The Frigate Still Fits

For the past 50 years a third of the U.S. Navy’s sur­face-combatant force have been frigates. Since 1980 the frigate’s share of U.S. escorts has zoomed to be­tween 40% and 50%. With such statistics, it is not sur­prising that this type of ship stands as an important con­tributor in almost every mission assigned to U.S. naval forces today.

In the scheme of fleet building, the frigate, with her clean lines and purposeful mix of weaponry, is a versa­tile escort built to extend U.S. naval influence over all the World’s seas. She is designed with an eye toward global reach and balanced interoperability in a wide range of Warfighting scenarios and environments. As one of the smallest of an imposing array of ships in the U. S. Navy’s arsenal, though, the frigate is designed under austere stan­dards of crew size, tonnage, equipment redundancy, and Weapon sophistication.

Although multimission in character, the frigate is usu­ally specialized for a single area of operation. In the U.S. Navy this has been, historically, antisubmarine war­fare (ASW). A frigate is specifically not designed to counter the most stressing threat of the day singlehand- edly but may contribute, in conjunction with other more Powerful ships, to battle-group or force defense.

Why Build Frigates?

Navies build frigates for affordability, pure and simple. Today’s fleet requirements demand counters to a wide va­riety of air, surface, and subsurface threats in an equally wide variety of scenarios and geographic locales. Not all missions demand the presence of top-of-the-line combat­^ants. Not all missions call for deep-draft, heavy-dis­Placement ships. Not all missions need a luxury four-door Lexus when a little two-door Mazda Miata will do.

All fleet commanders prefer the most capable (and ex­pensive) ships that today’s technology can provide. They ^a>so demand, correctly, that these ships be supplied in suf­ficient numbers to battle the enemy threat or to carry out file assigned missions of the fleet. The focus of their at­tention is on two overriding factors: individual capability and raw numbers—the two primary foundation blocks of any nation’s fleet.

Of course, the grim reality is that all fleets are always constrained within stringent fiscal bounds. Rarely do any fieet commanders have all the individual capability or all the numbers of ships they need. More often, the question becomes simply: “What is affordable?’’ The answer in­evitably colors all fleet building decisions and budgetary Projections.

T/ie Balanced Force Equation

The concept of balancing a fleet’s surface-combatant f°rce by building a mix of more expensive, more capa­ble ships and less expensive, less sophisticated ships has been a distinguishing feature of all the great navies of the Modern industrial age. The U. S. Navy has portrayed Ibis in different ways: the split between heavy- and light- cruiser construction during the 1930s and 1940s; the ad­vent of the destroyer escort for North Atlantic convoy pro­tection in World War II; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt’s “High-Low” mix during the 1970s.

The dilemma is a familiar one for force planners. To be successful, a nation must field a military force with peaks of high-tech capability and a breadth of coverage provided by a sufficient number of assets. More capable ships cost more money. Thus, as available funding is al­ways limited, no fleet can contain a large number of high- cost ships, and a balancing of fleet resources inevitably occurs. This balancing of individual ship capability with the required number of assets lies consistently at the heart of all fleet force-level decisions.

Clearly, either end of the wide array of choices that de­fine the balanced-force equation is patently unacceptable. A fleet composed of one or two extraordinarily powerful ships could never be in all the places required by poten­tial worldwide crises. The World War II German battle­ships Bismarck and Tirpitz were arguably the most pow­erful ships of their era, but their lack of numbers simplified neutralization schemes against them and rendered them largely unable to affect the outcome of events in the North Atlantic during World War II.

Equally important in this day and age, a fleet cannot be composed solely of many inexpensive, low-technology ships. What this force may gain in coverage and flexibil­ity it would lose disastrously in combat against a more high-tech enemy. Many components of the Iraqi military— formidable on paper—proved to be at least one genera­tion inferior in technology during the Gulf War, with dra­matic, one-sided results in combat.

The challenge, of course, is to identify what mix of the expensive, high-tech with the less expensive, lower-tech would make up the optimum force.

