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These VII Corps Ml Abrams tanks performed well during operation Desert Storm, hut required frequent refueling. This, coupled with an overemphasis on synchronizing the advance of armored forces, allowed Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards to escape the trap that had been set for them.
In the early 1980s, the Army went through a gut- wrenching internal debate that led to a major change in its war-fighting philosophy. The philosophy of the ^ietnam-era leaders, one that emphasized force ratios, firepower, attrition, and head-on assaults, largely was replaced with a philosophy of maneuver and deception as espoused by Colonel John Boyd, U.S. Air Force (Retired), °ne of the architects of the military reform movement.
This is excerpted from The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard, lo be published by the Naval Institute Press this September.
Unfortunately, the Army did not get everything quite right.
The Army’s new doctrine, “Air Land Battle,” had four major components: depth, initiative, agility, and synchronization. When the new doctrine was first published, Boyd publicly praised the Army for throwing out most of the firepower and attrition philosophy. He congratulated the service on the first three components of the new doctrine; depth of operations, initiative at the lower levels, and agility inherent in fast-moving armored forces, but criticized the Army for including synchronization, which he felt was logically inconsistent with the other
“You synchronize watches, not people,” Boyd said repeatedly. He argued that a requirement to synchronize actions would reduce the ability to move deep behind enemy forces quickly, cut off their retreat, and come at them through the backdoor. “Synchronized units can only move at the pace of the slowest unit, therefore the initiative and agility of the entire force will suffer,” Boyd said. What happened in the Gulf War suggests that the Army should have listened.
Modeled after General George S. Patton s expression
“Hold them by the nose and kick them in the butt,” the plans for the ground war were brilliantly conceived.1 As the start of the ground war approached, the majority of the Coalition forces massed in Saudi Arabia across the southern border of Kuwait, creating the impression that
tile main attack would be a straight-ahead bull rush directly into Kuwait.
Marines openly rehearsed amphibious operations just off the Kuwaiti coast in full view of the international press. All this U-8 AR“V activity was designed to focus the attention of the Iraqi forces to the south and to the east.
Early on the morning of 24 February, the Coalition force that had been massed on Kuwait’s southern border attacked the Iraqis. This force was primarily U.S. Marines, but also included units from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Kuwait. Several days before the attack, a large Coalition armored force hiding behind the Marines moved rapidly 200 miles west, behind the Coalition lines. There, on the second day of the war, it planned to break through a more lightly defended area and race northward through the western desert to circle around behind Iraqi forces concentrating on repelling the Marine attack from the south.
Seven divisions of Iraq’s Republican Guards were held in reserve well north of the Kuwait-Saudi border, while the Iraqis waited to see where the main thrust of the Coalition attack was centered.2 As the Marine forces poured across the Kuwait border, the Republican Guard—orienting itself to the south to meet the invaders—either did not notice or ignored the armored force that had moved laterally to the west behind Coalition lines.
Two things prevented this excellent plan from achieving complete success—turbine engines (smaller versions dinosaur blood flowing in the veins of one of the armored force commanders.
The Coalition force in the west consisted of two U> Army corps, augmented with units from Great Britain and France. The two corps were commanded by Lieutenan' Generals Gary E. Luck and Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Luck’s XVIIIth Airborne Corps, farthest to the west' was to circle all the way around the Iraqi forces and cn> off their escape routes to the north. Luck had the farthest to go but also had the least resistance from the enemy1 Franks, commanding the Army’s VII Corps, was given the specific job of destroying the Republican Guard.3
Franks’s objective was made perfectly clear by
General H. Norms11 Schwarzkopf, the oven all commander, on l4 November 1990 whe" he first revealed his plal1 for the ground war to hi* subordinates. He efl1" phasized the importance of destroying the Re" publican Guard, which he considered the cents1 of gravity of the Iraq1 j forces: “We need to destroy—not attack, no1 damage, not surround"'
I want you to destroy the Republican Guard' When you are done with them, I don’t want then1
to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don’t wan1 them to exist as a military organization.”4
Franks’s armored forces were equipped mostly with M1A1 tanks, the latest version of the Ml, and Bradley fighting vehicles. Both the Ml and M1A1 tanks are powered by turbine engines, rather than the Diesel engines used in previous Army tanks and in the tanks of every other army in the world. The turbine engines permit the Ml and the M1A1 to zoom across the countryside at fer
of the engines that power jet aircraft) and a large dose
rific speeds. Unfortunately, they burn a lot of fuel in the Process—seven gallons of fuel per mile—not miles per gallon, but gallons per mile—and the engines burn about tile same amount of fuel when idling, which is 70% of the tittle, as when cruising.5 Consequently the tanks have to 'top every three hours or so to refuel. The Diesel-powered Bradleys, traveling with the turbine-powered MlAls, had no fuel problems. When the tanks stopped to refuel, s°me as often as every two hours, the Bradleys’ fuel tanks "'ere still one-half to three-fourths full.6
Because turbine engines require large volumes of clean air, the tank crews had to stop, climb outside, and change tile air filters every three hours. During sandstorms, which "'ere common, the filters clogged as often as every 15 Minutes, causing the engines to stop.7
Shortly after the Marines crossed the border on the Corning of 24 February, it became apparent to Schwarzkopf that the entire Iraqi Army might flee to Iraq, father than stay and fight. The Marines, supposed to be Merely a holding force designed to fix the Iraqi forces in Place while Luck and Franks circled around behind them, "'ere enjoying far more success than anyone had environed. Practicing the maneuver concepts they had adopted in the late 1980s, the Marines . . . sought out areas of least resistance, and slithered through the Iraqi forces in front of them like water flowing downhill. They quickly turned file southern front into a rout.
