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The U.S. Needs a Commercial-Military Submarine
By Captain Laurence P. Gebhardt, U.S. Navy (Retired)
A dual-purpose commercial-military submarine tanker could offer the best of both worlds to industry and the fleet—secure, rapid movement of fuel, unhampered by weather.
Oil reserves accessible by land are dwindling. In December 1992, North America had but 3.9% of the world’s proved oil reserves, while the Middle East has more than 65%. Despite efficiencies, population-driven oil consumption continues to rise, now over 65 million barrels per day. Developing countries want their share. Oil companies are scouring the globe, pinning their future on finding large overseas fields.
Abundant oil does exist in the ocean sea beds off the coasts of the United States, Canada, and Russia, but it is largely inaccessible by conventional means and there is little economic incentive to develop it while supplies from the Organization of Oil-Producing Countries (OPEC) are plentiful and prices are low.
Massive seabed-to-surface and tall tension-leg platforms are expensive and not feasible in deep or arctic waters.
A submarine tanker undersea oil-access system may sound far-fetched but, if some say it can’t be done, others are doing it.
Radio Moscow World Service reported on 2 May 1993 that the state company Rosshelf will use nuclear submarines for the transport of oil recovered from the Russian arctic. One of the submarine tankers, to be built at Severomorsk over the next five to six years, will be 238 meters long and carry 30,000 tons of oil. Canada is investing $12 billion to develop the Hibernia sea bed oil field off the coast of Newfoundland. Why are the Russians and Canadians investing in this technology while the United States watches from the sidelines—a mere observer?
If nations continue to operate largely on a hydrocarbon-based energy system— likely for decades to come—then increased reliance on overseas oil means increased vulnerability. Overseas oil is controlled, and thus potentially expensive at the supply point; and it is vulnerable to terrorist attack at tank farms, terminals, and enroute in large, conventional tankers. The Kuwaiti oilfield fires during the Gulf War were difficult to extinguish.
Current legislation precludes drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska and in the shallow sea beds off the East and West coasts of the United States. Hurricane Andrew destroyed southern coast platforms. The U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization have responded to recurring tanker groundings, fires and spills by mandating costly improvements and guidelines for safer tanker design, crew proficiency, and operating restrictions on tankers entering populated areas.
According to Mobil Oil Chairman Allen E. Murray, “Barring a miracle, this nation can never be self-sufficient in (hydrocarbon) energy again.” Should our nation be more energy independent? Could submarine technologies provide a low-risk, cost-effective answer?
Rationale for a submarine tanker. The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences summarized impressive economic opportunities in the 3.9 billion acres of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) sea beds: More then 12% of domestic oil and more than 25% of domestic gas come from sea bed wells—and these percentages are rising as land sources diminish or become too expensive to recover.
It is time to consider dual-use submarines—safe, secure, advanced transportation, exploration and resource-recovery vessels— as a means for the United States to attain energy independence while helping other aspects of defense economic conversion. Vice Admiral Bruce Demars, U.S. Navy, has characterized nuclear-powered submarines as . . expensive to build, but cheap to operate. They are cost effective.” Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has clearly articulated the need to preserve the nation’s submarine building capacity. Economic missions for U.S. nuclear submarines can provide the singular solution for the nation’s interrelated oil resource problems.
Submarine oil transportation is not a new idea- During World War II, The German Navy used “milch cow” submarine tankers to extend U-boat range- In the 1960s, when nuclear propulsion and new life-support systems permitted long-term submerged and under-ice missions, the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers reported on submarine tanker feasibility, recognizing that any fluid or slurry could be carried in tanks- Patents exist for oil-well drilling sub'
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litical, military, and economic realities, however, have kept nuclear-powered submarines from any dual-use commercial-military
marines, and many submarine robots tethered to surface ships operate now to service sea-bed oil platforms and wells in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea. and elsewhere.
When Arctic oil reserves were proved, Electric Boat bought full-page advertising in The New York Times, advocating a submarine-tanker alternative to the now-deteriorating Alaska pipeline. Porole until now.
New design concepts promote a complete undersea mission. Drilling could be done conventionally or with submarine technology; extraction of oil would be performed at seabed wellheads. All loading and unloading operations would be conducted beneath the surface—in all Weather, any time of day. Low-light television cameras, and precision mooring control and arresting-gear can safely handle the large but neutrally buoyant submarines. The oil would be delivered to a protected seabed facility placed safely away from regular shipping channels. Because oil transfer and transportation system pressures would remain below sea- pressure, there would be no external leakage.
Submerged transit is safe. Submarines can maneuver in three dimensions to avoid danger, and submarines in deep Water are unaffected by the weather on the surface.
The U.S. government has invested heavily in outer-space research and development for more than 30 years and NASA continues to tout elusive commercial benefits. Much less elusive are the benefits that would accrue from developing the proved “inner space.” Thanks to the Navy’s hard-earned experience, the investment would be low risk.
The new design concepts are adaptable •o an existing or new submarine hull and can be tested as a defense-conversion initiative. Additional and interrelated technical, military and economic factors support prototype development for proof of concept:
^ Surface-submarine volume comparisons. Future tanker volumes may be reduced up to 50% as a result of new middeck regulations requiring that all transported oil be carried below the waterline—as is done in submarines. A study made as long ago as 1960 showed that a 40,000-ton oil cargo was feasible. Materials and construction techniques have improved considerably since then, and innovative tank systems will increase submarine capacity.