The Ebb and Flow of Balanced Forces

The frigate (or its predecessor, the destroyer escort) has figured prominently in the solution of the balanced-force equation since the turn of the century. This has been es­pecially true since the early days of World War II, when both the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy discovered that the numerous (and relatively sophisticated) destroyers built in the interwar period to screen the fleet also would be needed in the North Atlantic as merchant escorts. In the face of the German U-boat onslaught, these new de­stroyers (or destroyer-like escorts) would be needed in great numbers—and quickly. Thus were born both the re­quirement and the impetus for the successful mass pro­duction of destroyer escorts that played such an important role during the war in the North Atlantic.

From the beginning, the design of the destroyer escort was purposely austere and specifically targeted for the af­fordability efficiencies inherent in mass production. The first designs heavily favored ASW requirements in weapon and engineering performance in stark contrast to the larger, multimission characteristics of fleet escort destroyers. Depth-charge throwers, Hedgehog ASW mortars, and un­derwater sensors were dominant features in the early de­signs, which explicitly deemphasized antiship armament.

WILLIAM J. CLIPSON

pensive ships, continued into the 1960s and 1970s when the Chief of Naval Operations gave this concept a new moniker, the “high-low mix.” As Admiral Zumwalt de­scribed it:

‘High’ was short for high-performance ships and weapon systems that also were so high-cost that the country could afford to build only a few of them at a time; there are some missions the Navy cannot perform without the great flexibility and versatility of such ships. ‘Low’ was short for moderate-cost, moderate-perfor­mance ships that could be turned out in relatively large numbers and would ensure that the Navy could be in enough places at the same time to get its job done. In sum, an all-High Navy would be so expensive that it would not have enough ships to control the seas. An all-Low Navy would not have enough capability to meet certain kinds of threats or perform certain kinds of mis­sions. In order to have both enough ships and good enough ships there had to be a mix of High and Low.

Although not as precedent-setting as the new name sug­gested, the “high-low mix”

U.S. Navy surface combatants

Frigates as a percentage of total

k

Antiair armament was light and self-defensive in nature.

In 1941 Captain E. C. Cochrane, head of Preliminary Design in the Navy’s Bureau of Ships, commented on the evolving destroyer-escort design. His description illus­trates the design criteria devoted to the destroyer escort.

It also could serve as a definition for frigates for the next 50 years:

If the situation develops that escort vessels are needed to supplement and relieve some of the more valuable destroyer types, the Bureau of Ships believes that the general characteristics of the present design are such as to make this type (of ship) of considerable value for the purpose . . . Every effort would be made during the development of the design to obtain simplicity in both hull and machinery so that (more rapid) con­struction in comparison with that of destroyers could be expected.¹

Simplicity of design, specific mission focus, rapidity of construction, large class size, and ability to relieve larger ships of tasks are all clearly the classic earmarks of the

prototypal frigate from the __________________________

beginning.

Destroyer escorts began to enter the fleet rapidly starting in January 1943, and deliveries increased at a dizzying rate, with some 378 launchings in 1943 alone. Almost 500 were built and entered U.S.

Navy service from 1943 until the end of the war.²

As the United States en­tered the postwar period, the threat of a large and formidable Soviet submarine force argued for a continued emphasis on ASW in U.S. escort design. Inevitably, new surface-combatant designs came about to match an evolving threat or to field new tech­nological breakthroughs.

U.S. Navy surface combatants of this era spanned a wide range of size and capability, with consistent atten­tion paid to the specific design of a succession of small, ASW-oriented escort classes. Between 1945 and 1965, two cruiser classes and four large destroyer classes en­tered the U. S. fleet, but so did four different classes of frigates/destroyer escorts.

Throughout the postwar period, one unchanging theme underpinned U.S. surface-escort construction. It focused on a two-tiered approach to escort design. Large, expen­sive, sophisticated ships would counter the most stress­ful threats and run with fast carrier task groups, to tackle the multimission challenges of fleet air defense, ASW, shore bombardment and task-force escort. Simultaneously, frigate designs featured less displacement, less machinery and weapon redundancy, and less overall combat systems capability, with a decided focus on ASW considerations.

