Professional Notes

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A crew from VF-11 fires an AIM-7D Sparrow air-to-air missile during the first operational F-14D shoot with the AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles. VF-31 joined in this letter-perfect exercise in September 1992.

The fleet’s first F-14Ds, equipped with new software, are exceeding full- fnission capability predictions signifi­cantly while requiring fewer man-hours ^to keep them in the air.

The first two fleet squadrons, Fighter Squadron (VF)-11 and VF-31, have been °Perational at Naval Air Station Miramar, California, since 12 July 1992.

Projected high maintenance-man- hours-per-flight-hour data became a major issue dur- *ng debates over the F- '4D’s life-cycle costs, and also contributed to stop­ping F-14D procurement ^at 55 aircraft. But the data used to make the projec­tions were based on the 20-year maintenance record of the F-14A—not that of the F-14D.

Contributing to the pes- ^s,rnistic projections was the overall poor grade given the F-14D during its °Perational evaluation. Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX)-4 gave the Super Tomcat low marks *°^r its mean flight hours between failures in a re­port that found the F-14D to be “potentially opera­tionally effective and not °Perationally suitable.” The report di­rectly affected statistics that were gener- uted to predict full mission capability and •ttaintenance man-hours per flight hour.

The F-14D’s flyaway cost, coupled '^Vlth the projected high maintenance costs, prompted Congress to direct the Navy to pursue the F/A-18E/F and the

AX.

But there is more to the story. The air­^Craft’s software program suffered a $50- ruillion cut in 1989, forcing the Navy to develop a three-tape predeployment up­grade program to give the aircraft its orig- ■nally envisioned capability. During the °Perational evaluation, VX-4 evaluated ^lhe F-14D using Tape G6.48, an early version based on a 1983-vintage F-14A baseline tape. This software lacked many current F-14A/B capabilities and com­pletely failed to take advantage of the F-14D hardware. F-14D performance de­pends on software, and it is now evident that many problems that occurred during the evaluation were related to Tape G6.48. In fact, VX-4’s report listed Tape G6.48 as a major deficiency.

In addition, radar and avionics com­ponents removed from the aircraft and counted as failures during the operational evaluation were not verified as failures. In an F-14D Fleet Introduction Team study in April 1991, 60% of the compo­nents removed during the operational evaluation were returned by the contrac­tor coded A799—indicating that higher- echelon maintenance could not confirm the failures. Tape G6.48 inadequacies had caused good components to be removed erroneously. VF-124, the F-14 Fleet Re­placement Squadron, experienced the same A799 rate when it accepted the first F-14Ds with Tape G6.48.

VF-11, VF-31, and VF-124 have ex­perienced few of the problems described by VX-4 because the three squadrons have installed an upgraded tape—G6.57.

Thus, the problems outlined above appear to have been associated primarily with Tape G6.48, along with some minor hardware “stability” improvements. All VF-11 and VF-31 F-14Ds had their hard­ware modified prior to acceptance. As the software is upgraded, the F-14D’s main­tainability also should continue to improve. All three squadrons should receive tape D-01, the first pre­deployment upgrade, early this year.

In fact, VF-11 ’s full- mission capability and direct maintenance- man-hours-per-flight hour statistics through the end of September 1992 were among the best in the Navy. Com­paring last year’s VF- 11 F-14A data with current F-14D data proves instructive:

>■ 55.9% FMC for the F-14A

>• 72.2% FMC for the F-14D

Maintenance prac­tices have not changed, and many of the same maintenance per­sonnel are still in place—the variable is the aircraft and its systems. Of course, the aircraft themselves are new, which accounts for some of the statistical dif­ference, but the reliability of the radar, avionics, and computer systems is the telling statistic. VF-ll’s F-14As averaged 33.4 direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour during 1991. The average for July, August and September 1992 for the F-14D was 16.3 hours; in September, the figure was 12.6 hours. The data show an average increase in FMC of 11% with a simultaneous decrease in direct main­tenance man-hour per flight hour of 51% (63% for September).

During Operation Cope Thunder, F-14Ds (foreground) shared the Elmendorf Air Force Base flight line with home-based F-15s from the 11th Air Force’s 3rd Wing (tail markings AK and the constellation Big Dipper).

The F-14D was built to be maintainable. The on­board system checks actu­ally work, and lead the maintenance personnel di­rectly to the problem. Even though there are more sys­tem components, trou­bleshooting involves little guesswork.

The data generated by the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) are not far off VF-ll’s, and the FRS has been flying and main­taining the F-14D for more than 18 months—long enough to get reliable data.

From October 1990 through August 1992, the direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour were:

►  31.3 for the F-14A

►  17.8 for the F-14D (a 57% decrease)

Maintainability is an important factor

for a fighter, but the aircrew’s ability to employ the F-14D effectively over a broad range of missions is the sole rea­son for its existence.

One of the most important attributes of a carrier-based aircraft is the relative ease with which it comes aboard. The F-14A has the well-deserved reputation of being one of the toughest aircraft to bring aboard; in contrast, pilots have found the F-14D much easier to land because of several improvements:

►  New heads-up display (most important)

►  More powerful and responsive General Electric 110 engines (30% increase in thrust over those in the F-14A)

►  Modified direct lift control

These new capabilities should dra­matically improve the F-14D’s boarding rate and safety record in comparison with the F-14A. ’

In September, VF-11 and VF-31 sent detachments to Alaska for two weeks to fly in Operation Cope Thunder 92-4, a combined exercise with Navy, Air Force, and Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft operating under the Alaskan Air Com­mand. The F-14Ds used division (four aircraft) tactics almost exclusively for air- superiority and power-projection mis­sions, and were opposed by raids of 16 to 20 F-15 Eagles, CF/A-18 Flornets, and F-16 Falcons. The F-14D effectively employed its AIM-54C Phoenix air-to-air multishot capability. Since the Navy has canceled the Advanced Air-To-Air Mis­sile (AAAM), the AIM-54C will remain the most sophisticated missile in the U.S. inventory. It is the only missile capable of effectively dueling with the latest gen­eration of Soviet missiles currently being exported all over the world.

The F-14Ds routinely departed El­mendorf Air Force Base, Anchorage, Alaska, flew a tactical 370-nautical-mile route to the exercise range, employed the division in multiple fighter missions— several runs across a 140-square-mile area—and then flew back and landed at Elmendorf, sometimes under instrument conditions, without refueling. All of this equates to more than 1,000 nautical miles. No other Navy or Air Force fighter-at­tack aircraft could have completed the same mission without airborne refueling. Air Force F-15s flying from Elmendorf either had two KC-10 aerial refuelers for their missions or they did not participate.

