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Airborne Amphibians Are Here Again
By Michael McDaniel and Curtis Snyder
The need for strategic mobility is embodied in “ . . . From the Sea,” and modernized seaplanes can help fill the gap. The requirement to transport large, heavy equipment quickly, and deliver it to unprepared locations is crucial—Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm is but the most recent example.
A large heavy-lift seaplane, incorporating modern technology, could transport large amounts of men and materiel swiftly, and deliver it wherever there is enough water to float on. Combined with tactical aviation and special operations forces, presence could be established in locations hostile to our
despite a heroic effort, U.S. Air Force airlift was limited in both tonnage and flexibility of delivery. Existing aircraft could
their conquest of Kuwait with an im®( diate attack on Saudi Arabia. Fortunate! also, the Saudis had built a complexc ports and airfields.
The heavy-lift shortfall is r£' ognized, but current plans & merely for more sealift ships a®1; new C-17 wide-body transports' the same types of deployme( assets that proved inadequate1 the Gulf. Buying more of same is not a complete answer' what is needed is a fundamental1 new solution.
To transport large amountsc cargo quickly in the initial of an operation, there is only otf answer: large waterborne aircrar
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SCIENCE. INC. / INSET: ITAR-TASS/SOVFOTO
These large Orlan wing-in-ground- effect (WIG) vehicles on the ramp are evidence of Russia’s lead in this highspeed, heavy-lift technology. Much work has been done at the R. Alexeyev hydrofoil design bureau in Nizhny Novgorod.
intentions. The seaplane is back.
One of Desert Storm’s biggest lessons was the necessity for high-speed, heavy lift transportation. In the first few days of Desert Shield, it became evident that
carry many troops, but very few tanks or armored personnel carriers. In addition, the airlift was directed almost exclusively to well-established airfields safe in friendly hands.
U.S. Navy sealift also had limitations. Ships could carry the heavy equipment, but took time to make ready and were relatively slow once under way. Once again, all save the amphibious assault ships had to be unloaded in friendly ports that would have been vulnerable to a concerted attack.
Fortunately, the Iraqis did not follow
An advanced assault amphibian or plane would have the speed of an
plane, the operational flexibility of an;l phibious assault ship, and a payl0^ capability lying between the two. It cCl11 j serve as a transport for special forces ^
assault elements of ground forces, also as a means to deploy Marines to phibious assault ships already in the c° bat area.
aH1'
An advanced amphibian would no1
restricted to prepared airfields, or e ^ from large, level fields. It could op£f' , from any fairly large body of water, t'1
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| Table 1: Seaplane Characteristics |
|
| |||
Seaplane | Mission | Length | Wingspan | Gross Weight | Cruise Speed | Range | Payload |
|
| (ft) | (ft) | (lbs) | (lets) | (nm) | (lbs) |
R4Y Tradewind | Transport | 143 | 145 | 175,000 | 260 | 3,500 | 48,000 |
P6M Seamaster | Bomber | 134 | 100 | 175,000 | 470 | 3,000 | 30,000 |
A-40 Albatross | ASW/SAR | 138 | 138 | 190,000 | 430 | 3,000 | 22,000 |
PS-1 | ASW/SAR | 110 | 109 | 99,000 | 230 | 2,500 | 16,000 |
CL-215 | Firefighting | 65 | 94 | 44,000 | 160 | 1,100 | 5,000 |
Orlan | Transport | 190 | 103 | 250,000 | 215 | 2,000 | 33,000 |
Advanced |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Amphibian | Transport | 300 | 300 | 2,000,000 | 400 | 8,000 | 250,000 |
a rnoderate-sized lake or river to the open °Cean. It could unload supplies directly °nto a newly secured beachhead, instead 1 Waiting for ports and airfields to be un- c°vered. While a heavy-lift seaplane "'ould not replace either conventional ransPort airplanes or sealift shipping, it 'v°uld fin the gap left by the limitations 1 both, greatly expanding flexibility and Providing the initial surge requirement. Seaplane operations are not new to the avy, which operated large numbers rr°m World War I until 1965. Tactical jec°nnaissance and antisubmarine war- re Were the primary missions, with 1 rategic strike, search-and-rescue, and II1Phibious assault seaplanes as sec- ndary roles.
In the 1950s, the Navy developed two Vanced seaplanes, the R4Y Tradewind t . rhe P6M Seamaster, which still serve s° 'Hustrate some of the capabilities of ^Planes. The Convair R4Y was a tur- °Pr°p amphibious assault transport, ca- aole of carrying 200 men and light ve- PfiieS 31 a sPee<I °f 200 knots. The Martin M Seamaster was a turbojet-powered jPke bomber, similar to the Air Force’s e4. strategic bomber, but capable of opsting from the water instead of from a d^fnl of airfields. (See Table 1 for ails of these and other seaplanes.)
. technical problems and changing mis- tt requirements precluded any large- u3 e Programs. The R4Y suffered from pr,ellable turboprop engines, while the fvi^ had some structural problems. (.^HWhile, the multitude of U.S. and al- jjj srrfields available in the 1960s, comp , eh with the limited rough-water ca- r„. titty and the lack of glamour of then ent seaplanes, led to the abandonment
Canada, Japan, and the Soviet Union, amphibian. Canada fielded the air CL-215, a twin-engined amphibian designed for firefighting and search-and-rescue (SAR). Japan built the Shin-Meiwa PS-1, an antisubmarine warfare/SAR amphibian capable of operating in eight-foot seas. The Soviet Beriev Be-12 amphibian flew in 1963, and the Beriev A-40 Albatross flew in 1985. The Soviets also built the Orlan- and Utka-class wing-in-ground effect (WIG) craft, seaplanes that used ground effect to gain more range with heavier payloads.
Such efforts have lead to many improvements. Modem seaplanes, particularly the PS-1, A-40, and the WIGs, are capable of operating comfortably in seas that would have swamped U.S. Navy seaplanes of the 1950s.
Still greater improvements are possible. Modem composite structures can reduce structural weight, improve payloads, and reduce corrosion. Advanced digital flight control systems can reduce empty weight even more by permitting highly efficient design without regard to stability considerations, and with active load alleviation. Advanced high-lift wing designs can reduce landing distance and hydrodynamic loads. Finally, new engines can improve fuel economy and performance. The combination of advanced U.S. technology with modern seaplane- amphibian design can produce a heavy- lift transport amphibian with long range and true open-ocean landing capability.