This consistency of escort design planning, which in­cluded balanced numbers of both expensive and less ex­idea focused renewed at­tention on the perennial naval force problem of numbers against capability- This fresh look at the bal­anced force equation led directly to the successful effort to field the largest class of U.S. Navy surface escorts since World War Ik the Oliver Hazard Perry ° (LLG-7)-class guided-mis- sile frigate.

The Perry’s initial visibility as the low end of the high- low mix was unfortunate to a degree, because it implied a level of ineptitude that has proved not to be the case. Although largely focused as an ASW escort, the Perry de­sign afforded capability in other warfare areas. Her promi­nent and successful Desert Storm combat record proved that. To date, the success of the class stems from its ability to fill the low end of the escort force by furnish­ing the all-important numbers of ships for fleet needs. At the same time, the class provides a competent individual capability that extends across many of today’s important escort missions.

Frigates in the 1990s

Today, we are witnessing a rapidly changing surface combatant force. It is too simplistic merely to say that the numbers of ships are decreasing, which is decidedly true. In the mix of surface combatants and in the individual ship capabilities to be retained is where the real change in the fabric lies.

Within the past four short years, decisions have forced the decommissioning of entire classes of ships, including the Garcia (EL-1040) frigate, the Brooke (EFG-1) guided-

missile frigate, the Bronstein (FF-1037) frigate, the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) guided-missile destroyer, the Farragut (DDG-37) guided-missile destroyer, and (effectively) the Knox (FF-1052) frigate. As new-ship construction focused on Aegis cruisers and destroyers for the past eight years (with 49 built or authorized to date), the evolving char­acter of the surface combatant force has tended toward an increasing high-tech multimission capability centered upon ^a decreasing number of hulls.

This recent trend is not necessarily improper. The Navy has succeeded in fielding a force of significant ca­pability for a reasoned expense at a time of mandated re­duction in force levels. But one of the subtleties in cur­rent shipbuilding trends is that the U. S. Navy can afford

to focus exclusively on relatively expensive, highly capable escorts, because it is working from a firm foundation of low-mix frigates—frigates that pro­^vide the important numbers in the balanced-force equation. That will not always be the case.

Follow-on frigates ?

The U. S. Navy does not have any current plans to build follow-on classes of frigates. Given satis­factory levels of fiscal resources, it intends to ^continue building battle-force-capable surface com­batants that feature capabilities relative to the tech- aologies available. As these ships age, they would ⁿot undergo modernization (as has been past prac­tice) and would be allowed to decline gracefully in capa­bility relative to newly constructed combatants. As such, these older ships (which might soon include today’s Ficonderoga [CG-47]-class cruisers) would begin to as­^Sume many less stressful warfighting assignments now as- ^Slgned to smaller, less capable, low-mix combatants. Whether this concept would be allowed to proceed, given institutional barriers—from personnel assignments to mod­^ernization initiatives espoused by industry—remains to be ^Seen. Reliance on this method of providing for the bal- nnced-force equation, however, will require considerable ^adjustment in the underpinnings of the ship construction ^and upkeep infrastructure of today, a proposition that no °ne has realized fully.

If no new frigate programs begin, as is currently in­tended, the frigate mix of the U. S. Navy’s surface-com­batant force will gradually decay. By the year 2020, no frigates will remain. In spite of these trends, the frigate’s role in a balanced U.S. naval force will continue to make sense well into the 21st century.

A next-generation frigate must stay true to the basic un­derpinnings of low-mix design. Cost must be modest, pro­duction must be in sufficient numbers, and the mission focus must be limited. It must also contribute in the clas­sic warfare regimes of antiair, antisurface, and antisub­marine warfare and reflect due concern for that most im­portant aspect of modern design: signature reduction.

In antiair warfare a frigate fills the gap between Aegis and close-in weapon systems in both expense and capa­bility. Today’s frigates augment antiair area defense plans and provide extra levels of defense in depth. To­morrow’s frigate may launch extra missiles for an Aegis destroyer’s control or may help enhance the 360° cover-

The guided-missile frigate is still an antisubmarine warfare specialist. Its provision for the ASW multipurpose (LAMPS III) helicopter edges future Aegis cruisers and destroyers in this mission. In antiair warfare, it “fills the gap between Aegis and close-in weapon systems” with its Mk 13 launcher.

age around a battle group. In tomorrow’s battle against the low-visibility, low-altitude, high-speed cruise missile, relative position in a tight antiair warfare screen may be as important as raw weapon capability.