VF-11 completed 48 of 48 assigned missions from a deployment base a long way from home. Operation Cope Thun­der was a resounding success for the F-14D and clearly demon­strated that it is the best air-superiority fighter in the business.

In late September, off the coast of South­ern California, the two squadrons conducted the first operational F- 14D missile shoot with AIM-7 Sparrow radar- guided air-to-air mis­siles and AIM-9 heat­seeking air-to-air missiles. Every missile fired guided success­fully and three BQM- 34C drones were shot down with direct hits.

The squadrons are flying with Grum- man-installed Tape G6.57 software. Over the next few years, the air wing will re­ceive at least three software upgrades. The first, Tape D-01, is designed to im­prove air-superiority capabilities. The sec­ond, Tapes D-02 and D-03, should trans­form the F-14D into a “Strike Tomcat” capable of delivering Mk. 80-series bombs and cluster munitions. The next logical evolution beyond tape D-02 will be to upgrade the aircraft into an all­weather strike-fighter capable of deliver­ing smart weapons. This upgrade program should be accelerated as much as possi­ble to give battle group commanders the flexibility to employ the F-14D as a long range, self-escorted strike-fighter.

The F-14D program is on track and operating better than projected. With Quickstrike modifications, the F-14D still offers Congress and the Navy an alter­native to the costly F/A-18E/F and AX programs. The Navy’s new mandate is to do more with less; the F-14D is already doing a lot more with a lot less.

Lieutenant Wood is a pilot with VF-11. A 1983 grad­uate of the Naval Academy, he has served witl¹ VF-1 and VF-124. He is the co-author of “The Ninth Life of the Tomcat,” Proceedings, April 1992, pages 104-105.

Going to WestPac Will Be Different

By Lieutenant D. P. Wood, U.S. Navy

If you cannot be in several places at once, you should consider carefully where you do want to be. A smaller U.S. Navy faces such choices and must change its deployment schedules and operating areas if it is to respond to future crises.

Deployed forces will be required to cal­culate their distances from potential trou­ble spots very carefully and—though the threat ought to determine deploy­ments—fiscal reality is often the driver.

All areas will be affected, but the

scope of this article is limited to the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans- Many in Washington believe that our al­lies in Asia must shoulder more respon­sibility for their own defense, and a de­creasing Navy budget will, of necessity-

force this to happen regardless of other considerations. The ability to support ex­^ercises with foreign navies or to show the flag will be substantially reduced as fewer ^units deploy.

The architecture for deployments to the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans ^by 2000 is based on the following as­criptions:

^ By 2000, there will be no requirement ^to keep an aircraft carrier battle group ^ln the Indian Ocean, but we will need forces in the highly unstable Persian Gulf ^region.

^ U.S. Seventh Fleet naval bases will ^be limited to Guam and Diego Garcia "'ith a logistical support facility in Sin­gapore. Bases in Japan will be phased out ^lr the late 1990s. Japan will increase ^tbe size of its military and naval forces ^to provide for its own defense. Maritime ^positioning Ships (MPS) and auxiliary ^Vessels will remain at Guam, with the Seventh Fleet flagship and salvage ves-

joining them from Japan.

The U.S. Navy will probably shrink ’° 300 ships with eight aircraft carrier Battle groups. Should the actual number °^e higher, this architecture may still be ^v>able if only four carrier battle groups ^Ure assigned to the Western Pacific/In- Aian Ocean region.

A reduced submarine threat will allow ^U S. aircraft carriers to operate with few °^r no U.S. antisubmarine forces in com- ^bany. Increased cooperation with allied ^totces will allow carriers to provide air Power to joint exercises while relying on foreign vessels for protection.

* One carrier battle group will be re­quired on station in the Seventh Fleet’s area of responsibility at all times. Up to three additional carrier battle groups may reinforce the Seventh Fleet in some cases.

The current 18-month ship deployment cycle should be lengthened to 24 months. Combatants, and their accompanying aux­iliaries, would deploy to the Western Pa-

The U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific may have to rely increasingly on allied support. Here the USS Oldendorf (DD- 972) and the USS Robert E. Peary (FF- 1073) steam off northern Australia with two Royal Australian Navy ships: HMAS Sydney (F-03), a guided-missile frigate, and HMAS Success (AOR- 304), an underway replenishment ship.

cific for one six-month period every two years. Amphibious ready groups would be liable for deployment for six months every in two years, but would deploy only as the political situation dictated. If an amphibious ready group were not re­quired overseas, it would not be deployed just to show the flag, but would conduct a minimum of two amphibious rehearsals and landings in Hawaii or California.

Table 1 shows the deployment cycle for four West-Coast carrier battle groups. Deployments would be preceded by a six- month workup period. Following de­ployments, a one-year stand down would permit reduced-expense maintenance availabilities. Ships not requiring exten­sive repair would be available for local operations and Coast Guard support. Table 2 shows the three phases of ship missions.

The Military Sealift Command’s maritime prepositioning ship Sgt. William R. Button lies at anchor in Apra Harbor, Guam, a port of increasing importance in the wake of U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines.

Personnel transfers would take place during the 12-month maintenance phase to allow time for each department to turn over prior to the six-month predeploy­ment phase. This would require the co­operation of the Naval Bureau of Per-

sonnel to ensure that personnel transfers during the deployment phase would be severely limited.

Carrier battle group deployment using this plan requires that the battle groups be available to respond to world crises as formed units, but also be flexible enough to disperse over a region, for maximum U.S. presence at least cost. Geographic dispersal is necessary to provide ships to exercise with foreign navies, show the flag, make diplomatic port visits and, most important, ensure that at least one U.S. ship can respond to a limited need quickly. Dispersed naval forces during times of limited threat clearly have ad­vantages over centrally located carrier battle groups.

Exercises with foreign navies are likely to change radically within the coming decade. This is necessary to reflect po­litical reality in the region. Exercise Team Spirit, an annual joint exercise in Korea in the late winter and early spring of each year, is tied directly to the diplo­matic relations between the two Koreas. This represents the largest single repeatable draw on U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. Even though Team Spirit will continue to be a U.S. priority, the U.S. naval presence may still be reduced.

Historically, only 10-12% of U.S. forces committed to the Team Spirit exercise have been naval; of these, the majority have been amphibious and aux­iliary ships. A carrier battle group has been used to provide air cover and reconnaissance, and to keep a watchful eye on both North Korean and Soviet maritime activity. Now, the for­mer Soviet Pacific Fleet has ceased to be of major concern, and deployments from the naval and air bases at Vladivostok have slowed almost to a halt. As a result, we might eliminate the carrier battle group from the Team Spirit roster.