Using existing technologies, it is possible to build a seaplane with a takeoff gross weight of well over one-million pounds. Design analyses conducted in the 1950s and 1960s showed that, at weights in excess of 800,000 pounds, a seaplane will have a structural weight advantage over a landplane because of the weight of the landing gear required for a land- plane. This advantage increases with weight, and is magnified still farther because a one-million-pound landplane will have difficulty finding a runway that can handle it, while a large seaplane can still operate from any sizable body of water. A seaplane weighing well over one-million pounds would not be an impractical proposition, and could easily have a payload twice that of a C-5, deploying tanks by the platoon, instead of one at a time.
Still more advanced technology may also be applicable to seaplanes. Studies indicate that hydrogen fuel may significantly reduce fuel weight for long-range aircraft, with the potential for substantial improvements in payload fraction. Also, the Soviet Union had an aggressive WIG program, building 700,000-pound vehicles in the mid-1960s. Soviet WIGs, built for the fast-attack and amphibious-assault missions, were intended to exploit both ground effect and a ram-air effect from the engine exhaust for improved takeoff, cruise, and landing performance. Although the practicality of ground effect cruise is debatable, the power-augmented ram system has demonstrated a clear capability to improve takeoff and landing performance.
These technologies, even the formerly secret Soviet WIG efforts, are now available for the amphibious heavy-lift mission. They make possible an amphibian or seaplane with long range, large payload fraction, and the ability to operate from open oceans. Such aircraft would provide a high-speed, heavy-lift transport capability not shackled to prepared airfields—a capability that the nation needs, but that neither conventional airlift airplanes nor sealift ships can provide.
Operation of an advanced heavy-lift seaplane will pose some questions. The weather can be a problem for any ship or aircraft. While airborne, weather is no more of a problem for a seaplane than it is for any other large airplane. On the water, though, a seaplane is more vulnerable. Even the best of seaplanes are
- - . g5
C-2 support also is limited; the airC3 can land only on a carrier deck or at *' airfield, and while an airdrop capabil'1-
stei”
111
The Russians displayed their A-40 Albatross amphibian at the 1991 Paris Air Show. The aircraft has a modest 22,000-pound payload, but its 3,000- nautical-mile range gives it considerable flexibility.
only moderately good boats, and hangar- ing a large airplane demands a shelter that may not be available even at a Navy field, much less an unimproved beachhead. A heavy-lift seaplane, however, has an option not available to a boat: it can ride out a storm in the air, or fly to a more tranquil location. Because of its long range, a heavy-lift seaplane will have extremely long endurance, and will be able to take off, loiter several hundred miles away from the center of a storm while it passes, then return to base. The weather problem can be solved.
Support facilities pose another difficulty. In the past, seaplanes required hangar space, launching ramps, and seaplane tenders for operations away from established bases. In today’s fiscal environment, construction of massive new hangars or fleets of tenders is probably not an option. Seaplane ramps are not much of a problem, as most Naval Air Stations were equipped to operate seaplanes; hangars, however, are a different matter. This requirement can be addressed by designing the airplane to be maintained with minimal external equipment, and by providing lightweight hangars.
Earlier seaplanes were designed to be maintained with offboard equipment such as work stands. A modem seaplane must be designed to support routine maintenance without external equipment, with work areas built into the airframe, as was done on the large seaplanes of the 1930s. Extremely high reliability must also be designed into the airframe from the outset, to reduce the maintenance required. A heavy-lift seaplane must treat a hangar as a ship treats a drydock—as a place for overhauls, not routine maintenance.
Even for overhauls, though, an expensive hangar is not necessary. Conventional hangars are not just shelters for the airplane, but are workshops and office spaces. If these working spaces are contained in a separate structure, the hangar structure can be transformed into a strong, yet inexpensive, easily erectable shelter made of sheet metal or fabric. Such lightweight hangars have already been developed for airship applications, and can provide a low-cost overhaul capability.
The most obvious mission for a transport seaplane or amphibian is high-speed heavy lift, combined with amphibious assault. Troops and materiel may be based in the U.S., and loaded onto the seaplanes for deployment wherever necessary. The major advantages of this system over conventional airlift is its independence of established airfields. A C-5 or a C-17 requires at least a relatively large, flat, load-bearing field, and a paved runway is needed for maximum weight operations. A seaplane or amphibian can operate wherever there is enough water to float, permitting it to land near shore, then nose up onto the beach and offload its cargo. This flexibility applies not only to open-ocean operations, but to inland operations on lakes and rivers as well. A seaplane, in many cases, will be able to support troops a significant distance inland. A seaplane-borne force therefore has the striking flexibility provided by an assault ship, while retaining the speed of an airplane.
Certain items of equipment, such as tanks, are both very heavy and relatively cheap; more than 50 tanks can be Niugh for the price of a sing C-17, whx.'t car carry a single tank. A. a result of thi : mismatch, it has proved more economical to preposition heavy equipment near possible battle sites than to purchase a heavy-lift capability. U.S. ground forces earmarked for deployment to Europe used this concept extensively, and many units have two complete sets of equipment— one in the United States for training, and a second in Europe for fighting. Even in the post-Cold War world, it makes sense to load ships with the heavy equipment that cannot be easily shipped by air—as is done with the amphibious assault ships and Maritime Prepositioning squadron ships now in service.
There is one minor problem—manpower. Today, we station troops on board the amphibious assault ships, and hope that the ships and men are in the rigW place at the right time. MPS ships cart i no troops, and rely on having a friend!) I port available to unload the equipme111,1 and a friendly airfield next to the friend!) port to accommodate the airlifters fro1’1 the U.S. Both assumptions are optimist'1 A transport amphibian offers an ele' gant solution. Amphibious assault ship' j can be loaded with all the equipme1’1 they can carry, with a minimal operati0(l and maintenance crew. Instead of stf tioning Marines on board ships, and d£' signing amphibious assault ships to ae commodate thousands of men for montl1' at a time, troops can be ferried out to tt|c ships by the transport amphibian. Th1' will permit more efficient use of ship ca pacity and manpower—both scarci commodities in the current environm^1 A transport amphibian or seaplane al'1’ offers a solution to the problem ol 1° eistical support for deployed ship'( Today, carrier battle groups (CVBGs) a” surface action groups (SAGs) are sup ported by supply ships, cargo helicopart" and, in the case of CVBGS, carrier-o'1 board-delivery aircraft. These are cap” ble, but leave a gap. Because it mu> land on a carrier deck, the C-2 deliver aircraft is relatively small when compaft’ to cargo aircraft such as the C-5 or C-* ' which limits its payload size and weig1
exists, it is a one-way delivery sys’ with limited capacity. Items that must shipped to a surface combatant usua’^ go by helicopter, and remain limited 1 size and weight.