• . .In one sense this was good; in another it was bad. Time was now of the essence. Fearing that most of the Iraqi army, including the Republican Guard, would escape before it could be destroyed or captured, Schwarzkopf or- tiered Luck and Franks to launch their race through the Western desert 15 hours earlier than planned.8 Franks had Planned to use those hours to preposition large caches of fuel deep behind enemy lines.9
On the afternoon of the first day of the ground war, not file morning of the second day as originally planned, Luck and Franks took off through the desert in their attempt to trap the Iraqi army. . . . They did not quite make it. The eVents of the next 89 hours unfolded at a pace and tempo Huch quicker than anyone anticipated—and much quicker than Franks could handle.
The war was over almost before it started. The ceasefire took effect at 0800 on the morning of 28 February 1991, a mere 100 hours after the Marines launched their attack.10 It was one of the swiftest and most decisive victories in history, or so it seemed at the time. During the evening of 27 February, General Schwarzkopf had held his spellbinding press conference where he revealed the brilliant plan that had guided his forces ... the Iraqi army "'as trapped by our forces, which had encircled it.
Schwarzkopf: “To date we have . . . destroyed or rendered inoperable . . . over 29 Iraqi divisions, and the gates are closed. There is no way out of here. . . .
Reporter: “You said the gate was closed. Have you got ground forces blocking the road to Basra? [The highway between Basra and Baghdad was the primary escape route for the Republican Guard.]
Reporter: “Is there any way they can get out that way? ’ Schwarzkopf: “No. That’s why the gate’s closed.”11
It was one year later before the public learned that . . . most of the Republican Guard escaped to Iraq with its equipment, where it became “The Palace Guard,’ and provided Saddam Hussein a strong base of power that helped him to remain in office.12
On 24 February 1992, Tom Donnelly of the Army Times dropped the bombshell, when he reported that even though the war was a short one, Schwarzkopf thought that it could (and should) have been shorter. From Schwarzkopf’s vantage point, the enemy began collapsing almost immediately after the Marines launched their attack. He expected his field commanders to pursue the enemy aggressively. ... In his view, some of his commanders unfortunately had been too cautious and missed great opportunities to hasten the collapse. Schwarzkopf had been particularly upset with Franks at the time, even threatening to replace him on the second day of combat.11
Schwarzkopf became furious when he awoke on the second morning of the war to see that Franks’s forces had not continued their advance overnight; in fact, they had not moved since Schwarzkopf had gone to bed. Even though Franks had breached the initial enemy lines, he had stopped to wait for daylight. . . . Franks gave three reasons for halting: he had not practiced breaching operations at night (which raises the key question of why); he was afraid that some of his forces would get too far ahead of the others and he wanted to keep everyone in formation; and he feared that even small enemy tank units, if bypassed, would wreak havoc on the long lines of fuel trucks that were carrying thousands of tons of fuel behind his thirsty tanks.
