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Samuri of ancient and feudal Japan traditionally carried two blades: the classic, long katana, and a shorter, dagger-like weapon called a tanto. Japan’s current naval force resembles the latter: highly polished and capable, but useful primarily for defense at close quarters. Will the descendants of those Samuria, struggling to define their nation’s role in the post-ColdWar world (here, the submarine Nochishio enters San Diego harbor during a multinational RimPac-92 exercise), decide to build a navy of reach and power—thus transforming it into the long, killing sword of legend?
Any decision to build such a navy will be based on how the Japanese see their essential national interests, on the strength of their will to act on a global stage, and on the material and human limits of their strength. That decision will both reflect the progress of •Japanese-U.S. relations and set the future course of what has often been called the most important bilateral relationship in the world.
The question at hand is not “Will Japan rearm?”; in large measure, it has already quietly done so. From 1986 to 1991 its defense budget never rose less than 5.2% annually.1 In the current fiscal year it will exceed $31.9 billion, by some measures the world’s third largest.2 In naval terms that has translated into a modern and powerful force, one with potential for continued rapid growth. The question, rather, is “Will Japan develop military capability in proportion to its economic strength and potentially enormous political power?”
National Security
The Soviet threat to Japan has evaporated recently, hav- ■ng been replaced by some concern over instability in and among the newly independent republics.3 Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe’s anticipation that the small Russian-held islands off Hokkaido would be returned to Japan “in the not-so-distant future” was ended last fall in the messy cancellation of President Boris Yeltsin’s scheduled visit to Tokyo.4 Conservatives in Russia oppose the return of the islands, and their counterparts in Japan oppose large- scale economic aid to the Russians until the islands are returned.
The increasing aggressiveness of China should be of even greater concern to Japan. The most publicized aspect of this trend has been the hard line the Chinese have adopted in asserting what they say is a historical foundation for their claim to the Spratly Islands, and to the entire South China Sea down to 1,000 miles south of Hainan. Alarms have also sounded in the five other nations that lay claim to the archipelago.5 While conflict is unlikely in the near future, the area will continue to be a potential flashpoint as long as future oil discoveries remain a possibility.
The Chinese hard line also has been manifest in their continued claims to the Japanese Senkaku Islands, opposition to expanded democratization in Hong Kong, and refusal to renounce claims to Taiwan. The Chinese military budget has expanded 50% in three years, to more than $6.2 billion. Recent acquisition of SU-27 Flanker fighters, continued development of Han-class SSNs, and pursuit of improved diesel submarines will expand the reach of China’s maritime forces. China also has become Asia’s largest arms exporter, selling domestic and Soviet hardware and technology to an extensive market of unstable Third World nations.6
Korea presents perhaps the most promising—yet at the same time the most alarming—prospects for Japanese security in the next few years. Economic problems have North Korea wanting closer ties with South Korea, but a proposal for reunification remains hung up by the government in P’yongyang’s stubborn refusal to permit adequate mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. A still unrepentantly Stalinist North Korea, armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, is a terrifying prospect for Japan, viewed by its Vice Defense Minister Akira Hiyoshi
in late 1991 as “Japan’s top security threat.”7 Diplomatic pressure and the delay of the second phase of U.S. troop withdrawals from the peninsula have, at least temporarily, kept obstacles in the way of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and provided motivation for progress.
Defense spending in Southeast Asia has been increasing, with virtually every nation with a coastline modernizing its naval forces. Such spending perpetuates the spiral of insecurity and armament along Japan's most important trade routes.
Responding to America
How Japan perceives any threat to its national interests will be directly related to U.S. involvement in the western Pacific. U.S. trade in the region continues to be strong, but direct capital investment has slowed and is unlikely to increase in the face of stiff Asian competition.
Signs of a U.S. withdrawal into a North American trading bloc (witness the many potentially exclusionary aspects of the pending agreement with Canada and Mexico), and recent proposals in Congress for a drastic “managed” deficit reduction, have caused the Japanese to question the reliability of the United States as a trading partner, and to fear overt trade measures that could eventually cripple any nation truly dependent on world trade.