A minimum number of ASW combat­ants may still be dispatched to provide protection to the amphibious ships oper­ating off Korea’s east coast. Air cover may be provided either from shore or from an aircraft carrier, if one happens to be available. The Republic of Korea would presumably continue to conduct the exercise by combining U.S. and Ko­rean amphibious assets as well as ASW assets. In the less-hostile environment an­ticipated, this would allow more than half of the U.S. combatants normally allocated to the exercise to be elsewhere.

Deployment of an amphibious ready group to Team Spirit is compatible with the proposed architecture. Limiting the

combatant assets assigned to the exercise allows significant U.S. presence without requiring more than one carrier battle group to be within the Seventh Fleet’s area at any one time.

Handling of smaller, less complex ex­ercises would be conducted in a similar manner. Deployed combatants would be expected to participate in several local exercises with foreign navies while de­tached from the main force. The small local exercises currently conducted with allies such as Japan, Australia, and oth­ers as opportunity arises, may be counted on to become models for U.S. presence in other areas of the world.

The combatant and auxiliary forces needed to form a carrier battle group could be assembled when required. As any combatant officer of the deck knows, operating in a battle group environment requires its own set of skills, which are practiced endlessly during predeploy­ment and in-transit exercises. Since the deployed carrier battle group will have trained together during these periods, the battle group skills necessary to operate ef­fectively will still be fresh in the minds of the ship’s crews, should recombination become necessary. The success of this plan rests on the intelligent positioning of the carrier and the cruiser, the core force, when recombination is anticipated.

Significant reduction in military spend­ing is a political reality of the 1990s. To ensure a strong, effective U.S. presence around the world over the next decade, a careful deployment of forces will be nec­essary. While the architecture presented is but one of many possible, it fulfills na­tional needs with a reduced deployed force structure.

Lieutenant Wood, an engineering duty officer, is en route for duty as Diving Officer at the Ship Repail Facility, Guam. He has served on the USS Blue Rid$^e (LCC-19), and the USS Ouellet (FF-1077), and holds graduate degrees in aeronautical and astronautical en­gineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, Mon­terey, California.

Attack Submarines Should Lead Battle Groups

Captain Paul J. Ryan, U.S. Navy

The time is 10-20 years in the future, the place is one of many Third World littoral countries attempting to expand its influence at the expense its neighbor. A crisis appears to be developing, contin­gency plans are being developed, and two carrier battle groups are en route to the area.

Unseen and not tied to the logistics

train that supports the battle groups, the four nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) normally deployed with the two battle groups begin high-speed transits to the area. Two other SSNs also head for the scene, one with special-operations forces, the other with a load of 30 stealthy Tomahawk land-attack missiles to sup­plement the 100 missiles carried by the

SSNs assigned to the battle groups. When the first four SSNs arrive on the scene, two begin screening the battle-group op­erating area for diesel submarines and mines using a combination of onboard sensors and underwater unmanned vehi­cles (UUVs), and the other two take sta­tion just outside the capital port of the troublesome country, assigned to watch

' for the deployment of that country’s three diesel submarines and eight missile pa­trol boats while also using embarked in­telligence specialists to monitor that coun­try’s changing security posture.

Communications intercepted by the in­telligence personnel on these submarines reveal a plot to seize the U.S. embassy during a staged demonstration. After con- 1 sultation with higher authority, the battle group commander orders the command­. ^lng officer of the SSN carrying special forces to conduct a covert extraction of i embassy personnel. The skippers of the SSNs just outside the capital get rules of engagement that allow preemptive at­tacks on submarines and missile patrol boats getting underway in their areas.

The other three Tomahawk-armed SSNs are directed to suppress the ag­gressor’s early warning radars, direction­ending stations, air defense control sites, _ ^ar,d critical communication nodes as part °f a coordinated strike that will be con­ducted as soon as the carriers are within range and the embassy evacuation has ¹  been completed.

This scenario is not at all far-fetched. ^Wo SSNs are currently deployed with ^each carrier battle group, and SSNs have f         covertly deployed on many occasions in

response to crises around the world. Sub­marines have always been capable of multiple missions, and these missions are ^sirnilar to those performed by U.S. sub­

marines in World War II: area sanitiza­tion, intelligence collection, covert in­sertion and extraction of personnel, and land attack—which in World War II was limited to shore bombardment with the submarine’s deck gun.

During the Cold War, U.S. attack sub­marines concentrated on antisubmarine warfare because of the strategic nuclear threat posed by the many Soviet nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the tactical threat to our sea lines of communication from the large Soviet SSN force. Submarines were the premier ASW weapon, and, although sub­mariners continually trained for other missions, those missions were given lit­tle attention by any but those most closely associated with submarine training and operations.

Attack submarines can carry out many missions: surveillance and reconnais­sance, the clandestine insertion and ex­traction of special warfare forces, covert mining, mine location and minefield pen­etration, land attack with Tomahawk mis­siles, rescue, blockade (including covert shadowing of high-interest merchant ships), and ASW and antisurface warfare, as well.

As the threat from the large number of SSBNs and SSNs belonging to the for­mer Soviet Union subsides, U.S. SSNs can continue to shift their emphasis from global sea control to support in regional

Attack submarines like the USS Phoenix (SSN-702) can be major assets for battle group commanders. They are the prototypical sea-based stealth fighters.

conflicts. SSNs can be the front runners for a battle group, using their high un­derwater speed to get into position well before any adversary’s sensors pick up the approaching surface forces.

The most valuable characteristic of a submarine is its inherent stealth. Once submerged, a submarine can go almost anywhere undetected. Submarines can loi­ter off a hostile coast collecting intelli­gence without anyone suspecting their presence. They can mass off a hostile coast in anticipation of orders to launch a strike—and withdraw stealthily if a po­litical solution is achieved. Potential ad­versaries will never know how close they might have come to being destroyed by a threat they never knew existed.

The submarine’s stealth makes her a front runner in power projection. Her high speed and virtually unlimited submerged endurance allows her to be at the scene well before conventionally fueled surface forces arrive on station. A submarine is a potent warship and an enabler that clears the way for more vulnerable fol­low-on forces.

Submarines can’t do everything, but if you envision a submarine as the stealthy,

87

powerful scout that can work indepen­dently in front of a battle group to clear the way for follow-on forces, you can see that there is more capability built into at­tack submarines than just conducting ASW. The global threat posed by the old Soviet Union is gone. Our attention is shifting to all the other potential hot spots around the world, most of which are in littoral areas. Forward-deployed naval forces will usually be the first forces at the scene of any crisis. We must be ready to handle small crises with our on-scene forces and—if any crisis develops into a larger affair—we need to enable heavier joint forces to enter the picture.

The budgetary handwriting is on the wall: we’re going to have to do the same— or more—with less. The ships we design must be capable of multiple mis­

sions and we must be imaginative in their use. SSNs are already multimission and are ready for use in any number of pos­sible scenarios.

