Out of the Fog

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battlefield commander, being able rient, and act faster than an oppo- ing through the “fog of war”—can be werful force multiplier. But sorting through the vast amount of tactical information necessary to achieve this superiority will be an additional burden unless the Marine Corps acts to im­prove and standardize command and control doctrine and procedures.

i. MARINE CORPS

Until 1980, the history of Marine command and con­trol (C²) for ground combat was nothing short of exemplary. Dealing with the Clausewitzian “fog of war”—the uncertainty that characterizes the modern battlefield—has been a strength of the Corps in battles Past. Yet, the manner in which the best and most capable ^cornmanders led their Marines and commanded their war­fighting organizations more often than not was personal- Py-dependent and differed from one unit to the next.

In today’s warfare, the amount of information engulf­ing the commander during combat is increasing in den­sity. Our desperate attempts to see the battle more clearly Probably have done more to obfuscate than to clarify the commander’s vision. We have learned to work in the fog and with the fog. It is important, however, not to gener­ic additional, unnecessary fog in the process.

In the latter part of the 1960s, some forward-looking Marine officers saw the approaching age of computer tech- n°l°gy _ancj forecast its dramatic impact on the face of bat- Ife- Just as the machine gun, the aircraft, and the helicopter altered the way we fight, C² technological advances would forever alter the conduct of land warfare, they said. In re­sponse to the challenge of these visionary officers, the Marine Corps Development Center assisted in the for­mulation of the Marine Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS). It was a well-thought-out theory that brought new equipment, new organizations, and new pro­cures together in a single-system concept—one with Promise of bringing significant changes to Marine Corps "'ar-fighting doctrine.

Advances in automated position location, large- and small-screen tactical displays, computer-assisted decon- fliction of air and artillery, integrated intelligence, and lo­gistical data management and radical organizational re­vision—such as combining the fire support coordination and the direct air support centers into one agency—were but a few of the sweeping innovations. All these porten­tous developments were to be supported by a state-of-the- art communications architecture. Many hours and a great deal of hard work went into building the MTACCS model to include the myriad of interfaces between the numerous command-and-control functions necessary to make the whole thing work. The input and output requirements for each “node” in the system were documented carefully, and, where possible, automation was planned. It was a grand design.

While all this was going on at Quantico and Head­quarters Marine Corps, the Fleet Marine Force continued to operate in the field in a relatively stagnant C² environ­ment. Homemade map boards and status charts, acetate, grease pencils, yellow message pads, hand-written jour­nals, and radios that sometimes frustrated communicators and operators alike were typical combat operations cen­ter fare. The physical layout was anything you could con­jure up. A young Marine officer heading to the Fleet Ma­rine Force from his professional schooling was sure to find something unlike anything he saw at Quantico or dur­ing previous tours. It was not terribly complex, so, until recently, getting up to speed on how your unit operated was well within most of our capabilities.

As we recovered from Vietnam in the late 1970s and began to prepare to fight the Warsaw Pact forces in a con­ventional, target-rich battlefield, command and control started to get away from us. The technological develop­ment at Quantico was so far ahead of what was happen­ing in the Fleet Marine Force that involving the operational units was very difficult and therefore seldom attempted. This is where things began to break down. That isolated engineering effort, combined with changing technical re­quirements and a transient and shallow acquisition process, collided head on with computer advances that were mak­ing quantum leaps every few years. Adding to the conun­drum was the rapidly improving ability to collect infor­mation of all types across the functional spectrum of battle. So, while most of us saw the major improvement in C² as the switch from the grease pencil to the marking pen, the futuristic Marine Corps was getting bogged down in Sili­con Valley.

During this period, one of the centerpieces of the MTACCS concept was the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS). This was a fully automated fire support planning, coordinating, and executing suite of technology, and one of the main users and distributors of friendly position location information obtained from an­other, since fielded, automated system for navigation: the position locating and reporting system. The MIFASS pro­gram—after ten years and $152 million of engineering de­velopment, a couple of failed operational evaluations in the Fleet Marine Force, and a host of other programmatic difficulties—was terminated by then-Com­mandant P. X. Kelley.

The death of MIFASS left more than just a void in the glossary of acronyms. Because it was one of the primary nodes within a complex network of automated equipment, a technological black hole of sorts developed. As MIFASS faded into obscurity, other programs, including Tactical Combat Operations and some communications projects, were cut adrift. Eventually, the entire Marine Tactical Command and Control System concept and architecture was considered MIFASS-tainted and began to self-de­struct. From that point on, no self-respecting Marine of­ficer would refer to it in program reviews or even bring it up in casual conversation.

