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The ongoing crises in 1991-1992 in Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf may be shrouding the significance of security issues elsewhere in the world. In developing a credible post-Cold War strategy for Southeast Asia, the United States must continue to support its long-term allies in the region. —Here, the Royal Australian Navy, Oliver Perry-class Frigate firing a standard surface-to-air missile—in the region.
Challenges to U.S. Policy Formulation
“Logic dictates that change (in East Asia) is inevitable, but the transition period is likely to be fraught with great risk."
Colin L. Powell, January 1992'
The United States requires a two-part security policy. First, it must serve the nation’s present and future domestic interests; second, it must then be unambiguously promulgated to permit friendly countries to adopt mutually beneficial security postures. But it seems that uncertain domestic and regional political environments have tested the ability of the United States to respond with decisive adjustments to its international policy. Nevertheless, the position of economic and military dominance that the United States has assumed in the New World Order dictates that ill-considered or abrupt changes of America’s strategic policy in any region could lead to short-term uncertainty, then instability, and ultimately conflict in that region. Such is the case in Southeast Asia.
A strategic framework for Asia was presented to Congress on 28 February 1991. That report detailed the progress of a phasedown of U.S. armed services in Asia, devoting great attention to Southeast Asian basing issues. Negotiations for a ten-year extension of U.S. leases of Clark Air and Subic Naval bases (with a concurrent plan to phase Filipino military and commercial enterprises into the facilities) were not proceeding smoothly. An offer by then- Prime Minister of Singapore,
Lee Kuan Yew, to enhance military arrangements for visits and maintenance of U.S. naval ships to the Republic of Singapore was also featured. In operational and strategic terms, the facilities offered were vastly inferior to—and lacked the surge capacity of—Subic, but it was a salutary indication of the concern of at least one ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member that the uncertainty of a Southeast Asia without a substantial U.S. presence had little appeal.
The dramatic eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in Central Luzon on 12 June 1991 severely damaged the Clark and, to a lesser extent, Subic bases causing Washington to reassess the options for a continued military presence in the Philippines. The decision emerged that the U.S. Air Force would vacate Clark and senior negotiator Richard L. Armitage would continue with discussions on Subic Bay. Failure of these talks came with the Philippine Senate vote on 16 September 1991, against the renewal of the agreement. The cornerstone of the Bush administration’s Southeast Asian strategy had crumbled.
The intervening period has been bewildering as the
United States (to say nothing of the Philippines) has struggled to come to grips with this development and shape a course for Asian security into the 21st century. “Burden sharing” has been the catch phrase from the White House, while a substantial body of opinion in the Defense Department seeks to keep the peace in a one-superpower world with a large U.S. military establishment.2
As friendly Asian states look to the United States for guidance as to the shape and composition of their military forces, they receive blurred—and at times conflicting—signals.
An Australian View
“ We must accept that for most Americans, Asia will probably loom less large than Europe and the Middle East. The American Administration knows better. American business knows better. But not all Americans know better.”
Then-Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, 24 May 1991'
Australia has traditionally shared U.S. views and misperceptions of Asia. But we are drawing closer and closer to that region. Our traditional trade links with Europe have given way to greatly enhanced commercial dealings with our northern neighbors. Japan is now Australia’s largest trading partner, receiving 55% (US $22 billion) of its 1990 exports.4 Culturally, Australia recognizes the importance of an integrated population and has striven for balance in its immigration policy. In every year since the late 1970s, between one-third and one-half of Australia’s immigrants have come from Asia and the Pacific. More than 600,000 people—3.5% of the population—are of Asian descent; immigration is expected to swell that figure to 7% by 2010.5
Apart from the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) security treaty, the Five Power Defence Arrangement—between Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Malaysia— has flourished as a cooperative multinational venture. Participants in this group exercise together frequently and successfully, with recent indications that Brunei may be invited to take part in the future.