Captain Ryan is assigned to the Division of Politico- Military Affairs, Joint Staff (J-5). A nuclear sub­mariner, he commanded the USS Philadelphia (SSN- 690) prior to assuming his present duties.

LCACs Can Support Shore Bombardment

By Richard K. Fickett

The gaping hole in naval gunfire ca­pability caused by battleship decom­missioning could be closed somewhat by mounting multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) on air-cushion landing craft (LCACs).

The Navy does have some long-term plans for fire support—the advanced gun weapon system technology program de­signed to improve the effectiveness of the five-inch gun, and a ship-mounted ver­sion of the MLRS—but the near-term re­quirements will be filled initially by cruis­ers and destroyers armed with five-inch guns.

The MLRS/LCAC concept, hereafter referred to as the Shore Bombardment Air Cushion System (SBACS), offers a dual-role fire-support capability. During

U.S. ARMY

Combine the mobility of an air- cushion landing craft with the firepower of the multiple launch rocket system and you have a quick solution to the shortage of amphibious fire support.

the assault phase, it would complement other air- and surface-delivered fire-sup­port systems with long-range bombard­ment. Once the beachhead was secured, all MLRS launchers would be brought ashore and assigned normal fire-support missions under the control of the Com­mander, Landing Force.

The primary SBACS components

would be:

>■ M-270 MLRS launcher. A SBACS fire unit would consist of one M-270 launcher and 12 rockets. The M-270 is fully-au­tomated, self-loading, and self-aiming. An onboard fire-control computer inte­grates vehicle and rocket launch opera­tions. An on-board land-navigation sys­

tem tracks launcher location at all times. MLRS rockets can be fired separately, or in ripples of 2 to 12 rockets. As am­phibious cargo, an M-270 launcher pre­sents less of a loadout challenge than an AAV-7A1 amphibious assault vehicle.

> M-77 MLRS rocket with a range of 30 kilometers. Several new MLRS capabil­ities are also under development. The AT- 2 configuration will carry 28 scatterable antitank mines. A terminally-guided warhead will contain three millimeter- wave, terminally guided sub­munitions that track and home on hard targets. A sense-and- destroy-armor warhead that employs six explosively- formed penetrators to defeat armored targets through top attack is also being developed for counterbattery missions.

► LCAC. This craft’s capa­bilities have been demonstrated in nu­merous recent operations. Deployed in j 1984, the LCAC is the first significant | technical improvement in water-borne landing craft since World War II. Its pri­mary mission is to transport equipment j ship-to-shore from over-the-horizon dis­tances of at least 25 nautical miles.

Offshore, each SBACS fire unit would be employed under the positive control of the naval shore fire-support system, and target data would be transferred from the appropriate control center to the SBACS fire unit. Each M-270 launcher contains a stabilization-reference pack­age and position-determining system with an electrically driven, north-seeking gyro compass that provides cant angle, direc­tion, and elevation to the fire-control cen­ter. An onboard computer aims the M' 270 launcher at the target, and prompts the crew to arm and fire a predetermined number of rockets.

Three planned fire missions can be stored in the on-board computer, with multiple aim points plotted within each

target area to achieve maximum effec­tiveness. The crew can execute a fire mission manually by entering target co­ordinates and the number of rockets per target. The computer calculates the launch azimuths and elevations, and the mission is completed as in the automatic mode. SBACS launch stations could be Planned using global positioning system (GPS) data.

The M-270 launcher would be fully loaded (12 rockets) when initially secured to the LC AC deck. An additional 13 can- 'sters (each with six rockets for a total of 78) would be carried to provide a reload capability. Other rocket six-packs would be earmarked for on-call heliborne re­^supply.

All firing, reload, and resupply oper­ations would take place with the LCAC °n cushion. Before firing, the M-270 launcher would be centered near the LCAC stern, so that rocket back-blast ^would be expended between the stern- mounted lift fans. M-270 launcher crew­men would travel inside the passenger compartment when the LCAC is moving.

Some of the advantages:

^ Early deployment. The SBACS would Provide an excellent capability quickly by relying on non-developmental items. ^ Reduced vulnerability. LCAC-mounted Weapons eliminate torpedo and coastal

mine threats. Further, the LCAC’s low- profile silhouette and small radar cross­section would degrade the effectiveness of air- and surface-launched, terminally guided antiship missiles.

►  Stand-off range. SBACS could engage shore-based targets beyond the range of the five-inch gun.

►  Long loiter time. Heliborne resupply would permit SBACS to remain on sta­tion for as long as three hours.

►  Reduced manning. Only eight men are required to operate SBACS: a five-man crew for the LCAC and a three-man MLRS crew.

►  Compatibility. SBACS is compatible with the U.S. Navy concept of flexible transition that emphasizes multimission ships. The LCAC retains its role as a gen­eral-purpose landing craft within the SBACS concept.

►  Cost-effective potential. SBACS pro­vides naval gunfire support without re­quiring permanent ship alterations, and enables long-range fire support for sub­sequent operations ashore.

The SBACS concept has several short­comings:

►  Limited deck space. Only one M-270 launcher can be employed from an LCAC.

►  Loss of power. Should the LCAC lose air-cushion power, its SBACS role would likely be aborted.

►  Vulnerability. LCAC is a thin-skinned platform, and must remain beyond the range of coastal artillery to avoid expo­sure to shells or precision-guided munitions.

►  Visual signature. The LCAC’s “rooster- tail” sea spray and MLRS back blast pro­vide signatures for enemy coastal sur­veillance.

►  Unbudgeted costs. The U.S. Navy de­ployed 46 LCACs through mid-1992; the U.S. Marine Corps, however, is not scheduled to get the MLRS until fiscal year 1997.

Nevertheless, SBACS could provide a near-term, cost-effective naval gunfire ca­pability, not only augmenting current as­sets, but also providing long-range fire support to a Marine air-ground task force ashore. Using a non-developmental item acquisition strategy, SBACS could min­imize research-and-development costs, shorten deployment time, and provide an efficient, dual-role artillery system to the Fleet Marine Forces in the 1990s.

Mr. Fickett is an independent weapon system con­sultant, and has worked on the U.S. Navy’s minor caliber gun program and the U.S. Marine Corps’ light armored vehicle and ammunition requirements man­agement system. He served two tours in Vietnam as an infantryman in the U.S. Army.

Updating Combat Search-And-Rescue

By Lieutenant Commander David A. Lausman, U.S. Navy

The combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) mission has undergone a major ^ehange since Operation Desert Storm ended two years ago. At war’s end, ac- bve-duty Navy and Air Force units had ^relearned the old lessons from World ^ar II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert One, Grenada, and numerous embassy-evacu­ation efforts.