A large transport seaplane or amp!1' ian, on the other hand, could serve as'
VVlnged supply ship, landing on the open °cean and transferring personnel and Cargo using underway replenishment techniques. Such a transport might carry Several hundred thousand pounds of cargo to a battle group in a single flight. It could also serve as a crew ferry, permit- t'n§ rotation of the crews of deployed :n‘PS- In either case, a transport amphib- >an or seaplane would be a valuable asset.
Aerial refueling is another mission *eh suited to an advanced amphibian. ven before the Gulf War, the Navy had Acknowledged that a lack of tankers was a Problem. A large amphibian, capable routine open-ocean operations, could serve as a refueling asset capable of supporting carrier aircraft without consum- lng valuable deck space. Such a tanker c°uld be forward based, or could operate as An integral part of the battle group.
An advanced amphibian also could be . ec* for special operations, serving as an ^nion and extraction vehicle for "ALs and other special forces. An amphibian would offer high speed and a large payload, permitting sizable forces, including vehicles, to be deployed and extracted.
Finally, an advanced heavy-lift amphibian would have numerous civil applications, increasing the production volume and reducing the unit cost to the Navy. Because of its independence of large, expensive airfields, an amphibian could provide air transport to areas which lack the space or construction funds for a large airfield, such as islands, cities, and Third World nations. An amphibian, operating from both coastal and lake water bases, could also provide a valuable transportation system capable of supporting development in remote areas, such as Alaska, Canada, and Siberia. These areas have vast natural resources, but many of these resources are too distant to be reached economically by road. These civil applications can both help justify development funds and increase the number of units produced (thereby reducing unit costs), both of which will aid in program viability.
The Navy needs a large amphibious assault seaplane because surface ships and land-based aircraft cannot meet lift requirements—they are either too slow or too limited in operating areas. The current technology base, upgraded with American structural, flight control, and propulsion improvements and possibly incorporating advanced wing-in-ground effect technology and hydrogen fuel, can support the design of a heavy lift amphibian or seaplane capable of meeting the nation’s requirements. The large seaplane is an idea whose time has come again.
Mr. McDaniel is the lead engineer for the Department of Defense Airship Program and a project engineer for Wing-in-Ground-Effect Vehicles at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland. Mr Snyder is a program manager and the deputy for international programs at the Naval Air Warfare Center.
Air Officer and Forward Air Controller Assignment
'vith
a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Spe-
teoi
“If
for
you have a touch tone phone, please push one ambushes, push two for air strikes ..
I juring a 23-month tour from July r, 1991 to June 1993 as a Forward Air °ntrol Icr (FAC) and an Air Officer (AO)
Operations Capable) (MEU [SOC]) Antry battalion, I have noticed two p.kms with FAC and AO assignments. lrst, the lengths of aviators’ tours deen do not mesh with their battalion’s (Aployment cycle. During a normal ^°~year deployment cycle, an in- dintry battalion goes through four inv'nCt Pdases> each lasting approx- ar Alely six months, that are built trj.^d the deployment: the battalion ty lrilng phase, the predeployment (]t° l UP (SOC training) phase, the ^Ployment itself, and the post-de- k^ent duty battalion phase.
11 too often, however, aviators’ t00r FAC tours terminate just prior
key
to ^h orders arrived 12 months prior employment. Once this was dis- Po,e.ted, he was replaced as soon as sstble, but his replacement did not Ph'Ve Unt'l ttfter the SOC training fr(Use had begun. Since returning he ^ deployment, the battalion has Assigned two more FACs °Se tours also would end within
days of the next deployment. One has extended voluntarily to cover the next deployment, but the other FAC’s situation has not yet been resolved. Figure 1 gives an overall view of the AO and FAC assignments to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines during the past two years.
This problem is caused largely by a perceived need for a battalion to be
By Captain A. R. Jackson, U.S. Marine Corps
staffed with three aviators at all times— which actually is unnecessary. During the post-deployment duty-battalion phase, no significant training is conducted. Instead, the battalion generally fills temporary guard duty and base-augmentation billets. There is no tactical air control party for the FACs to train, and helicopter operations are very limited: There is no need for an air officer plus two FACs— a single aviator, acting as the AO, would be more than adequate to meet the battalion’s needs.
Once the battalion completes the duty-battalion phase, however, it is very important that all of the AO and FAC billets be filled. Ideally, all three aviators should arrive at the battalion at the commencement of the training phase and should remain with the unit until the completion of the deployment—making all FAC and AO tours 18 months long.
From an aviation perspective, however, this is not difficult to reconcile with aviation qualifications and refresher flight training. Aviators who will be returning to squadrons upon completion of their ground tours rarely can afford to be out of the cockpit for more than one year, because many of their qualifications will expire. Those aviators going on to other assignments.
Figure 1: Air Officer and FAC Assignments to 1/4 from July 91 to June 93
2 Year Deployment Cycle
Bn Training SOC Workup Deployment Duty Battalion
-AO #1 (24 Months)
FAC #l/AO #2 (23 Months - Voluntary Extension)
FAC #2 (9 Months)- Short Tour
FAC #3(12 Months)
FAC #4(11 Months (-Replaced FAC #2
(FAC #5-18 Month Tour/Voluntary Extension to 24 Months)
FAC #5/AO #3
FAC #6(12 Months)
FAC #7 (12 Months) I
Figure 2: Proposed FAC and AO Assignments
2 Year Deployment Cycle
Bn Training SOC Workup Deployment Duty Battalion
AO #1 (18 Months)
FAC #I (18 Months)
FAC #2 (12 Months)
however, either non-flying billets or fljl ing that will demand further trainings e.g., Training Command duty—can serv(j tours of 18 months or more.
The system—outlined in Figure 2—0' assigning FACs and AOs to infantry bah talions would rectify both of these prob lems, ensure that the needs of battalion' are satisfied, and would allow aviators|l' fill ground tours of either 12 or “ months.
During a two-year deployment cyde four aviators would be required. T"c would serve 18-month deploying toun one would serve a 12-month deploy!11; tour, and one would serve a 12 mon^ non-deploying tour. The assignment sys' tern is focused on the battalion’s depl°!’1 ment, which should be the driving fac' tor in all FAC and AO assignments.
By adopting and adhering to this s)^ tem, the Marine Corps would be abletl increase personnel efficiency and i”1’ prove the combat readiness of deployi® units.
(12 Months)
AO #2 / FAC #3
0 peir
sacola, Florida. His duty with ground units incluf a MEU (SOC) deployment with Battalion Land'J- Team 1/4 and the 11th MEU to the Western Fac’ ^ and Persian Gulf areas.