Australia follows closely and supports U.S. policy in Asia. In Prime Minister Hawke’s statement of 1991 quoted earlier, he endorsed the three main objectives presented to the U.S. Congress by the Bush administration in April 1990: namely, a continued forward deployed force, with modest reductions; overseas bases; and bilateral security arrangements, wherein the United States’ Asian allies would assume a greater degree of responsibility. Hawke
urged an “increasing pattern of bilateral and multilateral discussions.” But with the United States firmly entrenched in the Philippines, neither country saw the need for either urgent or major changes to their strategic postures in Southeast Asia. The early withdrawal of the United States from Clark and Subic revealed the need for a major policy shift. That shift has not yet come. In April 1992, Australia’s Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, sought to douse concern for regional stability when he warned that “such scaremongering about potential high level threats and regional arms races can only serve to increase paranoia and mistrust. This, in turn, can lead to increased credibility for claims about such threats.”7
The Rising Sun
“The Cold War is over and Japan won. ”
Anonymous
Japan’s position in Southeast Asia is perhaps the most Powerful but, at the same time, the most difficult to define. Its influence, which has to date been confined to trade and investment, has risen incrementally, spreading to include economic relations and policy advice. The future may include attempts at political cooperation and even security arrangements, but Japan’s position is without question the most unforeseeable of all the nations engaged in the region.8
Given the strength of Japan’s defense force, it is perhaps strange that it should feel so vulnerable to instability in the Southeast Asia basin. The answer lies in the fact that more than 300 million tons of raw material imports to feed its industrial machine must pass through the choke
Points of Southeast Asia. Internal political constraints prevent Japan from protecting this trade militarily. Geographically and culturally, Japan should enjoy a cozy relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbors, and the healthy aid and investment packages currently in place could only serve to cement these bonds. But the scars from
Japan’s prewar colonial adventures in East Asia have left a legacy of deep mistrust in many of Japan’s Asian neighbors. Japanese incursions into Southeast Asian markets have occurred gradually, and only after the momentum of Japan’s steady growth has been achieved in the United States and Europe.
The often-discussed 1% ceiling on Japan’s military expenditure is freely extolled to perpetuate the myth of a modest “self-defense” force. Japan has a modern navy reputed to be the third largest in the world, but no larger than would be deemed adequate to protect its legitimate international interests. In Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, however, this capability is viewed with suspicion. ASEAN nations reacted cautiously to a Japanese suggestion made in July 1991 that 12 noncommunist countries from the Asia-Pacific region strengthen their security ties.7 Japan seems genuinely enthusiastic and willing to lift a share of the security burden from its ally, the United States. But domestic pressure rooted in bitter wartime experiences, together with a marked reluctance in the region to include Japan in cooperative security measures, will keep that country off balance for a few years to come.
South China Sea Basin
The countries of Southeast Asia are at the base of this discussion and are tackled last for focus rather than from neglect. The Asian mosaic of influence, moods, and trends stretches deep into the history of the world itself. The Bush administration’s illusion of the Philippines as the cornerstone of a security empire seems inappropriate. A wheel with the hub stationed, perhaps symbolically, on the Spratly Islands, provides a more acceptable image. Southeast Asia’s diverse combination prospers in an atmosphere of dynamism and promise, but with an underlying frailty that makes it equally susceptible to the possibility of spontaneous combustion.
At the center of Southeast Asian politics is ASEAN, comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Established in 1967 as an anticommunist trading bloc, it initially demonstrated that it was a largely ineffectual political grouping rather than an aggressive economic association. But, to its credit, it has put aside cultural and historical differences to concentrate on issues of common interest. Now ASEAN presents a model of international cooperation and achievement. While Brunei enjoys the benefits of vast natural resources, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have achieved economic growth rates amongst the highest in the world.
The question of military buildup is one that is treated carefully in some quarters. ASEAN countries are modernizing and expanding their security forces. The alarmists view the process as an unjustified exercise in militarism. They believe that the process will eventually provide the means for states to pursue expansionist policies, or to seek to settle longstanding territorial disputes by force. The subscribers to this view dub the process an “arms race.”
The other camp contends that in order to sustain the rate of economic growth presently being experienced in Asia, assured, unencumbered sea-lanes are a fundamental necessity. Table 1 shows that Asia’s merchant fleets have almost doubled in capacity in the last ten years. It is argued, therefore, that the additional means that modernization and force-structure improvements have provided are legitimate precautions to ensure a free, unchallenged maritime environment.
The influence and aspirations of countries from outside the geographical and political ASEAN grouping bear some scrutiny. From Oceania, New Zealand shares with Australia many of the political and economic imperatives that have forced it to look more closely at Southeast Asia. For simplicity, it can be assumed that these two countries will follow similar policies.
While the former Soviet republics squabble over the ownership of the Black Sea fleet, it is emerging that the implementation of the Asian- Pacific strategy proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev at Vladivostok in 1986 will fall to Russia as the only Pacific littoral of the union. A number of interesting proposals have been put forward as to what form that strategy will now take. Interestingly, signals from ASEAN favored a continued Russian presence in Southeast Asia—perhaps a desperate bid to prolong the standoff with the United States, the situation under which ASEAN has prospered.10
In practical terms, however, the last major warship stationed at Cam Ranh Bay (the 8,000- ton destroyer Admiral Spiridonov) returned to Vladivostok in December 1991.11 Russia has announced that a modest military presence at Cam Ranh Bay will be retained. Options for the use of the base in the future are intriguing, but it can be reasonably predicted that Moscow’s future relations with Southeast Asian countries will be largely commercial (and “de- ideologised”) and that it will not be a major regional naval or military actor in the near term.