> Annual lift. Submarine speeds, and operations unconstrained by weather or ice, can yield annual transported volumes far exceeding surface tanker capability— for the same fleet size—because more trips can be made.
>■ Life-cycle costs. Building and operating high-quality, double-hull surface tankers is expensive, and life-cycle fuel costs increase when ships must be rerouted to avoid bad weather. Deep-draft tankers can no longer enter some ports, e.g.. Providence, Rhode Island, because of dredging limits; oil is shuttled in multiple high-risk transfer operations or new offshore loading facilities—subject to storm, collision, or terrorists—must be constructed. Submarines are designed to last at least 30 years, commercial tankers rarely more than 15. These factors confirm the claim that nuclear-powered submarines are cost effective.
>■ Jobs and the industrial base. Most commercial tankers are manufactured by foreign countries. U.S. produced submarine tankers would preserve building, operating and maintenance jobs in both the shipbuilding and oil industries of our nation. A fleet of submarine tankers could justify retention of not only a larger submarine industrial base but also naval and overhaul facilities.
> Operational hedge. Navy-crewed submarine tankers may not be glamorous duty, but the overall larger pool of qualified, experienced submarine sailors would be a hedge against new threats that might expanding the submarine force.
> Dual use. A Navy-crewed submarine tanker could quickly shift to a fleet support role, providing highspeed, covert and survivable refueling at sea or delivery of aviation or land vehicle fuel. Survivability. Terrorists will not find it easy to atattack a submerged submarine.
► Window on the future. Dual-use submarine technologies will help revive Navy and national deep-submergence programs. Manned deep-diving, bottom-mobile or sophisticated robotic underwater vehicles married to research or tanker submarines support seabed terrain special warfare, littoral, and mine warfare as well as commercially oriented research and development.
Congress clearly recognizes changing threats to national security. The Defense Conversion, Reinvestment and Transition Assistance Act of 1992, included as Division D of the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Act—passed and funded last year—contains findings, policy, and several mandates related to economic agendas complementing military strategy. Congressional policy links resources such as hydrocarbon energy to national security. Provisions to accomplish policy and statutory mandates are laid out in general terms to preserve critical portions of the defense industrial base (submarines); reduce dependence on foreign sources (oil) that could render military forces vulnerable; provide alternate sources (seabed oil resources); and develop advanced transportation (innovative submarine oil tankers).
These mandates apply not only to the Department of Defense, but also to the new National Defense Technology and Industrial Base Policy Council made up of the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Commerce, and Labor. Congress is willing to fund searches for new methods and legal rules to merge the defense and commercial industrial base wherever appropriate. The Advanced Researched Projects Agency (ARPA) Technology Reinvestment Project is one part of that experiment.
The Navy supports using nuclear submarines for research. It would be only a small step to add development for national economic purposes. New initiatives by the National Shipbuilding Research Project, a joint ARPA and Maritime Administration effort, may provide additional funding.
There is no reason not to proceed with a dual-use submarine tanker and sea-bed oil access system. The system design concepts, including sea-bed arresting and mooring equipment, control systems, piping and transfer connections, etc., have already been patented and are ready for development by industry professionals. Choice of an existing submarine hull for adaptation or an entirely new design could emerge from round-table discussions of Navy, oil industry, shipbuilding, environmental, and academic experts under the direction of the Carderock Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, the Federal laboratory for new submarines.
The added industry and academic members become a critical military technology partnership as defined in the legislation and the conceptual design-to-pro- totype test sequence could take place during the planned submarine building lapse as an additional industrial base hedge.
Naysayers may be jolted soon by reading about Texaco or Exxon hiring contract submarine tanker services from the Russians.
Captain Gebhardt is pursuing doctoral studies in the management of innovation and technology. He served on five U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarines and spent nearly five years in command at sea.
Long-Range Bombers Can Support Naval Aviation
By Major John Barnett, U.S. Air Force, and Major Herb Henderson, U.S. Air Force
Despite the lack of a clearly defined enemy, the United States will continue to rely primarily on the Navy to defend its rights to global navigation in pursuit of free trade. Yet, the proliferation of advanced weaponry to developing nations combined with declining defense appropriations clearly will strain the Navy’s ability to guarantee those rights. The combination of these forces compels a fresh look at the resources available to support naval combat operations. One of the most powerful and flexible of these resources is the strategic bomber.
The transfer of weapons technology, especially nuclear technology, could spawn a serious regional threat to U.S. interests in only minutes. This threat is further exacerbated by the increased flow to the Third World of chemical and biological weapons, short- and intermediate- range ballistic missiles, modem surface combatants, advanced sensors and improved command, control and communications systems (C3), long-range combat aircraft, advanced cruise missiles, and submarines. Thus, an emerging regional maritime power, deploying marginal blue- water-capable forces, could impede or block the flow of shipping, raw materials, oil, or other strategic minerals.
The 21st century U.S. Navy, smaller and perhaps less muscular, will sail into harm’s way facing the most lethal array of threats it has ever faced—but modem strategic bombers can help it to prevail. Naval strategists have long recognized the threat that Soviet Backfire bombers could pose to the fleet, but two can play the same game. Because of their relative youth and numbers, U.S. Air Force B-lBs probably will do the yeoman’s share of strategic heavy bombing. While focusing specifically on the B-l, the examples presented here can be extended to the B-2 and B-52 as well.