This time, though, determined not to forget the past, the Air Force’s Air Res­^cue Service and the Navy’s helicopter an- bsubmarine squadrons (HS) and heli- ^c°pter combat support squadrons (HCS) formed a joint total quality process ac­tion team.

These thoughts are offered in response ^to Major Patrick Kelleher’s October 1992 Proceedings article, “Strike Rescue Re­quires the Active-Duty Touch,” pages ■08-109.

The active-duty HS community is ^c°mmitted to the combat search-and- ^rescue mission, and HS-10 is managing ■he approved syllabus for the West Coast ^avy, plus all joint mission efforts.

Pr

HS-10, which flies SH-60Fs and is the HH-60H search-and-rescue fleet readi­ness squadron at Naval Air Station North Island, California, and the Air Force’s 542nd Crew Training Wing at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mex­ico, have concentrated on a complete ex­change of ideas, syllabi, and personnel to improve interservice standardization. In­structors have already exchanged course­ware, tactical doctrine, and syllabus guidelines, and have flown on operational and training flights.

Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS)-l at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, also has of­fered timely insights and has agreed to participate in personnel exchanges to further the joint training syllabus stan­dardization efforts.

Since 1990, the active-duty Navy pro­gram has evolved from a three-day ground school day and night terrain flight (TERF) using night-vision goggles (NVGs). The program now offers a com­prehensive ground and flight syllabus, de­signed to prepare aircrews to plan and ex­ecute a joint combat search-and-rescue mission, to include the insertion and ex­traction of special-forces personnel.

Things have changed a lot. The HS- 10 six-day ground training syllabus now includes:

►  Mission planning, threat analysis, and counter-tactics (which includes a hands- on Stinger training simulator taught by the 3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battery at Camp Pendleton:

►  Electronic warfare

►  Integrated air-defense systems

►  Survival strategies

►  Evasive plan of action and authenti­cation

►  Map interpretation

►  Tactical aircrew coordination

►  MAWTS-1 hands-on NVG physiology and equipment training (including use of the Navy’s first NITE Laboratory and Terrain Board) taught by MAWTS-1 cer­tified aviation physiologists. The scope of this course is limited only by budgetary constraints, not by the lack of material or

subject matter expertise.

HS-10 also provides advanced fleet CSAR training in the areas of survival, authentication, starlight NVG flight op­erations, multiship, and air-wing-coordi­nated rescue operations in conjunction with the Naval Strike Warfare Center; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Es­cape schools; and the Special Warfare Command. Lecture materials have been received from the Air Force’s Combat Aircrew Training School, MAWTS-1; Naval Strike Warfare Center; Sea-based Weapons and Advanced Tactics School (SWATS), the 542nd Crew Training Wing, and Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) teams on appropriate topics.

Liaison with these commands helps ensure that all training includes timely and tactically correct data.

No portion of the training syllabus is “relaxed or compromised for the sake of convenience.” The entire HS community communicates constantly with the FRS on every facet of the syllabus, to ensure its updating when new fleet operational and exercise-feedback data are presented.

The entire Navy combat search-and- rescue community (HS and HCS) has ad­hered to the major principle, during all phases of mission training, that “safety must not and will not be compromised for any reason in the execution of the night combat search-and-rescue mission.” Adherence to this principle is illustrated by the community’s safety record while operating with NVGs under all illumina­tion levels. The HS community has the most stringent requirements of any of the armed services in several key areas: min­imum night illumination requirements for introductory NVG flight training, mis­sion-commander qualification require­ments, aircrew-composition requirements, qualification requirements for low-light NVG flight qualifications, and flight cur­rency. These requirements are not a mat­ter of convenience, but a matter of asset and aircrew protection and safety.

The HCS community has an open quota for as many seats as it needs in any class that HS-10 conducts. Several re­serve pilots are involved with the ground and flight instructional portions of the

These Air Force MH-60Gs (left) and Navy SH-60Fs shared the NAS Fallon flight line during Operation Desert Rescue 92. Realistic joint training now enjoys a high priority.

West coast course—but despite working together at many major exercises, active- duty HS and reserve HCS coordinated- mission operations have been hampered by a shortage of HH-60Hs. The fiscal year 1993 budget provides for seven ad­ditional aircraft, but more will be needed.

Active-duty helicopter antisubmarine squadrons were an integral part of every carrier air wing strike-planning team long before they were assigned the combat- search-and-rescue mission; HS represen­tation on planning teams remains essen­tial to success. The HS community maintains responsibility within the air wing for ensuring that survival, evasion, authentication, localization, and pick-up efforts are properly incorporated into every strike mission plan.

The total-crew concept is one of the HS community’s strengths; it is the only community that requires all aircrew mem­bers (officer and enlisted) to complete a comprehensive syllabus approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. The combat search-and-rescue mission suits the HS community well because of its long as­sociation on board ship with tactical air­craft (TacAir). HS aircrews serve alongside their potential major cus­tomers—Navy TacAir crews—and par­ticipate with these crews in planning strike missions.

As documented in Joint Tactical Pub­lication 3-50.2, Navy and Air Force units are the only ones who acknowledge, train for, and execute combat search-and-res­cue as primary missions. The Air Rescue Service and Navy combat-search-and-res- cue units are the only two front-line, ac­tive-duty commands that dedicate train­ing sorties, travel funds, and manpower to ensure that designated aircrews remain tactically proficient.

By the very nature of their relation­ships with TacAir, these two communi­ties will be there when needed. Deployed

HS units are the only helicopter units ca­pable of integrating smoothly into hec­tic carrier flight operations schedule. HS squadrons have identified detachments and are prepared to send them to ships or shore bases—as required for the various mission scenarios.

Navy combat search-and-rescue units have been operating under the 6 [SH-60F]

+ 2 [HH-60H] concept since August 1990. They began by maintaining a con­stant vigil with forward-deployed assets in the North Arabian Gulf during Oper­ation Desert Shield/Storm; missions there ranged from support of special operations assaulting oil platforms to recovering downed pilots and visit, board, search and seizure missions. HS combat search-and- rescue crews are still there, and, the HCS community back home is still maintain­ing a 72-hour deployment capability. Var­ious joint exercises in the United States— Operations Quick Force, Roving Sands, 1 Desert Rescue, and Ocean Venture—• have combined to create a classroom for joint tactics.

The need for active-duty HS combat | search-and-rescue, reserve HCS combat search-and-rescue, and special operational capabilities has never been greater. The CAGs need this full cohesive HS squadron centrally deployed with the 6+2 concept; the CSAR community needs the surge and attrition assets and exper­tise provided by the HCS squadrons, which together form a fully integrated and unbeatable team.