The Japanese must contemplate a regional strategy of their own, a move being openly debated in the Japanese media today. If the strategy focuses on Southeast Asia, it must be an aggressive one. As suggested by George Friedman and Meredith LeBard in The Coming War with Japan (St. Martin's Press, 1991), the region cannot support the huge Japanese economy and have room left over for any significant U.S. economic presence.
On the U.S. side, the question is this: If our profitable economic involvement in the Far East continues to decline in relative importance, will we continue our security commitment indefinitely? The isolationist tendency among Americans is a strong one, particularly in hard times. Any U.S. military withdrawal is likely to leave Japan feeling uncomfortably exposed. Talk in Washington of possible reductions to eight or nine carrier battle groups must certainly perk up the ears of defense planners in Tokyo. Prudent Japanese must ponder what course to take if faced with a United States hostile to Japan economically and absent as a military protector.
The Will to Forge the Weapon
The Japanese Foreign Ministry's 1991 Diplomatic Blue Book pointed out that the nation is “now in a position to influence virtually all issues related to the construction of a new world order.”8 Diplomatic efforts will certainly lead the attempt to do so, and to that end the Japanese are considering increasing the size of their diplomatic corps by almost 25%. The report calls for a shift from “checkbook diplomacy,” but increasingly forceful, albeit selective, use of that “checkbook” is already a part of Japan's foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry now considers such
factors as the recipient nation's military spending, arms trading involvement, and stance toward democratization when deciding who will receive official development aid.9 Coupled with tremendous commercial economic influence on its Asian neighbors, development aid can now become a powerful tool for hegemony, should the Japanese choose to employ it so. Japan has thus far not backed up its lofty rhetoric about withholding aid where it conflicts with its own economic interests—most notably in China. Enormous Japanese aid and private investment have freed other assets to feed China's military modernization, despite disclaimers by the Foreign Ministry.10 The Japanese have also moved away from the U.S. diplomatic line by lifting a ban on loans to Iran and resuming aid to Vietnam during the U.S. embargo.
How close to the surface is Japanese militarism, or better put, how strong is the Japanese willingness to include a vigorous foreign policy and a significant military dimension in the defense of its own interests? Obstacles to a more active and visible role for Japan’s military appear to be falling already. The much-debated bill allowing SelfDefense Force personnel to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations (not involving combat) finally passed the Diet last June, and members of the Ground Self-Defense Force are now serving in Cambodia. Influential faction leader Ichiro Ozawa (among others) holds that even under the present constitution, units can be sent overseas on U.N. missions that involve the use of force." Inside
the opposition Social Democratic Party, an important faction called the Suiyokai is even urging recognition of the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Force, and endorses involvement in U.N. peacekeeping.12
Even more significant than that peacekeeping operations bill was the deployment of four Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers, a tender, and a supply ship in the Persian Gulf from April to October 1991. This historic event ended the Postwar Japanese determination that their military should never again he sent overseas. It presented the Japanese with a vision of their ships going (at least potentially) in harm’s way, yet thorough public discussion of whether the
deployment constituted “collective defense,” which is prohibited by law, or of what actions the ships would take if attacked was, interestingly, delayed until after the mission Was completed.13
This deployment showed once again that strict constitutional considerations do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to a greatly increased role for Japan’s military. Interpretation of the document has for years reflected the flexibility of the Japanese language itself, and has always been in tune with the prevalent public opinion. It would not be too great a leap for that consensus to redefine selfdefense in terms that would include protection of the nation’s political or economic self-interests.
The recession of the 1990s has not spared Japan, however, and programmed expenditures under the 1991-1995 Mid-Term Plan have been cut. Pressure from the Finance Ministry managed to hold fiscal year 1993 defense spending to a 1.95% increase over the previous year—the smallest since 1960 and considerably less than the Defense Agency’s request.14 Any return to a steady 3.6% annual growth in defense spending in the face of Probable slow overall economic growth will be a clear sign of insecurity among the Japanese, and of how they mtend to respond.