The strategic bomber’s hallmark is delivering heavy firepower at long range. A heavy bomber launched from the continental United States can be on target anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere, and the northern half of the Southern Hemisphere, in 12 to 18 hours flying time. Operating from forward locations such as Guam, Diego Garcia, or the Azores, the reaction time would be proportionately less. By combining speed, low-level flight, stealth, and standoff weapons, heavy bombers can attack targets successfully in low- to medium- threat environments with little or no support from other tactical aircraft.
As with all bombing platforms, the ideal target for the heavy bomber is a fixed target, with known coordinates, elevation, and construction. As standoff and precision munitions are incorporated into the heavy bomber’s weapons load, it will be able to attack hardened and mobile targets more effectively. Given that the Navy’s primary attack aircraft have limited unrefueled range when carrying external stores, heavy bombers can threaten targets that lie well inland of the littoral areas.
Targets appropriate to heavy bomber and initially critical to a sustained naval presence include C3 facilities, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapon- production sites, and satellite downlink terminals. Should the conflict broaden, the target list would expand to fighter- bomber bases, ballistic-missile sites, lines of communication, and massed troops. Such targets can be destroyed by only one or two heavy bombers, versus twelve or more fighter/attack aircraft.
Current B-1B characteristics include:
► Range—about 5,000 nautical-mile unrefueled range
► Speed—420 knots high-altitude cruise, 600 knots low-altitude cruise
► Weapons load—24 heavy (2,000-pound class) weapons carried internally on rotary launchers, or 84 Mk 82 500-pound bombs, also carried internally, which reduces both drag and radar cross section (RCS).
> Defensive systems—On-board defensive systems officer, extensive radar warning capability, terminal jamming, chaff, flares
> Low-altitude flight—automatic terrain following (TF) flight using TF radar system coupled into the autopilot. This reduces crew fatigue—not to mention the probability of flying into the ground- while flying long distances at low altitude. Training sorties normally include a two-three hour low-level flight period at 400-600 feet altitude.
> Crew—With four crew members (pilot, copilot, offensive systems officer [OSO], defensive systems officer [DSO]), the crew can bomb and defend while flying at low level using terrain following. Crew specialization means that there is less chance of getting overwhelmed during low-level combat sorties.
The B-lB’s Cold-War strategic deterrence role is shifting to that of a conventional attack-bombing aircraft. Heavy bombers have been transferred from the Strategic Air Command to the Air Combat Command and are scheduled for modifications that will enable them to employ more advanced conventional munitions- Among those under considerations are: Mk 84 2,000-pound bombs, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the Joint Stand-Off Weapon, (JSOW), and the Tri-Service Stand-Off Attack Missile (TSSAM).
Heavy bombers can support the Navy for several specific missions; some of these—mining and amphibious operations—can be done today while others such as antisurface warfare, convoy com' bat air patrol, and counter-maritime patrol operations are contingent on aircraft modifications.
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Mining operations. A single B-1B can carry 84 500-pound mines and quickly sovv a sizable minefield. One aircraft is a much more low-key operation than a squadron of smaller aircraft. Adapting the i-SOW to carry the Mk 36 destructor mine "'ould permit B-l aircraft to launch mines >nto harbors from miles offshore. B-ls Using night TF techniques could conduct Covert operations.
If covert mining is not required, a few S-ls could drop a considerable number °f mines very quickly; a submarine might take several days to get into position to Place mines, and would have to sacrifice some of its torpedo or missile load.
Amphibious operations. An amphibi- °us landing is an ambitious task. Once the immediate threats to the fleet have been eliminated, the landing force must he brought ashore to establish a beachhead. Preventing enemy forces from isolating and destroying the beachhead usually falls to carrier aviation. Some enemy forces and installations, however, may be so far inland that attacking them becomes a severe strain for carrier aviation.
These deep-strike and heavy-strike Missions are the bombers’ forte. Scheduled missions launched from the conti- Uental United States or forward locations Could interdict roads, bridges, and other fines of communication leading into the Ending area, in support of the actual 'undings.
Heavy bombers could hit strategic targets—enemy forces and facilities that do not pose an immediate threat to the landing force. Destroying these targets would have a broad effect on overall enemy efforts: communications, transportation, fuel storage facilities, electrical power, ammunition dumps, and like targets would support not only the amphibious landing but also sustained operations against the enemy.
The future. The B-1B fleet is not currently scheduled to carry high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs). Harpoon air-to-surface missiles, or air-to-air missiles. With some modifications (mostly software), however, B-1 Bs could employ them very effectively. Some imaginative scenarios include:
Antisurface warfare—the submarine/ B-1B wolfpack. Certainly a major advantage of the attack submarine is its ability to operate silently and detect and track surface vessels (targets). Once it detects the ships, however, the submarine has to attack them, which is not as quiet a proposition.
Upon commencing an attack, the submarine may become the target and, faced with an unescorted high-speed convoy, a submarine without a vertical launch system has relatively few weapons to use against a large number of ships.
Conversely, a flight of B-lBs can carry more antiship missiles than most submarines. A flight of six aircraft carrying Harpoons could launch enough weapons
Long-range, land-based bombers can offer fleet commanders many options: support for amphibious operations plus additional antisurface and antisubmarine warfare and convoy escort assets. It makes no difference if the aircraft have “U.S. Air Force” painted on their sides.
into a group of surface ships to overwhelm their antiair defenses. The bombers’ long range means they would be able to cover the entire ocean, wherever attack subs and enemy surface groups would operate. Sound farfetched? A naval officer suggested this mission.