The good news is that the initial frame­work is in place, ready for use. Im­provements can be made by buying tested and approved joint-service equipment off the shelf.

Today we have in place a competent force that is second to none. The ques­tion is “Will we continue to improve it, or will we ignore history and let it fall by the wayside?”

Lieutenant Commander Lausman heads the tactics . department at HS-10, the SH-60F and HH-60H fled I readiness squadron at Naval Air Station North Island- | California. He is a member of the team chartered to improve multiservice coordination in support of the combat search-and-rescue mission.

By Commander Daniel Ottaviano, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy’s core values are honor, commitment, and courage:

^ Honor—”1 will bear true faith and al­legiance. . . Accordingly, we will con­duct ourselves in the highest ethical man­ner in all relationships with peers, superiors, and subordinates; be honest and truthful in our dealings with each other, and with those outside the Navy; be wili­ng to take honest recommendations from Junior personnel; encourage new ideas and deliver the bad news, despite its un­popularity; abide by an uncompromis­ing code of integrity, taking responsibil- >ly for our actions and keeping our word; fulfill the legal and ethical responsibili­ty in our public and personal lives 24 hours a day. Illegal or improper behav- >or or even the appearance of such be­havior will not be tolerated. We are ac­countable for all that we do. We will be mindful of the privilege we have to serve °ur fellow Americans.

^ Commitment—”1 will obey the orders. . . .” We will demand respect up ^and down the chain of command; care for the professional, personal, and spiritual Well being of our people; show respect toward all people without regard to race, religion, or gender; treat each individual With human dignity; be committed to pos- ttive change and constant improvement; exhibit the highest degree of moral char­^acter, technical excellence, quality, and competence in what we have been trained to do. The day-to-day duty of all Navy men and women is to work together as ^a team to improve the quality of our Work, our people, and ourselves.

^ Courage—”1 will support and defend. . . .” We will meet the demands °f our profession; make decisions in the best interest of the Navy and the nation, Without regard for personal consequences; meet all challenges while adhering to a high standard of personal conduct and de­cency. We will do what is right, despite Personal and professional adversity.

Core values can be taught, understood, ^and even accepted on a rational basis. Knowledge of what is acceptable and un­^acceptable can create an awareness that mfluences the decisions and actions of People. The premise for this knowledge comes from Immanuel Kant’s philo­sophical ideal—the categorical impera- ^l,ve. Kant asserted that people are rational creatures who can reason to­gether for a well-informed judgment that could be universally applied to both per» ^s°nal and social good. This kind of cat­egorical imperative reappears now in the form of core values to illumine and enlighten the decisions and actions that Navy people will make.

In August 1992, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, ad­dressed a large group of naval officers at Norfolk, Virginia, and emphasized the compelling need for leadership initiatives that establish positive attitudes and val­ues throughout the naval organization. Initiatives that empower positive attitudes and nourish wholesome values will di­rectly affect the professional performance and personal conduct by which the Navy is known and judged. Constructive for­mations of attitudes and values will pro­duce declines in crime, family abuse, ad­dictions, and sexual harassment, and advances in the quality of both personal and professional accomplishments.

The choices we make and the actions we take are more than just rational mat­ters, and are often influenced or even de­termined by human needs, feelings, in­tentions, and life experiences. These kinds of intangible factors are formative struc­tures in the values matrix.

By definition, the naval values ma­trix begins with honor. It is both a mat­ter of what we believe and what we do. If we esteem ourselves, then there is sound reason to respect all those with whom we deal. Conversely, there is no respect when there is a dearth of dis­cernment in choosing who and what to esteem. The capacity to honor princi­ples and people is derived directly from the ability to esteem oneself in personal, community, and spiritual relationships.

The actualization of the capacity to honor oneself and others can be appro­priately termed integrity—the action cho­sen to close the ever-present gap between what should be done and what is actually done. It is the impetus that moves us to­ward the ideal.

Integrity may be rationally discerned, but may fail through rationalization. Any addiction to persons, places, or things, for example, can readily produce reasons for denying the problem and rationale for continuing the fallacious behavior. Like­wise, a veteran of failed integrity—but also of personal and social reform—takes Rollo May’s approach to integrity; rea­son alone will not save us from doing the wrong thing. We must recover our moral will, individually and nationally. Rea­son alone is no match for passion; the real issue is how to subdue the will.

If reason is not the direct route to in­tegrity, what route do we take? Do we really expect our people to reason their way to the highest ethical manner in all relationships,” and “honesty in all that they do?” Are these kinds of formidable, personal qualities, virtues, and charac­teristics going to be learned from attend­ing “Core Values” lectures on the gen­eral military training schedule? For core values to be learned, they must first be experienced by the learners.

The experiential learning of these val­ues is a unique feature of the CREDO program—a remarkably successful pro­gram with a 21-year track record. The acronym stands for Chaplains Religious Enrichment Development Operation (CREDO), which is sponsored and funded by the Navy Chief of Chaplains to support and facilitate the moral and spiritual development of sea service per­sonnel and their families.

The pragmatic intent of this mission is to improve the quality of life and enrich the quality of people in the sea service. This mission is accomplished through a variety of programmed learning experi­ences that engender personal, spiritual, and marital growth. Consequently, CREDO makes a positive impact on per­formance, readiness, retention and morale in the Navy, and it has become the pro­totype operation for excellence and ef­fectiveness in meeting the spiritual and personal growth needs of the Naval com­munity. The scope of this operation can be seen in the CREDO Norfolk operation from 1 April through 30 September 1991, built around an intensive retreat schedule (30 retreats with 1,052 participants), an average of 5 retreats per month and 35 persons per retreat (“retreat” indicates that a program is intentionally provided at a facility on a weekend):

►  Personal growth retreats—72-hour re­treats (17 with a total of 612 partici­pants) that provided participants unique opportunities to grow in their relation­ships with themselves, family, friends, and the sea services. Commands and par­ticipants consistently confirm the posi­tive impact of this program on readiness, retention, and morale.

►  Spiritual growth retreats (5 with 158 participants) provided participants the op­portunity to experience spiritual growth, and to integrate that positive experience in their personal and professional lives.

►  Marriage enrichment seminars (2 with 30 participants), conducted a program

The Navy LCAC crewman and the Marines coming ashore at Mogadishu, Somalia, in early December 1992 as part of Operation Restore Hope are individual representatives of a national core value: commitment to the cause of human dignity.

specifically designed for couples unable to go on the Marriage enrichment retreats.

►  Marriage enrichment retreats (7 with 252 participants), offered Sea Service couples an experience that consistently undergirds and builds their marriages and facilitates marital success,

►  Teen personal growth retreat (1 with 30 participants), led an affirming experi­ence that helps teenage dependents move forward in their personal growth process.

