditions to space control: space use for our own forces anil conversely, space denial against enemy forces. Ideally, the United States woul<l retain total space control and uncontested access to our space assets wherever, whenever, and however desired—while denying our enemies the use of their space assets.
Realistically, however, such supremacy is unlikely against a determined and capable enemy. There is a need, therefore, for a mental framework—a doctrine-' within which priorities can be set and op' | tions and countermeasures developed. This would include retaining theater- level sensors and capabilities and those organic to battle groups, in order to complement space-based systems.
The demonstrated success of space assets has created an urgent need to develop a naval space strategy and doctrine to refocus and revitalize our energies and thoughts about war in space—similar to the effect that Maritime Strategy had on thinking about war at sea during in the 1980s. Unless we do so, there will be dire consequences when the space-dependent U.S. military loses its access to space because of the actions of a “space-smart adversary.
Very likely, the lessons taken from the war with Iraq with regard to space are wrong. While space assets provided important, often crucial, support to the war effort, they were vulnerable to disruption- It is very unlikely that the United State* will face another opponent as incompe' tent as Iraq. Other nations recognize the heavy dependency that the U.S. military has on space systems and, undoubtedly, are planning accordingly. If they have the technical means to interfere with our use of space, they will certainly do so.
How should we respond to the threat
Proceedings / February 1
posed by an enemy’s offensive command- and-control warfare (C2W)? C2W commanders (formerly space/electronic warfare commanders) need to develop a firm conceptual and practical understanding of both offensive and defensive C2W— including the use of space assets. Whether serving with a battle group or a joint task force, naval personnel have a compelling need to understand space operations and have a valid conceptual model for space- related warfare.
It is imperative that a plan to raise space awareness and integrate it into planning be developed. Education and training are essential elements, but a naval space strategy to execute this initiative and a naval space doctrine are needed— and long overdue. □
The Coast Guard: Semper Paratus
(See p. 25, December 1993 Proceedings)
Captain Albert D. Grantham, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—As a 34-year Coast Guard veteran, I looked forward to reading about today’s Coast Guard in the December 1993 Proceedings. The opening of the Coast Guard section on page 25 pictured three Coast Guardsmen who would fit right into any Coast Guard recruiting poster. Then, I read the subtitle above them: “Semper Paratus—Always Prepared.” For as long as Semper Para
tus has been the Coast Guard’s motto, it has meant “Always Ready.” This might seem a nitpick, but for those who have served in the Coast Guard, our motto represents a commitment to service reflected in the words of our official march. Semper Paratus:
From Aztec shore to Arctic zone,
To Europe and Far East The Flag is carried by our ships In times of War and Peace;
And never have we struck it yet,
In spite of foe-men’s might,
Who cheered our crews and cheered again,
for showing how to fight,
We're always ready for the call We place our trust in the thee Through surf and storm and howling gale.
High shall our purpose be.
Semper Paratus is our guide.
Our fame, our glory too,
To fight to save or fight and die!
Aye! Coast Guard we are for you! □
“How About a Permanent Waiver?”
(See C. H. Griffiths, pp. 68-71, December 1993 Proceedings
Commander Nathaniel French Caldwell, Jr., U.S. Navy—A more appropriate title
would have been “Married to the Pro gram.” Indeed, Captain Griffiths specit ically states: “An officer selected for tin- program must agree to marry up with tit; discipline for the duration of his career- Funny, I don’t remember exchangiw vows with the program, but I do re men' ber swearing to defend the Constitution
Senior officers in the nuclear-pox^1 program—particularly nuclear sub mariners—need to wake up and heed tb‘ call to joint warfighting. It is here to sta; and even submariners must face that fad It isn’t a threat—unless you deny its ex istence. Unfortunately, the nuclear com munity now is paying a heavy price ft* denial. All nuclear cruisers are being do commissioned. The attack submari^ force is under fire; last year, the numbd of attack boats was cut from a Base Ford level of 75 to a proposed number of 6-! to an unspecified Joint Chiefs of Staff ro quirement and, finally, to only 45 in th£ Bottom-Up Review. Simultaneously, th£ Trident program has been criticized by sc nior members of Congress.
As described in “. . . From the Sea. the Navy is a joint service, fully interoperable with the other services and coalition forces. Ideally, submarines should N seen as essential to the four operational capabilities called for in “. . . From the Sea”: command, control, and surveillance battlespace dominance; power projection and force sustainment. Instead, the nu-
clea
por
tior
age
airc
to-<
whf
real
I
ina1
but
shu
bel
the
Set too Evi cei sta a t.
fot
tva
in,
tra
no
be
Pr
de
«n
he
Si
Hi
H
of
ENTER THE NEW
Colin L. Powell JOINT WARFIGHTING ESSAY CONTEST
SPONSORED BY THE U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
Aft er four successful years, the Warfighting Essay Contest is turning “purple.” The U.S. Naval Institute is pleased to announce the first annual Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest.
In the words of the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the competition seeks “those who are motivated to enter this contest not by a need to ‘toe the policy line,’ but who are devoted to the security of this great Nation.”
Essays should be about combat readiness in a joint context—persuasive discussions of tactics, strategy, weaponry, combat training, or other issues involving two or more ser
vices. Entries may be heavy in uni-service detail, but must have joint application in terms of force structure, doctrine, operations, or organization for combat. Interoperability of hardware and procedures may be discussed within the context of combat readiness. Essays are welcome from military professionals and civilians alike.
The Naval Institute will award cash prizes of $2,500, $2,000, and $1,000 to the authors of the three best essays entered. Maximum length is 3,000 words, but shorter opinion pieces or “professional notes” (typically 2,000-word technical arguments) may also be competitive.
WIN UP TO $2,500!
ENTRY RUL1S
1 • Essays must be original, must not exceed 3,000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest, U.S. Naval
Institute, 118 Maryland Ave, Annapolis, MD 21402-5035.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 1 April 1994.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name, address, telephone, social security number, and short biography of the essayist, tne title of the essay, and the motto. This envelope wilf not be opened until the Naval Institute has made its final selections.