Consider the following scenario: A nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) detects a large enemy convoy with a substantial ASW escort in, say, the central Pacific. The submarine sends a contact report, which triggers a launch of B-lBs standing antishipping alert in Southern California. The SSN continues to shadow the surface ships and send updates. In approximately six hours, the bombers are within Harpoon range of the enemy ships. With a final contact report to determine the exact position of the enemy, the bombers launch their Harpoons beyond the range of surface-to-air missiles, and— since it is the central Pacific—far beyond enemy fighter range.
The effect on the enemy surface group would be devastating. If the B-ls were
Reconstitute Naval Shipyards
By Lieutenant Commander Ronald W. Lubatti, U.S. Navy
able to launch under without radiating any electronic emissions from below the radar horizon, there is a good chance the attack would achieve complete surprise. Antisubmarine warfare discipline would go over the side; with missiles coming in, missiles going out, and close- in weapon systems set to automatic, ASW helicopter operations would be impossible—an ideal time for the SSN to sneak in and attack the high-value targets.
Considering the number of antiship missiles launched, at least some should be leakers through the air-defense curtain; many of the enemy ships would be damaged, at least. The SSN skipper would have time to decide whether to add his own antiship missiles to the fray, or to take out the survivors one by one.
In this scenario, the submarine commander has the firepower of missile- loaded bombers at his disposal, but also can use his own weapons to respond to the changing situation and attack targets of opportunity. In this instance he is like a ground commander who has “on-call” artillery to blanket the enemy, yet can use precision-guided munitions to take out selected high-priority targets.
Convoy combat air patrol. While air- to-air missiles are not currently envisioned for its weapons program, the B-1B does have an inherent air-to-air capability. Its APQ-164 multimode offensive radar system is based on the F-16’s APG-66 radar. Modifying weapons racks and software cold turn the B-1B into an interceptor capable of launching up to 24 AIM-7, AIM- 120, or even Phoenix air-to-air missiles. Two or three B-ls on convoy combat air patrol could break up an antiship bomber raid. With target information data-linked from E-2Cs or F-14s, B-lBs could deliver devastating broadside attacks from un
With the end of the Cold War, skyrocketing construction costs, strategic arms limitations and political pressure to cut defense spending, the United States must now confront the challenge of change while carefully maintaining a well-balanced defense. For the U.S. Navy, defense will be based on two fundamental foundations: the number of ships and submarines at sea (a number clearly destined to decrease) and the underlying strength of the U.S. defense industrial base of which the shipbuilding and repair industry comprises a major element. Even before peace broke out, the inexpected quarters. This option should be seriously considered, should the bomber, or air-launched cruise-missile threat reemerge on the world scene..
Counter-ASW patrol. Imagine a long- range B-1B armed with 16 air-to-air missiles patrolling thousands of miles at sea hunting hostile ASW aircraft. Using onboard electronic-support measures to detect, radar to track, and missiles to attack, a B-1B would pose a severe threat to any ASW—or reconnaissance—aircraft operating outside the enemy’s protective fighter cover. Such a combat air patrol would grant U.S. SSNs—and surface ships—freedom to operate throughout most of the oceans.
These “F/B-IBs” would carry a fuel tank in one weapons bay and missiles in the other two. With luck, the targets would never know what hit them.
Air taskforce Concept. The Air Force could take a page from the Navy’s book by forming air task forces:
> A heavy task force could consist of all long-range aircraft that could launch from U.S. main operating bases to support operations halfway around the globe. It would tend to operate where the threat of enemy fighters was low, since its aircraft would not always have fighter coverage. It might consist of the following aircraft:
Command and control—an EC-135, E-6, or E-3 airborne warning and control system aircraft to act as a flagship, with the task force commander, communications, and a small battle staff.
Aerial refueling—KC-135s or KC-lOs, underway replenishment for the task force.
Weapons carriers—B-lBs or B-52s, carrying whatever weapons the mission requires: bombs, air-to-surface missiles, dustry had started on its long and unavoidable path toward decline. In a major government study in 1980, "The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis,” the House Armed Services Committee concluded that “the general condition of the defense industrial base has deteriorated and is in danger of further deterioration in the coming years.” The increase in the number of ship deactivations coupled with the declining number of new-construction vessels on the launch ways will place additional stress on an already fragile industrial base.
During the Cold War, it could be armines, HARMS, or decoys.
Special-purpose aircraft—RC-135 electronic-reconnaissance aircraft, for example, might be required to search for surface forces or identify and designate land based radars for the task force.
>■ A combined air task force could consist of long-range aircraft launched from the continental United States or a forward operating base that would rendezvous with carrier-based aircraft. The carrier aircraft would have the advantage of the larger tankers to extend their range and allow a heavier weapons load, and the heavy aircraft would have the advantage of carrier aircraft providing fighter support, suppression of enemy air defense, stand-off jamming, etc.
These air task forces could provide an immediate response to a quickly developing crisis anywhere in the world. They could provide either political presence of a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike that would pave the way for a carrier battle group and follow-on forces.
Historically, a lot of so-called harebrained ideas later became war-winning tactics—and future challenges also may require creative solutions. Some of the less-traditional uses for heavy bombers introduced here could become valuable-' or even essential—in future conflicts- Using heavy bombers as long-range strike support for naval shore operations is an efficient method of enhancing combat capability, especially in an era when integrated operations can compensate for reduced forces.
