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Criteria established in the 1980s for military intervention do not dovetail with a drug war. It is not a problem between nations, or religions, or ideologies. It is a social problem with no easy solution. Military action is not the answer.
The end of the Cold War and the consequently reduced national-security threat provides the U.S. military with unprecedented opportunities to play nontraditional roles, not the least of which is its involvement in the national drug control strategy. Taking a military approach to a problem that does not lend itself to a military solution, however, means that the “war on drugs” is destined to fail. And such a failure could tarnish the successful and reliable reputation that the U.S. military establishment currently retains. Even worse, unleashing armed forces on this social problem could weaken the basic concepts of a restricted military establishment that have traditionally contributed to making the United States the world’s freest society.
In order to understand better the problems associated with Department of Defense involvement in countemar- cotics operations, it helps to provide a framework for what U.S. drug policy is—and what it is not. Fundamentally, it is social policy. Acting in accordance with the perceived public sentiment, state and national legislatures have determined that use of certain substances defined as illicit drugs is not allowed. This is a social statement—one with roots firmly embedded in conservative morality and conventional behavioral ethics.
Perhaps more important is what U.S. drug policy is not. It was not borne of concerns about the overthrow of the U.S. system of government, a threat to the Constitution, or a fear of the nation’s economic power being usurped by foreign or domestic powers. Individuals who profit immensely from narcotics trafficking are not doing so toward some higher philosophical belief or political goal. They qualify as neither terrorists nor guerrillas. They are simply criminals out to profit from an extremely high market demand.
Clearly, U.S. defense forces have operational capabilities suited for a counternarcotics role. Advanced intelligence techniques, sophisticated command-and-control systems, capable interdiction platforms, and firepower are all abundant within U.S. military forces. But certain technical capabilities do not make a method suitable. Deter-
As a result of the U.S. experience in Vietnam, a tremendous amount of strategic soul-searching went on in the late 1970s and 1980s. One of the most well-known and cogent byproducts was former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger’s six major tests to be used in determining when U.S. conventional military force should be applied to a particular situation.1
In evaluating the propriety of using military forces in the counternarcotics role, it is useful to see how Weinberger’s six tests would apply.
Test Number One
The United States should not commit forces to combat unless our vital interests are at stake. Our interests, of course, include the vital interests of our allies.
A cursory look might conclude that the drug war passes this test. Who would argue that the abuse of narcotics does not hurt the user and subsequently erode the quality and productivity of the citizenry? On further examination, however, this argument becomes hollow. Many social ills run contrary to the well-being of the nation^ alcohol abuse, inadequate education, inner-city strife and crime, decay of conventional morality and ethics, just to mention a few. Each has the potential to tear the nation’s fabric. Applying military solutions to such problems is absurd. The real solutions fall into the realm of social policy. Likewise, drug abuse—a social problem—also should be solved through social action. Military action is not justified simply by its applicability to the symptom— drug trafficking. While one might agree that a vital in- j terest is at stake, there is a clear disconnect between the interest (drug abuse) that requires correction and the symptom (drug trafficking) to which a military solution is partially applicable.
Further inspection of Weinberger’s first test reveals an additional disqualifier for the drug war. The test states that forces should not be committed “. . . to combat unless our vital interests are at stake.” Other than the infrequent and minimal return fire from drug smugglers, counternarcotics operations do not invoke combat in any conventional sense of the word. These are interdiction operations akin to border quarantines conducted by the Customs Service or Coast Guard. Although the tools of combat do come into play (surveillance aircraft and radars, intelligence networks, naval warships, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelli'
gence architecture), only someone with a wild imagination would consider them to be combat operations. Even former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese questioned the phrase “war on drugs,” when he stated, . . this metaphor may not be totally appropriate for dealing with a complex social phenomenon. . . ,”2
As it applies to the vital interests of our allies, Weinberger’s first test does not at all fit into current counternarcotics operations. The present strategy is designed to prevent illegal drugs from crossing U.S. borders. No reasonable argument can be made that this isolationist approach is in the interest of allies (with the possible exception of Canada.) Even in-country operations aimed at drug production are designed to stop drugs from entering the United States by reducing their production in the first place. In fact, it can even be said that these operations are not in the best interest of some allies—namely, those major drug exporters whose economic vitality is a function of drug production.