►  CREDO support group meetings (60 with 1,130 participants), provided regu­larly scheduled meetings in which par­ticipants engaged in personal and com­munity support activities.

All of these events were provided free of charge to the participants (active duty and family members) from the, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

There is a direct correlation between the core value of commitment and the CREDO philosophy and methodology, which is designed to “encourage one an­other and build each other up.” The en­tire program strengthens participants in their commitments to their duties and responsibilities.

CREDO can be a catalyst for courage, giving participants the opportunity to de­velop the personal power, will, and con­fidence to overcome adversities, resolve problems, and deal effectively with chal­lenges. CREDO support groups can be a source of great strength.

The Navy’s approach to core values emphasizes the importance of leaders as positive role models of ethical behavior and personal values; CREDO is built around leading by example. The success attributed to CREDO is derived from a spiritual basis that emphasizes the core values, and the program as a whole has much to offer in support of the Navy's objectives.

The Navy currently operates five CREDO centers, and undoubtedly needs a large-scale expansion of the program- Such an expansion would have a dynamic impact upon many thousands more peo­ple, and would be a creative catalyst for advancing core values not only in the Navy, but throughout the armed forces-

Commander Ottaviano recently reported on board the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20). He was formerly the deputy director for CREDO at Naval Base Norfolk. Virginia.

The New Warfare: SEW

By Rear Admiral A. K. Cebrowski, U.S. Navy, and Commander Michael Loescher, U.S. Navy

While war at sea typically has been quick, violent, decisive, and capi­tal-intensive, war ashore among industri­alized nations has taken on those char­acteristics only recently. Both forms of warfare are now dominated by speed, sur­veillance, command and control, and the importance of firing effectively—first.

Increasingly, the object of a land cam­paign is not the territory over which it is fought, but the destruction of certain capital assets to limit or deny strategic choices to the enemy. In this form of war­fare, the enemy’s strategic center of grav­ity will include his decision maker, his command-and-control systems, and his surveillance systems.

As a matter of policy, industrialized nations use technology to substitute cap­ital for labor in war fighting—in other words, they shoot more and fight less. Technological development and insertion have increased the rate of substitution dramatically. Electronics technologies in particular are responsible for this revo­lution in warfare. They appear in preci­sion-guided weapons; integrated surveil­lance systems, including space-based systems; high-speed decision aids; netted command-and-control systems and, in­creasingly sophisticated command-and- control, communications, and electronic combat systems.

As a result, we can attack a relatively few important capital targets—quickly, with profound effect. A new warfare area—Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW)—has emerged.

Space and Electronic Warfare. In 1989, the Chief of Naval Operations for­mally designated SEW as a Navy war­fare mission area. All principal warfare mission areas have two features:

> A strategic objective—one which sig­nificantly influences the scope, pace, or intensity of conflict >• A clearly defined target set

The strategic objective of SEW is to separate the enemy from his forces, to render the leader remote from his people (in effect, to take command of his forces), and to control his use of the electromag­netic spectra. This objective dominates when our quarrel is not with the people but with the enemy leadership. Under such conditions, it is highly desirable to limit damage, contain the conflict, and terminate quickly. The despotic regimes likely to be our adversaries are charac­terized by centralized leadership; hierar­chical command-and-control structures; and control of the press and information infrastructure. In the face of new tech­nologies, these features—no matter hoW modern and redundant—are vulnerable.

The target set consists of those sys­tems whose destruction yields the strate­gic objective. For SEW, the target set consists of the enemy leadership at all levels, including the battlefield level; its communications systems; surveillance and targeting systems; information pro­cessing, decision, and display systems; electronic warfare systems; and weapons guidance systems. An attack on this tar­get set is the epitome of power projec­tion, the ultimate penetration of the enemy. Naval forces operating in con­junction with other U.S. and allied forces will play a critical role. These are the en­abling operations for maneuver warfare.

At the same time, the technological revolution, especially in information man­agement, is presenting still other oppor­tunities—for friend and foe alike. Throughout the militarized world, the ad­^vent of the modern computer work sta­tion, the ongoing development of a global, commercial communications in­frastructure, and the proliferation of smart Weapons—all of which can be bought off the shelf—can combine to make a weak foe strong in a very short time. These de­^velopments, paradoxically, could provide ^a significant advantage to small, wealthy regimes and disadvantages to Western militaries—unless our acquisition of sys­tems encompasses commercial innovation.

A hostile SEW target set cuts both Ways—presenting opportunities both for Us and for potential foes. For example, a small country seeking the tactical center °f gravity of an overwhelming opponent Will view that force’s SEW assets as an irresistible target. Accordingly, we must develop a SEW-protection capability. Al­though Desert Storm appeared to the pub­lic to be a high-technology war in all aspects, many systems used in it were ^Several generations behind available com­mercial technology—and were, in fact, ^vulnerable.

SEW Defined. Space and electronic Warfare is conducted in terms of both Warfare and support functions. As war- fore, it is the destruction, neutralization, manipulation of enemy SEW targets. As Warfare support, it enhances friendly- force battle management, through the in­fograted employment and exploitation °f electromagnetic spectra and the medium of space. It encompasses mea­sures to:

^ Coordinate, correlate, fuse, and employ active and passive systems to optimize mdividual and aggregate communication, surveillance, reconnaissance, data corre­lation, classification, targeting and elec­tromagnetic attack capabilities ^v Destroy, deny, degrade, confuse, or de­^Ceive the enemy’s capabilities to com­municate, sense, reconnoiter, classify, tar­get, and direct an attack ^ Direct and control the employment of friendly forces and the information nec­^essary to provide for the administration ^arid support of those forces      '

Such definitions must be put into an operational context.

Establishing SEW as a warfare mis­sion area recognizes that information is the key to the hostile decision-making process, whatever it is and whatever form it might take. (In that sense, SEW incor­porates information warfare.) It also im­plies the technological maturity to oper­ate in and against the fourth and fifth dimensions of battle space: the geogra­phy of space and the physics of the elec­tromagnetic spectra. (In this sense, the advent of SEW has clear parallels with the development of other naval warfare areas.)

The advent of SEW indicates both the recognition of the requirement and achievement of the means to operate of­fensively and defensively in the electro­magnetic spectra, and in space, and against the SEW target set. Like the other warfare areas, SEW contributes to Navy missions:

>■ To gain control of space and the elec­tromagnetic spectra and deny or control the enemy’s use of them

►  Having done so, to project power by conducting offensive warfare in those dimensions

>• Simultaneously, to protect our own SEW systems

SEW Is Joint. As we saw in Desert Storm, many future operations will re­quire an orderly transition from on-scene naval forces to a combined force. Battle space for combined arms will include five environments—air, land, sea, space, and the electromagnetic spectra. This does not mean offensive warfare will occur in space. Rather, the interfaces of the five environments must appear seamless across both the echelons and the com­ponents in the joint—and combined— force.