One major initiative is under way—the construction of an intelligence community (especially within the Japanese Defense Agency) that can function independently without extensive assistance from U.S. sources. This quiet program will train hundreds of new analysts, and may, despite continuing difficulties, move Japan’s government agencies to a more coordinated effort.15 If and when Japan launches its own dedicated network of intelligence satellites to feed that effort, the nation’s intelligence program will have come of age.
Development and production of indigenous Japanese weapon systems is quite costly because of limits on construction runs caused by the current small size of the Self-Defense Force and the existing political prohibition of arms exports. Relaxation of the ban on arms exports would be one way for Japan to enlarge the defense sector of its economy prior to a buildup of domestic force levels. Public sentiment against such a move is still very strong, and any future change would signal an advanced stage of a return to militarism.
Japan has serious problems with military manpower, and these would have to be addressed well before any general buildup. Self-Defense Force members suffer from low prestige and inadequate compensation, and the armed services’ ambiguous role makes it hard to motivate careerists. Rear Admiral Yoshiaki Nishimura, Maritime SelfDefense Force Chief-of-Staff, said in 1991, “I find it really difficult to maintain . . . high morale among the officer corps, but we cannot take any action without the government and the people. We have to live with these circumstances.”16
Samurai of old were expected to disdain money and the material life, but today Self-Defense Force recruiters have trouble attracting young people away from the rich opportunities in Japan’s private sector. Enlisted recruiting standards are low, and a move to expand the role of women officers (last year the first 39 female cadets were admitted to the joint defense academy) was made less for the sake of sexual equality than to ease shortfalls in male officer recruiting.'7 The Self-Defense Force’s pension plan for its retirees has been recognized as inadequate, and retirement ages for senior personnel have been raised as a career incentive for the services’ best.18
Demographics indicate that the decline in eligible youths will continue into the next century; this in a nation already experiencing severe competition for available labor. One possible way to overcome some of these problems, and a sure sign of resurgent militarism if it occurs, would be for Japan to expand and upgrade its wretched reserve forces, now almost totally neglected in one of the worst-funded programs in the Defense Agency.19
Recommendations
What measures can the United States take to render unlikely (perhaps unnecessary would be a better word) any further Japanese return to militarism? Clearly, a first, important step is to convince the Japanese of our reliability as a trading partner, and of our determination to stay deeply involved in the larger Asian economy. Making good on these commitments will require adjustments and strong leadership in both the public and private sectors.
Defense policymakers and naval leaders have important, specific roles to play if we are to prevent the remilitarization of Japan. They must at every turn reaffirm U.S. dedication to the security of the Far East, and ensure that Japan is totally involved as a partner in our strategy for maintaining that security. Leaving any vacuum, particularly of naval power, in a rapidly rearming region would be dangerous folly.20 The Pacific may be what General Colin Powell refers to as an “economy-of-force theater,” but it must receive constant attention.
Some important steps have already been taken. The decision to relocate Seventh Fleet support and logistics functions to Singapore (a result of the closure of the Subic Bay Naval Base) sent a clear signal of the U.S. intention to continue as a player in the region, as has our continuing strong stand against North Korean nuclear weapons development.
Even as we try to remain multilateral in trade, we must continue to stress our bilateral security arrangement— under the mutual security treaty with Japan—as the cornerstone of our Pacific strategy. Our forces based in Japan are a great defense bargain for both nations. The Japanese pay almost three-fourths of the nonsalary costs of maintaining those units, a share that will increase even more in the next few years.
In addition, U.S. politicians and military personnel would do well to consider the following recommendations. First, laud Japanese contributions to world security. The $13 billion Japan contributed to the war against Iraq (about one-fifth of the total cost) was dismissed by Americans as insufficient. This surprised the Japanese, who paid specially levied taxes to cover the expense. The Japanese should also be credited when they adhere to their stated policies by withholding economic aid and investment from military regimes, and called to account when they don’t. (Put more bluntly, trade and China are two issues that could potentially divide the United States and Japan in the 1990s. Japan will probably adopt a more independent foreign policy in the next few years. By taking the high road on trade, the United States will maintain enough credibility—and economic influence—to encourage Japan to put short-term gain aside and act on its principles of pacifism and respect for human rights.)