The next day, after his forces breached the enemy lines, Franks planned to turn them around, backtrack, and attack to the south to clean up any remnants of bypassed enemy units. This further infuriated Schwarzkopf who told him, “. . . for Chrissakes, don’t turn south! Turn east! Go after ‘em!” [Schwarzkopf was referring to the Republican Guard, which was Franks’s primary objective and which he had not yet engaged).14
Schwarzkopf was not the only one frustrated with Franks. On the second day of the war, an angry Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, told Schwarzkopf, “Call [Lieutenant] General [John J.] Yeosock [Commander, U.S. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command]. Tell him the chairman is on the ceiling about this matter of VII Corps [Franks], I want to know why they’re not moving and why they can t attack an enemy that has been bombed continually for thirty days. They’ve been maneuvering for more than two days and still don t even have contact with the enemy. It’s very hard to justify VII Corps actions to anyone in Washington. I know I shouldn’t be second-guessing anyone in the field, but we should be fighting the enemy now.”15 In his memoirs, Schwarzkopf recorded his growing frustration on that evening, “Until we’d destroyed the Republican Guard, our job was only half done, and all of us felt the window of opportunity was rapidly slamming shut. 16
Schwarzkopfs anger at Franks’s slow progress was exacerbated by the rapid movement of Luck’s forces; farther to the west, they were racing through the desert at tremendous speeds. Luck’s lead unit, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, was commanded by Major General Barry McCaffrey, whom Schwarzkopf later described in his memoirs as “the most aggressive and successful ground commander of the war.”17 Because of Franks’s plodding progress, Schwarzkopf was forced to order McCaffrey to slow down for two days because he was getting too far out in front of Franks. Frustrated, Schwarzkopf later wrote, “I began to feel as if I were trying to drive a wagon pulled by race horses and mules.”18
In postwar interviews with the Army Times and his hometown newspaper, Franks defended his actions, explaining . . . [that] he constantly had to align his forces in complex maneuvers to keep them synchronized—the magic word.
“It was a matter of timing and synchronization,” he said.19 In a later interview he added, “Our leaders and soldiers performed a synchronized maneuver to mass against the Republican Guard and defeated them with a three-division fist.”20 This preoccupation with synchronizing the force so he could always keep them in formation to hit the Republican Guard with a “three-division fist” was also reported by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kindsvatter, VII Corps’ official historian. Kindsvatter quotes Franks’s instructions to his staff on the night of 26 February after a call from Schwarzkopf who had again urged him to pick up the pace: “We will synchronize our fight as we always have, but we will have to crank up the heat. The way home is through the [Republican Guard].21
On top of all this synchronizing, Kindsvatter, U.S. News & World Report, and Donnelly all reported that, on the next to the last day of the war, many of Franks’s turbine-powered tanks ran critically short of fuel. While the enemy was in retreat, one entire division had to stop and get an emergency ration from a sister division to tide it over until its own fuel trucks could catch up. Franks confirmed this in his interview with his hometown paper.”
Schwarzkopf’s concerns about the Republican Guard escaping were well founded. Franks never got behind them to cut off their escape. Instead, his carefully synchronized “three-division fist” literally pushed the Republican Guard out of the theater back to Iraq. It is true that he captured thousands of Iraqi soldiers and destroyed tremendous amounts of enemy equipment. But, it also appears that he was so busy refueling and synchronizing that he did not have time to get after the enemy and exploit the breakthroughs. . . .
Clearly, Franks’s failure to cut off the Republican Guard’s escape can be traced to his strict adherence to the synchronization element of the Army’s new doctrine. . . . Synchronization . . . also prevented Luck and McCaffrey from circling around behind. . .and cutting off the escape routes. In the final moments of the war, McCaffrey was attempting either to take the town of Basra from the west or to cut the highway leading north out of Basra toward Baghdad. When the cease-fire sounded at 0800 on 28 February, McCaffrey’s division was sitting in an onion field 27 miles west of Basra.23 It had bee11 there for five and one-half hours, having reached Phase Line Victory—its limit of advance.
. . . John Boyd was absolutely correct a decade ag° when he argued with the Army that synchronizing was3 dumb idea and that it would slow down the pace of op' erations. . . .We now have empirical evidence to confirm that argument. . . . Another aspect of synchronization must also be examined. Although our overall casualties in the Gulf War were extremely low, almost 25% resulted find’ friendly fire, the highest percentage of fratricide in U> history.24 Seven of the nine M1A1 tanks lost in comb3’ were destroyed by friendly, not enemy fire.25 Bradley fig*11' ing vehicles suffered even greater losses—17 of the - destroyed Bradleys were hit by friendly fire.