5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8*/2" x 11". Submit two complete copies. (If typed on a computer, please also submit an IBM-compatible disk and specify word-processing software used.)
6. The essays will be screened by a
ftanel composed of officers from the ive armed services who will recommend six essays to the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board. The Editorial Board will award the three prizes.
7. The awards will be presented to the winning essayists at a special ceremony in July. The award winners will be notified by phone on or about 20 May 1994. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by mid-June.
8. The three prize-winning essays will be published in Proceedings, the Naval Institute’s magazine with a 120-year heritage. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in Proceedings. The authors of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
1
i
clear community is taking huge, disproportionate cuts to pay for the expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps envisaged in . . From the Sea” and the aircraft carriers needed to maintain day- to-day forward presence—a mission where submarines can play, but are not really needed.
e Pro specif or thi- ith the ireer. ngin! :mer>' tution powe[ sub- edihf 3 stay it fad its ex- com- ce for ig do
tarinc
imbct Force of 6" iff rein the y, the )y se-
Sea,"
inter-
coali-
ildbe
ional
n the'
ance;
:tion;
: nu
Because of the submarine service’s inability to articulate its crucial contributions to national security, it is being shut out of important joint fora. Despite belated attempts to get submariners on the Joint Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, they come with too little joint experience and education. Even worse, the submarine service is perceived correctly by other officers on these staffs as not supportive of jointness, not a team player.
Finally, Captain Griffiths’ argument for continuation of the joint-duty waiver Was valid while the program was growing because of a shortage of nuclear- trained officers; no such shortage exists now. In fact, nuclear-trained officers are being strongly encouraged to leave the program by career-screening boards that deny many well-qualified officers the once automatic progression to department head, executive officer, and command. Shore duty tours once were a rarity for nukes; now, they are common. Furthermore, since a typical commander coming off an executive-officer tour cannot hope
to make captain until the 23-year point, there will be plenty of time to get joint education and a joint tour.
Key officers like Captain Griffiths have decided that the submarine service cannot be both safe and joint. It is sad to say, but a submarine service that cannot be joint, cannot be. □
“Balancing Corps & Marriage”
(See E. T. Gomulka, pp. 77-80, December 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Louis Louk, Jr., Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy— Commander Gomulka brought to light some very important issues and statistics about marriage in the Marine Corps. I agree with his recommendation of a three-phase marriage and enrichment program. I recommend, however, an additional phase to be presented to the students in Recruiting School. It would instruct recruiters to emphasize not only to the challenges associated with marriage during the first term of enlistment to prospective recruits, but also to familiarize them with the rigors of boot camp.
During the time I was stationed at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, California, from February 1988 to February 1991, I saw too many recruits who would have made good Marines either give up, request an administrative or
The War is Over...
Choose from more than 35,000 images that capture history. Order a photo of your ship, aircraft, or action. Our photo collection dates from the late 1800s to the present, and includes U.S. Navy ships, Coast Guard, Marines, maritime and military images, extensive aircraft shots, all of the wars, and much more. U.S. Naval Institute members save 20%.
BUT1HE IMAGES REMAIN.
Proceedings / February 1994
3.
Non-member price
Naval Institute Member price
“Fewer C-17s Buy More Lift”
(See G. White, pp. 72-76, December 1993
Proceedings)
Colonel Michael R. Gallagher, U.S. Air Force—I agree with Commander White that the United States is seriously short of strategic lift of all kinds, and I support his call for enhanced sealift. The United States must maintain a robust—and balanced—mobility capability in which sea, air, ground, and prepositioning assets each play an important role.
Shame on Commander White, however, for falling into the trap of assuming that mobility forces must compete against each other for the same inadequate pot of resources. I am appalled particularly at his proposal to raid the C-17 program for the funds to enhance sealift capabilities. He uncritically accepted contractor cost and capability estimates for the C-141 service-life extension program (SLEP). Space does not permit a full discussion of the fallacies in relying on a SLEP for C-141s, but the deeper you look into its true costs, the less attractive a major SLEP looks.
YES! Please Send the Photos Listed Below.
Name _________________________________
Address _________________________________
City------------------------------------- State--------------------- Zip
Daytime Phone Number______________________
Naval Institute Member Number__________________________
Ship name, hull number, and year aboard OR aircraft type and year.
1. □ Matte □ Glossy
2. □ Matte □ Glossy
_________________________________ □ Matte □ Glossy
□ If photo is unavailable, please substitute sister ship photo.
□ Please send me a free Photographic Collection brochure.
BLACK & WHITE PHOTOS Otv.
Price
$12.00 x______________________________ = $ _
$9.60 x____________________________________ = $ _
Subtotal $
Maryland residents add 5% tax $ ___________________
Shipping and handling $ ________________________
Total enclosed $ _______________________________
□ Check enclosed □ Bill me (Naval Institute Members Only)
□ Charge my □ MasterCard □ VISA
Card No______________________________ Exp.___
Cardholder’s Signature __________________________
3.50
Please allow four to six weeks for delivery.
Mail or Fax Your Order To:
U.S. Naval Institute, Photo Service, 118 Maryland Ave., Annapolis, MD 21402-5035, FAX 410-269-7940
15
convenience-of-the-government separation, fake an injury, or, worse, commit suicide because they received “Dear John” letters from their spouses or spouses-to-be. □
As to the discussion of problems associated with operating large jet aircraft off paved surfaces. Commander White got it half right—which is to say he got it wrong. The C-17’s unique thrust-re- verser design will give it the ability to operate on small paved runways (3,000 feet and longer) and the narrow paved taxiways and small ramps associated with them. As the future core airlifter for the United States, the C-17 has external dimensions much like the C-141, a cargo- compartment cross section approximating the C-5, and ground maneuverability of the C-130. We clearly need this plane.