Major Barnett is a B-IB defensive systems officer- at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. Major Henderson, a senior navigator formerly with the 28th Bomb Win? at Ellsworth, is assigned to the Air Mobility Com' mand at Scott AFB, Illinois.
gued reasonably that the primary mission of a Naval shipyard was to serve the flee1 and its secondary function was to provide a mobilization base to support a major buildup, geared to the Soviet threat. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall has changed the rules of the game, however- General Colin L. Powell, former Chair' man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put re' constitution in these terms to Congress- “This requires us to maintain the capac' ity to reconstitute a large, effective de' fense capability, if the need should arise- Preserving this potential will require fore' sight in protecting the infrastructure-
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Norfolk Naval Shipyard (above) should be established as the Navy’s major East Coast shipyard: Puget Sound can fill the same bill on the West Coast. Maintaining a force-in-being of skilled workers is the key to reconstitution.
stockpiling critical material, protecting the defense industrial base, investing in basic science and high-payoff technologies, and constituting Reserve units adaptable to activation as the mission dictates.”
A joint Navy-Maritime Administration Shipyard Mobilization Base study in 1981 concluded that a shipyard mobilization base should:
^ Ensure that ships of the naval fleet can be maintained in a high degree of Material readiness.
^ In peacetime, retain sufficient capability to maintain or increase the size of the naval ship fleet.
^ In time of conflict, be capable of handling activation, overhaul, repair, and battle damage of naval ships. v Ensure that the shipbuilding base provides the capability to build combatants to wartime requirements.
The following points must also be considered when defining a mobilization/in- dustrial base:
^ Provide a responsive and geographically dispersed industrial capability in support of fleet readiness.
^ Ensure sustained support ot highly complex and classified workloads.
^ Ensure that designated shipyards are ready for rapid expansion to support combat operations.
In basic terms, high-quality service to the fleet will continue to be an important function of a Naval shipyard. At the national level, however, reconstitution has taken on an increasingly important role and this must be factored into the overall defense posture in terms of keeping Naval shipyards healthy. Achieving this capability can be accomplished in three major phases at three major levels of involvement:
Level /, Phase I: Naval shipyards. Naval shipyards must become self-sufficient and able to compete with the lean and hungry private shipyards. Extremely high man-day rates—compared to those at private yards, will continue to challenge Naval shipyards. In addition, regional political groups will demand that a fair share of naval ship-repair work be assigned to private shipyards. It is conceivable that Trident and Los Angeles
(SSN-688)-class nuclear-powered submarine overhauls, initially slated for overhaul at Naval shipyards, could be put up for public-private bids.
Naval shipyards can compete by: continuing the aggressive implementation of project management, intensifying cross training of shop/trade personnel, facing up to reductions in force commensurate with project workload and with an emphasis on a reduction in overhead positions, and meeting or exceeding corporate operations strategy and plan goals established by the Naval Sea Systems Command.
The shift to project management is significant in that it changes the very nature of the way business will be conducted in Naval shipyards. The old organization was aligned to a functional approach; project management, however, emphasizes the product—an approach aggressively used in the strategies of national and international corporations.
In the past, a Senior Ship Superintendent (not an unusual position for a first- tour lieutenant/lieutenant-commander) was given the responsibility for completing an assigned availability on time and within cost, this position, however, had no authority over the shops or personnel. Direct line authority was maintained by the general foremen who reported to the shop superintendent. In addition, closing out a job order—a key factor in cost control—was controlled by the lead shop assigned to complete the work. Without direct line authority, the Senior Ship Superintendent started the difficult task at a major disadvantage.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover once said that “Responsibility is a unique concept: it can only reside and inhere in a single individual. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.” Under the functional organization of a Naval shipyard, no one person was really responsible for the overall strategy and completion of a specific project. The Senior Ship Superintendent had little, or no direct line authority, the Repair Officer spent time on all of the projects on the waterfront, and the group and shop superintendents concentrated on their lead shop assignments via general foremen who were assigned to multiple availabilities or shifted as the priorities were changed.
The shift to project management clearly delineates the person responsible for overall project strategy from advanced planning to vessel delivery; it is the project superintendent.
Cross training is one way to do more with fewer personnel—who will become increasingly valuable as shipyards scale down. The goal must be to keep the skilled trades actively employed by the project management team, instead of allowing them to work on another task that merely adds to the overhead costs. Specific trade categories in which initial cross training can begin because of similarities between the trades include: Shop X31/Shop X38 (Inside Machine Shop/Outside Machine Shop); Shop X26/Shop Xll (Welders/Shipfitters); Shop X51/Shop X67 (Electrical/Electronics); and Shop Xll/Shop X56 (Shipfitters/ Pipefitters).
Reductions in force must target overhead positions in order to keep skilled craftsmen and women on the waterfront. If historical precedents have any validity at all, the most critical constraint during reconstitution will be the number of skilled craftsmen available at the time of national emergency.
If there is one lesson to be understood by the Navy, it is what happened at Electric Boat, in Groton and New London, Connecticut, during the early 1970s as described by Patrick Tyler in his book Running Critical: “We (General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division) have added a large number of new facilities and have also added a great many new people to the Electric Boat rolls in the past few months. The record shows that the total output of the yard on the 688 contract has not increased at all, even though the number of people assigned to many of the ships have been increased by one hundred percent or more. The warning bells are everywhere. We have seen our schedules slipping, our cost-to- complete increasing and we have been hit by several quality control problems simultaneously.”