In antisubmarine warfare, the frigate solves the criti­cal numbers portion of the equation. It also will bring an ASW-speciality ship to the force that future Aegis cruis­ers and destroyers will be unable to fulfill. The individ­ual ASW capability of cruisers suffers by being tethered to the formation center for antiair defense. The early ships of the Aegis destroyer class lack an indigenous and com­plementary helicopter capability that severely restricts any independent ASW offensive capability.

In antisurface warfare, the frigate cannot compete with

during the next decade should make positive, measur­able strides toward reducing vulnerability. Although many high-tech solutions now exist, raw size of the plat­form is one of the most important portions of the low-sig­nature formula. Often it is the most important factor. Gen­erally, a smaller ship has smaller radar, acoustic, and infrared signatures than a larger ship. A smaller hull will involve less expense in installing high-tech materials or in designing low-signature attributes. In either situation, the case is strong that any new surface combatant design must consider important sizing constraints as never before, if ships of the future are to constrain their vulnerabilities.

the range and power-projection qualities of a Tomahawk missile. It does, though, have the potential to control that most important region of antiship warfare, the region that extends out to about 100 miles from the ship. The frigate’s use of the Harpoon missile (and its variants) or helicopter- launched antiship weapons (such as the Penguin or Sea

Skua) should allow the frigate to control the antisurface warfare battle space.

In such engagements, when the opponent is a highly mobile surface craft, precise targeting is the vital linch­pin. A frigate with an embarked helicopter is a perfectly matched team and can provide a single-ship antisurface capability that in many ways exceeds that of an Aegis destroyer. Potential future Third World adversaries may be small and evasive, may have a limiting radar cross section, and may require engagement at short range. Under those circumstances, the advantage in using a sophisti­cated, long-range Tomahawk cruise missile is somewhat moot. Far more important is comprehensive sea control out to a relatively finite distance from the ship a dis­tance defined either by the reach of an opponent s mis­sile or by geographic bounds off an enemy coast. In ei­ther case, 100-mile antisurface coverage from a frigate-sized combatant would add substantial naval capability.

Limiting a ship’s signature (including the low radar sig­nature control favored in stealth technology, infrared signature control, or quieting a ship’s acoustic signature) may be the key element of design in the next generation of ships. Anticipated modem technological breakthroughs

Does the United States need to com­mence a crash program to design and field a frigate-sized surface combatant to complement its well-regarded main­line destroyer-building program? In a word, no.

The U. S. Navy is blessed with a capable and flexible frigate design today in the Oliver Hazard Perry class, built with forethought and in sufficient num­bers to match fleet requirements for the foreseeable future. Modernization ini­tiatives either in place or planned for that class should maintain its position as a major contributor to fleet require­ments until its projected retirement early in the next century.

With the frigate portion of the escort force currently in good shape, now is not the time to rest smugly on our laurels. Rather, efforts should now focus on beginning to plan for the next (and inevitable) frigate design. With the luxury of not having to respond to an immediate critical need, planners should key this initia­tive to leap-frog evolutionary design concepts leading from today’s combatants and concentrate instead on revolu­tionary attributes not currently available for introduction- This should be the theme for the circa-2010 frigate.

Into the Future

While the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyer may be the best type of ship for the world envisioned by “the Mar­itime Strategy” of the 1980s, a future guided-missile frigate may be the best type of ship for the New World Order of the 2000s. As the turn of the millennium gets closer and closer, the geopolitical milieu will clearly be neither new nor very orderly. As articulated in “. . . From the Sea,’ the requirement for battleworthy fleet combatants to ply the far oceans and to exercise U.S. power and resolve will not disappear.