I’ll promise not to foul Commander White’s decks if he will cut the Air Force some slack to continue the critical task of successfully fielding the C-17. □
“Pushing Them Out the Back Door”
(See J. G. Burton, pp. 37-42, June 1993; J. H. Cushman, p. 17, July 1993; S. E. Dietrich,
R. M. Swain, R. H. Griffith, pp. 59-65, August 1993; P. E. Funk, M. T. Davis, B. B. G. Clarke, pp. 22-26, September 1993; W. B. McDaniel,
C. D. McFetridge, p. 24, October 1993; J. G. Burton, pp. 19-25, November 1993; W. S. Lind, pp. 23-24, December 1993; K. F. McKenzie,
D. C. Nilsen, pp. 23-24, January 1994 Proceedings)
“Desert Storm’s End Game”
(See J. H. Cushman, pp. 76-80, October 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired); former general editor of U.S. Marine Corps’ Persian Gulf War histories series—I see no
DOO
reason why we should not listen to an Air Force officer discuss ground-combat operations. Colonel Burton is well known for his advocacy of combat testing within the Pentagon procurement process and certainly knows a lot about weapons performance. As to ground tactics and operations in the Persian Gulf War, he is no more an amateur than were all serving U.S. officers when they were sent to the theater in 1990-91.
It may be a natural instinct for U.S. officers to critique the “end game” of the war, since war termination has been a part of U.S. wargaming and war planning for almost a generation. A nation that watched television coverage on a realtime downlink superior to what the combat commanders had may be excused for forgetting the Clausewitzean notion that the play of chance reigns ever on the battlefield. Nevertheless, I think that we all err with our concerns over what might have happened had we destroyed or pinned down more or all of the Republican Guard Corps in the Basra sector in the last hours of the ground war. Only because the Coalition could plan and stage its effort against a prostrate enemy with relative leisure is it possible to debate the final quarter-day’s conduct of a 100-hour ground campaign.
It is probably irrelevant to count the relative size of the Republican Guard force left to Saddam Hussein’s use after the cease fire. Even if the Basra-Bagh- dad connection had been cut by the Coalition, a surrounded force eventually would have reverted to Iraqi control after the cease fire—just as the Egyptian field army that was encircled by Israeli forces
in the Sinai during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was not lost. In that sense. General Schwarzkopf may have been on the mark in emphasizing the destruction of enemy forces, rather than their encirclement. Moreover, even without the Republican Guard Corps, Saddam Hussein had a large number of unengag infantry divisions with artillery, tanks.l and other fighting vehicles that would! have been more than sufficient to sub-J due rebellious Kurdish and Shi’ite dis | tricts. After all, in those battles, a T-5j tank would have been as effective as a| T-72 tank.
In the final analysis, neither the United Nations nor the Arab partners in the coalition likely would have countenanced further invasion of Iraqi territory or continuing destruction of Iraqi power. After all- which country wanted to see such > precedent established? But for President Bush’s personal grudge against his fantasized Hitlerian opponent, neither should have the United States considered such an option. It really seems unlikely that an Iraq friendly to U.S. interests will emerge from a post-Hussein regime, anymore than a calm and cohesive Somalia would have resulted if we had hunted down the bogeyman “General” Aidid.
General Cushman’s essay really tell* us more about the character of the joint command exercised by General Schwarzkopf. An avid student of the current practice of joint command and control, General Cushman has gauged well the Scylla and Charybdis of practicing the doctrine. He does us some disservice, however, by oversimplifying how ground command was structured and exercised, if only to single out General Schwarzkopf | as a consummate meddler.
His curious introduction of the German concept of fingerspitzengefuehl invites comparison to U.S. command habit* of “fingers-in-the-pie.” That is more instinctive to our national military tradition than the forlorn hope of transferring German mission-oriented tactics to U.S- minds. Certainly, most of General Cushman’s story reflects the latter reality- made even more facile with existing communications technology.
The United States must maintain a balanced lift capability. And part of it should be the C-17 Globemaster, which can carry heavy loads in and out of relatively small airfields.
General Cushman errs in stating that the French and British divisions served under the operational control of the commanders of the U.S. VII and XVfil Corps. Should they read the article, their commanders will be quick to point out that they retained both operational and administrative control of their formation* and that U.S. commanders exercised “tactical control”—a standard NATO practice that solved the political touchiness of the situation. One also notes the distinct and non-interfering missions assigned to the French and British for-
A
Proceedings / February 1^*
\\7HOLE V YORL
()KI X)
TRAVEL
mations by the commanders of XVIII and VII Corps.
It should be noted also that the Marine Corps commanders proved almost as impervious as the Arab force leaders to subordination to a U.S. Army commander. The Marine divisions posed no doctrinal difficulty for augmenting or receiving Army units. But to subordinate an air-ground task force like I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to a ground- component command and permit a single direction of the U.S. ground campaign simply was not to be done. This is not surprising, given the persistent jealousies of the services and their undying zest to perform well in the only game in town.
General Cushman has the Marine Corps force deployment to the theater mostly wrong. The sequence was 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), I MEF, 1st Marine Division, 3d MEB, and 4th MEB in August and September 1990. In December 1990 and January 1991 came reinforcements of the 5th MEB and the 2d Marine Division. The 2d Marine Air Wing deployed and received reinforcements starting in September 1990; the deployment of the force service support groups paralleled the divisional deployments. He also should review the provision of the Army armored brigade to the 2d Marine Division in January 1991. The command relationships were equally worrisome to the staffs of the Third Army and the I MEF. In the end, the 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division was placed under the operational control of I MEF—not the commander of the 2d Marine Division—a move that demonstrated a mistrust or unfamiliarity not warranted by the highly capable commanders of the brigade and division.
The end game of the ground-component command structure in the Persian Gulf War played out with no overall command—only separate service and national commands. General Schwarzkopf intermittently operated as his own ground commander, but he was too far removed from the units to exercise command. The
Army, Marine Corps, and Arab forces fought their separate battles. Fortunately, the enemy remained prostrate and no coordination of fires, cross-boundary actions, or employment of a generally non-existent theater reserve proved necessary. This phenomenon was reflected in the Marines’ approach to the war. The MEF commander acted as his own ground commander, disposed of no maneuver reserve, but had no real difficulty with the enemy. In his case, he did go forward in a command vehicle—unprotected by maneuver units—and encountered Iraqi units in the smog of war. Fortunately, they were seeking only the opportunity to surrender.