The lessons learned from this unfortunate foray into high technology set the Corps on its present course in acquiring command-and-control equipment for the Fleet Marine Force. The evolutionary aspect of C² automated tools and the absolute requirement that they be developed with input from the ultimate user were validated and ac­cepted. It became clear that the Marine Corps, because of institutional and budgetary constraints, cannot develop its own from-scratch ground C² system, and so must join its land warfare counterpart, the U.S. Army, if it is to suc­ceed. And, finally, the Marine developers’ attempt to come to grips with the Corps’ doctrine, procedures, and tech­niques for command and control was akin to wrestling with a giant marshmallow.

In the best Marine Corps tradition, Quantico refused to accept defeat and, as General Alfred M. Gray’s ini­tiatives to reorganize our equipment acquisition and com­bat development processes were implemented, new signs of life began to emerge. The evolutionary acquisition ap­proach to command and control was adopted. A “build a little, test a little, field a little” strategy was put in place, embodied first in the establishment of the FIREFLEX (follow-on project to MIFASS) testbed in the Fleet Ma­rine Force. The research and development community moved closer to the Army Tactical Command and Con­trol System effort. And, finally, Marine Tactical Com­mand and Control System was revisited, restructured, and reenergized.

The Fleet Marine Force Gets Involved

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While Quantico struggled through the MIFASS deba-                  ¹

cle, there was an awakening of a different sort in the field.        *

The closer study of command and control within the                   1

ground-combat element of our Marine air-ground task                ¹

forces had its genesis in the early 1980s at Camp Pendle-            '

ton. Lieutenant General Ernie Cheatham—then Com­manding General I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)—-        ‘

began exploring how to assimilate and filter battlefield               ¹

information more rapidly and to disseminate commands             I

to his subordinate commanders more effectively. Since               ¹

then, there has been a progressive, albeit sometimes te-              ¹

dious, effort to formalize our ground combat C² concepts          <

in the field.                                                                                              ¹

As we train our war-fighters and future commanders,                   ¹

it is imperative that we teach them how to command.                  ¹

We can only accomplish this if there is a standardized C²           J

process in place. Given that the personalities and leader­ship styles of our commanders are essential factors in how ¹ they approach command, the execution of specific com­mand functions must be established within some accepted bounds or we continually will reinvent the system after                                                                     ¹

each change of command. Too often in the Fleet Marine             ¹

Force today, we are doing just that.                                                   '

For reasons unknown, there continues to be some in-                     '

stitutional inertia working against bringing our C² processes      •

into the state-of-the-art. As a result, we often find within            ¹

our divisions antiquated (but still usually reliable) meth­ods of recording, storing, analyzing, and transmitting bat- ] tie information. The other services are already far ahead of us in this arena, and, as the glut of tactical data in- 1 creases with our improved means of collecting it, our Ma- ¹ fine ground units will be at risk of being overwhelmed during joint combat—not by the enemy, but by our own out-of-date C² system.                                                                 ⁽

Before we discuss mechanics, it is important to dif­ferentiate between the terms “command” and “control.” Command is exercised in battle through the commander’s authority, leadership ability, coup d’oeil (battle vision), and style. Control is more concerned with the staff func­tioning that allows for detailed planning, supervising, and modifying the actions of subordinate units during com­bat. Command and control is their combined ability to direct a military force toward the accomplishment of its mission in battle. Under the direction of FMFM-1, our I objective should always be to enhance our ability to com­mand, while minimizing our need to control.                                                                                1

We should develop our C² architecture upon five Pillars, which Brigadier General Paul Van Riper,

Commanding General of the 2d Marine Division, has described.¹ These are the organization, equip­ment (including communi­cations), facility, proce­dures, and training. But before you can properly organize and equip your combat operations cen­ter-—before you can iden­tify the basic functions,

Procedures, and tech­niques—there must be a comprehensive concept or phi­losophy in place.

The Marine Corps almost has this now. Marine Oper­ational Handbook 6-1 A, Ground Combat Element Com­mand and Control, resulted from the many advances pro­posed by Lieutenant General Cheatham and General Gray, then Commandant, and was put together by representa­tives of the three Marine divisions in the early 1980s at ^a C² conference at Quantico. Unfortunately, except for a small group who recognized the meaning of these con­cepts, neither the handbook nor the fundamentals of Ma­rine ground combat C² have yet been embraced by the ma­jority of professionals across our Corps.

Command Post Operations

Unless you are bringing a command out of cadre sta­tus or you have the luxury of time and a leisurely opera­tional tempo in your organization, building a command- ^and-control system from scratch is unrealistic. Neverthe­less, it is important to understand the fundamentals of such ^an exercise, to be able to make logical improvements or modifications to an existing system.

There are a number of ways to accomplish this, but the Primary energy must come from the commander himself, ^ith the pace of peacetime commitments and competing Priorities, not many staffs will begin or sustain an effort t° upgrade the C² capabilities of their organization on their °Wn initiative. The commander must be personally in­volved, or at least highly interested, or it will be over­come by events.