India was, until recently, regarded as having ambitions to project power through the South China Sea. The realities of building a powerful blue water capability without Soviet support have now diluted the previous aspirations of the Indian Navy. While India’s presence in the Andaman Islands will continue to give cause for nervousness among certain Asian players, it is unlikely that the coming years will see large-scale deployments of Indian surface combatants through the Malacca Strait.
The rate of modernization of China and its national defense will depend largely on internal factors, especially the results of sweeping economic reforms. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the foreign assistance program for the People’s Liberation Army-Navy was set back and development progress is now uncertain. The creative tension of the “other Golden Triangle” (South Korea, Japan, and China) to the north will continue to occupy the maritime strategic attention of China, but it has Southeast Asian territorial interests that are of concern.12
r
A country not-much-heard from, New Zealand is somewhat a silent partner, but nonetheless a critical player in regional security issues. Echoing attitudes of Australia and the United States, it maintains an active fleet, as demonstrated here in the Leander-class frigate Southland.
NAVAL INSTITUTE
Table 1: ASEAN Merchant Fleets
Country | No. of Vessels | Gross Tons | ||
| 1980-81 | 1991-92 | 1980-81 | 1991-92 |
Indonesia | 1,122 | 1,884 | 1,309,911 | 2,178,646 |
Malaysia | 196 | 489 | 620,894 | 1,717,479 |
Philippines | 620 | 1,420 | 1,606,019 | 8,514,876 |
Singapore | 1,031 | 774 | 7,869,152 | 7,927,866 |
Thailand | 136 | 296 | 361.669 | 614.800 |
ASEAN Total | 3,105 | 4,863 | 11,767,645 | 20,953,667 |
Note: The decline in the Singaporean merchant fleet reflects Singapore’ | s increased labor |
costs and ‘flagging out’ of merchant ships owned in Singapore. Source: Janes’ Fighting Ships, 1980-81 and 1990-91.
In 1988 the People’s Liberation Army-Navy demon-strated a capacity to deploy a balanced amphibious force to the South China Sea as far south as Brunei. China’s claims in the Spratly Islands thus occasion considerable regional anxiety. Chinese maps show that China asserts sovereignty and control over virtually the whole of the South China Sea, right up to the maritime boundaries of Southeast Asia nations.13
The issue was further complicated when, in May 1992, a U.S. oil exploration company signed a deal with China to work in the Spratlys. Though outside the direct area of the Southeast Asian basin, another claim—this time to the Senkaku Islands—was gazetted by China in February 1992.14 This latter declaration will hamper relations with Japan, which may in turn unnecessarily destabilize East Asia.
In the absence of strong political and diplomatic indications that future U.S. military presence is assured, it is reasonable to assume that ASEAN countries will continue to expand their security forces. The language used to describe the process is unimportant, but the status of buildup is not in doubt. Table 2 illustrates the magnitude of the numerical increases of major surface combatants in Asia, and it is worth emphasizing that the quality of these ships has improved at a similar rate. Recent reports show that the trends are continuing.
A major escalation in arms acquisitions has commenced in ASEAN, and none of the Bush administration’s indicators would give these countries the confidence to reverse these trends. There need be no cause for concern, but a search for innovative measures to secure regional stability and avoid the threat of miscalculation or misunderstanding is a matter for early consideration by the incoming Clinton administration.
Security Collaboration
ASEAN has resisted—at times energetically—being drawn into discussions on security issues, believing that such moves may lead to accusations by communist neighbors that the association was forming an alliance. Instead, ASEAN has remained committed to the 1971 call for a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality, with the understanding that the U.S. security presence in the area would provide the stabilizing influence. In turn, the United States has discouraged the formulation of multinational security arrangements.
Early in 1991, when Australian and Canadian foreign
Table 2: Major Surface Combatants in Asian Navies 1981-1991
1981 1991
China | 27 | 52 |
India | 30 | 41 |
Indonesia | 11 | 17 |
Japan | 48 | 61 |
Korea (South) | 20 | 38 |
Malaysia | 2 | 4 |
Philippines | 21 | 13 |
Thailand | 6 | 12 |
Singapore | - | 6 |
Taiwan | 35 | 37 |
Total | 200 | 281 |
Note: Includes corvettes, frigates, and destroyers. Source: Janes’ Fighting Ships 1980-81 and 1991-92
ministers sought to arrange multilateral security talks on the ASEAN region, Secretary of State James Baker asked them to drop the idea.15 By November of that year, however, his attitude on this issue had softened. Reactions to moves for greater consultation on security from within ASEAN have varied. While politicians and diplomats differed on the merits of cooperative efforts, the ground swell of academia has given qualified support to the idea. Not surprisingly, military leaders reject the notion because collaboration on contentious defense issues may well lead to curtailment of healthy regional military expansion programs.
