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Since September 1992, when it was signed and released by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval „ Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps, ; ■ • From the Sea” has been variously applauded and ?ven the raspberry.1 I believe the critics have misjudged lts intent and misunderstood its message. For the future jf U.S. maritime war fighting, nothing is more important Jan developing consensus on the concepts contained in
supporters of naval power and those who are not. Such diverse criticism may very well be a backhanded compliment for the paper.
Detractors generally can be placed in one of three camps:
► Those who say the white paper ignores traditional naval tasks on the high seas
► Those who say it is just more of the same old Cold War thinking
► Those who say the Navy lacks the capability to implement its concepts2
requests met the requirements of the Cold War. When Cold War ended, it was too late to trot out the lesser1, eluded arguments, which should have been made 3 along. Congress basically has inferred that, because k. naval service justified its weapons systems on the b& of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, they must no longer needed—at least not in such large numbers.
This certainly is taking the short view of national
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white paper is an attempt to justify Cold War force
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Successfully answering the critics is essential if the vision of the white paper is to be realized and the naval service’s war-fighting potential is to be maximized.
To answer the critics, one must discuss why the paper was written. The most obvious answer is that the security environment has changed so dramatically that the focus of the Maritime Strategy, which was controversial even during the Cold War, is no longer relevant. But that is only part of the reason the white paper needed to be written. Another part of the answer goes back to the longstanding rivalry between the Navy and Air Force.
Reminiscent of the Hatfields and the McCoys, the Navy and Air Force often have exchanged verbal volleys, believing themselves locked in a zero-sum game for assets. This has been true particularly in periods of decreasing defense budgets.3 The flames of this feud were fanned by former Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice when he released the Air Force’s white paper, entitled “Global Reach—Global Power,” which he proceeded to sell with an evangelist’s fervor—often by denigrating naval air’s contribution to combat.4 This public relations blitz was followed by an equally well-publicized reorganization of the Air Force. Together, these actions gave the impression that the Air Force was far ahead of the naval service in adjusting its war-fighting doctrine and capabilities to the end of the Cold War.
In truth, the naval service was somewhat awash at this time, with no clear direction emerging. This prompted one senior flag officer to lament, “If we don’t change direction, we’ll end up where we’re headed.” An early attempt to give direction to the service was seen as an attempt to save force structure and offered no priorities against which to budget.5 The concept arguments it presented for a balanced force were politically acceptable to various service unions, as Admiral Elmo Zumwalt liked to refer to them, but clearly were unacceptable to Congress. Congress’ displeasure with the Navy was evident when, following an earlier congressional hearing, Les Aspin, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, commented that Secretary of the Navy Lawrence Garrett and Chief of Naval Operations C. A. H. Trost had “been unhelpful in the extreme.”6
Congressional impatience with the Navy’s lethargic implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is another reason the white paper was written. The Navy was full of skeptics who saw little benefit in the move toward jointness. Despite difficulties integrating joint air operations during Desert Storm, there was a widespread belief that the Navy was joint enough. One flag officer said, “Give me a row boat and an HF radio and I can be a JFACC [joint force air component commander] just fine.” The Navy, which traditionally had flaunted its self-reliance, was discovering that Congress saw it as a service with an attitude. Unfortunately for the Marine Corps, there was strong guilt by association.
When General Carl Mundy became the Commandant, he quickly moved to commission a study on how to downsize and restructure the Corps. With the Marine Corps rapidly getting ahead of the Navy, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant Commandant created the group that eventually would develop the concepts contained i® “. . . From the Sea.” In November 1991, Secretary Gat rett made the tasking more formal. Unfortunately, eve® as the Secretary was moving the naval service forward his fate was being sealed in Las Vegas at the Tailhotd Convention. It would be left to his successor, Sea® O’Keefe, to pick up the baton and run with it—and ru® he did. A reorganization of the Chief of Naval Oper® tions staff removed much of the power base from tb( unions and focused it in the office of the Deputy Chi®1 of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requir®' ments, and Assessment. To ensure that concepts contain®1* in the white paper were supported by the budget, Seer®' tary O’Keefe directed a series of war games to be he'“ at the Naval War College before his last budget was suk mitted. Approximately $6 billion was reprogrammed 3‘ a result of the first game.
The white paper was viewed as an effective method given proper support from high ranking naval officials,3 overcome all of these problems. Thus, the white pap®1 should be viewed as a political statement as well as a wa® fighting document. This was very deliberate. First, fighting under Goldwater-Nichols is the bailiwick of ^ unified commanders, not the service staffs. Therefore, $ white paper is not a maritime strategy per se, but it do®! reflect current strategic thought.
To prioritize acquisition planning effectively today, ^ white paper had to make some assumptions about $ nature of warfare for the next 20-odd years. This is b® cause naval systems are long-lived, especially ships, who5® service lives can extend up to 50 years. Knowing the ge<l esis of the white paper, as well as what it is and is nol| we are better prepared to answer the criticisms leveled11 it and discuss the future of maritime war fighting.