Second, continue licensed and cooperative production of weapons with Japan. While we must protect from Japanese predation vital industries that use emerging technologies, we must not tie technology transfer to the balance of trade. The ongoing U.S.-Japan Systems and Technology Forum deserves continued, increasing support to balance the flow of information.
Third, press for more joint military exercises, particularly with the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and for increasingly well-defined—but not expanded—roles for Japanese forces. These should dovetail tightly with U.S. plans to meet various regional security contingencies.
Perhaps the most important role military and defense leaders can play is to continually remind Americans of the importance of cooperation with Japan, and of the tremendous potential our two nations have, working as partners with distinctly different roles, to lead the world into a free and prosperous new century.
The convincing will not be easy. As an excellent study of the U.S. role in the Pacific states, “Vacillating public views, ephemeral global consciousness, and eroding public determination to shoulder the burdens of leadership do not lessen American credentials as a superpower, but do seriously weaken its role as a great power.”21
All Americans can play a part. While we get our own economic house in order, we must soften our rhetoric, and expand and upgrade the level of our discourse on all issues concerning Japan. We must provide absolutely no excuse for cries of racism, because the Japanese (who have their own powerful prejudices) tend to view the actions of foreigners in that light. The Japanese are a proud people with a 2,000-year-old warrior tradition. If they fail to rise above that tradition, we should not be surprised, because the warning signs will be apparent at every step, and because their failure will only reflect the loss of our own determination to remain a truly great world power.
Defense of Japan, 1991 (Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency), p. 15.
Catherine S. Mangold, “The Military Question,” Newsweek, 25 November 1991, p. 45.
'“The Tribute after Tiananmen,” The Economist, 17 August 1991, p. 29.
'Japan Times International Edition, 18-24 November 1991, p 3.
5Jane's Defense Weekly, 22 August 1992, p. 19.
^‘Supermarket in the Pacific,” World Press Review/Asia Magazine, September 1992, p. 15.
’Reuters, 21 November 1991.
Takashi Kitazume, “Report Urges Japan To Broaden Its Diplomatic Role,” Japan Times International Edition, 6-12 January 1992, p. 3.
’“Tokyo To Link Aid More Closely to Politics,” Japan Times International Edition, 14-20 October 1991, p. 3.
10Japan Times International Edition, 16-22 November 1992, p. 5.
"Japan Times International Edition, 21-27 October 1991, p. 5.
I2“Vintage Tanabe,” The Economist, 6 July 1991, p. 36.
1 'Hideki Sakata, “Gulf Cooperation Mission Questioned,” Japan Times International Edition, 18-24 November 1991, p. 3.
14Japan Times International Edition, 4-10 January 1991, p. 1. l5David E. Sanger, “Tired of Relying on U.S., Japan Seeks To Expand Its Own Intelligence Efforts,” The New York Times, 1 January 1992, p. 6. l6Marc Zolton, “Restrictions on Fleet Tough on Japanese Morale,” Navy Times, 11 November 1991.
’’“Japanese To Allow Women Officers,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 26 October 1991, p. 732.
18Defense of Japan, 1990 (Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency, 1990), pp. 153-54. ’’’Japan’s Reserve forces total 48,500. Defense of Japan, 1992 (Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency, 1992), pp. 42-51.
’"As Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs James R. Lil- ley pointed out in a speech in 1992, “While there is little we can do about [things like] oppression in Tibet, we can do something wherever there’s water.”
21R. D. McLaurin and Chung-in-Moon, The U.S. and the Defense of the Pacific (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).
A naval aviator, Commander Dean served for two years on exchange duty with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. His article, “Eta Jima: Hallowed Halls,” was published in the March 1983 issue of Proceedings, and his Professional Note, titled “Japan’s Stalwart Seaplanes,” in the March 1984 issue.