Captain Jackson is assigned to the Marine AviaJ Training Support Group at Naval Air Station
Reinventing Short-Range Distress Communications
By Lieutenant Commander Dana E. Ware, U.S. Coast Guard
Since the early 1970s, the Coast Guard has operated and maintained the very- high-frequency (frequency modulated) [VHF-FM] Radiotelephone Safety and Distress System—commonly referred to as the National Distress System (NDS). The system is the primary means for mariners to alert the Coast Guard when they are in distress, and it also provides navigational information. It has served mariners and the Coast Guard well, but it is nearing the end of its life, and a working group is completing the Mission Need Statement for a replacement VHF- FM system.
Current Coast Guard policy holds that VHF-FM will remain the preferred means for distress alerting, but this is a shortsighted policy. Congestion in the VHF- FM maritime mobile band—especially on Channel 16 (156.8 Mhz)—has paralyzed short-range distress communications in some areas. The Coast Guard has initiated a Petition for Rulemaking through the Federal Communications Commission that would make Digital Selective Calling (DSC) mandatory for all VHF-FM marine radios purchased after 1 February 1997. Such a feature would reduce congestion because it is selectively addressable; each radio has a unique identifier. It also would reduce the number of hoax calls because every caller’s address would be available to the receiver. Implementation of VHF-FM DSC, however, will require the Coast Guard to build and operate a separate DSC-capable radio network. It is also appropriate to note that the two-year-old VHF-FM DSC prototype project in Group St. Petersburg has been less than 10% reliable.
The Coast Guard should forget about upgrading VHF-FM technology and embrace the opportunities provided by the sweeping changes that are taking place in communications, especially the revolution in mobile telephony brought about by cellular technology. In the United States, cellular-telephone services have more than 10 million subscribers, a number projected to grow annually at least 20%. Even under the harshest conditions—like those experienced in the wake of Hurricane Andrew—the reliability and survivability of mobile telephone systems is exc£ lent. By the late 1990s, proposed 1°" earth orbit (LEO) mobile satellite c<$ munications systems—like Motorola. Iridium—will provide global teleph0 coverage at costs that will be competi11 with terrestrial cellular systems.
By adopting mobile telephony as1 | primary means of distress alerting-a ship-to-shore distress alerting—and cp|1 gestion and hoax calls—could be moved entirely from the VHF-FM SP^, trum. The telephone technology to so—including 911 service with intelli? ■ call routing, automatic call distribut1 ^ (used at 911 public service access po>n j. and automatic number identification-^, readily available. By using these featuf ^ distress calls would remain “free” to ,j boater, distress-alert information wol\ be routed to the proper search-and-roSL’ (SAR) mission coordinator, call block1^ would be eliminated—thus ensuring expedient SAR response—and hoa* would be largely eliminated.
Certainly, such a drastic reform generate many questions.
GUARD
about an “all-call” capability? ^hen a distress call is made by VHF- the signal can be received by a radio 1131 is tuned to the same frequency—and Vvuhin the line-of-sight communications rc‘nge. There is no guarantee, however, aat a distress call made on Channel 16 'J'Ll be heard by other vessels because taere is no VHF-FM requirement for most V~SSels that operate within line-of-sight the coast. The International Maritime "^ganization’s Safety of Life at Sea ‘S°LAS) Convention applies only to cer- ain large merchant vessels—e.g., larger . aa 300 gross tons, passenger ships on "Jternational voyages. Coast Guard reg- j1 ations under the Commercial Fishing ndustry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 re- ^uhe communication capabilities aboard sorne fishing vessels—but cellular telephones and satellite communications are ||CCeptable. Recreational boats, however, re not required to have any electronic Ornmunications device.
Although the “all-call” feature of , hlF-FM allows transmissions to be ^eard ship-to-ship—and, undoubtedly, has aved lives—the NDS was intended for ^'P'to-shore distress alerting. The LAS ship-to-ship communications re- thlrernent sh°u'd not be allowed to drive e ship-to-shore alerting system that l|.rvies an entirely different customer base.
f^hip-to-ship alerting is a requirement Provide coastal ship-to-shore alerting,
1 communications device being used
to
then
£
<jer maritime mobile telephony could be -j, ^eloped through the International ^ Communications Union . f^n’t the VHF-FM NDS also a short- Se command, control, and communi-
a technical solution and standards
c«fi,
‘nto
°n (O) system? The NDS has evolved
q ’ a short-range C’ system for the Coast
Uard in coastal areas. However, there we.
Int(
trtore cost-effective alternatives—e.g.,
ernational Maritime Satellite (Inmarsat) ilj'rdunj M for voice, data, and facsim- lifr7'that do not have the inherent range Pro'tat'0ns VHF-FM and that would nj V|he operating units with the infor- . lon they need. We would pay for cir- as they are used—instead of con-
Cuits
tinuously like the VHF-FM control circuits today—and allow operating units to pull information in the form of voice, data, or imagery, regardless of their locations.
► What about direction finding? Taking the “search out of SAR” is the right thing for the Coast Guard to do. VHF-FM direction finding, however, is a technically obsolete and enormously expensive means of locating a distressed vessel from shore. Instead, 406 MHz Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) technology (and its inevitable successors), married with the global positioning systems (GPS) and mobile telephony should be advanced as the means of locating ships at sea. The reductions in the size, weight, and cost of GPS, EPIRB, and mobile telephony will continue—and allow more recreational boaters to purchase such equipment.
The Coast Guard should initiate a transition to telephony as the primary means of alerting it to marine distress. A bold policy statement by the Coast Guard to the effect that distress alerting will transition from VHF-FM to telephone as soon as service is available in a given geographic area would accomplish a number of things. First, we would develop a mutually beneficial customer-supplier relationship with the mobile-telephone industry to provide coverage, service, and features for the maritime user. Second, by adapting readily available and proven technology in a businesslike fashion, we would be able to satisfy organizational and customer requirements simultaneously. Finally, by not implementing the DSC upgrade, the Coast Guard would realize significant savings—by one estimate, between $30-$50 million in capitalization costs alone.
Obviously, the switch from VHF-FM to telephony cannot be—and should not be—instantaneous. The Coast Guard should press the International Maritime Organization and International Telecommunications Union to use mobile telephony for distress communications in GMDSS Area A-l (coastal)—much as Inmarsat Standard A is used in Area A-3
U.S. boaters use VHF radios when they need the Coast Guard—but the air waves are crowded. Mobile telephones are the answer.
(open ocean). Furthermore, SOLAS requirements that do not apply to the majority of U.S. vessels should not become Coast Guard- imposed, de facto standards for all vessels.
