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Complex near-term and future challenges await the next Commandant of the Coast Guard, who will relieve Admiral J. William Kime in May 1994. As leader of America’s primary maritime operating agency—vividly illustrated by recent events such as operations near Haiti, at-sea interdiction of Chinese migrants, and response to widespread flooding and disaster relief in the U.S. Midwest—the new Commandant must continue to articulate forcefully the need for a flexible, multimission Coast Guard.
This action will be required at a time when U.S. maritime and ocean interests most probably will not be on the national policy agenda. Despite this dilemma, the way our nation deals with its complex ocean and coastal zone issues, as the 21st century approaches, will nonetheless directly impact all functions of the Coast Guard. The new Commandant will be tested to describe these evolving impacts and gain budgetary support when most of the federal bureaucracy is in process of downsizing or retrenchment; nevertheless, vital and persuasive arguments exist which relate the Coast Guard’s contributions to the nation’s economic well-being. Equally significant, the service must produce a clear vision of the way it fits within the new U.S. national security framework, and also must market that vision to a wide public audience.
Near-term Imperatives
The ongoing federal downsizing will place a significant constraint on any new Commandant’s ability to craft a vision for the future. Nevertheless, a blueprint must be created in these turbulent times. Quite clearly, such a plan’s near-term guidance will retain a number of initiatives carried over from Admiral Kime’s watch. Most of the fol-
The interdicting and saving of Haitians have dominated the headlines lately, but the nation—and increasingly the world—depends on the Coast Guard to protect the marine environment.
lowing organizational directions, or near-term imperatives, are closely interrelated:
► Sustaining the total quality movement: Maintaining proper focus on the public and the Coast Guard’s own workforce as “customers.”
► Enhancing the Coast Guard’s role and image in the environment: Pushing hard to strengthen the service as n “green” organization and the lead federal agency for marine environmental protection. This is a vital function, be-
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cause the United States remains port nation, with 95% of cargo '©ports and 75% of crude oil '©ports carried on board for- e'gn-flag ships.
^ Expanding linkages with the hint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) organization: Building closer Ootids with the planners in JCS aid all the CinCs.
^ Forming an internal task force to deal with the wide- tanging impacts of Department °f Defense downsizing on the Coast Guard: Providing a Mandatory, thorough review bemuse of the significant ramifications of downsizing.
^ Reengineering the Coast Cuard resource-management tystem: Eliminating barriers to Cross-functional management of ’he multimission service—for Sample: amalgamating such 'Uterways-management func- k « ^anqler ’©ns as aids to navigation, vessel traffic systems, port safety, and marine environmental protection.
* Reinventing the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) conCept: Developing a new concept for a U.S. Maritime SecUrity Zone in step with the broadened concept of U.S. National security (including economic, political, and environmental security).
V Expanding strategic alliances with more federal agents and with other sectors of the U.S. marine industry: Vming alliances and making a cultural shift along with *he rest of the federal government. Such alliances will a,low access to other resources and provide some meagre of risk-sharing on complex projects.
Enhancing quality of life for the Coast Guard s workforce: Reaffirming a deep commitment to all work and i'fe issues, so the Coast Guard can remain a competitive e©ployer beyond the 1990s. The key will be continuing strong leadership to overcome cultural barriers to a better Glance between work and life activities for both military i^d civilian employees.
Developing an organizational or corporate data base: Publishing an integrated system that provides informa- ’©n on all aspects of the Coast Guard, with ease of access to the public and service personnel. One major result shc>uld be to provide measures of performance for all Coast P>ard functions.
Certainly there are other significant near-term issues facing the new Coast Guard leadership. During the new Commandant’s tenure (1994-1998), other pressing issues Urely will result from changes in the U.S. armed services ?t'd potential changes in the ways the federal government 's managed. If substantial progress is made in each of these Erections, however, the Coast Guard will be better preyed to respond to national priorities in the late 1990s a,1d into the next millennium.
A new Commandant of the Coast Guard, like any new chief executive officer in the corporate world, will want to place his personal stamp on the future of the organization. A strong commitment to strategic thinking (throughout the entire Coast Guard) and strategic planning (primarily at Coast Guard Headquarters) will help attain that key objective. Another critical necessity will be to continue institutionalizing strategic planning—a process already set in motion by Admiral Kime and his predecessor, Admiral Paul Yost. Expanded use of various “futures tools” such as scenarios (plausible stories about the future), environmental scanning, strategic intelligence, forecasting, vision statements, and the like should be the norm for all senior Coast Guard executives, not just the domain of the Headquarters strategic planners.
There are a handful of basic principles that apply to the function of strategic planning. None are particularly surprising or novel:
> The Commandant must be personally involved in all aspects of planning for the future. Direct leadership and vision are essential to the process.
> The leadership must be prepared to accept challenges to conventional wisdom, and encourage free thinking. Strategic thought will thrive if this becomes part of the culture.
>■ The Commandant must foster a board strategic prospective—not only an issue for strategic planners but also of concern for all Coast Guard senior managers.
> All flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Service must continue to engage in the process of organizational strategy.
>■ Early on, the service’s new leaders must determine “core attributes” or “core competencies” of the Coast Guard that have shaped its past and present—and will shape its future. >• The Commandant must take special care to link long- range vision and strategy to near-term challenges and constraints placed on the Coast Guard.
The challenges facing the Coast Guard and our next Commandant are immense and profound. Change is in the air, and with change comes opportunity. Clearly, with use of the world’s ocean and U.S. coastal areas increasing, the future of the Coast Guard is bright.
Captain Brigham is commanding officer USCGC Polar Sea (WAGB-11), and until June 1993 was Chief of the Commandant’s Strategic Planning Staff at Coast Guard Headquarters.
feedings / December 1993