The final challenge is to meet or exceed fiscal goals established by the Naval Sea Systems Command. Failure to meet established corporate goals will result in higher man-day rates and progressively larger fiscal goals in the future.
Level II, Phase II—Naval Sea Systems Command. The next level of involvement in the drive to establish a reconstitution ability for Naval shipyards must come from the Naval Sea Systems Command and associated shipyard boards of directors. Specific overhead functions that are germane to all Naval shipyards must be transferred to a single cost accounting center or business operating center that will serve all Naval shipyards. Currently, every Naval shipyard is self-sustaining with a large core of personnel assigned to overhead positions of which the planning and estimating department, business office, and the comptroller constitute the largest segments.
Ideally, major portions of these functions should be transferred to one central business operating center. The net result would be a reduction in thousands of overhead positions while still providing the Naval shipyards with the same services. Man-day rates at Naval shipyards would also be significantly decreased, thus helping to make the Naval shipyards competitive with private yards.
Computer linkups with the Naval shipyards via the business operating center, supported by the Naval Sea System Command’s advanced industrial management program (AIM), can achieve this. The AIM program seeks to automate the entire process by improving the major areas of industrial management by integrating technology with innovative job packaging processes. These would include all references into the job order, schedule sequences that are networked to specific work zones, certification data bases that will be easier to track and maintain, etc. Naval shipyards with on-site local area networks will be able to access advanced planning documents, schedules, and complete jobs directly from the businss operating center.
The advanced program is destined to become the Naval shipyard business tool of the future. Standardizing forms and documents in Naval shipyards is one of the keys, since standardized formats will permit a smooth transition to the advanced system by ensuring a universal data base that can be shared among all of the shipyards via the business operating center.
Level III, Phase III—National level. Congress must provide the required funding to support the transition to a single business operating center and future base realignment and closure commissions must realize the advantages that would accrue from the transfer of duplicate overhead functions to one center. Another option, in conjunction with the formation of a single center, would be to downgrade a certain number of naval shipyards to ship repair facilities. A facility would be smaller and its overhead services would be carried by the business operating center. This would allow us to keep as many skilled workers in place as possible—the critical factor during reconstitution.
The initiatives discussed must be in place prior to the 1995 round of base closures: the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard is slated to close that year, and this year’s round recommended closing the Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards. The recommended new shipyard structure, if implemented, will:
> Establish Norfolk, Virginia, as the major East Coast shipyard with a supporting facility at Portsmouth, New Hampshire
>■ Establish Puget Sound, Washington, as the major West Coast shipyard with a supporting facility at Long Beach, California
► Establish Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as a forward-deployed facility
Failure to complete the key initiatives will likely result in additional shipyard closures that will weaken reconstitution ability when the results of the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission are announced.
The military-industrial complex of the United States is no longer in balance with the national economic situation. As the nation continues to address the current budget crisis, reconstitution has emerged as the best option to maintain security, given the projected reduction in overall forces. The aggressive implementation of key initiatives just discussed will ensure a future reconstitution ability:
Naval shipyards and facilities can do more with less and can become competitive with private shipyards. But we must act now.
Commander Lubatti is the Planning Officer at the Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, Washington. He has served as an assistant weapons officer on the USS Sam Rayburn (SSBN-635), as a test engi- neer/director at Cape Canaveral and as a lead shipboard coordinator at Superintendent of Ships, Groton, Connecticut.
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By Commander Russell G. Acree, Jr., U.S. Navy, and Scott C. Truver
At the climax of what was then called the “Revolution at Sea,” Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare (0p-03), who believed that people should lead, follow, or get out of the way, said: “This is not a job just for the admirals. This revolution is an all-hands working party, committed for the long- pull.” Much of the revolution has been overtaken by evolutionary pressures, but there remain vestiges that are just reaching the fleet.
The Aegis Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM) development initiative jointly carried out for surface warfare by the Aegis Program Office and the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Activity (NESEA), St. Inigoes, Maryland, is one such remnant. Embodying the philosophy of “build-a-little, test-a-little, learn-a-lot,” the initiative is in position to lead surface warfare, the rest of the Navy, and the Department of Defense into the arena of 21st-century technical data support systems.
NESEA, the in-service engineering agent for Aegis warship communications and electronics, in 1986 began assessing methods to improve shipboard document publication and use. The need for such a capability had already been recognized, if for no other reason than to decrease the staggering volume and weight of documents held on board ships. USS Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis cruisers, for example, carry almost 36 tons of paper and associated containers, 65% of which is above the main deck. This translates into a storage requirement of nearly 1,800 cubic feet, which in turn has a considerable impact upon ship stability. Small wonder that the Ship Operational Characteristics Study in 1988 concluded that reducing on-board paper would contribute to a surface warship’s ability to put ordnance on target:
“The surface combatant of the early 21st century will be an information intensive ship. It will be necessary to reduce data storage volume requirements, improve the quality of support data, and reduce the data handling workload. The information of concern includes tactical data, technical data, maintenance related support and reporting system data, and administrative data such as that for personnel, training, and pay records ... the opportunity to decrease overhead (nonwarfighting) volume and weight is real . . . The study added that any replacement system must reduce weight and volume without compromising ease of retrieval.
Compact disk/read-only memory (CD-
You're looking at an Interactive Electronic Technical Manual display on the USS Anzio (CG-68)—success to date portends that the equipment will be installed throughout the fleet.