The Coast Guard’s multimission tactical command, control, communications, and computer (C4) requirements must be addressed separately. Soon after its inception, the NDS was expected to carry the load for near-shore C3—a requirement that it was not designed for. Addressing each separately will ensure that the correct solution is found for each problem. GPS and EPIRB s should be promoted— either voluntarily or through regulation— for use in most vessels. There has a substantial federal investment in these systems and they have proved to be effective.
By immediately providing SAR forces with an accurate position and identifying hoax calls, the Coast Guard would be able to eliminate many searches—especially, the enormously wasteful “DF sorties”— in favor of rescues that save lives. Fewer lengthy searches would improve the quality of life for the crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft. Also, adopting such a program also would stimulate the development of a high-tech industry in which U.S. companies are the acknowledged leaders.
Making a transition to mobile telephony for ship-to-shore distress communications will require organizational fortitude, planning, marketing, and hard work. These changes, however, are technologically, economically, and socially feasible. When all is said and done, adoption of the strategy set forth here probably will boil down to whether the Coast Guard has the ability to recognize an opportunity, the will to adopt change, and the ability to manage effectively the related risks.
It also represents a chance to demonstrate to U.S. taxpayers and the Congress that the Coast Guard spends its money carefully. By doing so, we will reassert our worth to the nation and prove that the Coast Guard can deliver valuable services in a challenging fiscal environment.
Lieutenant Commander Ware is currently assigned as Chief, Telecommunications Management, Information Resource Management Staff, Seventh Coast Guard District. He has served in the USCGC Venturous (WMEC-625) and the USCGC Durable (WMEC-628), and as the Chief, Telecommunications Management Branch, Eleventh Coast Guard District.
Santa Claus, Diesels, and Elves
three things have been thoroughly pr°v.e' ► There is no difference in the operat®
of two-stroke and four-stroke, direct-
By Giunio G. Sand
In February 1990, Proceedings published “Santa Claus, Diesels and the Easter Bunny” by Rear Admiral J. Guy Reynolds [pages 56-57]. Periodically, I pull out this article and read it again. Its philosophies immediately take me back to my youth and my home town on the Adriatic Sea: Trieste, Italy.
In Trieste, any time you propose something new—something that threatens the
No, these are not Santa’s elves. They are an experienced team of naval architects who have built many successful small submarines over the years. The United States has no monopoly on such talent.
routine that everyone knows so well— the first answer that you get is “Nosepol!” The expression means much more than “It can’t be done;” it means that you have proposed something profoundly radical and, in doing so, have become a complete nuisance. It is an emphatic “No” that comes from the bottom of the heart.
Admiral Reynolds’s article made several assertions about quieting, cost effectiveness, threats, and missions that were only marginally correct—even in the days when two superpowers were trying to intrude into each other’s waters at long, high-speed transit ranges, sprinting and drifting once in the patrol area. Therefore, at its core, the theme of the article was “Nosepol/”
Nowhere in his article, for example, did Admiral Reynolds say that a nuclear submarine would be as quiet as a diesel- electric boat. He attacked from the opposite direction , saying that a nuclear boat would not be as noisy as a snorkel- ing diesel. This is hardly surprising—an old diesel boat running near the surface belching out the exhaust of some 5,000 horsepower through a small pipe will be noisy. But it is like comparing a Brown Bess musket with a modem sporting rifle.
Modern air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems are quiet—and can be made quieter. A compact closed-circuit diesel will provide a mature and quiet power source for a relatively small modern submarine that can operate in the shallow waters of the world, e.g., the Persian Gulf and the Yellow Sea, and make submerged transits to and from these regions at modest speeds.
Not Nuclear? No, Thanks! Nevertheless, after more than three years of causing deliberate delays, spreading rumors, and making false accusations, the U.S.
Navy managed to cancel a much-need^: evaluation of the three-inch gas storag1 toroid/ 9-meter (normally called th‘ 3gst9) AlP/closed-cycle diesel submarine Thus, the Navy was able to give moif muscle to its long-held assertion tlP1 there is only one form of underse® propulsion worthy of consideration: n® clear. That the closed-circuit diesel ha^j logged more than 30,000 hours of uH'
derwater operations was immaterial—® cause results buried in archives do exist. .
What is really pathetic, though, is ^ nobody in the U.S. Navy will try to ma\ a cool and logical assessment of the prl and cons of the new submarine-prop1' sion technologies. The reason is very s'1'1, pie: Nobody knows how to do it. The are innumerable studies on almost ev^; related subject, but you will not fin% j single complete design of a modern o submarine. _
But Can It Work? With modern c0,1'_
pact closed-circuit (C'j diesel engi111,.
, • . , .. ., ,,&>•
o"
indirect-injection, and naturally aSP rated and turbocharged diesels in the a breathing or CTnodes.
A
There is a future for small submarines; a 105-foot submarine could carry six heavyweight torpedoes and four sub-Harpoons more than 8,000 nautical miles at 8 knots. Adding drop tanks, like the one below, or piggy-backing on another submarine would increase the range dramatically.
'nt0
^ln8 the same technology to an Alba- Su^ lAGSS-569)-class boat would give th a submar'ne 600,000 kilowatts with Proportional increase in range and The implications for the navies operate the more than 400 conven- ,nnaI submarines is that for a relatively exPensive retrofit, many of their boats
. Specific fuel consumption is the same ^ air-breathing and C3 modes.
In the C3 mode, specific oxygen con- SUrr>ption is stoichiometric.
^>th diesel-electric submarines you Can do three things: retrofit an A1P diesel
ubmarine with a state-of-the-art AIP leseU or improve the state of the art.
. Let us examine the first option. Con- ,!('er one of the smaller conventional lesel-electric submarines: the Italian savY’s Enrico Toti-class of 593 tons ^“merged. If one of these submarines as retrofitted with an energy pack ca- j!able of delivering 120,000 kilowatts to e shaft over a 28-day mission, she °uld be able to log as many as 6,000 apical miles at 9 knots or 1,000 nauti- miles at more than 21 knots. In other . .ms, she could operate in a “sprint-and- , 'b mode for weeks without sticking er nose out of the water, c Another Italian submarine, the Nazario *l,ro class—1,637 tons submerged— ^°uld be retrofitted with a 320,000 kilo- I a" Plant. This would allow travel for ^ hours at 21 knots—2,100 nautical ^ e&or almost 900 hours at 8 knots— re 7,200 nautical miles. The same .°uld apply to the smaller Type 209. Ap-
!hat or ho]
would acquire the performance of a nuclear submarine—without the problems associated with nuclear power. In essence, these submarines would be “green nukes.”
[See “The Albacore Advantageby Henry E. Payne III, Proceedings, July 1993, pages 59-62.]