Franks’s forces suffered the worst incidence of fratm cide in the war.26 All of the M1A1 tank losses and 75 ,f of the Bradley losses occurred in Franks’s unit.27 During the final hours of the war, when the situation was m05,1 fluid on the battlefield, Franks’s concern over fratrici^ caused him to exercise even greater caution in permit ting his forces to advance. He ordered hjs troops to cease fire 37 minutes before the official cease-fire time because he was concerned about fratricide in the final franG race to cut off the escape road to Basra.
When armored units train to stay synchronized in the'1 assigned zones, and behind their limits-of-advance phase lines, they are not accustomed to operating in a chaotic free-flowing situation in actual combat where units ufl' knowingly or intentionally get out of formation. If they encounter other units who are out of an assigned zone or beyond a phase line, they will automatically assume those units must be the enemy and therefore subject to at' tack. The high percentage of casualties from fratricide was a direct result of trying to operate in an ordered, syn' chronized fashion on a battlefield that in reality was char acterized by disorder and chaos. If the units do not prac tice amid chaos, they are less able to handle it when the) are dumped into it. [See “Halt! Bang! Who Goes There? this issue, pages 89-92.]
Unfortunately, synchronization may become even mofC entrenched in Army thinking. Franks was promoted to gen' eral shortly after the war and placed in command of tne Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.28 ... I suspe^J we will see a resurgence of the linear theories of ordered warfare so prevalent in Army thinking before World Wa( II. Synchronization will probably move beyond the realn1 of doctrine to that of dogma. The Army’s two most celf
forces, General George Patton and Major General Job11 S. Wood, must turn over in their graves every time some' one mentions synchronizing armored forces. .. . Time and again, Kindsvatter explains how Franks’s various units had to stop when they reached the [next] phase line . . . com' pare this technique to that of Major General Wood, the Army’s top tank commander during World War II. Han' son Baldwin quotes Wood in his 1979 book, Tiger Jack' “There is no place for detailed orders, limiting lines or zones, phase lines, limited objectives or other restraint5 ... in the extremely fluid operations after the breakthrough-
brated and respected World War II commanders of armore1
eir! ase1 tic. an- iey of
.. . Most of the Republican Guard got away, perhaps as many as four and one-half out of the original seven divisions. Rather than admit that a faulty doctrine may have been the cause, the Army has dusted off the bied and true Vietnam excuse—it Was the President’s fault. And Schwarzkopf is the one pointing the finger.
The day before the war ended, Schwarzkopf, in his now- famous 27 February press conference, said^that his mission was to destroy the Republican Guard: “If I’m to accomplish the mission that I was given, and that’s to make sure that the Republican Guard is rendered incapable ot conducting the type of heinous act they’ve conducted so often in the past, what has to be done is these forces [Franks’s forces] continue to attack across here and put the Republican Guard out of business.”31 That seems Perfectly clear.
In the same press conference, he said the gate was closed and there was no way out. . . . Now the story gets very confusing.
President George Bush quickly came under pressure, both domestic and international, to end the war when the Public saw the graphic television scenes of destroyed Iraqi equipment on the highway of death. But the means to end
plaining to do. .
Schwarzkopf was — - -
Schwarzkopf’s comments on the cease-fire and Republican Guard’s escape are very interesting, coming after a month of reflection on what happened:
“Frankly, my recommendation had been . . . continue the march. I mean we had them in a rout and we could have continued to . . . wreak great destruction upon them. We could have completely closed the door and made it ... a battle of annihilation ... the President made the decision that... we should stop at a given time at a given place that did leave some escape routes open to them to get back out and I think it was a very humane decision and a very courageous decision on his part also. ... It s one of those ones that historians are going to second guess, you know, forever. . . .” 37
All this is very confusing. First, Schwarzkopf announced
it was up to higher headquarters to find us, and we hoped now and then they would not do so. . . . In crossing the Saar River, General Wood “took the division outside the sacrosanct corps and army boundaries, but as Wood later Wrote, “Such lines meant little to me. And I went where the going was good.”29
Patton and Wood used tactical air power to protect Wood’s flanks while he was thrusting deep behind German lines roaring through northern France after the break out from Normandy in July 1944. In contrast, Schwarzkopf held back McCaffrey to prevent him from getting too far in front of Franks for fear of exposing a flank. Phase lines Were merely check points for Wood to report his progress back to Patton. In Schwarzkopfs synchronized modern army, phase lines and even grid lines a few thousand meters apart were used as limits of advance to maintain syn- nhronization. Unlike McCaffrey or any of Franks’s division commanders, Wood’s rate of advance in 1944 was limited only by the actions of the enemy, not by restraints from his own higher headquarters. Consequently, Wood’s 4th Armored Division traveled farther and faster in its historic drive from branches to the Moselle River against the first-rate Wehrmacht than any of Franks or Luck’s divisions did >n the Gulf against a tenth-rate Iraqi Army.30
Confusion at the end—and fixing lhe blame
the war appeared to be at hand; the picture painted by Schwarzkopf at the press conference suggested that the war was over for all practical purposes since the Republican Guard was trapped. A few hours after the press conference, General Powell called Schwarzkopf and asked whether or not he had accomplished his mission and whether he, Schwarzkopf, would agree to calling a halt to offensive operations at 0800 the next morning, 28 February. Schwarzkopf initially said no, he wanted to prolong the operations for another 24 hours.32 Under continued pressure from Powell, Schwarzkopf finally agreed. In his memoirs Schwarzkopf states that, when he agreed to the cease-fire, he told Powell, “Our objective was the destruction of the enemy forces, and for all intents and purposes we’ve accomplished that objective. In retrospect, it is difficult to understand how he could say that to Powell because he knew that the Republican Guard had not yet been destroyed. Nevertheless, the cease-fire went into effect at 0800 local (Iraqi) time on 28 February.