Let’s first deal with the assertion that the white p#’ is simply repackaged Cold War thinking that keeps ®*’( craft carriers on center stage. In some ways, the Navy ’ a victim of its own success and a congressional Catch'*-" Throughout the Cold War, weapon system acquisiti®’ could be justified to Congress only in terms of the Soviet confrontation. In the battle for bucks, Navy bf*5 played the game to the hilt. All the while, naval fort* were forward deployed responding to National Coming Authority tasking, which rarely had anything to do vVl direct Soviet confrontation. j
But Congress wasn’t interested in these lesser inch1131, uses of military power; its only concern was how nav
curity needs. What the critics really are saying is that
ture levels in a new era. Admittedly, the Navy needs justify force levels, but the white paper does not argue,^ Cold War levels. On the other hand, it argues that sF
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force structure solely on what is needed for regional combat ignores foe reason the American Public invests in security ln the first place.
During concept delegations, the working group wrestled with ways fo convince Congress and |ue public of the impor- fonce of tasks short of j;°nflict conducted by °rward-deployed forces. r°rn discussions with House Armed Services Committee staff members and from Aspin’s white papers on secu- nty and force structure, it became clear they had little apPreciation for such activities. Whereas Aspin asserts that foe primary reason Americans want military forces is to ave the option of fighting when other means fail,” the fote paper’s working group believed that Americans want fo'foary forces primarily to prevent or deter conflict by uderwriting those “other means.”7 fo a marvelous last stroke, the name of the white paper as changed from “Power From the Sea” to “. . . From ae Sea,” to emphasize the notion that naval forces can ^ssert influence, deterrence, and support as well as force. 0 meet these peacetime objectives—ensuring friends, U'lding coalitions, and influencing potential adversaries— e e Navy may be unique in that, for the post-Cold War a 11 requires a larger force for peace than conflict.
Even so, the white paper does not argue for a status- ’Uo Cold War force. In fact, using the white paper as a ^u>de, the Navy’s recapitalization plan reduces forces by staggering 30% from the base force that was first pro- k°Sed by the Bush administration and was still on the °°ks at the beginning of the Clinton administration. Such rawdown recommendation, coming as it does from the f/v'Ce itself, is unprecedented and ought to be given care- consideration.
Ca he other critical camp, made up of naval supporters, k Tn36 ^'vided into two groups:
nose who believe the new focus undermines traditional ^Aal missions
nose who believe it is dangerous because the naval Scr^jCe is not equipped to fight in the environment de- Tn ^ the white paper
tj0 hose who believe the Navy has abandoned its tradi- nal role of open ocean warfare and protection of sea
lines of communication are arguing semantics. From as high a vantage point as the working group could attain (based on expert opinion and analysis), no peer competitor on the high seas could be seen or forecast on the horizon. With the United States and its allies in command of the seas, two clear objectives presented themselves to the working group. First, the naval service needed to ensure that the forces it fielded were relevant to the environment in which they would have to operate—namely, the littorals. Second, in fielding equipment, the service could not lose sight of the fact that a peer competitor could unexpectedly arise on the high seas.
The first objective, keeping the naval service relevant, touches on both criticisms. The white paper did not abandon open ocean warfare or protection of sea lines of communication, it assumed them.8
Relevancy also goes to the heart of the argument offered by those who say the concepts in the white paper are risky because the Navy is not equipped to fight along the littorals. That’s exactly the point. The white paper is a vision statement, a road map, not a reflection of current reality or capabilities. If you don’t know where you are going, you can’t possibly get there. The fact that billions of dollars already have been reprogrammed to address current shortfalls speaks volumes about the importance of the white paper.
On the other hand, if the service were to lose sight of the possibility that it may again have to fight in the open ocean, it could, over time, acquire systems that would effectively preclude its doing so. To date, the Navy’s acquisition strategy is to ensure future ships and aircraft are multimission capable. The wisdom of continuing along this course seems self-evident.
What are the challenges of this new war-fighting environment? The white paper identifies the most troublesome
'Sean O’Keefe, Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, USN, and C.E. Mundy, Jr.
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ones. The first is identifying threats amid the congestion of friends, adversaries, and neutrals. The closer forces move to shore, the less time will be available to sort things out. The Vincennes (CG-49) tragedy should provide us with a wealth of lessons in this area.
But the problem of aircraft identification and engagement is not the only technological problem in the littoral regions. Sea-skimming cruise missiles and even older, coastal missile batteries also present grave threats. In another area, years of open-ocean antisubmarine warfare experience counts for little in turbulent and noisy littoral waters. Environmental challenges are compounded by the forecast proliferation of new generations of conventionally powered submarines.
The most deadly challenge, however, remains the simple mine. The Stark (FFG-31) and the Princeton (CG-59) have provided dramatic evidence that naval ships remain vulnerable to mine warfare. Mines also can affect maneuver warfare from the sea, which is the very foundation of the white paper’s increasingly integrated concept of naval power projection.