Preliminary design cost of a new submarine of roughly the same dimensions as an Enrico Tort-class boat and fitted with an advanced AIP diesel would be $900,000 and the detailed design would cost $6 million. Advanced systems would allow her to operate with a crew of 14 and to carry 16 21-inch torpedoes, while giving her a high-seas endurance of 60 days. Such a boat could be built in a small shipyard at a cost of less than $100 million.
What is the mission profile of such a boat in a patrol area, say, 3,500 nautical miles from her home port? First, there would be almost 21 days in transit—500 hours at 7 knots—then 18 days on patrol, “sprinting and drifting”—total available sprinting distance at 23 knots, about 900 nautical miles; drifting at 4 knots on lead- acid batteries, 400 hours with one 32-hour recharge—and then the voyage back to base, another 3,500 nautical miles. The total mission duration would be roughly 60 days; the total distance travelled underwater would 9,500 nautical miles. Even if the “green reactor" should pack it in, the submarine would be able to switch to her air-breathing diesel to take her home.
Improving the State of the Art. The Italian diesel-engine manufacturer VM is making a turbo piston jet diesel-engine for aeronautical applications—the TPJ- 1304 HF engine. With its 210 shaft horsepower and relatively light weight—a mere 400 pounds—it would keep the batteries of a modified Enrico Ton-class boat charged with a noise of less than 50 decibels, or one dyne/square centimeter at 25 hertz. The same dramatic escalation in performance would apply for the other submarines I have mentioned.
The U.S. Navy could build a new Albacore with a diving depth of more than 600 meters, 900,000 kilowatts or better of electrical power, the capability to recharge the battery at the full operating depth, no trail, and no noise. Again, these are not fantastic claims from Santa Claus’s workshop—but hard figures, based on actual performance measured on the shaft of an existing engine.
If the resources were made available, it would take about $50 million to design and develop such a power source. This price might seem too high for a green reactor, requiring but 450 grams of oxygen per shaft horsepower, but keep in mind
chitecture and Mechanical Engineering from the versity of Trieste in 1959, and continued his stu^ in manned diving under the well-known World II Italian naval commando Spartaco Schergat.
that this would be the cost for a proper and complete engineering effort, with all of the necessary documentation—but without a cubic meter of paper and a lot of $1,000 toilet seats. Besides, efficient engines like this have been manufactured before. For example, the Napier Nomad—with more than 3,000 shaft horsepower and a specific fuel consumption of 150 grams per shaft-horsepower—was built in the 1950s. The point is that designers should feel free to take existing technologies and improve on them, instead of feeling compelled to start over every time with a clean sheet of paper.
To some, these ideas may sound all
Italians have shown a knack for building very successful midget submarines—and have the expertise that many see as increasingly valuable for littoral operations in shallow waters.
like work done by Santa’s elves. It is, however, the work of a team of experienced naval architects who have designed and built numerous smaller submarines during the past 25 years. These architects know well how to avoid the “$1,000 toilet seat” syndrome that often plagues inexperienced designers who try to enter the field and refuse to accept the non-development items that are readily available all around them.
Of course, someone will point out that stored oxygen can be dangerous; the degree of danger, however, often depends on the point the speaker wants to make. Sulfuric acid is not generally used as a cologne, and— combined with lead—it can produce a quite energetic bomb. Nevertheless, most people fail to notice that under the hoods of their automobiles there are enough of these materials to produce an explosive in their own batteries. I have no doubt that those who warn us of the dangers of stored oxygen would enter a nuclear reactor happily, without a second thought about the dangers of radiation. Nevertheless, they might be willing to recognize that oxygen is handled routinely throughout the U.S. military, being carried regularly in bulk form by trucks. Furthermore, the engineering practices for the safe handling of such fluids are well established in the submarine community.
My Midget, Your Monster. A monster is a midget designed according to military specifications by a panel of experts, working under the supervision of Naval Sea Systems Command. By combining sound engineering practices, the common sense of Santa’s elves, and a reputable certification society, a viable smaller submarine could be built. This is not a complaint—it is a fact. If two similar sets of rules for submarine construction— the U.S. Navy’s P9290 and Det Norske Veritas’s (DNV) Rules for Certification of Manned Submersibles—are compared, the former appears loosely worded and the latter direct and to the point. The reason is that P9290 deals with responsibility, placing the blame; while the DNV’s rules are concerned with assuring the underwriters who would foot the bill if an accident occurs. The underwriters are less interested in finding a culprit then they are in making sure an accident never happens.
Admiral Reynolds would have us think that only very large, nuclear-powered submarines are capable of carrying out offensive action in distant waters. A submarine 34 meters long, however, could carry six heavyweight torpedoes and four sub-Harpoons more than 8,000 nautical miles at 8 knots. A 39-meter submarine could carry as many as 14 similar weapons for more than 1,000 nautical miles at 5 knots on lead-acid batteries alone before recharging them using its AIP system. If a design lesson from the
Air Force is taken, simple drop tanks could increase a boat’s endurance b) 50%—12,000 nautical miles underwatd at 8 knots.
Oxygen also could be stored in > toroidal hull. With a nondetectable communication system, such submarines could operate in wolf packs, bringing id' credible firepower to bear on their if tended targets with relative impunity Fully outfitted—except for weapons-'' these boats would cost $30 million and $50 million respectively. These are the practical figures from Santa’s elves. 1* you wish to have regular and frequen1 program-review meetings with 30 to ^ people in attendance, then you must appl' the “toilet-seat” facto1 to these numbers.
Admiral Reynold closed his article b) stating, “. . . Let us build the best sub" marines for the future uninhibited by the em0" tional attachment to the technology of the past- This makes me wonde[ A couple of years ag°- the Assistant SecretaO of the Navy for Re' search, Developmet1' and Acquisition, Geral|) A. Cann, stated that the price of the Centurion class submarine should be brought do"1' to “only” $1.5 billion. A more recent g set by the Pentagon is $1 billion. Perhaps then, the “technology of the past”—thc “emotional attachment” to which should sever—actually is current nuclei technology.
Just remember that—if you believe-^" there really is a Santa Claus who V1 bring you practical, cost-effective pr£ sents. For too long, the thinking of 1J-5 Navy submarine designers has be6'1 guided by the three touchstones:
► Not invented here
► Always start with a clean sheet of paPe
► Nuclear at any cost
It is time for the U.S. Navy to end i15 emotional attachment to these three ide‘l and examine nuclear submarines in r<ds tion to future—shallow-water—mission They may be found wanting.