When we consider the SEW target set in such a conflict, it is clear that:

►  SEW will be a joint endeavor.

►  SEW will be conducted and coordi­nated both vertically (i.e., multi-echelon, from the unified commander through the tactical commander) and horizontally (i.e., across components in the force).

►  SEW typically will precede other ac­tions on the tactical continuum.

Thus, like amphibious, strike, and an­tiair warfare, SEW is a warfare area that in most future scenarios will extend be­yond the Navy, requiring continuity of planning and action across the echelons and the components. For example, as joint command-and-control warfare doc­trine emerges, Navy SEW will be coor­dinated with and subordinate to the larger effort.

SEW Disciplines. SEW’s warfare and warfare-support functions are contained within eight disciplines. Warfare support disciplines are:

►  Operational Security. This discipline includes measures taken to minimize hos­tile knowledge of ongoing and planned military operations. It includes physical security, counterespionage, and person­nel security.

►  Surveillance: It provides for the tacti­cal management of all technical surveil­lance as a force system across the entire multidimensional battle space, including all sensors, regardless of location (whether national, theater, or platform) or ownership (whether component, joint, or combined).

►  Command and Control, Communica­tions and Computers, and Intelligence (Cl): C⁴I is the means to the end of com­mand-and-control—a technological, or­ganizational, and doctrinal system that provides three functions: the doctrinal delegation of forces (i.e., command-and- control); information management (i.e., communications and computers); and intelligence dissemination. Since World War II, command-and-control functions have been exercised through the system of C⁴I. Both command and control itself and the management of C⁴I systems, like aircraft, ships, and weapons, can be del­egated. It is important to recognize that they are separate functions.

►  Signals Management: This discipline encompasses measures to protect force signals and includes the management of frequencies and emission control, and the security of signals, communications, com­puters, and transmissions.

The warfare disciplines of SEW are:

►   Operational Deception: This incorpo­rates more than electronic deception. On the modern battlefield, operational de­ception begins with diplomatic posturing and ends with many actions in between. It occurs in two phases—preparation and execution—and it is intended to influence enemy plans, execute a stratagem, induce quick reactions, and apply pressure to act. Operational deception techniques are con­ditioning, reinforcement, and required continuity across echelons and compo­nents. Operational deception is an essen­tial element of every military action, and multi-echelon, multi-component coordi­nated operational deception is central to combined arms actions.

►  Countersurveillance: This targets enemy surveillance systems and is the sum of all active and passive measures to prevent or manipulate enemy surveil­lance of selected areas. It consists of techniques to deny or divert detection or to deceive or overwhelm the detector, and then destroy it. Countersurveillance is ac­complished at all echelons, from the uni-

to all components of the force, regardless of their posi­tion within the structure. These systems must remain

functional across all levels of conflict, as the

lied commander and joint task force com­mander to the component commander.

>■ Counter-CI: This includes measures to deceive, delay, degrade, or eliminate el­ements of a hostile Cd system—includ­ing communications, data, and command- and-control nodes—by deceiving, saturating, jamming, and destroying such elements. Like countersurveillance, counter-Ci must be accomplished at all echelons.

>- Electronic Combat: This targets enemy weapons and weapon systems and in­cludes the coordination of all measures to provide counter-targeting/counter- weapon, and terminal phase protection to the force. The aim of electronic combat is to protect the force by providing a doc­trinally organized, technologically seam­less, area defense. However, unlike point electronic defense of today, electronic combat will accomplish that force defense through actions nationally viewed as both offensive (e.g., destruction of enemy radars) and defensive (e.g., classical elec­tronic counter-countermeasures).

New Direction. Just as the airplane provided more than better scouting for the battleship line in 1924, SEW is not just better electronic warfare or better Cd or better use of space, instead, like air power, SEW is a fundamental alteration of the tactical continuum that permanently changed the face of warfare. Paralleling 5 the development of other new naval war fare areas in their time, it marks

a collision between technol­ogy and doctrine, creating

a new direction by revising previous tactics.

History teaches us that better tech­nology does not necessarily lead to vic­tory. Rather, victory goes to the com­mander who uses technology better or who can deny the enemy the use of his own technology. The SEW warfare-sup­port opportunities, therefore, are as sig­nificant as its warfare opportunities. Such opportunities include:

>    By doctrine, a single commander of re­sponsibilities—previously splintered among many—in space and in the electromagnetic spectra

►  The conception of sensors—whether platform, theater, or national; component, joint, or combined—as a unified force surveillance structure

►  The development of virtual communi­cations networks across multiple satellite communications, coupled with a flexible command-and-control system tailored to broad applications

Doctrinally, then. SEW both adds to the tactical continuum through the first shots of operational deception, counter­surveillance. and counter-C'l, and also in­tegrates the offensive and defensive ac­tions of electronic combat.

SEW Technology. What technology do we need to conduct this kind of warfare? Basically, there are three requirements:

>    First, we need a doctrinal, organiza­tional, and technological battle-manage­ment system applicable across all echlons

orce structure expands from battle group- naval expeditionary force, or joint task force to a full theater-level command like ^ Desert Storm’s.

►  Second, the system must incorporate force-wide surveillance and communica­tion systems, the interfaces of which are synergistic and seamless across the bat­tle space and operationally transparent

to the user, regardless of echelon or _t component.

►  Third, the system must integrate hard kill (e.g., weapons on target), soil kid (e.g.. saturation, deception), and very sott kill (e.g., intrusion). Such capabilities must be coordinated horizontally, across the five-dimensional battle space, and ver- tieally, up and down echelons.

The technological challenges are not small. But there are no show-stoppers- Developments in one area will contribute to breakthroughs in others. As we build these capabilities, use of commercial products will increase, and the structure and process for acquisition will evolve to accommodate the requisite technology- These features—and the relationship be­tween SEW as warfare support and SEA as warfare—are well illustrated in the areas of surveillance and Ci.

The Surveillance Subsystem. Surveil­lance assets available to a commander ot U.S. forces are programmed for and op­erated by diverse organizations. Some are part of a national inventory of sensors- others are operated at the theater level- others by allies, and still others are phys­ically attached to tactical platforms.

For joint warfare, the implication I^s that we require the means to sense the entire battle space at once, with trans­parent transition across the air. land, sea- space. and spectral interfaces. Moreover, such a force surveillance system must be “borrowed" and focused on the tactical problem—that is, it is impractical and in­appropriate programmatically for a com­ponent service to seek to consider struct- ; ing such a force-wide sensor system- Instead, the question becomes: How can diverse sensors, many of which are net-