In concert with the dramatic decline of centralized So­viet power in Eurasia, proliferation of power in all forms

The Frigate of the Future

Conceptually, the circa-2010 frigate should be bounded by the following broad considerations:

►                  Core Concept: by definition, the future frigate should stand on the ladder one rung below the destroyer design of the day. It should be capable of both some independent operations and opera­tions in concert with newer, more capable and more expensive combatants.

►                  Cost: measurably and consis­tently less than what would be expected for a destroyer or other battle-force combatant.

►                  Mission: should contribute to a wide range of naval missions

but should concentrate on a single prominent mission (such as anti­submarine warfare) at the expense of a broader, multimission cap­ability.

► Self-defense: must field signifi­cant short-range self-defense capability across all threats to be effective (not to be confused with providing area defense in multi­mission disciplines). A stout “puncture proof’ self-defense philosophy must be followed to field systems that will counter enemy cruise missiles and torpe­does and alert the ship to the presence of mines. A formidable self-defense posture is essential, especially in protection against the threat of a “cheap kill” or an

“embarrassing kill,” while operat­ing in the Third World.

►                  Embarked aircraft capability:

Vital for a ship of limited size and means. The flexibility and capabil­ity inherent in manned aircraft operating from small ships adds to their utility in a thousand ways. Manned aircraft should be amply augmented by employment of the unmanned aerial vehicle of the day.

>  Signature control: Again a vital building block for the ship of the next century. The smaller size of the frigate should help achieve this desirable attribute. A smaller signature directly aids the achieve­ment of the “puncture-proof’ self-defense objective, as well.

is accelerating around the world. The end of the Cold War, "'hile welcome on many counts, does not necessarily her­^ald a more stable and less violent world. Chronic regional instability, global economic competition, arms prolifera­tion, energy dependence—all are factors that could ex­plode overnight into open conflict. To ensure our nation’s "'ell-being into the future, the Navy must be ready to con­tribute and master its role in military contingencies.

The worldwide stature of the United States and the im­plied obligations for the only nation with superpower eco- ⁿ°mic, social, and military standing will require capable U.S. military forces far into the future. This will, in turn, demand a naval surface combatant force of significant, "dde-ranging capability that will require both ample numbers of ships and appropriate individual capability in ^each ship.

A frigate envisioned for 2010 should not be considered ^a competitor in the planning to field capable battle-force ^c°mbatants of the destroyer size and larger. These ships ^are (and will continue to be) vital if the U.S. Navy is to introduce ships with the individual capability, the area de­fense, and the power-projection aspects required in mod­^ern naval warfare. Simple truth, however, leads to the con­tusion that once the Navy applies real-life affordability ^Criteria to future ship purchases, it will be unable to field the numbers of those more expensive combatants needed f°r consistent worldwide naval presence. Through the fore­^seeable future, some portion of the fleet must be devoted t° the counternarcotics mission, the naval reserve training Mission, the allied navy exercise mission, the convoy/am- Phibious/merchant tanker escort mission, the fleet repre­^Sentational mission, the minesweeping defense support

mission, and a hundred other demands placed upon a pre­sent and future U.S. Navy.

As Harlan Ullman so aptly concluded in his recent book, In Harm’s Way, American Seapower and the 21st Century:

the phrase ‘in harm’s way’ has encapsulated the fight­ing spirit of the United States Navy and Marine Corps, forged many of their aspirations and set much of the ethos for the sea services. Now, even as we sail into the 21st century, this heritage is no less a major philo­sophical and spiritual determinant in defining the case for maritime power than in the past. . . . There will always be a harm’s way. Whether we will be as ready and able to respond remains the burning question that must be effectively and affordably answered.⁴

In the future, operating in harm’s way is inevitable. Thus, fielding a capable and efficient surface combatant force is imperative. But effectiveness and affordability will always enter into the equation. The frigate fits.

'Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982) p. 142.

'Ibid., p. 152.

'Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr, On Watch, (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p.72. 'Harlan Ullman, In Harms Way, American Seapower and the 21st Century, (Sil­ver Spring, MD: Bartleby Press, 1991), p. 1, 236.

Captain Linder, a frequent Proceedings contributor, is currently assigned to the staff of the Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet. His U.S. Navy experience includes command of the guided-missile frigate Elrod (FFG-55).