Mr. Santi is President of Giunio Santi Engined ^ s.r.l. of Zingonia, Italy. He was formerly the E* j utive Vice President of Maritalia—a subsiding Micoperi SpA, of Milan— in Fiumicino, Italy 'r 1986 to 1991. He received his degrees in Naval^,
idi«!
The Naval Doctrine Command Starts Work
By Rear Admiral Frederick L. Lewis, U.S, Navy
■eutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox, U.S. Navy, wrote this in his prize-winning essay, “The Role in J°ctr'ne *n Naval Warfare,” published that year's March-April issue of Pro
to
sUs i
ance.
ls that it generally refers to the guid-
haye uati role.
'°n of the Department of the Navy’s lick’ fissions, and structure. The estab-
Jjtment KDC)
cm , ’ls eyidence that the Navy has taken 1 the u
0pJntil now, the Navy doctrine devel-
• • • . there is a vital difference be- tM,ecn our naval manuals which describe minor doctrine and those of the 'n°dern army. Ours do not flow from anything higher up, but represent Merely a detached work unrelated to other branches of the profession. m°st invariably they are prepared by ® board of officers, many of whom ave no greater qualification for the ,ask than that of being good all around JJicers. The product of this board is n°rmally the personal opinion of one two of its best prepared members, Used on their own study and experience, which may be necessarily lim- l,ed and incomplete. From time to ne the manuals are revised, usually y an entirely new board, which in- ev,tably injects its own personal e1uation in the new instructions.
Consequently, our manuals are 01 comprehensive and do not por- the close relationship which is Slrable. The revisions do not dee °P the subject in an orderly, logit ’ and systematic process; but, due triable conceptions and doc., nes' produce confusion of service °ught and practice. ”
L
1915
°f Di ■nth
Je<^lngs—and his thoughts are as ap- |- 'p'ble today as they were then; there is ® new under the sun.
Naval doctrine connotes many things tiomany people, yet a published defini- n cannot be found. General consen- in tactics, and procedures contained (Nw CUnrent Naval Warfare Publication system. A Navy version of the g®Partment of Defense definition has • erally been accepted, but world events mandated a new look and a reeval- nent of the Naval Doctrine Command 1993 ^ at Norfolk, Virginia, in March
' lThe challenge. until
rjj ent process at all levels was a frag- •j^tted, bottom-up, fleet-driven approach. ^_e Ueet, or organizations such as the tya^al Strike Warfare Center, the Naval r College, or the Space and Electronic
Warfare Center—Centers of Excellence— for example, identified doctrinal deficiencies, assigned primary review authorities, evaluated solutions, and drafted and coordinated a publication addressing the issue.
Once a deficiency was identified or a new concept envisioned, the impetus for publishing a revision—or an entirely new publication—was related more to the resources available than to the need. Not even at the highest level of doctrine was there a single organization providing top- down guidance. Playing mostly administrative roles in this process, the Naval Tactical Readiness Division and Navy Tactical Support Activity provided oversight, resource allocation, and publishing capability rather than substantive document review.
Historically, the fleet and the Centers of Excellence served as primary review authorities. While they will continue to write some doctrinal publications, the Naval Doctrine Command will develop and implement a new, top-down approach to doctrine development to ensure a centralized focus.
Naval doctrine should be more than simply a guide to naval forces, because, in effect, it becomes the cornerstone for all naval tactics, techniques, and procedures. The U.S. Marine Corps has had a doctrine development organization at Quantico since the 1920s, but the Navy is a latecomer to this process and has not, until now, had a resident cadre whose sole purpose is to develop doctrine. Since were no standard procedures or central agency for ensuring doctrinal compatibility, the plethora of commands could not always find a common working ground on which to base doctrinal discussions or joint operational philosophy.
Getting the fleets to agree on doctrinal matters has rarely been a simple undertaking—especially in the absence of a central coordinating authority. The different missions of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets offer the clearest example: the Atlantic Fleet, working closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has conducted operations differently from the Pacific Fleet, for whom NATO is an unfamiliar entity. The inherent link between the requirement for doctrine, equipment, training, and force structure was not always specified; nor was the rudimentary truth that doctrine was absolutely essential to warfighting capabilities.
High-level attention to naval doctrine and doctrine development has been sporadic throughout the Navy’s history, but recent events have spurred a reevaluation of doctrinal shortcomings, particularly with respect to joint operations. Foremost has been the Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986, which directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a joint combat capability. The Act was the genesis for the Joint Publication System and the development and codification of joint doctrine. Individual services were assigned lead-agent responsibilities in their particular areas to develop joint doctrine; the legislation itself directed the alignment of service doctrine with joint doctrine.
The felling of the Berlin Wall removed the cornerstone threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations, the relatively stable foundation upon which Navy doctrine and tactics had been based—leaving the Navy with the outdated strategic concepts embodied in NWP-1 and a development process wholly unsuitable to keep pace with evolving national strategies. Regardless, the Navy remained committed to a blue water, war-at-sea mind set. Change, while both sorely needed and inevitable, was slow in coming.
Evolution of the Naval Doctrine Command. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm highlighted deficiencies in Navy doctrine, particularly with regard to joint operations. Training in and understanding of joint doctrine were inadequate; equipment and procedures for joint operations were not in place; and—because of earlier neglect—joint doctrine had been
I
the chain of command. On September
voice in joint and combined doctrine de
>■ Reevaluating the Navy doctrine devC
developed that was ineffective and, in some cases, impossible to execute by naval forces. Combined doctrine fared somewhat better in maritime operations, but inadequate training, limited previous interaction with non-NATO coalition forces, and the lack of a common com- mand-and-control system only served to point up its deficiencies.
In examining the lessons learned from the Gulf Conflict, it became only too obvious that Navy doctrine and its inherent developmental and review processes needed restructuring. There were provisions on the OpNav staff for the development of both tactical doctrine and Naval and Allied Warfare Publication de-
The U. S. Navy will be working increasingly with forces from other nations—such as HMS Brilliant (F 90), shown during Operation Desert Storm, and the crew of the French destroyer Jean De Vienne, part of the Maritime Interdiction Force enforcing sanctions against Iraq.
velopment, but the small staff assigned was essentially administrative; there was little capacity to evaluate standardization and joint or allied congruency. The dispersed, bottom-up developmental process had produced inconsistent doctrine and procedures.
The Navy had remained aloof in the development of joint, and to a lesser degree, combined doctrine. In some cases, this resulted in less-than-optimal joint employment concepts for naval forces, as seen in the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) procedures and execution in Desert Storm. Operational- level naval forces were not completely conversant with joint and combined doctrine; it was nominally understood at the battle group staff level and higher, but, for most operators, painful on-the-job training was required.