The most cogent contribution of General Cushman’s essay is his frank revelation in footnotes that General Schwarzkopf hoarded the records of the campaign, many presumably classified. This tendency confirms General Schwarzkopf to be cast in the MacArthur model—vice the Marshall model—of the Army officer corps, and reflects too much the apparent cynical conduct of public officials. □
■‘Surface Navy: Still in Search of Tactics”
(See C. H. Johnson, pp. 92-95, September 1993; K. Brown, p. 20, December 1993; J. P. Wal- man, pp. 14-16, January 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Marty Smith, U.S. Navy, Prospective Commanding Officer, USS Drum (SSN-677)—While Captain Johnson’s intentions are right on the mark, I don’t think that the Navy will find the time or money to make the long-term changes that his “extraordinary effort” will require. However, I do believe that the surface Navy can make some definite improvements in its tactical skills; an improvement desperately needed as battle groups and amphibious ready groups shrink and Third World navies rapidly improve their tactics and hardware. Some of these steps can be borrowed from the U.S. submarine force which has long recognized the values of stealth, decep
the
D-DAY REUNION / 50th ANNIVERSARY CRUISE 29 MAY— 8 JUNE 1994 ☆ Cunard Line Queen Elizabeth 2 ☆
volv
sistii
tical
subr
alw;
duty
Experience the elegance of a bygone era Official D-Day ceremonies >- Naval Institute lecturer I author Paul Stillwell
the <
tend
istr;
ship
voh
Contact: Michael Dillard • (800) 950-9522 • Two Logan Sq. Ste. 625 Philadelphia, PA 19103
vol
cal
abl
i$r
Use
cat
Off
of
Mi
the
He
Ua]
of
<hj
fie
lot
of
ce
to
cii
V
th
at
0)
se
t)
\
Hi
A
h
tl
t<
cer i
tion, and intelligence when fighti" against a numerically superior force.
Captain Johnson pointed out the lad of an overall integrated set of tactic guidelines which need to be kept bo1 highly sophisticated and straight forwa11! For years, the submarine force has bed blessed with this very guidance in tb form of The Attack and Approach Aft"1 ual written and updated by Command Submarine Development Squadrif Twelve (SubDevRon 12). Backed upb! detailed guidance in specific warfa" areas by other naval-warfare publication developed and maintained by SubDevR" 12, it clearly is the kind of document tip Captain Johnson is looking for.
Unfortunately, there is no equivak" to SubDevRon 12 in the Surface Na') However, there are some organization that, with a little effort, could take on tin, mission—e.g., the Surface Warfare Vc velopment Group or the Pacific Fleet A" tisubmarine-Warfare Squadron.
Perhaps the quickest (and best) wayll' increase the number of “tactical” tactic® action officers (TAOs) in the surfa1" Navy rests on the shoulders of— guessed it—the ships’ commanding off1' cers. By tradition, duty, and experience they are the best people to fight and lea" the ship into battle. Therefore, they mu?1 personally train their TAOs and off'" cers-of-the-deck to think and react as the) would, standing on the bridge or in cob1' bat information center. If the captain doc- not take an active role in ensuring, f°( example, that the TAOs have the neces' sary guidance in managing their time setting priorities to enable them to 1 e""1 and practice their tactical skills, he isne glecting a crucial part of his duties. Si1"' ilarly, if an executive officer is counts ing the captain’s efforts by requiring d"'1 too much time and effort be spent on $ ministrative and personnel matters, ^ captain needs to sit down with the exec' utive officer and review the ship’s mlS' sion statement (or, perhaps, write one)
This brings to mind another interest1"^ difference between the surface Navy a"
19*4
Proceedings / February
the submarine force—the level of involvement of the executive officer in assisting the commanding officer in the tactical employment of the ship. A submarine’s executive officer will almost always serve as the underway command duty officer in wartime conditions when the captain is resting. Therefore, he will tend not to be preoccupied with administrative matters at the expense of the ship’s tactical excellence. This close involvement also helps the executive officer prepare for the responsibilities of fighting his own submarine. The surface Navy’s executive officers—who usually have more administrative assistants than a submarine executive officer anyway— need to adopt a similar attitude, aimed at becoming a ship’s second-best tactician.
ISt
The captain needs to be closely involved in the design of the ship’s tactical-training schedule to ensure that valuable training time in port and underway is not wasted. Too often, exercises or the use of trainers are a waste of time, because of inadequate preparation, lack of officer involvement, and the total absence of realism. The captain is the only one who can rapidly fix these problems—with the enthusiastic help of his executive officer, department heads, and TAOs. Finally, given the lack of an integrated set of tactical guidelines, the captain should create his own set of fighting instructions, drafted and chopped by his crew and officers in order to increase their tactical knowledge and impart an important sense of ownership.
Cl'C
rffc
J
While the politicians and senior officers are preoccupied over the long-term role of the naval services, doctrinal policies, and what the next uniform sweater will look like, the task of developing the tactics necessary to win the next war at sea will go by default to those commanders and captains privileged to be on sea duty. Waiting for direction from the type commander or a military think tank will help only the captain looking for the next Monday-morning “lessons learned.” And the captain who starts to think about his TAO’s tactical proficiency—or lack thereof—three weeks before deployment to the Persian Gulf has done so about 17 months too late. □
“Heavy Helicopter Kings”
(See C. W. Meyer, pp. 87-88, November 1993; D. M. Hartwell, p. 14, January 1994
Proceedings)
General Wayne A. Downing, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command—Captain Meyer’s article was stimulating and it raised many good points. Nevertheless, he made some serious errors in his assessment of
the MH-53J special-operations helicopter that is being flown by the Air Force’s Special Operations Command.