Nevertheless, the mood has changed, and far more quickly than may have been envisaged two years ago. At the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in January 1992, Singapore tabled a proposal to set up a mechanism for ASEAN to discuss security issues with regional powers.16 Of the countries least disposed to new measures, Indonesia and Malaysia seem now to be supportive.
No one suggests that, having gained a broad consensus, the next step will be easy. The pattern of dialogue and the nature of proposed confidence-building measures will be determined slowly. In the absence of a dominant ASEAN participant, agreement on the agenda will be the first major challenge. The conflicting claims of the Spratly Islands will loom early in the discussion, as will the future involvement of Laos and Vietnam and the United Nations’ endeavors in Cambodia.
But the January summit was a watershed for ASEAN security. The meeting concluded with all countries signing a declaration that recognized the importance of stability and security to continued economic growth.17 The wheels of security cooperation are slowly beginning to turn.
A Task for the Lone Ranger
“On balance ... the resurfacing of endemic regional tensions in Asia may be inevitable and ultimately healthy. . . . There is no need for the US to be policeman for the region, self-appointed or elected by default. Asian-Pacific dynamics should be unleashed to be dealt with by regional players. ”
Edward A. Olsen, December 199118
Southeast Asia requires a marshal, not a policeman. None of the countries with interests in the region wishes to abrogate its security responsibilities. None is asking for a handout. Whereas the Bush administration was committed to the region, there is no assurance that a U.S. Navy under pressure to make substantial fleet cuts will retain the capacity to station ships in the area in the future.
The January 1992 offer by Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong to host a U.S. naval logistics base is an indication of the faith that country places in America. President Bill Clinton must now send a clear signal of his long-term vision for the region.
A proposal to build on the Singapore model has merit. Point Lumut in Malaysia, Sattahip in Thailand, Surabaya in Indonesia, and perhaps the Philippines, or even Cam Ranh Bay, all have modest facilities that would give U.S. naval forces a network of bases throughout the region. The policy should be unambiguous: U.S. commitment, but cost sharing of collective security. ASEAN has demonstrated the will to achieve selfreliance. The United States would earn political capital by providing the vision and the leadership to see that the Southeast Asian states succeed.
1 From the National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, p.3.
2 Patrick E. Tyler, “Senior U.S. Officials Assail Lone-Superpower Policy,” New York Times, 11 March 1992.
'Bob Hawke, “Australia’s Security in Asia,” speech by the then-Prime Minister of Australia at the Asia-Australia Institute (University of New South Wales, Sydney). 24 May 1991.
4 "Odd Man In: A Survey of Australia,” the Economist, 4 April 1992.
'Ibid
"ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty entered into force 29 April 1952 and bound the signatories to recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific area constituted a mutual threat.
7“The Move to the North: The Strategic Imperative,” speech by the Australian Minister for Defence, The Honorable Robert Ray, Darwin, Australia, 8 April 1992. "East West Center, Hawaii, as published in “Japan in Asia: The Economic Impact on the Region,” Far East Economic Review Publication, Hong Kong, November 1991, edited by Nigel Halloway, p. 7.
"Michael Richardson, “Wary Reaction to Japanese Plan,” Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1991, p. 31.
’"Edward Grebenshchikov, “Place in the Sun,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 February 1992, p. 24.
“Sophie Quinn-Judge, “Cam Ranh Mushrooms,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 January 1992.
l2Six countries (Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei) lay claim to all or part of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
“Michael Richardson, “Defusing the Spratlys,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August 1991, p. 18.
“International Affairs Bulletin titled “New (Chinese) Law Claims Sovereignty,” released 27 February 1992 (number FBIS-CHI-92-039).
“David Lague, "Regional Security Despite US Objection,” Australian Financial Review, 12 April 1991; and Mark Metherall, “US Opposes Security Plan, Letters Reveal,” The Age, 24 April 1991 (both letters drawn from a lecture Commodore W. S. G. Bateman, Royal Australian Navy, presented in the United Kingdom, 12-13 December 1991).
“Michael Vatikiotis, “Time for Decisions,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 January 1992, p. 23.
“Michael Richardson, “ASEAN Opts for Closer Security Ties,” Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, April-May 1992, p. 32.
“Edward A. Olsen, “A New American Strategy for Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol- XXXI, No. 12, December 1991.
Commander Pert is an ASW specialist who joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1966. Having commanded the patrol ship HMAS Lae (1973-74) and the training ship HMAS Jervis (1989-91), he is now serving in Defence Headquarters, Canberra.