Fortunately, the Navy absorbed the bitter lesson—it could ill-afford to proceed without repairing the doctrinal gap between its traditional single-service, independent operations, and the larger scheme of joint operations.
Following Desert Storm, a variety of solutions surfaced. In early 1992, at the Fleet Commanders-in-Chief conference, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, presented the idea of a central Navy doctrinal organization; in April 1992, he directed a working group to develop a proposed charter and organization for a Naval Doctrine Command.
In September 1992, the Department of the Navy published its under pinning statement “ . . . From the Sea,” providing a new direction for the naval service, and the impetus to establish a centralized doctrine coordinating authority was stronger than ever. Concurrently, Admiral Kelso and General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, met with Acting Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe to discuss the concept. Secretary O’Keefe liked it, and asked that a Secretary of the Navy Instruction be developed to codify the mi‘ sion of the command and its place with'1 1992, SecNavInst 5450.16 directed tl» establishment of the Naval Doctrin' Command, under a rear miral or major general, not mally assisted by a one-s'3j deputy from the sister sd vice. Four divisions were d tablished: Strategy and Co' cepts; Naval Doctrine; Joi' and Combined Doctrin3 and Evaluation, Trainin.-| and Education. Person^1 began to arrive at Norfolk November 1992, buildi"; toward a full manning levl of 50 military and civili; personnel.
Organization and M,J sion. On 12 March 1993, the Naval D®1 trine Command was formally opened3 the Deak Parsons Center, Norfolk Nav" Base. The command is an Echelon T'1* shore command reporting directly 11 CNO and CMC for all matters related'1 the development of naval concepts an1 integrated naval doctrine; it will rep°( to CNO for matters relating to NaVJi unique doctrine. The commander b"’ been granted broad authority to establi' close liaison for doctrinal matters W'3 the Coast Guard, Marine Corps Comb3 Development Command (MCCD^1 joint, combined, and other service do trine centers, and U.S. Navy and U-" Marine Corps warfare centers of exO lence and appropriate training cob1 mands. U.S. Army, Air Force, and Co"' Guard liaison officers are assigned to tb* command.
The Naval Doctrine Command vh “be the primary authority for the dev£ opment of naval concepts and integral1 naval doctrine; serve as the coordinat"1-" authority for the development and ev" uation of Navy service-unique doctrio provide a coordinated USN/USMC nav velopment; and ensure naval and j01' doctrine are addressed in training and e ucation curricula and in operations, ercises, and war games.” The Naval D°\ trine Command also will keep an eye 11 the future—to meet the requiremeI’l] of joint operations while forging navJ strategy.
Immediate tasks include:
> Translating the vision and strategy c° tained in “ . . . From the Sea,” into d°l trinal reality
>■ Developing doctrine that will en»b naval commanders to participate fully joint operations j.
exist]
ahd
^ conducted a thorough review of 'ng Composite Warfare Commander amphibious doctrine and the NEF CePt paper is being developed.
'•nt Doctrine Development. NDC has med the Navy Coordinating Review
^Pment, review, and publication struc- J*. and
Integrating naval doctrine into the edition and training system.
^ Current Developments. The Naval °ctrine Command is underway at flank sPeed and, expanding on the initial pri- °rnies provided by CNO, is working on 'Pjliatives that will close the gap between lrLand Battle doctrine and Naval ExPeditionary Warfare and enhance underending of doctrine and the doctrine extern throughout the Naval service, blowing are the Command's top
Parities:
Development of Capstone publications. (|y 6 Naval Doctrine Publications . DPs) are the key to consistency be- naval and joint doctrine. NDP-1, g°Val Warfare of the United States Navy ^le United States Marine Corps is cheduied for publication this December. f. e remaining five documents—NDP-2, oval Intelligence; NDP-3, Naval Oper- b'°ns (Volume I, Power Projection and ^despace Dominance and Volume II, v°l Forces in Operations Other Than ar); NDP-4, Naval Logistics and Force ^Ustainment; NDP-5, Naval Planning', ^ NDP-6, Command, Control, and '""veillance —are in various stages of
Separation.
Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) Con- Pl- A recent conference at the Contend
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£Uthority for all joint doctrine. The 0rPmand will participate in every step ^ he joint doctrine development process. q Naval Education and Training. The 0tT1mand will ensure that Capstone doc
uments are used at Navy and Marine Corps schools and become part of the training continuum in all warfare communities.
>• Littoral Warfare. The Command is focusing on adaptive force packaging, forward logistics support, strike and close air support, theater missile defense, multi/antiship missile defense, and shallow/very-shal- low-water mine and antisubmarine warfare.
> Combined Forces Operational Doctrine. The Naval Doctrine Command has assumed responsibility for all NATO standardization, Allied Publications, and NATO working party support. In addition, NDC will work with the Naval Tactical Support Activity to develop unclassified documents to fill the doctrinal void with respect to multilateral operations with non-NATO nations.
>• Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. To supplement NDP-6, NDC is defining requirements for follow-on doctrine that will make maximum use of future systems and architectures.
>• NWP System. The Command is aligning Navy publications with the Joint Publication System, shortening production and revision times, reorganizing the system to support assigned roles and missions, and transitioning to a compact disc- read only memory (CD-ROM) format.
>■ Modeling and Simulation. NDC will ensure that Naval wargaming models accurately reflect doctrinal guidance, present and future operational capabilities, and are compatible with other service models.
Future Challenges.The sea services finally possess the capability to provide complete coordination and standardiza-
Doctrine will dictate the best way to employ weapons like the F/A-18 from the Naval Strike Warfare Center, and the Tomahawk missile launching from the USS Mississippi (CGN-40), then operating in the Red Sea during Operation Desert Storm.
tion for naval—and Navy—doctrine. Centralization will give the Navy the top- down focus already used by the other services. It will ensure consistency between naval and joint doctrine and provide the necessary structure for a complementary doctrine continuum. It will provide increased fleet understanding of Navy, naval, joint and combined doctrine. The fleet will continue to assist in providing the long range strategy from which platform requirements and systems will be derived.
Doctrine translates new ideas and approaches into a comprehensive way of thinking—and, ultimately, warfighting. As the primary authority for the development of naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine, and the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy service-unique doctrine, the Naval Doctrine Command will assist naval forces in achieving necessary flexibility while providing standardization essential to the process.
Admiral Lewis commands the Naval Doctrine Command, Norfolk, Virginia. A Naval Test Pilot School graduate, he commanded VF-142, Carrier Air Wing Eight, and Fighter Wing One. He later served as Director, Strike and Amphibious Warfare and most recently commanded Carrier Group Four.