First, he states, “although the Sikorsky H-53 is . . . the MH-53J Pave Low to the Air Force . . . they are all the same heavy-lift, long-range helicopter.” The MH- 53J Pave Low III is decidedly not the same as the other H-53 variants. After its service-life extension—which included the installation of a state-of-the art terrain-following, terrain-avoidance, and ground-mapping radar; a complete defensive-electronics suite; and a glass cockpit—it is almost an entirely new aircraft and certainly the most sophisticated helicopter in the U.S. inventory.
Captain Meyer asserts that the MH-53Js “are difficult to deploy by air, because they require huge C-5B military transport aircraft.”
All MH-53Js are air refuelable, which means they can conduct long-range self-deployment. Recently, in order to support a Marine unit in the Caribbean, MH-53Js were in place and combat-ready 24 hours after initial notification. It took the helicopters that relieved them more than four days to arrive on the scene. Also, the C-5 option means that MH-53Js can be deployed anywhere in the world and be ready for action within 48 hours of initial notification.
Not only is the helicopter itself different, but the mission profiles flown by special-operations pilots are decidedly different than any others. One of the great lessons of the failed hostage-rescue attempt in Iran in 1979 was that no matter how good a crew is in their specialty, you cannot train them in a short period of time to fly the demanding low-level, all- weather, and limited-visibility profile that characterizes special-operations missions. Even the months of training that crews had for the Iranian mission did not prepare them adequately.
The dedicated pilots who fly the MH-53J Pave Low III have attained their high level of proficiency through constant and realistic training with Army Special Forces and Rangers and Navy SEALs. This level of skill, however, can be maintained only if the focus of all their training is on tasks related to special-operations (including deck qualification on Navy ships). The best way to ensure this is to keep them in a separate command where they train with the people with whom they fight. Putting these helicopters and their crews in Marine squadrons in order to “consolidate training and logistics” would jeopardize this hard-won proficiency and, therefore, en
danger them and the operators they carry.
The U.S. special-operations community developed its superb capabilities by heeding the lessons learned from its failures, near misses, and successes in combat. Throwing away this critical capability based on claims of efficiency would be a false economy. □
“Red Sky in the Morning”
(See J. H. Alexander, pp. 39-45, November 1993; H. A. I. Sugg, p. 16, January 1994 Proceedings)
William A. Winston—As a crewmember in the USS North Carolina (BB-55) during the invasion of Tarawa, I enjoyed Colonel Alexander’s article immensely.
The night before the assault, the North Carolina left the fast carriers and steamed to Tarawa in order to participate in the preliminary bombardment on D-Day. As daylight approached, we could see the atoll and the thick pall of smoke hanging over the island. Our ship did not fire a shot, however. We were ordered back to escort the fast-carrier task group. Fifty years later, 1 still wonder why.
Our ship’s 16-inch and 5-inch guns could have flattened the Japanese pillboxes and blockhouses and harassed the defending troops prior to the landing. The North Carolina fired 360 rounds of 16- inch and 2,353 rounds of 5-inch during the pre-invasion bombardment of the Roi- Namur Islands in January 1944.
/
The best way to ensure that the skills of the pilots and crews of the Air Force’s MH-53Js— skills that U.S. special-operations forces have come to count on—are maintained is to keep these men and their machines in a separate command.
19
Young Americans of future generations need such examples as the men on Tarawa if our country is to endure strong and free. □
PRESTON’S
SHOREBIRD
SWEATSHIRT
You’ll be a walking field guide when you wear Preston’s NEW North American Shorebird Sweatshirt. 33 species are shown and named, including Willet, Ruddy Turnstone, Kildeer, Dunlin, plovers, sandpipers, gulls, terns. Printed front and back, navy on ash. 50-50 poly/cotton. L & XL $32.95; XXL $3435. Add $3 shipping. Send check or MO or call (516) 477-1990. MC, VISA, AMX accepted.
PRESTON’S
188-F Main St. Wharf, Greenport, NY 11944 N.Y.S. residents please add sales tax
7= THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA PRESS
Sailor of the Air
The 1917-1919 Letters and Diary ofUSN CMM/A Irving Edward Sheely Edited by his nephew Lawrence D. Sheely U tilizing Sheely’s correspondence and meticulous diary spanning 19 months of training and service, this book presents an unusual first- person account of the experience of naval aviation in World War I. 240pp. 1993 cloth $29.95
Box 870380 • Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 t Orders 800-825-9980 • Fax 205-348-9201 m
DO YOU BUILD PLANES?
NAVAL BASE/AIRWING
The Largest Selection of Plastic US Naval Planes in America
NAVAL BASE 560N Willow Avenue Cedarhurst, New York 11516
(516) 295-9525
Catalog S2.50
“Twilight of the Supercarriers”
(See C. R. Girvin, pp. 41-45, July 1993; H. G.
Hatch, p. 13, August 1993; R. D. Mixson, W.
D. Houser, pp. 14-18, September 1993; J. W.
Stratton, B. Tillman, pp. 19-22, October 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Bart A. Vinskey, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy—Admiral Mixson wonders if Captain Girvin is familiar with “. .. From the Sea.” I am sure he is, but what of it? I wish someone would explain the unique capabilities of the aircraft carrier in operations in Somalia. In Somalia, the primary aircraft were helicopters and Air Force AC-130 Specter gunships.
Admiral Mixson also was upset with Captain Girvin’s assertion that carrier aviation played a “relatively insignificant” role in the Persian Gulf War. He cites a number of statistics—e.g., “flying 35% of all power-projection missions and providing a preponderance of air-defense suppression strikes.” The admiral does not discuss, however, the significance of these efforts. For instance, he may be correct that 93 of 109 Iraqi craft were destroyed by carrier aviation, but he does not discuss what type of craft they were, whether they were at sea or in port, how much ordnance was used against them, or how many sorties were generated per craft destroyed.