Radio Communication System Guided Missile Cruiser CG 68
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Antenna Group
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STSHIP SYSTEM 9 Exterior fl Communications 1 440 | SUBSYSTEM Communication Antenna Systems 4411 |
I SYSTEM II Radio Systems 1 441 | EQUIPMENT LF/HF Whip Antennas (Surface) 4411AS |
fl MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENT DESCRIPTION
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2 Clean and inspect matching unit couple] tuner, or -junction box
ANTENNA 2-2
AgTENNA COUPLER AN/5RA-S7A
Eliminating the tons of paper manuals on board ships like the USS Yorktown (CG-48) (right) and the USS Arleigli Burke (DDG-51) (below) will contribute to their seakeeping capabilities.
It also will improve combat readiness.
ROM) devices were fixed on as the best storage medium and a pilot project was established that focused on the Aegis combatant radio communications system (RCS). From the shipboard perspective, several attributes of the CD-ROM technology were compelling:
► Each 4.75-inch CD-ROM typically stores 600 megabytes of data—equivalent to the information contained on 300,000 double-spaced pages of text;
11,000 pages of graphic images can be stored on a single disk.
► CD-ROM disks promise 50 years of operating life; some say 100 years are achievable.
► The medium is compatible with shipboard conditions and survivability requirements; the us data stored on a CD-ROM are immune to environmental hazards and electromagnetic interference or pulse damage.
► A high level of standards are already accepted by industry, which is not true with some other optical media systems. Thus, “off-the-shelf hardware and software are available for CD-ROM playback, lowering overall system development, acquisition, and life-cycle costs.
► Costs are also low regarding the publication and distribution of disks. The cost of mastering a CD-ROM today is $800 to $1,200, with a production cost per disk of about $ 1.50. The cost for a coast-to- coast First Class mailing of a disk is $0.73, compared to about $4,500 for the equivalent amount of data on paper.
► CD-ROM media present good data access and transfer rates, and can safeguard classified data easily.
By June 1987 NESEA had produced an RCS electronic manual using the CD- ROM media; late in 1989, an enhanced version became available and it became part of a critical experiment for actual ships. The explicit objectives were to:
► Evaluate IETM technology.
► Achieve significant cost reductions or cost avoidance in the production and maintenance of core Aegis technical manuals.
>• Win over fleet sailors (perhaps the most difficult task of all!).
► Evaluate applicability to training.
Two new-construction cruisers were picked in early 1992—the USS Anzio (CG-68) and the USS Shiloh (CG-67). Subsequently, the USS Barry (DDG-52), the second Arleigli Burke (DDG-51)-class Aegis destroyer, and the USS Vicksburg (CG-69), were added to the program.
Three shipboard operator stations (radio central, transmitter room, and ET-2 workshop) and one portable unit have been installed in each of these warships, with NESEA providing in-service training support and interim repair part support. Shipyard operator stations were established at the precommissioning units at the two Aegis shipbuilders, Ingalls Shipbuilding and Bath Iron Works.
Precommissioning training of the initial two crews using the electronic radio manuals was carried out at NESEA. Critical to the overall success of the project was the decision to introduce it to the fleet through the Aegis Training Center at Dahlgren, Virginia. Captain Sheldon Margolis, then CO, was convinced that the it would be successful only if introduced through the training establishment. Margolis also believed that, unless this was done, the odds were that the fleet would regard the electronic manual project as no more more than a Program Office-laboratory gadget forced on it from Washington.
The initiative has been closely linked with the David Taylor Research Center, the lead Department of Defense activity for establishing service-wide standards.
and has the full support of the Naval Sea Systems Command.
The RCS electronic manual is unusual among contemporary efforts in that it involves a decomposed database, the first of its kind for a weapons system in U.S. armed services. It replaces four separate paper manuals—some more than 1,000 pages long.
The electronic manual is not a raster-scanned image of the printed page, unlike so many other paperless manuals; it is a smart database of information in ASCII text, using a pageless, frame-oriented format that can be accessed with the touch of a finger: topic and keyword search using an inverted text indexing system; search on pictures and graphical images of radio suite and associated equipment systems and subsystems; and a subsystem search using official nomenclature. The pictures-graphics search routine, however, is the most innovative method, and the one that generates “Gee whiz!” reactions from firsttime viewers.
The electronic manual uses Microsoft’s Windows software that permits the user to view pictures and graphic images of systems and subsystems, starting with an initial screen that shows the side, fore, and aft views of an Aegis ship’s superstructure. Users can call up specific radio systems or subsystems by clicking a mouse on a color-coded antenna. Each of the major communication system groups—high-frequency (HF), ultrahigh frequency (UHF), satellite bands traffic— is highlighted in different colors. The user clicks on a particular system and a photo of the antenna appears in a window; clicks again, and a schematic of the antenna appears in another window; clicks again and selected text appears in a third window. The process can continue, with photographs, graphics, schematics, block diagrams, and text relating to specific
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equipments and subsystems internal to the ship called up by clicking the mouse, allowing the technician to work down to an individual circuit, panel, or plug, if necessary.
The system includes two other important features. Wheelbook replicates the green-book carried by most senior enlisted sailors to take important notes. It allows the user to make marginal notes to clarify or expand upon the text blocks, and store them on the retrieval system’s hard disk—flagged on the CD-ROMs text blocks for later use.
Clipboard allows the technician to isolate a section of text and clip it for transport to another medium. The original text remains untouched, but the technician is free to manipulate the clipped text however desired and import it to other documents or databases.