Test Number Two
Should the United States decide that it is necessary to commit its forces to combat, we must commit them in sufficient numbers and with sufficient support to win. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, or if the objective is not important enough so that we must achieve it, we should not commit our forces.
In order to show that countemarcotics operations fail this test, it is necessary only to understand the nature of drug trafficking—what it is and what it is not. It is a response to an economic phenomenon resulting from the forces of supply and demand. A demand for narcotics exists, and drug traffickers provide the supply. What it is not is a politically or ideologically driven phenomenon. There is no group, national or extranational, whose objective is to traffic drugs for the purpose of undermining U.S. citizenry, destroying the national social fabric, or overthrowing the U.S. government.
Viewed as an economic force, and not a political or ideological one, it is thus nonsensical to apply the concept of “winning.” We might euphemistically say we want to win a “war” on the increasing cost of medical care, but we would never consider using military force to win it. So it is with the “war” on drugs.
But even if we were to indulge ourselves and agree that counternarcotics is a “war” to which military force applies, it would fail Weinberger’s second test for another reason. According to the test, we must commit forces in sufficient numbers to win. The supply of drug trafficking being driven by demand, however, means that the more resources committed, the less the supply.
Subsequently, a greater price drawn in the demand mar- 11 ket will increase the profit-to-risk ratio of suppliers and | once again diabolically increase supply. Regardless of the - number of forces committed, the “war” cannot be won. I We might even predict that, for each incremental reduction of drug trafficking, the forces committed would rise
in some exponential fashion.
Finally, it is sometimes tempting to view counternarcotics operations as being parallel to the counterinsurgency operations used in the Vietnam War. After all, similar tactics of low-intensity conflict are applicable in some cases, and surely the tactical forces used in Vietnam apply to countemarcotics. But again, the parallel breaks down when we recognize that drug traffickers, unlike the Viet Cong, are not driven by ideology. As Colonel Harry Summers stated in his book On Strategy, . . insurgency itself was a tactical screen masking North Vietnam’s real objectives (the conquest of South Vietnam). . . ,”3
Drug traffickers are driven by no such nationalistic or otherwise ideological goals. Therefore, regardless of how one evaluates our ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations, the argument is specious. In the absence of a politically driven enemy, low-intensity conflict or counterinsurgency operations simply do not apply to the problem of drug trafficking.
Test Number Three
If we decide to commit forces to combat, we must have clearly defined political and military objectives. Unless we know precisely what we intend to achieve by fighting,
and how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives, we cannot formulate or determine the size of forces properly, and therefore we should not commit out forces at all.
What about a military objective? With little imagination we can create a military objective within the regime of countemarcotics operations. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney did so in his Annual Report to the President and the Congress published in February 1992. In a section titled “Counterdrug Program,” Secretary Cheney laid out a military strategy for such operations. Couched in military jargon—note the word “attacking’ used in each component—he identifies a three-part strategy: (1) “Attacking the Flow of Illegal Drugs at the Source;” (2) “Attacking the Flow of Drugs in Transit;” and (3) “Attacking the Distribution and Use of Illegal Drugs in the United States.”4
This thinking comes closest to Weinberger’s test of a clearly defined military objective. In this case, therefore, the more appropriate question is not whether the military objective is clear, but whether the military objective is justified. Is the United States justified in using military force against an economic force inside the borders of a foreign country—regardless of that country’s desires? Is
the United States justified in using military force on the high seas °r along borders to confiscate goods that the United States (and other nations) may have declared illegal but which pose no military threat to the United States? Is it appropriate—indeed, safe to our nation’s freedom and the survival of the Constitution—to use military force inside our borders in opposition to an economic threat?