Furthermore, Captain Girvin does not argue for the abolition of the carrier fleet. He proposes a smaller aircraft carrier. The 50,000-ton ship he describes would be capable of providing the air support that the fleet requires. Indeed, these carriers would be larger than the many Essex (CV-9)-class carriers that served into the mid-1970s and were active in Korea and Vietnam. Captain Girvin’s ship is the carrier that the Navy will need as it shifts its focus from great battles fought by supercarrier battle groups to the more flexible operations and forces forecast in “. . . From the Sea.” □
“Are We Committed?”
(See S. H. Frewing, pp. 57-59, December 1993 Proceedings
D. J. Fitzgerald—The Tailhook scandal lies more in the arena of public relations, not ethics. All ethics that personnel of the sea services will ever need are embodied in the oath they take “. . . to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” □
Lieutenant L. A. Perry, U.S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Frewing’s recognition of the need for a strong and broad course in naval ethics is commendable. A comprehensive ethics curriculum should be a
basic and ongoing part of naval training at all levels. One fleet-wide stand down hardly will solve the problems that are evidenced by Tailhook and other ethical scandals currently afflicting the Navy.
The challenge facing the Navy is reflected in the civilian world. Over the past several decades, the teaching of—and training in—formal ethics has been removed more or less from curricula at all levels of education. As the ethical chaos of our society has become more evident, the Naval Academy has begun to embrace secular training programs and preparation in ethics.
Often, however, the ethical decisions facing military personnel have no parallel in civilian life. One has only to glance through a basic chemical-warfare manual to ascertain the need for a sense of ethics that enables personnel to act with clear and insightful judgments in extremely trying circumstances. For the Navy, therefore, the challenge is to develop a truly meaningful—and consistent—course of applied naval ethics. Periodic doses of education on sexual harassment, substance abuse, and legal restrictions are worthwhile, but they are not sufficient to 1 develop the inner sense of integrity that is the foundation of true ethical behavior. Ethical training needs to be integrated into all aspects of Navy life and recognized for its absolute necessity to a way of life based on service and honor. This presents a formidable task indeed, but one vital to the combat effectiveness and institutional integrity of the Navy. □
“Standing Up for Truth”
(See W. DeCamp, pp. 89-90, September 1993;
J. T. Willmon, p. 14, November 1993; D. M.
Walter, R. C. Stern, p. 14, December 1993
Proceedings)
Captain David R. Carlson, U.S. Navy-" Major Johnson’s courageous act stand* in sharp contrast to the appalling display of ethical flexibility made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during their embarrassing public acceptance of policy that was designed to allow the President to salvage the scraps of a foolish and unenlightened campaign promise.
The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy being implemented to accommodate homosexuals in the armed forces asks that responsible military leaders wink at—if n°’ turn a blind eye toward—disobedience o* the law. The outcome of this policy is no1 difficult to predict because we’ve been down this road before.
During the 1970s, unofficial acceptance of “soft” drug abuse in the armed forces was widespread—and disastrous Many believed that off-duty behavior wt>s a private matter. Provided that everybody
Proceedings / February
pin"
lotf” t atf
bi^
&
s*
a**!
It a" ha°s Jen'-
eif'
an“
;iOl>S
ah*1'
at,c,
th>cS
■leaf
r try-
:S U j
suf'
,af«
nl
to 1
tllU1
COec
THis ■ <?
i*'
Sf
A i5' t*
$
it1"
uU'
»o'
1*
ne
4*
<#
was “straight” when they came to work, it was no problem. The ugly truth was that those who were using drugs—mainly marijuana—banded together for mutual support and pleasure. These informal groups spawned inappropriate relationships which undermined good order and discipline. The deplorable result eventually prompted the current “zero tolerance” policy.
If anyone in uniform smokes marijuana today, and the crime is discovered by random urinalysis, his or her career may be over. Obviously, smoking one “joint” does not threaten to shake the foundations of the military establishment, but tacit approval of illegal conduct begets enormous problems.
Most who support ending the gay ban assert that behavior—not orientation— should be the issue. But does anyone think that homosexuals in uniform should—or would—take and honor an oath of celibacy? Hardly. Furthermore, it’s naive beyond reason to believe that clandestine sex is any less unifying for its devotees than clandestine substance abuse. In fact, many experts argue convincingly that sex may be the most powerful drug of all. Therefore, it’s reasonable to assume that the military “gay underground” that we’re hearing so much
about now does not exist to promote Bible study.
Let’s be frank—sodomy is illegal. It is a criminal offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 22 states retain laws against it. But effective enforcement of regulations dealing with sexual conduct may be nearly impossible. Our widespread but unpublicized failure to control heterosexual sex in mixed units does not augur well.
It’s simple. When people who are young, healthy, and sexually attracted to one another are forced to live and work together in stressful, isolated environments, you will have behavior detrimental to good order and discipline. Including homosexual men and women only ensures that homosexual fraternization and harassment will be added to the list of woes with which our leaders must contend. Worse yet, there is no fix. There is no random test that can detect illicit sexual conduct. The daily evidence of wrongdoing is its corrosive effect on morale, readiness, and safety.
Therefore, commanders will face a terrible dilemma. Those who try to deal with the problem will be labeled as homo- phobic zealots who are conducting witch hunts—and invite reprimand. Leaders who ignore the problem and its inevitable
destructive effects will be guilty of contributory negligence.
In an effort to mold a military that perfectly reflects the nation, we are creating a force that will reflect perfectly—and, in some cases, distill—all of the nation’s problems. Leadership distracted by the social chaos this wrongheaded policy guarantees will be unable to lead—and, as always, the price will be high. □
Now Hear This!
"I am glad that this fine book, The Big E And Me, was written of the inspirational record of the magnificent carrier, USS Enterprise CV-6."
Thomas J Hamilton Rear Admiral,USN(ret)
Rex Mitchell’s remarkable memoire takes us onto the guns of the BIG E and into the very soul of America's greatest and proudest war ship.