These are by no means the only challenges. As naval forces move landward, the threat of tactical ballistic missiles increases. Naval fire support is another area requiring increased attention. As matters stand today, naval aviation is the primary source of such support. This is worrisome in light of the fact that carriers remain the favorite naval target of budget butchers. Every armchair strategist in the United States sees the savings that can be made by reducing carriers, but they seldom weigh the risks engendered by such reductions. Even an Office of the Secretary of Defense study has labeled carriers “sunset” systems incapable of meeting the challenges of the future war-fighting environment.
With all these challenges, is adapting to the new environment worth the expense? Look at what’s at stake. Despite the cries of “Come home, America” that were heard from both extremes of the political spectrum during the 1992 presidential campaign, an estimated 2.5 million Americans are traveling, working, or living abroad on any given day. And more than $400 billion worth of capital assets owned by U.S. companies are on foreign shores. Threats to these citizens and interests are sometimes ambiguous and slow to develop. Thus, appropriate U.S. response forces also must often incorporate a certain calculated ambiguity and have the ability to linger where danger lurks.
Beyond direct risks to U.S. interests, instability in vital areas can threaten them indirectly, and direct action often is required to restore order. Only naval forces possess both the punch and sustainability needed to meet these ambiguous challenges and then, if necessary, open the door for the introduction of ground and land-based air forces, should crisis escalate to sustained conflict. Naval forces provide the President with more options than other services because of their versatility, flexibility, and mobility. Ensuring they remain relevant options in his quiver of policy tools is what citizens want and deserve.
“. . . From the Sea” may be too radical for some and not radical enough for others, but its measured, evolu
tionary approach to changing security requirements is th< correct course for the predicted future. We are still refe' ring to this future as the post-Cold War era. Dr. Richafl Kugler has observed that if we can’t give the current sc curity environment a label, we probably don’t understafl1 it. There are those arguing that we are undergoing a re' olution in warfare that will make all current systems vul nerable and outmoded. I tend to disagree. The whiz-ban gizmos of the future are likely to be costly to develop an1 expensive to field. At the same time, the world econoiU* is undergoing the worst stomach pains it has felt since bf fore World War II. The money simply is not going to N available for a long time to revolutionize warfare world' wide. Nevertheless, the mobile, flexible, and versatile fort1 envisioned by the white paper holds the promise of beinf able to adapt to the unexpected.
Even if the force is relevant, will it be affordable? P1 John Hamre would put it to the test by asking seven que' tions. The questions are aimed at determining quickly wh: capabilities the American people want their armed forcei to possess:
> Do you want a force that can deter nuclear war?
> Do you want a force that can stop a nuclear strike?
> Do you want a force that can fight a Desert Storm sizeil| conflict?
> Do you want a force that can rescue U.S. diplomats aTJ| other Americans living or traveling abroad?
> Do you want a force that can assist in the drug war?
> Do you want a force that can deal with terrorists? ■
> Do you want your armed forces to have the best eqd>P ||
ment in the world? P
I think the future envisioned by the white paper is
correct one, and the force it will mold passes the test- ., us?cI
. . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century” ington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 1992). See also U.S. Naval f stitute Proceedings, November 1992, pp. 93-96.
2See Anthony Harrigan, “Comment and Discussion,” U.S. Naval Institute - . ceedings, January 1993, p. 20; and Jerome Wiesner and Kosta Tsipis, “7 PefC Pentagon Solution,” The New York Times, 4 March 1993.
’See James L. Lacy, Within Bounds: The Navy in Postwar American Security icy (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1983), p. 19. J
4See Donald B. Rice, “The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reac ^ Global Power, A White Paper” (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Forj June 1990); and Donald B. Rice, Remarks to the Washington Chapter, NaI'° Security Industrial Association, 1 March 1990, p. 5. 2
5See H. Lawrence Garrett, Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, USN, and General Al a USMC “The Way Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1991, pp- ^ ^ •Patrick E. Tyler, “Navy Urged to Bring Ships Home to Cut Costs,” The W 1 ington Post, 28 March 1990, p. A6. -jjH
7Les Aspin, “National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S- ^ itary Forces,” speech before the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 JatlU j 1992, p. 6. L
"See Sean O’Keefe, “Be Careful What You Ask For,” U.S. Naval Institute ■ ceedings, January 1993, p. 73.
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Captain Hayes is assistant director of the Strategy and Campaign |.* partment of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War ^ lege. Prior to assuming that position, he was the Strategy and Policy ^ ficer for the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe-^ London. While in London, Captain Hayes participated in the Naval L Capability Planning Effort, which developed the concepts contain* .j, “. . . From the Sea.” A naval aviator, Captain Hayes commanded Vfl copter Antisubmarine Squadron Six on board the USS EntetP I (CVN-65).