With an eye toward publishing a comprehensive set of landing operating procedures that will absorb new ideas, ^techniques, or experimental technology, the commander must first identify the critical information he needs to fight rite battle. This data is normally known as the comman­d’s critical information requirements (CCIR). A re­^view to determine these requirements should be done every ri-12 months within divisional units, and every 12-24 months at the Marine air-ground task force level. It is im­perative that this information be what the commander re­quires—not what the staff thinks he needs. This is where Personal style and preferences can be incorporated into a

standardized C² system.

The filtering and flow of tactical information, pri­marily CCIR data, through the combat operations cen­ter demands periodic re­views of the functional re­sponsibilities of each member of the team. A battle roster that clearly identifies the personnel needed for the effective operation of the command post is an excellent initial step in tying everything to­gether. This would be fol­lowed by education in or confirmation of individual C² tasks for each staff mem­ber, which would assist in focusing the commander on the battle.

Since the commander often is in and out of the com­bat operations center, and the principal staff also must un­derstand the tactical picture, a display of CCIR there is essential for effective control. The displays must be pro­fessional and easily readable from a distance, and—most important—must reflect only the most current CCIR data available. Identical boards also should be included in the forward command post and any briefing and planning areas.

Once there is a clear understanding of the critical in­formation requirements and how information will flow into and out of the combat operations center, and once each Marine, sailor, or soldier understands his individual duties, the next step is to lay out the center. This often will take several field exercises to refine.

General Van Riper’s efforts in 2d Marine Division have led to the “Three Map Theory” of command post layout. The absolute importance of integrating fire support and intelligence with maneuver is time-tested and universally accepted. Therefore, the command post must have the enemy-order-of-battle map on one side and the fire-sup­port-coordination map on the other side of the operations map. This is the focal point for command post C² proce­dures and provides the “big picture” for the commander and his staff. No longer should we find the intelligence officer or fire support coordinator in separate shelters.

Combat operations centers need to be exercised, or team drills conducted, at least every six weeks. Collective C² knowledge, skills, and memory are perishable. Getting out of the office every other month and setting up and oper­ating with your C² system means fewer start-up problems, either for exercises or in the early stages of combat.

A Prescription for Continued Progress

In this time of strained budgets, an investment in C² technology and improvements in C² doctrine and proce­dures can provide significant returns. Being able to ob­serve, orient, decide, and act faster than your opponent can multiply combat power many times over. Without the prodigious costs associated with a new weapon system or a means of transport, C² improvements may prove the most cost-effective way to use our diminishing funds, both for research and development and procurement.

The following thoughts are presented for consideration in meeting some of the Marine Corps’ C² challenges:

►  Re-create an overarching concept for MAGTF C². MTACCS is a good technical base, but we need a doc­trinal base as well.

►  Evolve all new C² technology from within the Fleet Ma­rine Force. Continue to use field C² testbeds, centrally co­ordinated at Quantico. These eventually will grow into an ongoing C² user-development process, routinely accepted and integrated into daily life in the field.

►  Establish a three-division standing operating proce­dure for ground combat C². Use a Fleet Marine Force working group if necessary, until it is fielded as an oper­ational handbook or field manual.

►  Completely restructure the non-Fleet Marine Force C² organization in the Corps. Consider the consolidation of the C⁴I division at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps into the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. There is an urgent need for a single voice within the Corps for all aspects of C², including garrison (white) equipment and policymaking.

►  Put some space between communicators and C² by in­volving more infantry, artillery, and aviation profession­als. This thought initially will tend to annoy the commu­nicators. For years, however, they have been unfairly burdened with addressing the C² challenge before us.

►  Teach C² concepts and standing operating procedures at the Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College.

►  Join with the Army on ground combat C² programs— both hardware and software—wherever possible. The Commandant introduced this idea on a recent visit to the 2d Marine Division. Rice bowls may have to be broken, but institutional pride ultimately will have to be replaced by common sense—and monetary sense.

Officers must be educated in the way we should fight and in the way we exercise command and control over our ground combat units. There must be a focused effort, gen­erated from the field and centrally coordinated at the Com­bat Development Command. Some hard decisions need to be made relative to standard practices and technology.

Unless we continue to move forward aggressively in many of these areas, to develop a Marine Corps-wide con­cept—with standardized, but adaptable, command-and- control procedures across all three Marine divisions—- ground combat C² may be a vulnerability rather than a strength in the next conflict.

'Marine Operational Handbook (OH) 6-1 A, Ground Combat Element Command and Control, outlines the component parts of an effective C² system. *

Lieutenant Colonel Mazzara, a 1971 graduate of the U.S. Naval Acad­emy, is a Bilateral Plans Officer, U.S. Central Command. An artillery officer, he commanded 5th Battalion, 10th Marines during Desert Storm and has had experience as an assistant program manager for ground com- mand-and-control systems at Quantico.