Ideal book for the shipmate, his family, history buff or WWII enthusiast. This 333 page, quality paper back is a distinctive addition to any library. $19.95 plus $3.50 postage. U.S. orders only. Mail payment with order to: Rex Mitchell, 32742 Alipaz Sp 32, San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675
Sixth Annual
Marine Corps
Essay Contest
★ ★ ★ ★
The U.S. Naval Institute will award cash prizes of $1,000, $750, and $500 to the authors of the three win- ning essays in the recently announced fourth annual Marine Corps Essay Contest.
The Naval Institute created this contest to encourage discussion on current issues and new directions for the Marine Corps.
Essays must he postmarked ho later than 1 May 1994.
Essay Contest Riii.ks: ^___________________
1. Essays must be original and no longer than 3,000 words.
2. All entries should be directed to Editor-in-Chief, Proceedings (USMC Contest), U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, MD 21402-5035. Questions: Call, 410-268-6110; Fax, 410-269-7940.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 1 May 1994.
4. Letters notifying the three award winners will be mailed on or about 1 July 1994.
5. All essays should be typewritten, double-spaced, on 8-1/2” x 11" paper. Include address, phone number, biographical sketch, and social security number with each entry.
6. The Naval Institute will publish the winning essays in Proceedings, its monthly magazine. Some entries not awarded prizes may also be selected for publication. Their authors will be compensated at regular rates.
7. The Naval Institute Editorial Board will judge the competition.
21
OWN A BEAUTIFUL DATA PLAQUE OF THAT SPECIAL SHIP OF THE FLEE1
A WWI FLUSH DECK FOUR STACKER- OR A SUPER CARRIER'
...Ship data plaques are also available for other ships of the Fleet and Coast Guard Cutters...from WWI to the present.
These beautiful plaques make ideal gifts and are striking additions to any den or office. Ship Data Plaques are 10"x16" and are made of polished, non-tarnishing brass, mounted on a rich walnut grained base-
Ship Data Plaques are only $49.00 plus a $5.50 shipping charge (California residents add $3.80 sales tax).
For a plaque of your ship - call toll free:
800-327-9137
SPRITE INDUSTRIES 1827 Capital Street Corona, California 91720
.RUSSIAN MILITARY. f HISTORY TOUR >
BnEPEA! HA 3JU1AA! With visit? lo...
Moscow • St. Petersburg • Kursk Stalingrad • Murmansk • Kronstadt
• St.Petersburg Naval 4 Artillery Museums
• Monino Air Museum • MoscowTank Museum • Battlefields/War Museums/Memorials Also...
• Meet Russian Vets & Military Historians
• Home Visits For Those Interested Escorted by:
Professor John M. Thompson September 5-221994 From: New York..$3,554/L.A..$3,890
Tour Prices All Inclusive
© Lufthansa
For more Info, call or write:
East-West International Tours
Placentia, CA. 92670
1248 Montevideo Ave.
1-800-359-6719
“The Red Cross Marks the Target”
(See M. S. Baker, pp. 70-71, October 1993 Proceedings)
Commander Anthony B. Serfustini, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—The points made by Captain Baker concerning the vulnerability of the medical officer in the field ring true.
In July 1993, I served as an instructor at the Fleet Marine Force Medical Officers Course at which many of Captain Baker’s concerns were addressed. It is
imperative that the type of training offered at this course be made available to all reserve medical personnel who may be assigned to serve with a Marine unit and made part of an ongoing educational effort in a Naval Reserve setting. It is the duty of all reserve medical officers to be acquainted not only with the latest advances in medicine and surgery in order to treat casualties, but also with ways to protect themselves and their personnel. □
“A Better Hornet: Promises, Promises”
(See J. Stevenson, pp. 104-107, October 1993; C. F. Weideman, G. E. Hakanson, pp. 18-20, December 1993; Editor’s Note, p. 20, January 1994 Proceedings)
Commander M. G. Moffit, U.S. Navy— Mr. Stevenson’s commentary appears to based somewhat on fact and much more on conjecture. The assumption that the E/F version of the Hornet will experience the same if not greater programmatic difficulties than the A/B version stretches the correlation a little too far. I would certainly hope naval aviation has learned something about executing a viable program since the A-12 fiasco as well as with all that has been learned during the last 15 years of the F/A-18 program.
Additionally, it’s amazing that an individual of Mr. Stevenson’s apparent knowledge would believe any program would survive the Washington environment without being modified to some degree. If there was one thing I learned while assigned to the OpNav staff, it was that compromise was the name of the game. Nothing survived that wasn’t negotiable; therefore, everything was negotiable.
Institute Press book, or a commentary
Something else disturbed me about this commentary. For the life of me I couldn’t figure out why this commentary was published. It didn’t seem to be responding to any particular reader response, but yet it had an unusual flavor. And then it
dawned on me. It’s dollars, stupid! Th1 commentary and the previous editor^ izing on the entire F/A-18 issue wd thinly disguised promotions of The Pd tagon Paradox: The Development of ^ F-18 Hornet, published by the Naval I" stitute Press. What better way to promt'1 interest in the subject—and increase sal of the book—than to stir the pot a littk
This issue is a hot topic for naval a'1' ation because the effects of . . Frof the Sea” are having a significant impd' on it. Certain portions of our traditio" bound naval aviation community are fim ing this a very difficult issue to come grips with. It is unfortunate, however,1' have Proceedings add fuel to an alread! hot fire with this kind of commentary an effort to promote interest in an ass°' ciated fiscal venture.
In the future, I hope the Naval Inst1" tute will be a little more sensitive whd it comes to issues with which there mig*1' be a conflict of interest. I expect bettd from Proceedings which historically ^ done an excellent job in maintaining open forum for professional discussi1'11 and promoting thought on naval and rnd' itime issues.
