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As the United States continues to downsize its military in the wake of the Cold War, the focus of public debate tends to center on perceptions of interservice rivalry. Recent articles have declared the Marine Corps a winner in Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s “bottom-up” review, citing his decision to minimize reductions to the Corps compared to those being levied on the other services. The thrust of such debate, however, is misleading and—in a larger context—it fogs unnecessarily the ongoing efforts to realign America’s military. Unpredictable challenges, ranging from disaster relief to regional conflict, have made the process difficult. Realizing their resources are finite, the services are striving to discard capabilities they no longer need, while building forces tailored to the requirements of the coming decades.
The primary thrust of the military drawdown centers on building rapidly deployable, conventional forces able to project military power and deal with unexpected crises. The Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps remains fully intact, with three divisions ready to deploy on short notice. Another Army corps, with headquarters on the West Coast, also prepares for contingency operations. To increase strategic mobility, the Afloat Prepositioning program will grow substantially over the next decade. Additionally, Army light divisions, structured for rapid deployment and low to mid-intensity conflicts, have been only marginally reduced. The Army confronts severe cuts, particularly in its armored and mechanized divisions formerly earmarked for Europe, but it has continued to modernize and enhance its ability to deal with contingency operations.
Similar considerations drive Air Force restructuring. The Air Combat Command, recently activated, provides a deployable war-fighting headquarters able to control the newly reorganized composite wings, themselves capable of deploying rapidly to a crisis area. Operational concepts embodied in Global Reach, Global Power include plans for long-range attacks anywhere in the world, conducted by bombers launched from the United States. Upgrades of precision munitions and target-intelligence systems seek to improve the ability of air forces to pinpoint targets and apply firepower selectively. Like the Army, the Air Force has been forced to make considerable force reductions, but not at the expense of capabilities essential for rapid response to unforeseen contingencies.
Although historically expeditionary, the naval services have refocused their attention on forward presence, littoral operations, and maneuver from the sea. Sacrificing older warships designed for open-ocean operations, the Navy continues to retain its ability to project power ashore. During the next decade, new amphibious and mine coun
termeasures ships will enter service. Aircraft carriers, ai phibious ready groups, and cruise missile-capable shi| and submarines patrol the waters near many of the world potential trouble spots. Not surprisingly, given increasi global instability, operational tempo has increased, some times despite deep cuts in manpower and force structure Although faced with daunting decisions about allocation the Navy continues to reorient to the new realities.
The Marine Corps—never primarily directed toward tk Soviets in the years following World War II—has tk shortest reorientation distance to travel. Marines contim1 to concentrate on their main tasks of power projection aflj crisis response. Although being pared by more than 20,1 Marines, the Corps is streamlining and modernizing 11 provide the expeditionary capabilities needed during ui foreseen contingencies. The ongoing Fleet Marine Force5] shift to a revised force structure, developed after an e*' haustive review of past lessons and future projections, $ ceives constant review to ensure that it meets the nation changing strategic demands. Marine aviation continues f work the problem of replacing its aging medium-lift h1 licopter fleet. The Corps’ premier close-air-support m craft, the AV-8B, is being upgraded with new, all-weathe capabilities. Like its sister service the Navy, the Marifl{ Corps deploys expeditionary forces throughout the world The naval services, in concert with the Army and A>( Force, continue to balance necessary force structure cut- against the strategic demands of the post-Cold War world
To integrate these military capabilities, the Departme11' of Defense has expended considerable effort strengthen] ing joint war-fighting proficiency. New intelligence af' chitecture is being fielded to provide widespread inter operability and dissemination of products. The Atlanta Command recently assumed responsibility for joint train' ing and readiness of forces located in the United State5;
A review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff carefully examine1
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the roles and functions of the services to determine re'^ dundancy that may be eliminated. At the CinC level, adap'pll tive planning meshes capabilities into flexible-deployme11* and crisis-action packages. Together, these joint effod5 ^
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are building military forces prepared to respond to the uk'.
predictable military challenges of the future.
Declaring a victor in the so-called “budget wars” 0 Washington obscures the essence of ongoing military {C' structuring. Rather than concentrating on reductions, the real discussion should center on capabilities. While dis' carding obsolescent force structure, each service has pre' served, and in some cases has enhanced, its ability to fe' spond to regional crises. Public comparisons of service budget and force cuts largely neglect the positive step5 being taken to deal with the military threats of the cok1' ing decades. Such simplistic comparisons do little mofe than muddy the water.
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General Krulak is the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Pe velopment Command, Quantico, VA.
10
Proceedings / November
19’-'