The text, photographs and graphics Were customized to highlight particular features of the Aegis radio communications suite. Associated text from the paper manuals, for instance, was configured to the Windows structure of the computer screen. The graphics are explicitly faithful representations of the schematics, block diagrams, and other graphics Printed in the paper manual, but are color- coded to highlight items of interest, something not usually done in the paper format. Users can scan, scroll, and zoom-in or out on items, choosing the best display; in hardcopy, a lot of these data are contained in hard-to-use multipage fold- outs. Video imaging and audio for the Aegis IETM will come later.
Highly specified and automated word searches using an inverted text index are also included in the system. Searches can use official nomenclature for individual systems and subsystems. Powerful free-text searches can thus be carried out and subsequently linked to photographs and graphics in the database.
The at-sea evaluations in the first ships have been successful. Captain Bayard Russell, U.S. Navy, the Shiloh's commanding officer, said: “The RCS IETM Program is outstanding. It works and it has greatly enhanced operational readiness in Shiloh. The IETM approach should be applied to technical documentation for other Aegis ship systems [and] should be expanded to include all new construction CG/DDGs.”
Captain H. Wyman Howard, U.S. N'avy, the Anzio’s CO, wrote: “The IETM is light years ahead of standard tech manuals or raster-scanned pages, and has become a critical part of the operations and maintenance of the RCS .... IETM is an information multiplier. With IETM as a tool/coach, junior personnel can perform complex technical tasks with nearly the same effectiveness as senior techs .... IETM concept is valid . . . sailors love it
_ It is the first step toward a paperless
Navy.”
Electronics Tecnician First Class Blake Berg on the Anzio looked to the future: “I think the experimentation stage is over with. It’s time to get on with getting these systems implemented into all surface ships and possible even the shore stations and communications stations .... If we don’t get on with our project... in a few more years here we’re just going to be back where we started from.”
A series of tests compared the use of the RCS electronic manual with equivalent technical information. Results showed that the IETM:
► Is two to four times faster than equivalent paper documentation when used as an information retrieval tool.
> Reduces the time required to activate an RCS circuit by 12% to 23%.
>• Particularly benefits radiomen, reducing activation time by 32%.
>• Reduces the time to isolate a fault in an RCS circuit. Savings vary from 3% based on 1991 tests to 8% based on 1992 tests.
In addition, while not a substitute for in depth experience, the IETM is an information equalizer that significantly narrows the margin of difference between experienced and inexperienced sailors.
Tomorrow's classroom—today. The NESEA-surface warfare linkage has resulted in at least one other revolutionary initiative: the development and introduction of computer-aided training technologies in the classroom environment. The “Classroom of the Future” in operation at the Aegis Training Support Group at NESEA was used to instruct the communicators for the cruisers and destroyers thus far scheduled for IETMs.
Aegis precommissioning and replacement crews are currently training for four baseline cruiser and one baseline destroyer class, which requires about 100 technical manuals per student, which in turn generates a requirement to keep about 15,000 manuals up to date. Changes to the manuals are frequent, and plans call for a paperless classroom at Dahlgren to complement the three optical work stations and one portable unit in each Aegis ship, and the work stations installed at Bath and Ingalls, all of which will use the electronic training manuals format and architecture for training.
Preliminary data suggest that training- related savings will amount to about $4,000 per student and that training may be reduced by several days. More comprehensive testing and evaluation are needed to confirm speculation that electronic training manuals will soon enable training to migrate from costly shoreside training infrastructure to ships and aircraft squadrons.
Reducing costs. The Navy expects substantial cost savings from shifting to the new format for core Aegis Weapon System technical manuals. For the Arleigh Burke Aegis sestroyers, the documentation totals 60 manuals in 100 binders for each ship. The 500 copies of the manuals typically produced for all users of the ship’s information consume more than 26 million pages of paper as they progress from preliminary draft to final products delivered to the ships. Further, revisions made throughout the ship’s service life create a nightmare of changes that must be made manually.
A 1991 cost analysis showed that the Navy could save $3.12 million per Aegis destroyer in fitting out ships with Aegis weapon system documentation if it were produced in the electronic format. An independent 1992 analysis of life-cycle cost avoidance determined that the IETM offered several benefits: the processing time to change an electronic manual would be cut in half compared to paper manuals and the costs to complete a change would be one-third of that for paper manuals.
Significant cost savings would result if the Aegis Weapon System manuals were produced in CD-ROM formats— and the concept extended to the rest of the fleet. Each year some 22.5 million pages of manuals are changed by hand, at an annual cost of $400 million and 1,000 sailor-years of effort.
The plan for future Aegis IETM initiatives looks toward the ultimate goal of producing the entire Aegis Weapon System (AWS) technical manuals and associated computer program documentation in the new format. The plan also encompasses front-fitting the RCS IETM to all new-construction Aegis cruisers and destroyers and to invoke Department of Defense computer-aided logistics support (CALS) specifications for technical manual documentation for the core Aegis manuals.
The joint NESEA-surface warfare Interactive Electronic Technical Manual project has taken the lead throughout the defense community. In one small area of naval warfare, it offers significant potential for efficiencies that will ultimately contribute to combat readiness.
Commander Acree is the Project Officer, Aegis IETM/Optical Technology Project, Aegis Program Office. Dr. Truver is the Director, Studies and Analysis, Techmatics, Inc., Arlington, Virginia.