The answer to all of these questions is an unequivocal “no.”
Thus, even if counternarcotics operations ■nay satisfy the “clear uiilitary objective” of Weinberger’s third test,
>n this case the military °bjective itself is inappropriate. We must follow Weinberger’s advice and . . should not commit °ur forces at all.”
Test Number Four
The relationship between our objectives and the size, composition and disposition of our forces must be continually reassessed and adjusted as necessary. In the course of a conflict, conditions and objectives inevitably change. When they do, so must our combat requirements.
In the United States a few small indications show that the national drug strategy may be having an effect. Teenage drug use, for example, is down.5 The overall situation, however, remains extremely pessimistic. The national drug arrest rate over the past decade more than doubled from 256 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1980 to more than 526 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1989. Similarly, domestic arrests rose about 96% in five years—from 13,126 in 1984 to 25,718 in 1989. Other measures of effectiveness of counternarcotics operations rose in a similar fashion.6
For all these objective measures, however, U.S. success at countering drug production, trafficking, and consumption continues to be dismal. According to an annual report released by the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board in 1991, “Drug trafficking was on the 'acrease around the world, and . . . the drug abuse situation worldwide remains grim. . . ,”7 Indeed, dissatisfaction at the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy—the organization created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to coordinate all federal agencies participating in counternarcotics operations—may be a reflection of the nation’s inability to stop an economic force with police and military force. “‘Morale,’ says one current staff member, ‘is in the sewer.’”8
Weinberger’s fourth point states that forces should be adjusted as conditions change. But the increases in drug-fighting budgets, greater attention and publicity, and increased “success” at intercepting drugs have failed to accomplish any measurable reduction in illicit drug use.9 Reflecting on the relative failure of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, the inclination is to think that if progressively turning up the heat has failed over the past decade, the strategy itself is indeed flawed. As Weinberger suggests, it is time to reevaluate and adjust. In this case, as in Vietnam, adjustment may be achieved best by withdrawing our “combat” forces, and looking seriously to other solutions.
The other option—turning the nation into a police state with militarily sealed borders—is certainly not a palatable alternative for the world’s leading nation of freedom and democracy. As a 1990 report by The Drug Policy Foundation states, “Since the eight decades of trying to control people’s choice in the use of various substances has failed, the U.S. government has moved toward a more militaristic drug policy at home and abroad.” The more we try, and the more we fail, the more the spiral of violence and war escalates. As Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman said in a recent plea to former drug czar William Bennett:
Every friend of Freedom, and I know you are one, must be as revolted as I am by the prospect of turning the United States into an armed camp, by the vision of jails filled with casual drug users and of an army of enforcers empowered to invade the liberty of citizens on slight evidence. A country in which shooting down unidentified planes ‘on suspicion’ can be seriously considered as a drug war tactic is not the kind of United States that either you or I want to hand on to future generations.
Test Number Five
Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, the U.S. government should have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people and their elected representatives in the Congress. Of course, this does not mean we should wait upon a public opinion poll. The public elects a president as a leader, not a follower. He takes an oath to protect and defend the Constitution. The people also expect a Congress sworn to the same principles and duties. To that end, the president and the leadership of the Congress must build the public consensus necessary to protect our vital interests. Sustainability of public support cannot be achieved unless the government is candid in making clear why our vital interests are threatened, and how, by the use, and only by the use of American military forces, we can achieve a clear, worthy goal. U.S. troops cannot be asked to fight a battle with the Congress at home while attempting to win a war overseas. Nor will the American people sit by and watch U.S. troops committed as expendable pawns on some grand diplomatic chessboard.