Schwarzkopf flew into a rage a few hours after that when he learned that Franks’s forces had not cut off the Republican Guard’s escape route—as Schwarzkopf had ordered the night before. He had issued that order after he had agreed to the ceasefire and had told Powell that he had already accomplished his military objectives. He was furious because he had been told that Franks owned the highway leading into Basra from the south, when, in fact, Franks did not.32
Schwarzkopf knew that McCaffrey had not taken Basra or cut the road north out of Basra. This meant that the gate was wide open and much of the Republican Guard escaped . . . Schwarzkopf believed that he had been lied to.35 Franks later said that Schwarzkopf had not been misled, merely misinformed.36 In any event, Schwarzkopf now had a lot of exOn 27 March, a month after the war, interviewed by David Frost.
that his mission was to destroy the Republican Guard. At the same time, he said the gate was closed so that the Republican Guard could not escape the destruction. Then, he agreed to a cease-fire because we had accomplished our military objectives, which any reasonable person would assume meant that the Republican Guard had been destroyed. Finally, he revealed that the gate was not closed after all; the President had left it open. If Schwarzkopf knew the gate was open, even after telling the public it was closed, why did he agree to a cease-fire when he knew full well that most of the Republican Guard was escaping? I can conclude only that the President did not end the war too soon, but that Schwarzkopf permitted Franks to act too slowly. And where was the U.S. Air Force in all of this? It too must share in the blame; after all, it had total air supremacy and an arsenal of high-tech sensors and weapons that, according to its claims, permitted the Air Force to attack the enemy’s forces any time they tried to move, day or night, good weather or bad.
Franks’s cautious approach and his obsession for slamming the enemy with a “synchronized three-division fist” suggest that dinosaur blood runs freely through his veins. Schwarzkopf himself may have a touch of it. During his interview with David Frost, Schwarzkopf expressed outrage at the Cable News Network (CNN) for televising pictures of captured American pilots.
“You know, I didn’t like the idea that I was seeing it on CNN. I will have to state that openly . . . CNN aiding and abetting the enemy who was violating the Geneva Convention. . . . ”38
Schwarzkopf’s comments suggest that he does not understand the moral dimension of conflict. Yes, he was angry. So was everyone who saw those pictures. The sight of the pilots being paraded on television made many people in this country so angry at Saddam Hussein that they were ready to go out there and kill him themselves. . . . Those pictures galvanized an entire nation and solidified its support for the war. Those pilots made a greater contribution to the war effort through their unwilling television appearance than if they had been free to fly a hundred combat sorties apiece. Schwarzkopf understood the physical dimension of the conflict quite well. It appears that he also had a better understanding of the mental dimension than Franks, for he saw the enemy disintegrating long before Franks did. Like so many of his Vietnam predecessors, however, Schwarzkopf did not have an appreciation of the moral aspect. . . .