Editor’s Note: The entire F/A-18 isJ,,( is—as Commander Moffit observes- hot topic, ” and an important concern ft1 naval aviation—indeed, the entire Nau Since discussion of professional issues what Proceedings has been about f°[ more than 120 years, we have publisht> numerous articles on the F/A-18 Horn4 program and letters in response to thosl articles. The books published by Naval Institute Press are part of the opef forum that the Naval Institute provide for those interested in naval and mariti',,‘ affairs. Therefore, the publication of°h interview with a Naval Institute Press O'-1 thor, an excerpt from an upcoming Nuy‘
a Naval Institute Press author is not conflict of interest in our view, but a »l,! ural way of introducing new ideas for d,s cussion into the Proceedings forum ^
Proceedings / February
’ “From a Commissioner”
j (See E. Donnelly, pp. 55-56, February 1993; R. M T. Egan, S. G. Cockerham, H. J. Lindenbaum,
I pp. 19-20, April 1993 Proceedings)
“The Polling Data”
(.See G. C. Sadler, pp, 51-54, February 1993; R. T. Egan, S. G. Cockerham, H. J. Lindenbaum, pp. 19-20, April 1993 Proceedings)
Captain Georgia C. Sadler, U.S. Navy (Retired)— Regarding the Roper surveys on public and military attitudes about the assignment of women in the armed forces, Mr. Egan asked whether men and women inside and outside the military services have significantly different opinions. The Roper surveys did not ask a question on the general issue of women in combat, because that question has already been answered; Women have been—and will be—in combat.
In the Persian Gulf War, Navy women were members of a damage-control team fighting a fire on a foreign vessel. Women Marines drove trucks to the front lines. Women died in a Scud attack and a helicopter crash. Women were POWs. The question, therefore, is whether women will be in combat only in support roles or also given direct-combat assignments. Consequently, the question asked in the Roper surveys was whether the respondents favored or opposed the current military policy of not assigning women to direct-combat positions. In response, 47% of the public and 42% of the military favored women in direct-combat positions, while 44% of the public and 57% of the military were opposed.
The record does not support General Cockerham’s assertion that public support for the assignment of women to combatant ships and aircraft “was primarily evident among respondents who mistakenly believed that women are already assigned to those combat units.” The Roper survey found uncertainty and misinformation regarding the current assignment policy for women (42% thought women are already assigned to combat aircraft and 45% believed women are serving in combat ships), but because this raised the question as to whether public support for women in combat stemmed from a mistaken understanding that they are already in direct combat, the Roper Organization did a crosstabulation of those individuals Who knew the correct information with •he question of whether assigning women
to combat ships, combat aircraft, or ground combat should be voluntary, required, or prohibited. The results were presented to the Presidential Commission on 11 September 1992 by Carolyn Set- low of Roper. As Ms. Setlow stated, they indicated that the views of those who knew the correct information “very closely mirror the views of the public at large, so that whether they were correctly or incorrectly informed on the current assignment of women appeared to have very little impact on their broad attitudes on whether, in fact, women should be assigned, should be allowed to volunteer, or should be precluded from [direct-combat] assignments.”
General Cockerham also said that “the commission determined that the ‘voluntary option’ is not workable where combat is concerned,” and implied that because the public favored the discredited volunteer option, it would be irresponsible for the commission to make serious recommendations based on the data from the Roper questions, which included the volunteer/required/prohibited options. Though the commissioners did seem to agree that letting women volunteer for combat would be unfair and would not work, several commissioners pointed out that the answers to the volunteer/re- quire/prohibit question were useful, because they revealed that the proportion of the public against the assignment of women to direct-combat positions was low compared with the percentage who favored women in direct combat, either by letting them volunteer or by requiring them to serve. For example, 80% of the public supported the assignment of women to combat ships, while only 17% were opposed. Similarly, 78% favored assignment of women to combat aircraft, with only 18% opposed. Even in the area of direct ground combat, only 27% of the public said women should not be assigned compared with 70% who said they should be allowed to volunteer or be required to take such assignments. Furthermore, when the voluntary option was removed and the respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the assignment of women to combat ships and combat aircraft, about two-thirds of both the public and military responded that they favored such assignments.
General Cockerham also said that I “failed to mention that military personnel support current policies exempting women from direct-combat positions by a margin of about 57% to 42%.” In fact, I did include that statistic near the beginning of the article; however, more useful than the answers to this general combat question were the responses to questions about specific types of combat assignments. These showed that both
the public and the military differentiated between types of direct-combat positions by favoring assignment to combat ships and combat aircraft, while opposing assignments which placed women in most direct-ground-combat roles. Thus, combat is not seen as monolithic but rather as having a range of possible assignments, some which are appropriate for women and some which are not.
Additionally, General Cockerham’s statement that “those with direct-combat experience are most strongly opposed to the repeal of the current exemptions” is misleading because the Roper data included only some, not all, military personnel with direct-combat experience. For example. Navy personnel shown in the survey as being in “combat specialties” included only fighter/bomber pilots and SEALs; all other pilots, all officers in other warfare communities, and all enlisted personnel who are not in special warfare were included in the “non-combat specialties” category.
As to the survey of retired flag officers, it should be noted that it was devised by the commission staff and was not part of the Roper surveys. General Cockerham also failed to mention that the survey showed that recent retirees are far less opposed to women in direct-combat roles. For example, while 71% of all retirees did not want women in fighters and bombers, opposition dropped to 56% for those who retired between 1990 and 1992. Similarly, 58% of the 1990-to- 1992 retirees did not favor assigning women to combat ships compared with the overall retiree figure of 76%.
Finally, although the opinions of retired officers may be interesting, the view of an active-duty admiral is more pertinent. At the 12 May 1993 hearings of the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on assigning women aviators to combat squadrons and repealing the combat ship exclusion. Vice Admiral Ronald J. Zlatoper, Chief of Naval Personnel, said:
25
All these initiatives are the right steps at the right time. They are supported throughout the chain of command from the deckplates to the Chief of Naval Operations. Women have served with distinction and honor throughout the Navy’s history, and this progress permits them to develop fully and use their talents to the maximum extent possible. However, most importantly for the Navy and our nation, women working side by side with their male shipmates, throughout the fleet, will provide the talent and devotion to duty needed to keep the Navy at its peak of effectiveness. □