The inappropriateness of administering this test to coun- temarcotics operations is perhaps most telling here. Polls show a strong consensus that the drug problem is serious and that the government should play an active role in the solution. In one poll a strong 87% considered the drug problem “very serious,” while 94% saw the nation’s crime rate as being pushed up by illegal drug use.10 When it came to solutions, however, opinions were less clear. Strategies other than the drug war—such as decriminalization—reveal how Americans view the situation. For example, in the same poll, more than a quarter of Americans did not think that decriminalization would make things worse, while nearly half (48%) felt that crime would not increase if drug use were legalized. In a separate poll, a significant 35% disagreed with the statement, “All drug use is immoral and should be illegal,” while 38% indicated that “Adults should be allowed to make their own decisions about drug use.”11
With these kinds of numbers questioning the current strategy, it is difficult to imagine how the government can, “. . . [make] clear why our vital interests are threatened, and how, by the use, and only by the use of American military forces, we can achieve a clear, worthy goal.” This, however, is what Weinberger’s fifth test requires.
The public may support the war on drugs at the present low levels, since it does not have a visible impact on the average citizen. It is questionable, however, whether the public would support turning the nation into the isolated police state that would be required to all but stop the flow of drugs. Therefore, it follows that countemarcotics operations fail Weinberger’s fifth test.
Test Number Six
The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort—only after diplomatic, political, economic,
and other efforts have been made to protect our vital interests.
Essentially, the test cannot be applied to a social problem where no opposing political force exists. This test also fails, because, in U.S. efforts to solve the drug problem, many other solutions have not yet been tried or—- in some cases such as decriminalization—even seriously considered. No one can claim that the government has tried all other strategies and must thus use its “last resort.”
Conclusion
Weinberger makes it clear that his six tests should not be “. . . applied mechanically or deductively.”12 He states that each case will require judgment and that a certain degree of subjectivity will be involved. In the case of the “drug war,” a preponderance of evidence shows that most, if not all, of his six tests are not met.
Armed forces are designed and intended to be used as an extension of political force. If this has any truth, then a clear political force is needed if armed force is to be applied appropriately. In a social problem, such as drug use and trafficking, no such political force exists. Thus, the application of armed force is clearly inappropriate.”
Americans want a solution to the current drug problem, and they want that solution to come from government. The shape of the U.S. drug strategy requires more debate and the thoughtful consideration of alternative, and perhaps more novel, approaches. The ideal strategy is not clear. What is clear is that the U.S. armed forces have no place in that strategy.
‘Mr. Weinberger originally articulated the six major tests in an address to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. They were subsequently restated in Foreign Affairs magazine. See Caspar W. Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, Issue 4, Spring 1986, pp. 684-690.
2Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, Campaign Planning and the Drug War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. February 1991).
3Col. Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (NeW York: Dell Publishing Co., 1982), p. 131.
4Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Con- gress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992), pp- 103-104.
'“The Bad-News Drug Czar,” U.S. News and World Report, 10 February 1992.
p- 33; . .
6Statistical Abstract of the United States, 111th Edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S-
Bureau of the Census, 1991), p. 184.
7“Facts on File,” Vol. 52, No. 2672, 6 February 1992.
"“The Bad-News Drug Czar,” op. cit., p. 33.
Ibid.
‘"“Public Opinion on the Drug Problem,” The Gallup Poll, January 1990.
"Arnold S. Trebach and Kevin B. Zeese, Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations (Washington, D.C.: The Drug Policy Foundation, 1990), p. 226. l2Weinberger, op. cit., p. 685.
‘'Occasional exceptions to this rule exist—the use of military troops to control the 1992 civil unrest in Los Angeles being a recent example—but these are usually emergent or disastrous in nature and are limited to very short duration and localized areas. Military force is used only as a quick fix and not a long-term solution. Countemarcotics operations, as currently conducted, can in no way be considered short-term.
Dr. Hamilton is a retired businessman and professor of chemistry living in Dallas, Texas. He is a combat veteran who saw action in the crossing of the Rhine and the Battle of the Ardennes in 1944. He holds nine military decorations, including the Bronze Star.