As Boyd had preached to the Army . . . one of the objectives of maneuver warfare is to come at the enemy through the back door in a moral and mental sense, as well as in the physical sense. The events of Operation Desert Storm indicate that many senior Army leaders have not changed their thinking from the Vietnam era and still prefer to march in synchronized lockstep through the front, or at best the side door, and literally push the enemy out the back door. Schwarzkopf’s description of the third day of the war reveals this mind-set: “Central Command’s Army corps were now moving inexorably east, like the piston in an enormous cider press.”39
In stark contrast, World War II Generals Patton and
Wood thought in terms of thrusts, penetrations, and envelopments to get behind the enemy, not pistons pushing the enemy out the back door.
'Reuter News Service, Transcript of General Norman Schwarzkopfs press conference of 27 February 1991, The Washington Post, 28 February 1991, A35-A3°' This was the famous press conference in which Schwarzkopf explained the garl]e plan and how the first three days of the ground war unfolded.
-Lt Col. Peter S. Kindsvatter, USA, “VII Corps in the Gulf War,” Military Review February 1992, p. 18. Kindsvatter, a graduate of the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, was the official historian of VII Corps during the war.
'Brian Duffy, Peter Cary, Bruce Auster, and Joseph L. Galloway, “A Desert Storm Accounting,” U.S. News and World Report, 16 March 1992, p. 36. Interview with General Franks.
4Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, (New York: Lind3 Grey Bantam Books, October 1992) p. 380.
'Bruce Ingersoll and Patrick Oster, “M-l,” Chicago Sun-Times, 26 April 1?^' More than a decade ago, Army officials expressed concern about the Ml’s lit11 ited mileage—four gallons per mile. Since 1981, the fuel mileage problem apparently has gotten worse, not better. A General Accounting Office study, ‘ Df eration Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment of Bradley and Abrams. Report B24224, 10 January 1992, reports that Ml Als consumed seven gallons pcr mile when operating during the Gulf War.
‘Ibid., p. 18.
’Ibid., p. 29.
"Kindsvatter, op. cit., p. 22; confirmed by Schwarzkopf in his 27 February PresS conference.
’Duffy, et al., op. cit., p. 35.
'"Kindsvatter, op. cit., p. 37.
"Reuter News Service transcript of Schwarzkopfs 27 February 1991 press con ference, A35-A36.
"Duffy et al., op. cit., p. 36.
"Tom Donnelly, “Battles," Army Times, 24 February 1992, p. 8.
“Schwarzkopf, op. cit., p. 462.
“Ibid., p. 463.
“Ibid., p. 465.
“Ibid., pp. 338 and 339.
'"Ibid., p. 456.
Peter L. DeCoursey, “General Blames Threats on Heat of Conflict,” Reading' Pennsylvania Times, 1 March 1992 p 3 “Ibid.
’■Kindsvatter, op. cit., p. 32.
’’DeCoursey, op. cit., p. 3.
“Joseph L. Galloway. “The Point of the Spear,” U.S. News & World Report, 1* March 1991, p. 32.
Steve Vogel, “We Have Met The Enemy, And It Was Us.” The Washington P°st' 9 February 1992, p. F-l.
Government Accounting Office, op. cit., p. 5.
“Donnelly, op. cit., p. 18.
’ Kindsvatter, op. cit., p. 17, correlates with General Accounting Office, op. nil’ p. 24.
“Donnelly, op. cit., p. 16.
Hanson W. Baldwin, Tiger Jack (Fort Collins, Co: The Old Army Press, 1979)* p. 156.
’“Maj. Richard J. Bestor, , USA, et. al., Armor in Exploitation (The Fourth At mored Division Across France to the Moselle River), Research Report, Comnu1' tee 13, Officers Advanced Course, The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky- May 1949. p. 34.
Reuter News Service, transcript of Schwarzkopfs 27 February 1991 press conference, A-36.
’’Schwarzkopf, op. cit., pp. 468-471.
“Ibid., p. 470.
“Ibid., p. 475.
Ibid., p. 475. See also DeCoursey, op. cit., p. 17, in which Franks claimed tha1 Schwarzkopf was given erroneous information. Franks confirmed that he had been given the task of cutting the retreat highway but failed to get there before the Republican Guard and 700 tanks had escaped.
“DeCoursey, op. cit., p. 17.
Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA “Talking With David Frost,” David Frost host- WETA-TV, 27 March, 1991. transcript by Journal Graphics Inc., New York, NeW York, p. 12.
“Schwarzkopf, op. cit., p. 466.
Colonel Burton, a KC-135 pilot, spent 14 years in the Pentagon, where he specialized in acquisition and testing. His clashes with the Army over the vulnerability of the Bradley fighting vehicle resulted in changes that paid off during Operation Desert Storm.